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INTRODUCTION
In organizing our thoughts about existence, we repeatedly succumb to 
a temptation to make things permanent. For the simple reason that 
nothing about the physical world is permanent, other than change, our 
immediate refuge in the world of thoughts for seeking to make things 
permanent is our only chance for doing so. Essentially, the way we 
exist in space and time brings the experience of impermanence to the 
fore of our consciousnesses; after all, we are going to die, everyone we 
know is going to die, everything we ever worked for will be 
annihilated by cosmic forces of the universe when the sun runs out of 
fuel and consumes the solar system that is the home to our planet 
earth, and every artifice we construct as a testament to our being-in-
the-world will become no more long before the final moments, as the 
undulations of human, animal, and the non-sentient world cosmically-
conspire to reveal the fragility of our projects. In the face of this fact 
about existence - these limitations inherent in the structure of existence 
- we have a choice. We can either own up to them and build our lives 
in an empirical and scientific manner, guided by reason, in order to 
make the best we can of our fragile lives, or we can attempt to defy 
these limitations and seek to overcome them altogether; it is a matter 
of accepting our contingency as persons, as beings, or of struggling to 
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overcome contingency, and make ourselves masters of space and time.
Because everything physical is limited by the fact of decay, and for 
human beings, by the fearsome specter of death, this finitude of 
physical forms leaves us, the homo sapien, at a loss if we seek 
immortality. But this has been an age-old quest, and one unlikely to be 
completely exorcized from our consciousnesses any time soon. For 
Talib Kweli, another view is possible.
“You only scared to die when you ain’t livin’ right man…”1
Against the tradition of many human societies, and certainly the West, 
Kweli is indicating that there is a biological basis for the experience of 
fear, and this is found in not “living right.” Kweli is also suggesting 
that people, by virtue of being able to experience this fear, implicitly 
are aware of right and wrong, and that, like Nietzsche suggested, that 
these moral terms are essentially rooted in physical and biological 
phenomena.2 In his genealogies on the origins of the terms ‘good,’ 
‘bad,’ and ‘evil’ Nietzsche has located the origin of those conceptual 
phenomena in a need of human beings to stabilize the flows of their 
existences for the sake of ensuring that they could reliably access said 
designations (good, bad, and evil), as a guide to action,3 to community 
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construction and recognition,4 and as a means to creating a notion of 
proper order for persons who would be deemed as more and less 
worthy of merit and access to the goods of life - physical and 
conceptual - appropriate to their stations in life.5 In ways such as these, 
people have tried to make their selves, ranks, and material wealth more 
or less permanent.
In so doing, it is fairly obvious that we have to organize our individual 
lives, as well as our social togetherness, through the construction, use, 
and continuing faith in the organizational capability of the wills of 
individuals and collectives. But presently, and for the foreseeable 
future, too, it doesn’t appear as though we will be able to overcome the 
limitation placed on our lives by the fact of death, nor will we be able 
to overcome many other less final limitations that result from our 
insignificance in relation to the universe about whose size we have 
only managed to place forth competing theories that make distinct 
spatial claims.6 The will runs out of fuel, and there is nothing we can 
do about it. We can only manage our decay, and make it as graceful as 
possible, and make the necessary psychological adjustments, aided by 
our linguistic expressions, to make sense of this process of coming 
into presence and then again passing into absence. Kweli’s declaration, 
then, is based on a deep existential attunement to these cosmic realities 
                    4
- realities about which many persons care not to think of in the current 
world. But despite the significant cultural hegemony of human social 
and political arrangements in the current world geared toward the 
production of the illusion of permanence, this older, contingency-
accepting, authentically-spiritual wisdom about human life remains 
alive in the arts, in various religious traditions around the world, and 
can be found in the philosophies that inform the central thesis of this 
project.
———————————————————————————
Our efforts here are undertaken for a very specific reason. In the 
current world the human value of freedom is essentially under siege. 
By ‘essentially,’ here we mean that there is no way to understand our 
current world without placing at the center of this understanding the 
way in which freedom is being threatened with socio-political 
obsolescence. This may seem needlessly contrarian at first, since, after 
all, our politics apparently are more and more organized in the name of 
freedom: the freedom to think independently, the freedom to vote for 
various leaders who voters expect to be accountable on the basis of 
their ability to deliver freedom, the freedom to speak and publish ideas 
outside of the mainstream, the freedom to buy and sell one’s property 
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and tradable goods and products to anyone whom one wishes to 
transact with, the freedom to pursue happiness, the freedom to 
supposedly love whomever one wishes to love, etc.  The legalization 
of gay marriage; the liberalization of barriers to trade within and 
across nations; the sweeping, rebellious impulse in the name of liberal 
freedoms associated with freedom for the individual and the need to 
limit the power of constituted authorities in order to guarantee that 
freedom found across the Arab and Muslim world now - and which 
have begun consolidating their success in the Latin American world 
following the rise of social democratic governments there in the last 
decade or so; the encouragement via global electronic connectivity of 
the rise of many new expressions of individuality and community long 
lacking the means to speak their names and causes; the rise of women 
in the professions and the feminist revolutions in sexuality and 
sociality…..these have all been typical of the age we inhabit, and all 
are revolutionary forces changing human existence. The world as we 
know it today is rapidly being transformed by multitude impulses to 
freedom.
Accordingly, a counter-attack has been waged by those whose ways of 
life, long ossified by metaphysical entombment, are potentially 
threatened by these forces.7 In some cases the threat is quite real, such 
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as in the ardent desire of many Egyptians to try their former ruler 
Hosni Mubarak and his various hangers on manipulating the political 
scene there subsequent to the initial Egyptian revolution of 2011, and 
to at the very least incarcerate them for their crimes against the people, 
or in some cases execute them for some of those crimes which 
certainly include the murder of innocent persons.8 In other cases, the 
threats those waging the counter-attack against freedom imagine is 
precisely that - an iota of their imaginations - but, because of the way 
in which their imaginations inform their cognitive apprehension of the 
material world, their feelings of being threatened by the changes under 
discussion here are at least partially-related to real material changes 
that altered conceptions of being-in-the-world will require.
In both cases, of apparently direct threats to status and even the lives 
of those who have benefitted from the restriction of the freedom of 
others, and in the case of those indirect threats resulting from imagined 
and real threats, and the combination of these threats, those engaged in 
the counter-attack against the rise of long-repressed freedoms have 
relied on various technologies of distancing9 to stave off the 
challenges that have emerged to the security of their positions. Some 
of these technologies are as old as human societies, and in some cases 
even older, such as the basic tools of violence used to inflict physical 
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pain and impress upon challengers in their bodies the consequences of 
contravening the order of the day in their actions and, even, in their 
thoughts - for example through the use of torture. Orders of authority 
have also for a broad swathe of human history used symbolic 
significations to codify the appropriate social positions of persons 
living in those orders to ensure as best as possible the stability of their 
rule. Titles of nobility, normalized codes of behavior appropriate to 
social class, the designation of formal rank in institutions created by 
human beings, and other such mechanisms have been employed to 
create what Nietzsche has called “the pathos of distance”10 such that 
the space between persons, communities, social classes, and nations, 
could be ideologically-reinforced.
This raises the obvious question of why this must be done: why have 
people felt the need to completely segment their existence, and thence 
organize their cognitive capacities in line with the division of social 
reality? After all, social existence is indivisible, and therefore the only 
way persons can assure themselves, and even then only for a limited 
time, of the apparent benefits of distance is through the deployment of 
technologies of distancing. Failing such a concerted exertion of the 
will, we shall posit, human cognitive capacities, apprehensions of our 
surroundings, and empathic feelings for the Other will always 
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eventually overtake the distance between oneself and other persons, 
between human groups and social classes, and between nations, and, 
as a result, will reveal the inherent contingency of artifices that have 
been constructed to give unique permanence to our conception of 
being. 
Artifice can be thought in a freer manner, however this alternative 
notion remains veiled in the society of seekers of permanence.
This returns us to Kweli’s concept of “living right,” which, rather than 
being associated with the internalization of essentially true and good 
concepts, morality, a certain vulgar concept of ‘truth,’ and the 
presumed permanent presence of these figments as unchanging, 
instead seeks to have us consider why we fear death when we are not 
living right. Death, according to Martin Heidegger, is associated in our 
existential situation as human beings with the finitude of our 
existence,11 and this is something which we are all radically aware of: 
death is the always present but often unnamed Other whose 
ramifications for our existence we can only accept, not alter. Plato long 
ago wrote in The Republic that in the afterlife - that is, after we die - 
we would be rewarded with the goods of the heavens and a fortuitous 
reincarnation if we lived our lives in accordance with the requirements 
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of justice - and failing this that we would be at a loss, sent to Hades, 
and be deprived of those fortunes reserved for the just.12 Similar 
notions of reincarnation and posthumous rewards for adherence to 
doctrinal coda can be found in all the major world religions, and, 
apparent paganisms aside, in indigenous traditions from various parts 
of the globe. But all this compels us to ask the question of why human 
beings and societies have felt the need to construct such a notion of 
posthumous rewards, of the atheist version of these - glory and legacy 
- and why indeed the focus of the world’s spiritual traditions are 
frequently pointed at death, as opposed to life. I am suggesting here 
that Kweli is a philosophical thinker whose primary concern is not 
death, but is a redoubled effort to extricate ourselves from morbidity 
and ask ourselves the question of what living right entails.
Since we are all going to die, the question of human space and time, 
the space and time of our lives, is more appropriately a question of 
how we shall live, and how we will harness what is unique, so far as 
we can know, for human beings, to make our lives worth living. An 
inescapable question of togetherness arises therefore, since human 
existence is an essentially political one - that is, one that is lived in a 
polis, a gathering of beings together in the world.13 How shall we live 
together? What will be the basis of our togetherness? Will our 
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togetherness be ruled by the imperatives that originally drove people 
to develop technologies of distancing, and thereafter the imperatives 
that developed as a result of living and being conditioned for life by 
the kind of life created by those technologies? Or is something else 
possible?
These technologies, that produce distance between people, societies, 
nations, social classes, men and women, older and younger, between 
religious orders, and which form their own epistemological trainings 
for persons reared in their midst, we will argue in this project, have 
been a response to an ontological preconception of being - a notion of 
human nature, that is - that seeks to essentialize the nature of people 
for the sake of escaping from the confines of our contingent space-
time existentiality. Therefore this entire way of existing associated 
with what the current world considers order is fundamentally about 
escaping from the presence of otherness and difference comprehended 
as danger - whose maximum expression comes in the guise of death, 
but whose innumerable manifestations terrorize people on the way to 
death, rendering them unfree and unfulfilled, breeding into them 
ressentiment,14 turning them into dealers of anguish and pain to their 
contemporaries and their progeny. All will thus live a life of missed 
opportunities, of bodily expression (including intellectual and artistic 
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since the body is the house of the mind) prevented; and those who 
refuse to conform to these disciplines will be surveilled with suspicion, 
tolerated when possible/appropriate, and scapegoated in moments of 
extreme social anxiety. The excluded must be controlled, 
domesticated, normalized, and, if need be, exterminated lest society 
become lackadaisical to the maintenance of order.15
But what of living right? Surely we will continue to construct artifice. 
But what will be our relationship to our creations? There is no natural 
order for human life. We cannot know for certain if there is a natural 
order to the material and sensible universe, although we can gain a 
utilitarian glimpse here and there, and some of these glimpses can be 
truly awe-inspiring and revelatory, such as in the discovery of the 
Higgs-Boson particle that constitutes the physical precursor of mass. 
Nonetheless, our glimpses are fleeting, contingent, and dependent on 
our creatively constructed languages. Science, as much as poetry, is 
poetry. Unlike the formalized understanding of prose, that seeks to 
communicate a rational, universalizable, and ‘objective’ argument - 
objective because it turns the truth into something that is understood as 
objectively present, whose presence we can confirm, ironically 
through connecting its being to suprasensory conceptual laws of 
physical reality - poetry is always spontaneous, it writes human life 
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but pointing in the direction of new forms of expression that never 
existed before. Thus its capacity to arouse the literary sensibilities of 
people even in the absence of adherence to conventions of grammar 
and narration that generally provide the pathmarks of being in a given 
text. In poetry lies the present-becoming-the-future even in the 
apparent focus on temporally-past instances of reflection. And because 
no two people have ever been exactly the same, either physically or in 
regard to their consciousness, communication, authentic 
communication, between persons must on some level always be 
poetic. Heidegger, invoking his favorite poet, Hölderin, proclaims with 
much clarity that “poetically, man dwells.16” Poetically we point in the 
direction of the unexplored and essentially always unfinished nature of 
existence, and together, with each other, with the Other holding the 
hand of the self, we go into the future to come. There are no 
guarantees and the only source of stability is that most fragile of all 
human forces, love.
Quite radically, those who wish to transform themselves into 
objectively present beings, who seek to guarantee their future with 
anything more than the agency of love must eventually rely on 
technologies of distancing, and always reinforce through their agency 
the distance between Self and Other. This move therefore cuts them off 
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from the possibility of a primordial togetherness with the Other; in 
essence love is exchanged for power.17 Consequently, people who 
require this distance can easily develop an addictive relationship to 
those technologies, which require a person to turn themselves into 
something objectively present, the Other into an opposed objectively 
present principle-being, and enforce these designations in 
consciousness, in physical reality, and the recordings of history, with a 
high degree of reliability. From this constellation of efforts the 
resulting expectations for order and distance that take on a prescriptive 
significance for the building of families, communities, nations, and 
other clusterings of togetherness (a vulgar togetherness based on 
exclusion) over generations will alienate people and communities from 
one another. Their poetry, the source of language, affect, and therefore 
intellectual and physical expression, will lose the vital interplay 
between beings needed for the creation of new ideas, and will come to 
be characterized by an effortful reinforcement of those manufactured, 
seemingly objectively present tokens and significations that form the 
basis of political economy.
Because losing sight of the origins of the contingency of the 
construction of political economy is essential to ensuring belief in its 
naturalness, a threat to any part of this framework will become a threat 
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to the whole, and life beyond can thus seem unimaginable. This 
returns us to Kweli’s statement at the outset - indeed, people living in 
the midst of division are not living right, because their abjuration of 
death, difference, and the Other, too, brings fear to the fore whenever 
the constructed normality they’ve become habituated to is interrupted. 
Gripped by this fear, which becomes their primary object in life, both 
to escape from and to believe in because its absence brings their entire 
life and efforts into question, people begin to lose sense of the 
possibilities that their surroundings are always teeming with. This, 
quite literally, prevents people from becoming what they could have 
become, and by this I don’t mean to say that people will fail to live up 
to some metaphysical or ideal version of themselves, because such a 
conception of becoming is fundamentally restricted, but rather, that the 
poetry of experience that people are potentially available to experience 
is dashed, and people are always more or less relatively aware of this. 
To retain this capacity for dimmed faculties, of a restricted 
imagination, and of a repressed body, then, fear comes to be a 
justificatory ward, precluding the possibility of living right in the 
Kwelian sense. By reducing our interaction with our surroundings, and 
with the Other who is always already found there, the portion of our 
bodies and our souls seeking the new, new influences, new 
experiences, needful of these for growth, empowerment, inspiration, 
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and love becomes uninitiated in living, uneducated in how to take care 
in myriad new and unfolding situations - which existence seems to 
guarantee we will face - and afraid, ultimately, of the Other that is both 
found without, and as well within, the self.
“The common bond between Us may be the Other. The Other may not even be as 
localized as a definable Them that one can point to. In the social cohesion of scandal, 
gossip, unavowed racial discrimination, the Other is everywhere and nowhere. The 
Other that governs everyone is everyone in his position, not of self, but as Other. 
Every self, however, disavows being himself that Other that he is for the Other. The 
Other is everyone’s experience. Each person can do nothing because of the Other. 
The Other is everywhere elsewhere.18”
Each of us experiences the experience of the Other because we are the 
Other for every other Self that shares existence with us. This means we 
may be as strange as we may imagine the Other to be, we are more or 
less equally strange for the Other, so the judgment of other people on 
the basis of standards which we feel are associated with normality 
requires the capacity to claim that we, ourselves, are the holders of 
insight into the nature of reality, according to an overarching logic that 
purportedly explains the laws of cause and effect relatively reliably. 
But in claiming such exceptional perceptional prowess, we preclude a 
more spontaneous, primordial relationship with our surroundings, in 
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which the Other resides with us, and to which the Other is actively 
contributing to the truth of its unfolding. The metaphysical notion of 
truth that stands in our path to our surroundings, traditionally 
associated with Plato in the Western cannon, who claimed only the 
truly wise could access the forms - or truths that are truly true because 
of their universality and timelessness, their existence outside of time - 
is based on a division of reality, resulting in the oxymoronic idea of a 
‘real reality’ determined by the wise with access to the laws of nature, 
and a ‘deficient reality’ full of the hustle and bustle of regular folk, 
women, slaves, children, and everyone else, wherein what happened, 
what happens, and what is happening, are all considered ephemeral 
phenomena unworthy of being admitted to the record of the truth.19
But this is where the politics of our cognition, and how experience 
itself is politicized, becomes a question for political theory. And 
politics is fundamentally a question of how we shall live together in 
the polis, which as we have alluded to above, is a question of how 
beings are gathered near one another in the name of being being itself. 
Inescapably, humans are political animals, meaning that we are a type 
of living being that at least for a significant while in all our lives, must 
be around other human beings in order to learn the information, 
tactics, maneuvers, and actions with which we need  become familiar 
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in order to survive. The kind of gathering is in question here, and the 
mechanisms associated with the gathering is where we find the origins 
of technology, whose potential political significance to which we have 
alluded above. Techne, the ancient Greek word for art, craft, and 
technique, the root word of technology - which is the systematic study 
and ‘improvement’ or more accurately refinement, of technique - has 
at its root a close relationship to the production of artifice, which 
simply means those things that have been created out of the handiwork 
of human beings that would not have existed on their own otherwise in 
nature. This more expansive definition of technology is restricted for 
awareness, however, in the current world, where the term has instead 
come to colloquially signify electronic, machine, informational, and 
other ‘advanced’ technologies associated with circuitry, semi-
conductors, radio and electromagnetic waves, and other creations 
related to the increasingly efficient manipulation of the natural world 
for the sake of producing a system of presences associated with our 
modern culture of comfort, entertainment, military security, casual 
energy consumption, and ubiquitous record-keeping. The kind of 
political togetherness (or as we have suggested above, vulgar 
togetherness based on the exclusion of those to be feared) promoted by 
the current world constellation of technologies, thus, takes on a life of 
its own. Under these terms the organizers of polis seeks to reproduce 
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themselves. As such the contingency of our political options has been 
forgotten, rendering our choices somewhere in the range between 
invisible to consciousness and unnamable in speech and thought due to 
the ward of fear concerning the potential revelation of the Other. 
Social order is technology, and the way in which beings are brought 
near, or kept at a distance, physically, intellectually, spiritually, and in 
terms of ethics and morals, is the primordial function of technology. 
Different modulations of these relationships produce different kinds of 
togethernesses. This includes the extent to which lives, ideas, feelings, 
histories, historicizations of their histories, creativity, and anything 
else that inheres in existence is admitted to the bar of that which 
counts as real, significant, and politically-relevant in determining the 
parameters of the polis. Thus understanding the polis as a gathering, a 
more primordial definition than the generally-invoked one of ‘city,’ is 
intimately connected to the idea of technology, which itself is merely a 
means for bringing certain people, according to certain criteria 
determined in various manners, nearer to oneself, or keeping people at 
bay; in some cases, technology can, and has, been used to remove 
beings altogether from our surroundings. And here I mean killing 
them, and histories of nations and communities are replete with 
examples of this.
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But why kill the Other? In Antonio Negri’s and Michael Hardt’s 
Multitude, an interesting alternative conception of the uses and 
misuses of violence is put forward: aggressive war against people who 
have not done anything to attack another people waging said 
aggressions must always be sanctified, justified, in the name of order, 
and, quite obviously, war waged in the name of defense against said 
aggressions never bother with justifications for both the obvious 
reason that those under attack don’t have time to consider 
justifications, and they very idea of justifying the defense of one’s own 
life seems illogical and unnecessary to people under threat of invasion 
and perhaps decimation, if not annihilation as a free, or at least unique, 
people.20 Usually, aggressors cast the enemy to be attacked as a mortal 
threat to the security of the order of the day - spreading the fear of 
death amongst their countrymen and women. From the Spanish 
conquistadors who would read Christian declarations of right before 
entering into battle against the indigenous nations of the Americas to 
the American Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the 
former invoking the threat of weapons of mass destruction and 
terrorism to justify the invasion of Iraq and continuing occupation and 
aggression against Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and other 
places whose listing would go on, and the latter whose chief counter-
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terrorism advisor John Brennan engages with the President in ‘just 
war’ deliberations over killing innocent persons through clandestine 
and illegal aerial drone warfare, citing St. Augstine and Michael 
Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars as influences on their decision-
making, aggressors have sought to justify their aggression.21 In so 
doing, the Other, theoretically, can be killed with impunity since ‘we’ 
are ‘right’ in our actions, and their position as the Other invalidates all 
their protestations to the contrary, and reduces their opposition to our 
aggression to something unnatural, and that cannot, therefore, be 
considered a legitimate political grievance.22
In order to remain free of the Other, something which is impossible, 
then, in the case of aggressive war - a limit example of a technological 
orchestration of togetherness - a mixture of physical and idealogical 
technologies of distancing that aim to keep the Other at bay spatially 
and in consciousness, is required. But none of this addresses either the 
omnipresent fear of the Other that undergirds this entire manning of 
being, or how to live with the Other whose existence can truly never 
be extinguished, both because this is impossible short of genocide and 
even then unlikely, because as Laing saw it, we are all the Other for 
someone else, always already. Those engaged in this practice are thus 
unfree even from the fear and insecurity their practice purports to 
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produce security as a protective cover for.
—————————————————————————
But this is all very complicated, since, on the one hand, the United 
States of America is a nation whose ostensible liberalism has been 
invoked in the name of precisely its attempt to project power across 
the globe for the sake of overthrowing regimes whose apparent 
intolerance of the Other within their borders has been cast as a reason 
for that intervention. Tolerance, it appears, has itself as an idea been 
yoked to the self-conception of America, and if we examine the 
thoughts of various European thinkers who supported colonial 
ventures, this maneuver of bringing tolerance into the Western fold as 
something essentially an ideological property of the West is caught up 
with our current conception of what it means to be a liberal, and free 
being.23 There is some value, some ideological appeal, in thinking of 
oneself as being a liberal. Aristotle claimed that liberalism has been 
marked by magnanimity, largesse, generality, and because all these 
require an extension of the self in space and time, the strength to be so; 
just as much the wealth, too.24 But in today’s world, moral 
inconsistency - not the least the unwillingness and/or the inability to 
accept contradictions or the prevalence of paradoxicality in the midst 
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of order - and intellectual laziness are orders of the day, wherein 
conservatives in America on the one hand trumpet the need for 
traditional values domestically, but all the while argue that our Western 
civilization has progressed beyond anything that can be hoped for by 
the non-Western world indicating the need to forcibly liberalize those 
societies for their own sake. 
Liberalism, like all values when these are rendered manipulable for the 
sake of reinforcing the identity of the group against the non-identity 
and otherness of the Other, is transformed into something that simply 
needs to be reinforced through technologies of distancing - in this case 
preventing criticisms of foreign policy as not in line with stated 
intentions (the common charge of American hypocrisy on the matter of 
freedom from much of the rest of the world) from being heard or 
considered as a sincere criticism (the common deflection of this 
achieved through the reversal of the discussion to refocus on the 
deviant otherness of the Other: “those Muslims are so bad to women 
we have to do something25”), and refusing to sincerely address the 
purported liberalness of American society in its manifestation 
presently and its moorings historically by ignoring and/or minimizing 
the brutality of the twin holocausts fundamental to the nation’s 
founding, the decimation of the nations of indigenous America and the 
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sickening and twisted manipulation and attempted herd-animalization 
and consequent slow-motion genocide against persons from numerous 
African nations.26
Clearly, persons with a historical awareness and with enough integrity 
to own up to what they can learn about history will have to sort this 
out in some manner. The options appear to be either acknowledgment, 
and all the reckonings that entails, or willful ignorance, and all the 
requirements for distancing from the Other, who always carries this 
historical knowledge. The production of the nation as a spectacle has 
been a chief means by which to ensure this forgetting, since, if we 
consider the mind and the body to be one, the memory of these crimes 
are imprinted on the bodies of all involved, both perpetrator and 
victim. And none can help but feel it. The capacity to experience the 
spontaneous generation of feelings associated with this set of historical 
awarenesses is at the center of our project and the desire to revalue the 
possibility of authentic liberalism.
—————————————————————————
By way of this introduction, fundamentally concerned about living 
right, and its opposite, fear, ultimately of death as the maximal Other, 
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but, too, of everything else other than the self as commonplace daily 
phenomena in human experience, we hope to illustrate the stakes 
involved in how we answer the question: how shall we exist in 
freedom? Shall we make our consciousnesses in the image of the 
permanence of our artifice, be these states, social orders, economic 
arrangements, cultural practices, stations of privilege, and other 
creations, or will we base our existence on this earth on the fact of 
impermanence and declare ourselves worthy of freedom in spite of 
that impermanence? Is freedom the freedom from contingency? Or is 
freedom the ability, maturity, knowledge, and creativity to face up to 
contingency, accept it, and with the potential to experience joy and 
love, to nonetheless struggle and labor to make the best of our finitude 
in the face of the impermanence that characterizes the human 
condition?
In the Platonic manner of conceptualizing knowledge that renders that 
which is truly knowledge as permanent and thematically metaphysical, 
what is revealed is an attempt on the part of humankind to escape the 
body, its decay, its impermanence.27 All elements of the world - 
including the female of the human species because of their required 
intensity of bodily awareness due to the fact of biological 
reproduction, and the laboring masses of the world whose awareness 
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of the contingency of all social reproduction on their labors - that are 
more closely connected to the body, then, are associated with 
uncleanliness, death, decay, impermanence, and therefore placed on a 
lower order of being than those, generally men, whose rational 
perfection and bodily contingency permit them to imagine with more - 
but still illusory and misguided - realism the possibility of 
permanence. Enforcing this division, between permanent and 
impermanent, between the bodily experience and that of the 
supposedly distinct rational mind, requires technologies designed for 
this effort, and theorists as old as Plato have admitted that for the sake 
of disposing people to their natures, supposedly, the erection of 
artificial structures in society is necessary. This is an obvious 
contradiction only resolved by the keepers of order in The Republic 
reserving for themselves the power to decide, through their superior 
capacity for intellection, what the natures of those under their rule are, 
and disposing them appropriately to various employments deigned 
necessary for the upkeep of the social whole - the gathering of beings 
organized by the technology of the polis.28
From Plato, through his disciple Aristotle, through their revivalists in 
modern European political thought - such as Hegel for whom the state 
is a central element in the development of human consciousness - and 
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even to their apparent detractors like Hobbes and Machiavelli, the state 
understood as the human creation, the artifice, at the heart of the terms 
of order, has been the dominant technological device for how to gather 
beings in a polis.29 Serving this technology, as is the duty of the 
citizen, however, has produced much confusion about what it means to 
be a human being, what the reality of the state truly is, and what, 
ultimately, it means to be a free person. Giving the state a reality that 
is not its own, dishonest conservative theorists - which ironically has 
come to include the majority of self-anointed liberals30 - have begun to 
take the state’s presence for granted, and have naturalized those 
ideological - that is artificial and constructed - understandings of 
human beings such that gave rise to the state. Indeed, both Plato and 
Hobbes, opposite views about the existence of a highest good and the 
role of the state in shepherding it as opposed to creating it by virtue of 
fiat authority, believe that in the absence of order human beings will 
resort to an animalistic existence which in the first disparages animals 
as devoid of love,31 and secondly ignores empirical reality about the 
presence of love in human life in areas in which the state almost never 
reaches. And while their statist and authoritarian visions are not 
impossible certainly, their approaches to dealing with the 
consequences of that vision is rather disabling in relation to the 
possibilities for life, expression, and freedom, that inhere in the human 
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condition.32
To escape this, Plato constructs Philosopher-Kings and the Guardian 
caste from which the Philosophers as wise rulers are selected from, 
and Hobbes posits the state as a guarantor of order in both the material 
and ideational realm, ultimately backed up by force acting in pursuit of 
an architectonic balance that political science as a study of order 
reveals.33 In both cases those who contravene the good, and the 
normalized order, irregardless these two thinkers’ differences on 
questions of equality among human beings in nature, are threats to the 
state and can be punished through the sovereign power enacting a ban, 
or declaring in effect war against the recalcitrant in question.34
Western political thinkers have in general been champions of the state 
and the necessary order it purportedly provides to human affairs. 
Naturalizing the state, therefore, has been a most significant 
ideological maneuver commenced to effect a naturalization of human 
behavior as ‘human nature.’ The dialectical framing of being as 
‘human nature’ thereafter dramatizes the state as an ongoing 
performance in which people in accordance with their natures that 
have been generally and specifically (wherever possible in relation to 
the availability of technologies of biopolitical management35) - and 
                    28
directly and indirectly - defined for them in accordance with an overall 
political conception of order determined by authority play their 
assigned roles. Within this greatly restricted framework, the space of 
freedom, of free action, limited to the sphere of a depoliticized life 
ensconced safely within a hovel, permits that only those who agree to 
this segmentation of space and time ought to be free, and those who 
threaten it are variously irrational, dangerous, uncivilized, barbarian, 
vainglorious, and, in today’s terminology, are cast as ‘terrorists,’ 
whose being is in fact concomitant with being enveloped within and 
thus only capable of dealing to others, terror, and, more insidiously, 
this same designation, too, denies those same persons the human status 
afforded those whose suffering we recognize as human suffering. 
Having failed to grant human status to ‘terrorists,’ we delude ourselves 
into the foolish belief that they are incapable of suffering, and, 
therefore, that their actions can be explained and understood on this 
basis.
—————————————————————————
Now as we indicated above, humanity is far from accepting this 
without a fight, and numerous rebellions abound globally at this point 
in the name of a more thoroughgoing freedom demanding more than 
the right to play with trinkets and be distracted by grandiose spectacles 
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in one’s so-called ‘free’ time.36 Many people apparently don’t want to 
live in fear of death, of the Other, and in despair of life.37 But 
deactivating this potential in all people is something that makes 
possible the ability of social classes and groups in power around the 
world to harness people’s productive power for their own designs.38 So 
a counter-attack has been commenced;39 and for allies global elites 
have enlisted the assistance of variously privileged sectors around the 
globe whose identification with global elites through shared (supra)
nationalist historiographies that come to encompass religious 
fundamentalism at one extreme and the idea of a ‘modernized’ nation 
of self-interested and self-reliant rational actors at the other, since in 
both cases, unwavering belief in religion in a fundamentalist, ritualistic 
manner, and belief in the self as a disciplined island unto itself secured 
through the prudence associated with forgoing the joys of spontaneity 
and concentrating on hard discipline, can only be given longevity 
beyond the immediate through the guarantee of economic and resource 
security seemingly grantable by elites in control of largesse.
But this is nothing new in a sense, since any casual, but at least honest, 
appraisal of the rise of nation-states in the modern Europe-dominated 
world system cannot but take note of the fact that nationalism was 
always dependent on internationalism, for both ideological as well as 
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material reasons. Without the enslavement of Africans no Europe or 
America would exist as these entities now do, and without the 
analogous reduction of the world’s indigenous to what Martin 
Heidegger called “the standing reserve”40 that could be disposed with 
in any manner deemed expedient in many of the world’s nations, 
including quite significantly in postcolonial societies seeking political 
consolidation41, would lack the required apparatuses of control to even 
begin to assert their claims of ‘effective control’ which underscore the 
possibility of a state being recognized as such by other states in the 
context of international law. This contradiction, presently, is being 
straddled by an accepted legal aporia that gives maximum leeway to 
state authorities and a minimum of respect and freedom to individuals 
that always already make up the being of such states. The 
systematization of political science as a field of scholarship dominated 
by consciousness of the state form as the essential element of 
politicality tragically reduces our awareness of these contingencies 
that influence the dialectical development of being-in-the-world. As 
we shall see this has implications for political praxis as well as for the 
commission of scholarship under the aegis of progress as progress 
comes to be equated with the rationalization of the state, which, taken 
as permanent, is essentially irrational.42
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So our intervention is most timely. There is a war being fought around 
the world - William Robinson has termed this a “world war,” with 
casualties climbing into the hundreds of millions.43 In many ways 
there are many wars being fought in accordance with the struggle to 
liberate societies from the kind of ontological restriction that has 
become commonplace among nations competing in an international 
political system typified by competition over the resources that are 
conceived to be the source of all of modern life. As former colonial 
societies have come to be represented by nation-state institutions 
around the globe, people in these societies have begun clamoring for 
the goods of life long held by the people of the West as their daily 
privilege, and have begun to pressure their authorities in direct and 
indirect ways to provide those goods. And the extent to which new 
states can provide these goods, or alternatively use repressive means to 
control those segments of their populations that they cannot create a 
strong identification with through the panegyrics of nationalist pomp, 
they can survive for another day. But because the European states from 
where these technologies of order emerged and were refined through 
the mercantile and imperialist world order could only do so through 
the massive exploitation of the colonial world, replete with genocidal 
policies, the new states seeking to do much the same must either turn 
their domestic space into internal labor colonies - as China has done 
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with what is called great success - or turn their energies outward 
toward instability-creating military adventurism.44 Indeed, the 
incompleteness of these states reveals the irrelevancy of the inside-
outside dichotomy undergirding the idea of the nation-state bounded 
by a territorial frontier; as many examples can be found of states 
waging ‘internal wars’ to complete their territorial claims as can be 
found of states attacking others beyond the their borders for similar 
reasons.45
The production the the subject, the citizen, the national individual 
belonging to the haloed community of destiny associated with the 
nation-state requires defining those to be excluded and requires the 
internalized self-discipline of the citizen, as well, whose spontaneous 
capacities, as discussed initially above, have to be attenuated in favor 
of apprehending reality in line with this ideal. Michel Foucault has 
described this understanding of self-discipline as “governmentality,46” 
which, when arranged at higher orders of the state for the purpose of 
the attempted rationalization of political economy is best understood 
by his definition of the term as “the conduct of conduct.47” Freedom in 
the context of competing nation-states in an international political 
system characterized by the despair-driven mongering of the resources 
of life by collections of persons (polis) over and against other 
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gatherings of persons, in a world lacking the ontological imagination 
driven by an openness to the question of being - why are there beings 
rather than nothing? - will come to require the discipline of conduct 
Foucault had in mind since in the absence of normalized (and 
normalizing), state-directed discipline, individuals and nations will be 
unable to trust that all are signed onto the same project of making-
present those goods of life associated with the identity, ideally, with 
greater and greater levels of reliability.48
But people are always already living in a shared world, whose daily 
‘worlding,’ the set of activities and interactions that make up the 
character of the world itself as denoted by an all-encompassing 
signifier for the verb that characterizes those activities, presumes a 
unified whole as a stabilizing projection of reality. So when freedom is 
transformed into governmentality, so that the reliable production of 
permanent artifices comes to be expected, and when the technologies 
used to harness the resources for these artifices and to provide security 
for their existence through distancing come to require the exploitation 
of the global environment at the expense of other nations, people begin 
to realize that they are depriving the rest of the world of the means of 
life. Fearing their own bad consciences, and desperately needing to 
convince themselves of their exceptionalism in order to justify their 
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behavior to themselves, for many persons discipline in the material 
and ideational realms of existence becomes necessary to avoid 
confrontation with Kweli’s claim about the fear of death: these people 
‘ain’t livin’ right,’ and they know it. They could have been much more, 
they could have created intimate relationships with the Other, shared 
cultural technologies, refined these processes in a global and 
civilizational dialogue aimed at the creation of a loving, shared, global 
community. Falsified as permanence, freedom must come at the 
expense of the Other, and, eventually, of the Self, since by denying the 
experience of otherness at the center of the experience of selfhood, one 
which is always accessible to the undisciplined, empathic 
consciousness, bodily possibilities contained within the mind-body 
nexus, within the physiology of human existence, are dashed.
Societies based on this kind of jealous and private notion of 
experience, one which cringes at the possibility of experiences anew in 
order to retain an hypnotized everydayness to ward against the 
experience of the Other, must, we shall see, come to conceive of inter-
societal, international, and global relations between groups as an 
amalgamation - be this democratic, representational, monarchic, etc. - 
of authoritarian impulses deemed necessary to render sovereign 
decision to divide the ontological totality to preclude the Other from 
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appearing on the Other’s own terms. Various political technologies can 
be deployed to this effect, ranging from military force to prejudicial 
tolerance so long as the Other’s appearance remains relatively 
unthreatening to oneself.
Alexander Wendt, has offered a moderate corrective to the 
development of the study of world politics by claiming, importantly, 
that ‘anarchy is what states make of it,’ as opposed to a natural 
situation in which nation-states taken as natural human orderings in 
relation to territory and population act in ways that correspond to a 
universal rationality.49 This latter position has been commonplace in 
political science, and has a historical tradition associated with it 
reaching back into a European historical imaginary that emphasizes 
the capacity of persons to pursue an idealized notion of individual 
moral security connected to security for the community,50 and 
connects these in turn to the ideal ordering of the state, in order to 
ameliorate the ambiguity of the human experience resulting from the 
rapacity in human nature and the absence of moral conventions of 
serious meaning or that are owed any consideration in determining 
individual action without the power of fear being concentrated in a 
regularized authoritarian capacity ensconced in the state institution.51 
Reactions to ambiguity defined by fear are not the only reaction 
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possible, although once fear begins spreading, once fear is held up as 
the human experience itself in the absence of order, a path dependent 
logic begins to operate which greatly pressurizes subsequent reactions 
to be carried on in a similar manner.52
In the early ‘Cold War’ period, scientists and mathematicians at the 
RAND corporation, a US military think tank in Santa Monica, 
California, formalized much of this logic concerning fear of the Other 
being an inescapable reality in the mathematical models that have 
come to together make up what is now called “Game Theory.53” The 
most significant game - “the Prisoner’s Dilemma” - is where two 
players find themselves in a situation of mutual distrust in relation to 
the potential benefits of cooperating with authorities who have 
imprisoned them, or with each other. According to the assumptions of 
the game, both players’ least worst option is to always snitch on one 
another, reneging on any agreement they may have to remain silent in 
the face of authorities who require one or the other to relate to them 
the needed information to convict either of them of the crime in 
question for which they are in prison and awaiting trial. This is 
because being physically separated, neither has the ability to reliably 
reinforce any possible agreement upon mutual silence, making 
cooperation with prison authorities most likely to be their best route. 
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But this leaves both sides confessing to a crime, producing the worst 
possible outcome and giving authorities information to convict both 
prisoners of the crime. This is likened to not only the situation all 
individuals face, such as in Hobbes’ theory where individuals 
surrender their political self-determination to authority since self-
determination for both interlocutors in a discreet interaction is 
considered to be politically potentially destabilizing. Classically, that 
has been the view considered ‘realism’ by the prevailing orthodoxies 
of political science and statecraft. But, atop that, in neorealist theory, 
where a dehistoricized and depoliticized Hobbesianism is applied onto 
nation-states who are presumed to be “unitary” and “rational.”54 This 
produces the outcome that all states will, and indeed, should, arm 
themselves in preparation for armed conflict with one another since 
cooperation in the end is generally impossible unless inequality 
between nations permits powerful states to offer protection to smaller 
ones under certain circumstances.55
Escaping the “war of all against all”56 - what international relations 
theorists term “the security dilemma”57 - within the state thus required 
internal discipline of populations whose plurality thence necessitated 
instrumental reduction. Outside of the state’s borders, thus, the best 
that could be hoped for would be a cold peace. Indeed, between the US 
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and the former Soviet Union such a state of affairs persisted, with both 
conducting witch hunts for communists (in the US) and 
counterrevolutionaries (in the Soviet Union), and adopting an 
aggressive, nuclear-armed posture relative to one another, to ensure a 
peace based on the threat of destruction. The same logic still applies. 
The RAND corporation’s development of game theory eventually 
came to underly assumptions that formed the basis of the development 
of economics, econometrics-evaluations of social policy, and 
eventually a lot of the disciplines in the social sciences.58 What was 
first a cautious, if paranoid, assumption in Hobbes’ work to err on the 
side of security, and what was similarly deployed as a reason in Hans 
Morgenthau’s theory of world politics to pay heed to the disastrous 
and tragic effects of the human ego when its unbridled expression of 
lust of power is given vent thereby abolishing trust and common 
morality in human affairs, has now been systematized by neorealists 
and game theorists alike as a scientific theory that describes human 
behavior as being always driven by zealous guarding of the self (and 
the state - the collective ego projection of selves seeking self-ness with 
a degree of surety exceptional when considered in relation to selves 
generally) understood as essentially-defined by nature as unitary, 
which thus came to underpin the US’ claim to better safeguard human 
nature during the ‘Cold War’ against the essentially (that is, 
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essentialized) socialist and collectivist Soviets whose attempts to 
create an alternative basis for cooperation would always end up in 
totalitarian control and the abolition of freedom for the individual.59
Quite curiously, then, freedom for the individual seems to require (1) 
conformity to the parameters and behaviors of the national identity, in 
order to enable the appropriate signaling of presence through 
standardized language to their fellow citizen such that they could be 
trusted as an extension of the self (necessitating thus the domestication 
and/or the obliteration of the Other within the self for individuals and 
for societies), creating very, very narrow, if any, space for individual 
freedom,60 and, (2) a posture of permanent hostility in relation to all 
persons outside the social boundary. This second point is essential 
because in the absence of this hostility the first point, concerning the 
conformity of signification, is undermined, leaving the individual 
potentially designable as the domestic enemy61 - a determination made 
by sovereign power that must use dissent as a negative example of the 
consequences of non-conformity to teach a lesson to those under the 
sway of state regarding what lies in wait for them - since the lack of 
clear demarcations articulated to the territory of the state, which in 
powerful states corresponds to the rationalization of many of their 
major interests in a regime of property (or propriety), will result in the 
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entirely contingently-defined transformation of the population within 
into the prima causa, the locus, from which evil becomes.62 This 
analysis suggests that in addition to being opposed to non-conformity, 
this sovereign arrangement must also disempower the people with 
relatively more or less intensity depending on the circumstances of 
threat it imagines it faces, casting democratic government, even its 
possibility, by the wayside.
In its aftermath, the logic of the  ‘Cold War’ - which saw the 
undemocratic institutionalization of the national security, ‘deep state,’ 
has since mutated through the continuation of the vested military-
industrial interests that are at the core of the American state’s 
sovereign exceptionalism into the so-called ‘War on Terror63.’ This 
fearsome project, in an era of globalization, is rapidly reorganizing the 
territorial basis of politics, and, as such has brought the ‘logic’ of 
“mutually assured destruction,” refined in the ‘Cold War,’ to 
individuals, whose declaration of dissent and freedom, whose casting 
the Other as ‘terrorists,’ and, whose fight for the remaining spoils of 
the pre-globalized, nation-state system of identity politics, invites mass 
destruction to be unleashed at local, regional/middle-level (i.e. - the 
war in the Congo), and global stages of conflict, spelling catastrophe 
for human civilization and beyond.
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Herfried Münkler, a German political theorist, has argued that violence 
in the name of civilization, despite the inherent dangers of the process, 
is an unimpeachable necessity, because in the absence of imperial 
order, the costs associated with what he calls the “barbarism” at the 
edge of empire will endanger all of civilization, and so he makes the 
case that American power ought to augmented by a new European 
defense capacity under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and a revamped and robust European Union military 
capacity under the leadership of so-called responsible powers like 
Germany, the United Kingdom and France.64 The costs of this, which 
we can only fathom he ignores because he thinks non-European (non-
white, that is) lives are simply of less importance than those of 
Europeans, since his work more or less omits any consideration of the 
effects of imperial hyper violence on those who are its victims, he 
deems necessary and even salutary for human civilization.65
This conservative resignation, from which freedom fails to find its 
expression because of its particular intensity and the behaviorally/
culturally-conditioned lack of imagination in place from the 
imperatives of power politics, reveals the limits of understanding 
identity as something that can be made objectively present, and 
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presents us with a lacuna in Heidegger’s thought concerning that ever-
controversial claim of his philosophies concerning the question of the 
authenticity of being-in-the-world.66 
It is our position that only a plural identity, always already changing, 
influenced by the pregnant possibilities of physis, can ever be 
authentic, since, as Heidegger himself says, the “being of dasein is 
essentially care.67”
—————————————————————————
This inquiry will proceed in two divisions. In division one we will 
examine the major political philosophies of freedom in the modern 
West and see how these have come to be understood not as spontaneity 
and the ability to be available for the situation of existence, and thus to 
be truly free in the mind, body, and soul, but have instead come to be 
understood as a specie of what Foucault termed “governmentality.68” 
From the discipline of colonial subjects  in the colonies to the 
discipline of the working-class majorities in the imperial societies, 
governmentality has offered some among the global majority the 
chance to be powerful, and to rise to the level of elite status, but the 
ability to project power as domination, the goal of elites, is not the 
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same as freedom and requires the orchestration of human life in line 
with complex, and most often repressive technologies that have the 
effect of gathering people together in collectives based on resentment 
and despair in order to better dispose their pre-ontological being to 
being available harnessing by power politics. And while there are 
revolutionary impulses to overcome this and reclaim freedom 
understood authentically around the world today, it is important to 
pierce the armor of the ideological apparatus of the American-
dominated, so-called ‘free world’ to reveal that another, more robust, 
more enjoyable, more loving freedom, is sought after, and is in fact 
more than possible. As Arundhati Roy has put it
“Another world is not only possible, she is on her way. On a quiet day, 
I can hear her breathing.69”
In division two our inquiry will proceed to consider the way in which 
the prevailing, impoverished notion of freedom has come to dominate 
our thinking about foreign affairs and international relations in an era 
of globalization. Here we will examine how American exceptionalism 
- premised ideologically on an officially-stated public liberalism but 
factually-premised on actual realpolitik flowing from the same 
ontological root - has produced an ideological discourse of order 
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masquerading as scientific, and how this has led to states in the 
international system taking on pressures associated with the security 
dilemma as understood in the context of American imperatives for 
dominance, but which have had, as well, a significant prescriptive 
effect on the behavior of states, ‘sub-state’ groups, and, increasingly in 
a globalized era, individuals, who, in relation to the arguments in 
chapter one, have begun to willingly trade freedom for the chimera of 
security in the context of the ‘War on Terror.’
This idea, of a ‘War on Terror,’ it will be argued, is in fact a war 
against freedom, both for individuals who will feel the pressure to 
conform in order to not be labelled ‘terrorists’ and thus jeopardize their 
own security, and states, which if they are reconfigured for providing a 
framework for the existential idea of freedom, run the risk of running 
afoul of the global imperial concept. This global imperial concept, 
born in the modern West, now has come to rely on local proxies, 
whose identification with local sources of identity notwithstanding, are 
essentially Western insofar as they agree to the terms of making 
present their identity on the technological assumptions about the polis 
present long ago in Western history but for which alternative 
conceptions abound in other ontological traditions found globally; 
these being essentially hierarchical notions of natural right whose 
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rightful place in the garbage dump of stupid ideas that, but which are 
given life anew through the permanence-seeking distortion of being 
resultant from the naturalization of (political) artifice whose aim is 
nothing more than the re-legitimization of class rule in an essentially 
democratic era. As Zizek has put it in a critique of American politics 
after 9.11, which we can apply writ large to the global scene 
fundamentally-conditioned by American cultural power, the new 
political intervention that sees the globalization of networked power of 
states to prosecute counter-terror and counter-insurgency strategies and 
tactics is primarily aimed at “disciplining emancipatory excesses70” 
that inhere in the contemporary global occasion after many decades of 
socio-cultural liberalization that typify the post-1968 global shift.71
—————————————————————————
The purpose of all this effort is to take a stand in favor of freedom, and 
to propose a political theory of how to relearn, and defend this 
freedom from the adherents of permanence, whose reign of terror can 
only end in the destruction of the human race.
—————————————————————————
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DIVISION ONE
“Felicity is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another, the 
attaining of the former being still but the way to the latter. The cause whereof is that 
the object of man’s desire is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time, but to 
assure forever the way of his future desire. And therefore the voluntary actions and 
inclinations of all men tend, not only to the procuring, but also to the assuring of a 
contented life, and differ only in the way; which ariseth partly from the diversity of 
passions in divers men, and partly from the difference of the knowledge or opinion 
each has of the causes which produce the effect desired.” (Hobbes, Leviathan, I, XI)
“I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual a restless desire for power 
after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this is not always that a man 
hopes for more intensive delight than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be 
content with moderate power, but because he cannot assure the power and means to 
live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.” (Hobbes, 
Leviathan, I, XI)
“The fascist answer to the recognition of reality is the rejection of the postulate of 
freedom.” (Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Page 268)
“The Discovery of society is thus either the end or the rebirth of freedom. While the 
fascist resigns himself to relinquishing freedom and glorifies power which is the 
reality of society, the socialist resigns himself to that reality and upholds the claim to 
freedom, in spite of it. Man becomes mature and able to exist as a human being in a 
complex society.” (Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Page 268)
“Resignation was ever the fount of man’s strength and new hope. Man accepted the 
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reality of death and built the meaning of his bodily life upon it. He resigned himself 
to the truth that he had a soul to lose and that there was worse than death, and 
founded his freedom upon it. He resigns himself, in our time, to the reality of society 
which means the end of that freedom. But, again, life springs from ultimate 
resignation. Uncomplaining acceptance of the reality of society gives man 
indomitable courage and strength to remove all removable injustice and unfreedom. 
As long as he is true to his task of creating a more abundant freedom for all, he need 
not fear that either power or planning will turn against him and destroy the freedom 
he is building by their instrumentality. This is the meaning of freedom in a complex 
society; it gives us all the certainty we need.” (Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 
Page 268, emphasis added)
“Should we shout?
Should we scream?
What happened
To the Post-war Dream?”
(Roger Waters, ‘Requiem for the Post-war Dream,’ from Pink Floyd’s The Final Cut)
—————————————————————————
I. The National Security State as a response to the Postwar Dream: 
Paranoia, otherness, and The Construction of Threats
In the closing years of the second world war, when Karl Polanyi 
penned the above words, there was much hope that a new kind of 
world order would replace the one that came prior. A world of 
democracies, economic development, and liberal freedoms for 
individuals was envisioned by thinkers, leaders, and people around the 
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world from east to west, north to south. Those who still held to the 
contradictions to this vision from the among residuals depths of 
reactionary forces of racist colonial empire felt their days numbered as 
decolonization movements swept, on the fuel of the postwar  dream, 
through the former colonial states, giving birth to more than a hundred 
new nation-states formed nominally in the name of the freedom of 
their people, now able to live in self-determined nations. Facing up to 
the resulting complexity arising from the multitude of relationships 
now to be carried forth on a free and equal basis through institutions 
like state sovereignty - institutionalized in international organizations 
like the United Nations Organization - required a new maturity of 
human beings and societies they comprised, was this new found 
arrangement to be a success. The Non-Aligned Movement, 3rd World 
Internationalism, and new political theories from the emerging 
societies nonetheless resolutely proffered the “postulate of freedom” as 
Polanyi put it. Emerging from racism, exploitation, and subjugation 
through generalized violence, the new nations expressed the desire to 
face up to the new world, and to begin the arduous process of reason-
led, trial-and-error-learning-based, reconstruction of a civilization laid 
to ashes by modern technology deployed to much destructive effect in 
the final days of empires clinging to their domains and in their battles 
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against one another in the world war. Manu Bhagavan, quoting India’s 
first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, points towards the mass 
sentiments that Nehru himself was an elite crystallization of: the desire 
to escape from poverty and despotism that animated the moral force of 
what Bhagavan has termed evocatively, “the Nehruvian 
International72”:
“The interdependence of world problems means the interdependence of various parts 
of the world on each other .... And so we advance necessarily to the realization of a 
world order and a world government .... India will help in this process to the best of 
her ability. Our nationalism has always been based on this conception of world order 
and international cooperation.
 This statement followed from interest amongst World Federalists in Nehru, in part 
stemming from a speech he delivered on 3 April 1948:
We talk of world government and one world and millions yearn for this ....I have no 
doubt in my mind that world government must and will come, for there is no other 
remedy for the world’s sickness. The machinery for it is not difficult to devise. It can 
be an extension of the federal principle, a growth of the idea underlying the United 
Nations, giving each national unit freedom to fashion its destiny according to its 
genius, but subject always to the basic covenant of world government.73”
From Central and South America - two places largely untouched by 
actual fighting in relative terms by the war but long treated as colonies 
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by the United States - to the rest of the emerging world in Africa and 
Asia, to the marginalized worlds of minorities and historically-
oppressed groups in the Western world, the desire to seize the moment 
after the war was decisive for the spirit of the age. The desire for a 
“new man” was best put by Frantz Fanon, an international man of the 
3rd world, of Black Liberation, and anti-colonial struggle. Writing in 
his masterful tome, The Wretched of the Earth, he offered a searing 
indictment of the modern history of European power politics, racism, 
imperialism, and nationalist tyrannies over European workers, coupled 
with a desire to look forward and construct a new world:
“[What matters now]…. Is the very basic question of not dragging man in directions 
which mutilate him, of not imposing on his brain tempos that rapidly obliterate and 
unhinge it. The notion of catching up must not be used as a pretext to brutalize man, 
to tear him from himself and his inner consciousness, to break him, to kill him. No, 
we do not want to catch up with anyone. But what we want is to walk in the 
company of man, every man, night and day, for all times. It is not a question of 
stringing the caravan out where groups are spaced so far apart they cannot see the 
one in front, and men who no longer recognize each other, meet less and less and talk 
to each other less and less. The Third World must start over a new history of man 
which takes account of not only the occasional prodigious theses maintained by 
Europe but also its crimes, the heinous of which have been committed at the very 
heart of man, the pathological dismembering of his functions and the erosion of his 
unity, and in the context of the community, the fracture, the stratification and the 
bloody tensions fed by class, and finally, on the immense scale of humanity, the 
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racial hatred, slavery, exploitation and, above all, the bloodless genocide whereby 
one and a half billion men have been written off. So comrades, let us not pay tribute 
to Europe by creating states, institutions, and societies that draw their inspiration 
from it. Humanity expects other things from us than this grotesque and generally 
obscene emulation. If we want to transform Africa into a new Europe, America into a 
new Europe, then let us entrust the destinies of our countries to the Europeans. They 
will do a better job than the best of us. But if we want humanity to take one step 
forward, if we want to take it to another level than the one where Europe has placed 
it, then we must innovate, we must be pioneers. If we want to respond to the 
expectations of our peoples, we must look elsewhere besides Europe. Moreover, if 
we want to respond to the expectations of the Europeans we must not send them back 
a reflection, however ideal, of their society and their thought that periodically sickens 
even them.
For Europe, for ourselves and for humanity, comrades, we must make a new start, 
develop a new way of thinking, and endeavor to create a new man.”74 
This new freedom was not exclusively for those who had been on the 
receiving end of colonial and imperial violence and humiliation, but 
more radically than even that - which was certainly radical in terms of 
the world structure that prevailed at that time, after all it sought to 
completely alter the status quo in the colonized world75 - Fanon’s 
theories were also aimed squarely at residual and former colonial 
masters within the colony’s local European quarter, and back in their 
safe European homes.76 Fanon argued that European societies had been 
made sick by the disease of automatic privilege associated with race or 
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class membership, and indeed pointed out that in the European states 
the working classes had long been detested, relegated to a position of a 
lower order of humanity akin to a subhuman race, and exploited with 
little to no concern for their welfare.77 Elites presented as a salve for 
these bleeding wounds the possibility of identification with the nation, 
even granting the masses a role in the production of the nation, the 
right to access the wealth of the elite and the freedom imagined 
enjoyable once individual success was attained because of the rational 
personal conduct that supposedly brought this about, and social 
stability only presumed possible through the coercive bonds of the 
nation-state with a monopoly on the legal use of violence deemed the 
necessary repertoire of modern and modernizing ordered freedom.78 
Surrendering their own individual capacity to formulate political 
thoughts in a spontaneous and idiosyncratic manner informed by a 
healthy self-expression driven by a close relationship between mind 
and body, and with immanent, non-alienated relations in the 
community populated by thinking, free, solicitous, and capacious 
beings, Fanon argues, the people of the Western nations who consent 
to the governing order’s terms of domestic peace internalize a specie 
of the same violence that nations in the colonies had waged life-or-
death struggles to resist. Once again, in The Wretched of the Earth, 
Fanon writes:
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“…the European spirit is built on strange foundations. The whole of European 
thought developed in places that were increasingly arid and increasingly 
inaccessible. Consequently, it was natural that the chances of encountering man 
became less and less frequent. A permanent dialogue with itself, an increasingly 
obnoxious narcissism inevitably paved the way for a virtual delirium where 
intellectual thought turns into agony since the reality of man as a living, working, 
self-made being is replaced by words, an assemblage of words and the tensions 
generated by their meanings. There were Europeans, however, who urged workers to 
smash this narcissism and break with this denial of reality. Generally speaking, 
European workers did not respond to the call. The fact was that the workers believed 
they too were part of the prodigious adventure of the European spirit. All the 
elements for a solution to the major problems of humanity existed at one time or 
another in European thought. But the Europeans did not act on the mission that was 
designated them and which consisted of virulently pondering these elements, 
modifying their configuration, their being, of changing them and finally taking the 
problem of man to an infinitely higher plane. Today we are witnessing the stasis of 
Europe. Comrades, let us flee this stagnation where dialectics has gradually turned 
into a logic of the status quo. Let us reexamine the question of man. Let us 
reexamine the question of cerebral reality, the brain mass of humanity in its entirety 
whose affinities must be increased, whose connections must be diversified and 
whose communications must be humanized again.79”
Having become less and less aware of their surroundings, because 
commanded as such by elitist political thought for many centuries, 
enough European persons - call them the nascent middle classes - let 
their rulers do the real thinking for them, and thus restricted through 
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various means their own thinking to that which could be made present 
through the internalization of what rulers have deemed to be at various 
times the key signifiers of the realness of reality.80 With very few 
exceptions, the history of mainstream European philosophies and 
political thought have forever been cursed as a result, and alienation - 
even if potentially overcome from time to time in philosophical 
heroism81 - came to be the relation of most European nations and their 
citizens to their surroundings; surroundings which, of course, never 
ceased to be the wellspring of life itself.
David Campbell has argued that in the midst of the uncertainty created 
by the rise of post-Christian ideas about political order associated with 
Thomas Hobbes, on the one hand, and Rene Descartes, on the other, 
the state’s managers - an increasingly institutionalized and organized 
technique of gathering people and populations together and near one 
another in order to control the processes of social reproduction - had to 
deploy the idea of a negative foundation for their state’s existence and 
to guarantee loyalty of the people as the source of its existential 
security, and did so by circulating “discourses of danger”82 about the 
world beyond the local community and the unseen in each person 
beyond that which was seen and apparently evident in everyday social 
intercourse. Certainly states existed in other places beyond the 
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boundaries of Europe, but in China, India, Africa, and pre-European-
settlement Americas, these states were usually typified by various 
positive ideals of togetherness that bound people together ranging from 
worship of the ruler and/or king/queen, worship and veneration rituals 
of ancestors accorded a high level of consistency through various 
institutions that oversaw those rituals, and even in some cases, forms 
of what we call political liberalism today, with an emphasis on the 
human capacity for freedom and creativity, and the moral charge to 
tolerate differences along with the practical and positive benefits such 
tolerance had for social order and collective life. In this project, 
however, our position is that these systems, while important to retrieve 
in ways this project endorses since our aim is to retrieve freedom as 
the most essential human value, are nonetheless temporarily eclipsed 
in their world-historical significance for now as a result of contingent 
developments in the last several hundreds of years that have displaced 
their purchase on the organization of life in the polis by ideas that were 
fundamentally developed in the course of what is casually referred to 
as ‘western modernity.’ This is why Fanon’s words on the matter are so 
impassioned - and important - but that at the same time his is a tone of 
hopeful desperation since alternatives that the past he imagines must 
have held for him have been alienated from him and everyone else by 
processes of deracination and the objectification of beings by the logic 
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of a scientific praxis seeking to explain everything, and then reduce 
the everything to be ready-at-hand.83 He and many others, then and 
now, remain desperate for new ideas about how people will live 
together in this world we are fated to share.
To begin addressing the question that will dominate this division - 
What is Freedom? - we will have to situate ourselves in relation to the 
dominance of ideas that have become globalized through the 
multivariate historical agency of European imperialism, first, and 
thence were intensified in their long-term significance by means of the 
residual relations first created in that era, and thence normalized as the 
real through systematic simplifications of human existence made 
possible through concealment of dialectical reality in favor of 
metaphysical essentialism. The taking for freedom as the ability to 
produce a permanent state of being free of impediments, or free of any 
potential negative moral or ethical judgment by others, has given rise 
to a foreign policy in the United States of America, buttressed by the 
scholarly inquiry into the political science of international relations, 
that seeks to produce the permanent arrangement of the world’s 
resources, and persons, as much as possible, in a manner that comports 
with the socially-constructed expectations of the American people.84 
This is not to say that the political class in America is directly 
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accountable to their governed, but rather, taking into account the 
governed’s expectations, the perception of these are being met such 
that the terms of political rule are not challenged is an inherently fuzzy 
notion that involves the complex manipulation of symbols associated 
with American statecraft; the empirical record that shows that the 
elites’ need to sell a version of freedom to the American people as the 
outcome of American foreign policy has been, and remains, essential 
to the political class’ being able to operate in the manner they so 
choose to serve their own interests in the absence of critical inquiry 
and movement.85 We would also add that despite the socially-
constructed and contingent nature of these expectations there are 
specific factors that conceal this contingency and add a great deal of 
epistemic inertia precluding changes in cognitive ability: (1) a political 
project with roots deep in western history and whose American 
incarnation have been long invested in understanding the world 
metaphysically, (2) a global political environment in which producing 
goods for consumption associated with metaphysically-defined 
freedom has a strong role in creating the impression of the presence of 
legitimate authority,86 (3) contingent structures of identity for 
individuals and groups understood as timeless and essential, and (4) 
the connection of all of these epistemic bastions of the status quo for 
selves, social groups, and nations to the unavoidability of suffering, 
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and the absence of a means to integrate and overcome pain in 
prevailing metaphysical vocabularies.87
Our initial focus will be the historical origins of the ideas associated 
with freedom that gave rise to what will be seen as a two-fold foreign 
policy paradigm that sets as a goals, first, that the domestic sphere is 
secured by demarcating the spatiality of the Other, and second, the 
concealment of the enablement of organized violence against 
foreigners through various methodologies capable of neutralizing 
spontaneous thinking about the facticity of such actions. This argument 
is inextricably linked to the way in which the Self, understood as the 
individual and the essential idea of national community they purport to 
belong to, relates to the Other, in the various ways the Self conceives 
of the Other, ranging from the internally-differentiated minority and 
non-conformist in this negatively-grounded democratic age secured by 
majoritarian sanction, to those external others belonging to other 
nations and ostensibly therefore deemed potentially, or actually, a 
threat to the Self. In Writing Security Campbell shows that in the 
course of the development of the very idea of statecraft as we have 
come to see it practiced and understood in the current era, the 
institutionalization within the sovereign authority the ability to decide 
on what constituted the domestic and the foreign was essential in the 
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process of defining the kind of person who would be understood to be 
a citizen of the state,88 and that the very idea of foreign policy, usually 
thought of as a bridge between one essential and pre-constituted realm 
and another such realm was more primordially tied up with the process 
of drawing the boundaries of acceptable behavior within a domestic 
polity than it was a rational calculation of policy, externally-oriented.89 
The consequence of this was the marking off of identities as examples 
of the looming presence of the Other who was the origin of threats to 
acceptable domestic identification practices on the part of individuals 
governed by the state. Over time the normalization of these practices 
achieved through hegemony of material and ideological configurations 
which reinforced the status quo has concealed this essential 
contingency of both identity and the practice and legitimacy of what is 
called foreign policy. Campbell writes successful performances of 
foreign policy require the functionality of a “double exclusion” “in 
which internal threats made possible external dangers and external 
dangers controlled internal threats,”90 which therefore reinforce one 
another as the sources of security and insecurity, through which the 
state comes to be seen as legitimate.
To these points we can add Noam Chomsky’s observation by way of 
Walter Lippman that the media engines of the American state have 
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achieved to a significant degree the “manufacturing of consent”91 
through the (1) manipulations of the symbology of danger and threat 
construction through the use of language playing on historic tropes of 
danger and enemies lurking beyond,92 and (2) the subsequent surrender 
of common peoples’ decision-making and reasoning, and ultimately 
even their desire to reason, regrading the crafting of foreign policies, to 
elites who are systematically presented as experts to whom deference 
ought to be paid:
“government, to be successful in its foreign and domestic policies alike, must 
comply with three basic requirements. It must recognize that the conflict between the 
requirements of good foreign policy and the preferences of public opinion is in the 
nature of things and, hence, unavoidable, […] the government must realize that it is 
the leader and not the slave of public opinion… a dynamic, ever changing entity to 
be continuously created and recreated by informed and responsible leadership, […] 
it must distinguish between what is desirable in its foreign policy and what is 
essential, and while it may be willing to compromise with public opinion on 
nonessentials, it must fight, even at the risk of its own fortunes, for what it regards to 
be the irreducible minimum of good foreign policy.93”
But the happy dream of being safeguarded and protected within the 
domestic space of the nation, and of each nation’s being globally-
protected within its own space relative to other nations by the 
guarantee of the global hegemon - the United States of America in the 
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post world war two period - has to come to an end for the American 
people and for many of America’s allies who, out of ideological 
alignment or convenience, aligned themselves with American power 
now some sixty and more years ago.94 Campbell points out that in 
addition to the political and economic ramifications of imperial decline 
and the eclipsing of the Westphalian system of nation-states, that in the 
new globalization system - whose results are ongoing - we are 
witnessing an “irruption of contingencies”95 wherein what was 
previously thought essential is now becoming contingent on a 
planetary scale. This brings into question the old order of political 
being-in-the-world unconcealing “discourses about prior, primary, and 
stable identities”96 that are its constituents, which can thence be 
observed in their contingent reproductivity. States and nations are 
contingent products that aim to produce something like essence and 
permanence.
Researchers and analysts have also pointed out in various ways the 
“internationalization of the state,”97 the rise of the “transnational state 
apparatus” and the “transnational capitalist class,”98 and the new 
migrations of nations and peoples around the world en masse in search 
of stable and relatively more desirable livelihoods as productive 
processes are altered by those in control of them in the service of 
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expedient ends.99 Globalized expectations for order have been 
challenged at borders,100 within stratified global cities, and in that 
linchpin of global order in the post world war two era, the nation-state 
itself. So-called ‘failed-states,’ often those cobbled together on the 
basis of arbitrary imperial impositions of order and political economy 
based on existing extractive economies, and with little regard for bio-
regional and ecological exigencies reflective of the contingency of the 
prevailing terms of order - nothing more than the imposition of 
metaphysical ideas of order onto an essentially changing and usually 
chaotic human social reality - because of the economic, ecological, and 
political crises they now face, have been forced to resort to the use of 
force to maintain the power relations which make them up in recent 
years.101 And where they have been unable to do so, their rulers have 
been able to either compel powerful states in the system through varied 
subterfuge to provide them assistance in their pursuit of goals the 
powerful states’ rulers associate with overall systemic stability, and 
that the leaders of middle and lower-level powers make certain to 
present as such.102 When these states are unable to reproduce the terms 
of global political and economic order in accordance with the wishes 
of the more powerful states, and especially those of the United States 
in recent times,103 a powerful incentive to intervene is felt by the 
global powers in whichever way necessary, ranging from military 
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intervention in the traditional sense - with technological adaptations 
employed as needed and as they become available from military 
research complexes the world over - to various diplomatic and 
political-economic strategies including sanctions, embargoes, coercive 
negotiations, etc.104 
In recent times, an emblematic, and relatively low-cost tool of 
intervention has been the unmanned aerial vehicle, or drone, by means 
of which the US military has developed a global strike capacity that 
allows them to adjust their desired levels of carnage with some 
precision105, and to avoid casualties that have been the hallmark 
sacrifice of great wars conducted by great powers historically.106 Until 
very recently, Americans, however, have remained happily ignorant of 
the reality of this new and terrible form of warfare, misdirected by the 
obfuscations of national security. This loaded phrase - national security 
- far from being an objective signifier of the security of one’s domestic 
community and space, in fact, in its acceptance in the nomenclature of 
normal news talk, indicates in its increasing circulation - along with 
the christening of “homeland security”107 following the attacks of 
9.11.2001 - rather than safety and security, the exposure of Americans 
to the intense insecurity of the globalization system; insecurities in a 
previous era visited upon others, which most Americans - like 
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Europeans before them in regard to the depravity of imperialism108 - 
had remained happily ignorant of the reality of.109
Recent political developments in the heart of the empire, however, 
have forced Americans from the margins to the mainstream to begin 
questioning not only the doctrine of national security, in place since 
the start of the ‘Cold War’ and now ubiquitous in the punditocracy of 
cable television news following the onset of the terror wars, but also 
the police powers in American cities that have been massively 
expanded as a result of the ‘scientific’ study of security procedures 
enabled by the panoptic epistemology-generated data set on domestic 
behavior and activities intensified with new fears after the attacks on 
New York and Washington on September 11th, 2001.110 From the 
killing of family dogs, to the institutionalized groping of the genitals of 
air travelers, the absurd, sycophantic, stupidity required of Americans 
is causing many to recoil in shock. But if public opinion polls are to be 
believed, still a majority of Americans feel as though these practices 
are necessary in the name of their security, which, as we have just 
mentioned above, is now joined at the hip the the abstract idea of 
national security.111 This all despite the fact that the history of 
American wars overseas has already evidenced the integration of 
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surveillance and population management strategies abroad back in 
America following war efforts.112 
Alfred McCoy has documented just such a transpiring in the context of 
the war against the Philippines that culminated in American control of 
that nation as a direct colony for a half a century at the outset of the 
20th century.113 Surveillance techniques involving the use of 
informants and the spreading of disinformation, torture tactics used to 
produce additional information about resistance fighters eluding 
capture in order to neutralize them, techniques of imprisonment to 
achieve the same were all brought to back to America from that war 
(as was President Taft, too, who prior to being President presided over 
an American colonial occupation)114; then it was water-boarding and 
the use of a real-life prisoner’s dilemma to crack loyalties, now it’s the 
introduction of surveillance drones, massive “strategic interception”115 
of all digital communications to be data-mined to establish patterns of 
behavior and interconnection for analysis,116 and the introduction of 
extra-legal, situational lawlessness as needed by reference to national 
security exigencies when deemed necessary by the federal 
government, local governments, and their exceptional combinatory 
collaborations, making a mockery of, and even subverting for the 
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purposes of the state the very idea of liberal government built with 
checks and balances to prevent the accumulation of tyrannical 
power.117 Indeed, as Corey Robin points out, multi-layered government 
now seems more likely to greatly magnify the scope of political 
repression, rather than secure us in the knowledge that checks and 
balances could work as some think they were intended to.118
The development of the security state as a conceptual idealization of 
the functioning of the state has roots in other western nations besides 
America. Fanon, in  A Dying Colonialism, writing on the culture of the 
colonial city of Algiers in French-ruled Algeria in the twilight of 
empire, reported that as the need to provide security to the European 
quarter of the city become more pronounced as the independence 
struggle and urban guerrilla combat intensified, eventually many 
French themselves, ranging from collaborators with the Algerians to 
sympathizers on the one hand, to those more driven by personal 
concerns such as smuggling into the colony their cache of illegal drugs 
or bootlegged alcohol, to even the innocent non-collaborating and law-
abiding Frenchman, came under the scrutiny of security systems run 
by the occupying regime’s security forces and police.119 The paranoia 
unleashed by the use of disguise, the subversion of traditional gender 
roles in the Algerian community by women revolutionaries, the 
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increasing humanitarian sentiment among French Algerians - 
prominently including Jewish colonists who made cultural contacts 
with Jewish Algerians - local Arabs - during the Vichy period which 
immediately preceded the decisive phase of the Algerian struggle in 
the aftermath of the second world war, the increasing effectiveness of 
Algerian revolutionaries in planting bombs undetected by security 
forces, the use of the French language - long the language of the 
occupation in which the common use of words themselves came to be 
understood as a statement of French superiority and Algerian and 
Muslim inferiority - by the partisans of freedom as the new Voice of 
Algeria radio, and the overall porousness of the complex security 
apparatus with its multiplying points of contact and enforcement 
requirements across the colony, combined to radically-undermine the 
French forces’ own belief in the tenability of their colonial project.120 
For a while, though, due to their possession of great technological 
powers of destruction - air raids, commando operations, and the 
systematic use of torture to punish Algerians, spread mistrust and fear 
among their ranks, and gather information on how to locate and kill or 
capture their cadre in hiding and on the run - the French were able to 
temporarily overcome the impending futility, and the psychological 
effects of that futility on their will to remain in Algeria.121
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But in so choosing this path to reinforce their belief in the goodness of 
France, and the civilizing mission they purported to be carrying out, 
the French who supported the odious tactics clearly contradicted their 
own supposed moral values regarding their civilized and liberal self-
conception, revealing in their stead the practical and behavioral effects 
resultant from a series of pragmatic compromises that began in France 
during the destruction of the old regime and its replacement with the 
order of equality based on utopian visions of the revolutionary era.122 
Unable to achieve the kind of “general will” that those political and 
epistemological philosophies presumed to be possible because of the 
ontology of humanity at their core, increasingly France’s imperial 
project, throughout their broadly-dispersed domains of influence, 
would come to rely on the indiscriminate use of terrorist violence to 
prove the rationality of France’s self-proclaimed universal values.123 
From Haiti to Algeria to Indochina, French philosophers, politicians, 
political activists, businessmen, and scientists sought to prove the 
universality of French values - their permanence, that is -  by both the 
sword and by the written word of their language. But when these 
projects failed, as they all inevitably did, the resort to violence to force 
the recalcitrants of order to ‘be free,’ to confirm the universality of 
Enlightenment concepts of progress, knowledge, order, and most 
importantly, what constituted a free being, was commenced.124
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This fundamentalist and absolutist adventurism can assist us in 
understanding the fanaticism and extreme violence of the American 
neo-imperial project in Iraq, and, if we follow Fanon’s analysis of the 
capitulation of the French left in the face of nationalist exhortation to 
remain loyal to the empire (who much as the American left now, 
reacted with fear and trembling towards being tarred as disloyal)125, 
and, now, increasingly also explains analogous circumstances within 
America’s “homeland,126” now unfolding in America, with the tactics 
of the terror wars being imported back into America to discover those 
individuals and groups deemed enemies of the state.127 In reality, 
however, the only major domestic threat America faces comes not 
from those deemed enemies or their potential sympathizers in the ‘war 
on terror,’ but, according the US government’s own information, from 
white supremacist groups, Christian fundamentalists who have 
transformed the religion of Jesus Christ into an armed doctrine of 
cleansing and purity,128 and various nativist and neonazi organizations 
whose ranks are increasingly recruited from soldiers returning from the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.129 This is no small concern in a nation 
that still to this day consists of a fairly large proportion of people who 
blame liberals and peace activists for the “loss of Vietnam.130” But 
following rancorous objections from several politicians belonging to 
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the Republican party the sheepish Democratically-controlled 
Department of ‘Homeland’ Security withdrew the report containing 
this invaluable information and have certainly not engaged in any sort 
of public relations and information/education campaigns to raise 
consciousness among Americans in general about this potential 
threat.131 The consequences have already been disastrous.132
But this disaster goes beyond the murder and horrific violence and 
discrimination visited upon Arab, South Asian, Muslim, African 
Muslim, African, Latino, and various Americans of non-European 
ancestry. The fear that has gripped America following the onset of the 
new terror wars - which have no end in sight and seem to possess a 
capacity for multiplication of conflict - has caused Americans, 
including the majority of Americans from non-European backgrounds, 
to acquiesce in the proliferation of a new security architecture as well 
the sacralization of national security that has effectively transformed 
the United States’ own domestic territory into a “battle-space133;” the 
enhanced powers of authorities ranging from local law enforcement to 
federal and military authorities have become increasingly accepted as 
standard operating procedure. Indeed, as former Vice President Dick 
Cheney chillingly put it, this is “the new normal.”134 And much like 
the belief in the mission of civilization associated with the French 
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colonial project that led ordinary Frenchmen - and especially French 
elites and intellectuals - to identify with an essential French identity, 
the American idea of national security leads ordinary Americans to 
identify with an essentialized identity of America with an order-
producing, freedom-expanding, positive conception of exceptionalism, 
which carries with it an concomitant negative conception: excluding 
all threats to the positive conception through the use of an unbridled 
will to power accentuated by technological violence deployed to 
negate difference and otherness understood as danger.135
—————————————————————————
II. Ways of Being, Permanence in the Liberal Tradition, and the 
Roots of Liberal Identity Politics
The illusion of permanence and access to a steady stream of both 
material and ideological advantages that strengthen the sway of 
illusion have together come to be understood as freedom. Nonetheless, 
the consequences of the deployment of political technologies are 
naturalized, and thus remain unrecognized by many of the apparent 
beneficiaries of those technologies. As such, a philosopher of freedom 
is confronted with a fundamental conundrum: how can we make 
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evident the process of naturalization of artificial political constructs 
that preclude an awareness of freedom inhering in existence, available 
to all persons in an entirely unique manner in accord with their physis, 
but awareness of which will be unattainable so long as their freedom 
remains yolked to the naturalized-artifice that compresses the spatiality 
of existential freedom with metaphysical identity politics? 
divisionFor people generally, a more fundamental existential question 
emerges: What is Being? This question, pregnant with infinite 
answers, is essentially unanswerable in a final form, and this is proven 
empirically by any casual observation of human history. Even where 
answers have been given in ways that have been dominant over 
periods of time, those answers - expressed as the synthesis of 
differences into a form of life seen as natural to a group - have come 
and gone. From great empires to small tribal communities, forms of 
life come and go, and if they are more and more systematized - as in 
the case with the power politics of historical empires and great powers 
- all the while, they cannot admit to the internal differentiation, 
contingency, and the omnipresent chaos within.136
In the introduction we considered the question of permanence and 
impermanence, and our analysis in this division is concerned with the 
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equation of freedom with permanence, and the way in which this 
notion - permanence - distorts empirical reality and obscures 
awareness at the level of ontology.137 This question, the wonderment 
that an awareness of it imposes on our consciousnesses, and the 
corresponding impossibility of providing a final answer - any answer 
in the final will be a negation of the real138 - is the key to our freedom 
as human beings. The provision of the goods of life - the object of the 
political philosophies of liberalism as that word has been bandied 
about in the Western canon - and securing these goods as individual 
property to give life to the individual in a manner considered secure 
has been the dominant theme in the tradition that has come to inform 
the now globally-hegemonic idea of freedom.139 The securing of 
property through the agency of rights would enable the individual to 
exercise self-ownership, free labor power ‘liberated’ from feudal 
constraint and responsive to what theorists again naturalized as the 
laws of supply and demand which would deliver market prices in the 
absence of artifice,140 thus facilitated their participation in the world of 
supply and demand from a ground on which for some time could be 
constructed systems of increasing efficiency,  encompassing greater 
swathes of human societies, and, eventually, to produce a mobile, 
material and ideological capacity, for rationalization, and 
intensification of social and economic activity never possible in the 
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context of pre-market society.141
On these registers - land ownership, the fairness of exchange values in 
the market for the produce of the land and labor, the freedom of the 
ability to sell one’s labor, and in addition, and the freedom of being 
free from obstacles to social and economic activity - freedom is 
understood to be the ability of an individual to live in a manner that is 
free of artificial impediments and only obstacles considered natural, 
such as the laws of supply and demand as these are defined by the field 
of economics, and the free of constraints emergent from the presence 
of other people and the territorial and temporal constraints of space 
and time. But the three most basic elements in economic production, 
land, labor, and capital, are essentially limited in their availability, and 
to treat them as purely tradable commodities is delusional.142 
In classical economics, there is no direct consideration of the 
renewability of soil for the production of goods from the earth, and 
there is similarly no concern for political implications of gathering 
people together to prime them for selling their labor power in a fashion 
that abstracts their bodily limits and capacity for laboring in the pursuit 
of achieving economies of scale,143 the most essential goal in large-
scale profit-making endeavors.144 Consideration of these political 
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questions could scandalize prevailing arrangements. The kind of 
human clusterings that occur in a market-driven society, and the way 
in which these were brought about, for good reason, have had to be 
consigned to a forgotten past - and when the past that constituted the 
present is considered, various kinds of narrative are employed to see to 
it that the past is imagined as a necessary and rational forerunner of the 
present.145 Obviated in this kind of partial remembering, is, of course, 
the matter of choice, and therefore, the question of being that sits at the 
core of individual choices in all instances: why be one way rather than 
another?
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Thereafter that question reduces, logically following, to why are there 
beings at all rather than nothing? This question, when considered, is a 
pathway to infinity, literally. This is the gateway to freedom. The 
radical contingency and utter meaninglessness of existence in the 
traditional metaphysical sense made manifest in pondering this 
question simply and empirically levels - as in reduces to basic ground
(lessness) - all conceptions of order, of exceptionalism, of perfection, 
to being species of the same thing: the drive for certainty. But, in the 
final analysis, being cannot ever be certain of itself understood in a 
fixed, metaphysical, and essential sense. Seeking this can only deepen 
self-doubt to unmanageable proportions.146
Economics as a separate disciple characterized by the discovery of 
certain objective laws of human nature in consideration of physical 
limitations cannot be distinguished from politics. Doing so results in 
the depoliticization of human life and therefore obscures the role of 
choice in the configuration of human affairs.147
The ideas underpinning freedom seemingly have come to require the 
prosecution of foreign adventures in the name of spreading this same 
freedom to other places westerners consider to be less fortunate than 
the West. This takes place on the terrain of a shared world, since it is 
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obvious that the ability to enjoy pleasure upon pleasure is something 
which will require material largesse, generally tending to outstrip the 
endowment of resources found in any one place; but less obviously, 
and more insidiously from the standpoint of the question of being, 
must also take place in the context of an ideological competition over 
representations of what counts as being in the languages found in 
different places in the world (or through the displacement of 
indigenous languages by the language of an expansionist power) in 
order to create a justified rationale for the exploitation of resources and 
to produce the calmness of mind needed for those seeking to ensure 
their enjoyment of pleasure after pleasure.148
Must freedom exist for one person in a social vacuum such that their 
freedom can only be understood in a zero-sum manner, as Hobbes’ 
political theory of the need for order seems to strongly imply?149 Is this 
state of affairs an inevitable path-dependent trajectory because of the 
existence of the repertoire of technologies available for the 
sacralization of identity politics through ideological epistemology 
articulated to the reproduction of ontological enclosure that restricts 
the being of being?150 And we must extrapolate this question upward, 
and ask if freedom can be understood to be the property of one nation 
over and against its possible enjoyment by other nations.151 This will 
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be the central question in the second division: can nations enjoy 
freedom together or will they feel the need to jealously guard scarce 
quantities of freedom against one another in the rough and tumble of 
international relations? For now, the question will remain focused on 
the individual whose ability to bring to themselves the goods of life 
has been equated with freedom; this concept having been made 
explicit in the words of Hobbes that we began this division with.
What most theorists whose work owes a debt to Thomas Hobbes fail 
to consider in a systematic fashion is the way in which his theory is not 
simply an anti-religious, secular, and scientific statement on human 
political affairs, social order, and the inherent equality of all 
individuals before death.152 Even though two well-regarded critics of 
Hobbes - John Locke, who disagreed with Hobbes’ institutionalization 
of political power in the absolute sovereign deemed necessary for 
order since individuals couldn’t be trusted as their own judges and thus 
the individual or core group of individuals assuming sovereignty must 
be controlled by the agency of a representative institution wherein 
legislation based on the laws of nature revealed through reason would 
produce a better stability than a single man could,153 and John Stuart 
Mill, whose criticisms of Jeremy Bentham’s theory of Utilitarianism in 
his most famous work On Liberty contained a significant critique of 
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the Hobbesian idea of the commensurability of persons and their 
fundamental constitutions concerning the predictability of their 
behavior in relation to appetites and aversions which underlay Hobbes’ 
theory of radical existential equality of persons - apparently seize upon 
his ontological reductionism, both accepted the basic Hobbesian idea 
that individual freedom required absolute protections against exposure 
of the individual to fear that they would surely be gripped by if there 
were no formal political order.154 The state of nature for Locke, and the 
state of undeveloped and uncivilized society for Mill, are 
epistemological-conceptual bogies through which rationalizing 
arguments are structured that greatly encourage individuals to agree 
with the parameters of the political order, and whatever exceptional 
powers are deemed required to maintain that order.155
For Locke, the question of being is answered in much the same 
manner as Hobbes: that human beings are rational actors whose reason 
will guide them towards their appetites and away from those things 
they find averse.156 And for Mill, the question is similarly answered, 
save for the importation into his philosophy of certain notions of 
increasing possibilities for enlightenment through scientific skepticism 
operationalized into a rational inquiry into the truth of what is 
perceivable through the senses.157 But clearly these are two sides of the 
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same coin. If we are to take Locke at his word his views are such that a 
parliamentary institution is the best way to institutionalize a prudent, 
conservative, and tolerant socialization for society seeking to enact the 
law of nature,158 and for Mill a similar institution is needed and 
properly civilized and trained persons needed to populate it, and space 
for eccentric and odd influences on the gradual perfectibility of 
progress must be protected lest the gains of civilization be drowned out 
by what he imagined to be the uncouth and unlettered opinions of the 
masses who lacked the necessary education.159 But in both cases, with 
Hobbes, their understanding of freedom was as freedom from 
obstacles, the only differentiation in their thought is that these 
successors of Hobbes simply think this is best achieved not through an 
absolute sovereign but through a sovereign whose action and capacity 
is checked by formal liberal institutions.160 Both Locke and Mill, like 
Hobbes, however, reserve absolute power to the state, especially in the 
context of a state of emergency, or otherwise defined exceptional 
situation whereby the normal functioning of the law is to be suspended 
in the name of commencing some higher, extraordinary goal associated 
with preserving the unexceptional circumstances of civil society that 
ought to prevail the rest of the time.161
“But since a rational creature cannot be supposed, when free, to put himself into 
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subjection to another; (though, where he finds a good and wise ruler, he may not 
perhaps think it necessary or useful to set precise bounds to his power in all things) 
prerogative can be nothing but the people’s permitting their rulers to do several 
things, of their own free choice, where the law was silent, and sometimes too against 
the direct letter of the law, for the public good; and their acquiescing in it when so 
done: for as a good prince, who is mindful of the trust put into his hands, and careful 
of the good of his people,  cannot have too much prerogative, that is, power to do 
good….”162
And although Locke followed up this apparently contradictory claim 
of executive power, at least in relation to the main thrust of his 
theoretical distinction from Hobbes, with claims that the “prerogative” 
power only can be used for “preservation” of both man, and the 
“nation,” in accordance with the “law of nature”163 understood as the 
inability of any man to do himself harm, our criticism is buttressed all 
the more by his original claim of exceptional powers since the point 
we are making here is that the liberal notion of the Self, from Hobbes, 
and now to Locke, is seen as a permanent, unchanging entity, who for 
the sake of being his highest self must live in accordance with the laws 
of nature; these revealed by the use of “reason”164 in both Hobbes’ and 
Locke’s theories. And despite the incongruity of political theories 
based on the servicing of the appetites in relation to the Platonic 
concept of the eternal idea165 - which in ancient philosophies of Greece 
could only be accessed through the willful repression of the passions in 
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the name of reason166 - both Hobbes and Locke presume that there are 
eternal truths about human nature, and that reason can guide, if the 
passions are sufficiently trained either through fear,167 or through 
paternal education in the laws of nature and tradition,168 compelling 
individuals to realize and act in comportment with that nature.
Out of these claims on the nature of human beings and their societies, 
both Hobbes and Locke conserve the idea of permanence, if a stripped 
down, disenchanted version relative to the “pure intellection”169 that 
was supposed to reveal the eternal idea in the ancient Greek universe. 
In seeking to preserve the existence of some sort of permanence-
seeking individual, the passions, while partially unleashed,170 must 
remain repressed, are judged a source of threat to good order, and 
explicitly in Hobbes’ work demands the censorship of thought by 
individuals for their own sake, through the unrestrained agency of the 
state to create institutions to produce fear171 backed up with the threat 
of violence - and short of violence, the violence of banishment.172 The 
aim of this intervention is to produce a prudential temperament in 
individuals such that they police themselves without need of constant 
supervision by the state.173 In Locke’s work much of the Hobbesian 
apparatus of fear in civil society remains in tact, with the one 
governmental shift from absolute sovereignty concentrated in a unitary 
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government to the same the kind of sovereignty employed by a 
parliamentary institution serving to both divide power and restrain it, 
on the one hand, and to magnify and legitimize its operationalization 
in practice, on other hand (see above).174
Liberals, testifying to their faith in progress and capacity for self-
correction from their Hobbesian origins, cite John Stuart Mill, whose 
defense of individual freedom of conscience first and foremost as the 
crux of individuality - eccentricity,175 that is - or, more 
contemporaneously, the theorists John Rawls and Richard Rorty, 
whose purportedly non-metaphysical176 theories of politics seemingly 
grant the individual the widest possible range of freedom from social 
conformity and the dictate of obeying sovereign authority based on 
potentially arbitrary and exclusionary concepts of social order. 
However, in all these cases the notion of the individual as a permanent 
being whose permanence and desire to subsist as such lie at the center 
of each’s thought. In Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, 
reasoning is thematized in a hypothetical “veil of ignorance” and 
“original position” through which reason is said to purely operate in a 
thought experiment which privileges a constructed self without 
constitutive attachments to her surroundings, and therefore capable of 
engaging in a meaningful abstraction of the inessential elements of 
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their existence in order to serve that which is essential.177 
What Hobbes would have us regulate ourselves in relation to our fear, 
and Locke through our being disciplined by paternal authority, Rawls 
thus simply abstracts away as a postulation and basis for the 
subsequent construction of his systematic liberal theory.178
Through these thought experiments Rawls purports to find essential 
reasons for why his understanding of political liberalism is persuasive 
to people in general, irregardless of their cultural contingency.179 
Constitutive cultural attachments, we should remember, are precisely 
those attachments which in Plato’s philosophy, and then later through 
Christian adaptation and the gospel of original sin, made common 
persons irrational and intellectually inferior to those who were truly 
rational and whose rationality was denoted by their ability to control 
their passions.180 But this is in fact impossible, and when apparently 
possible is only possible in a negative mode, for even when the 
individual is abstracted from their attachments to the world - or believe 
themselves to be - they remain essentially attached to the world, and 
instead internalize social rank and corresponding values associated 
with an abstracted notion of mastery over the world that gives rise to 
clear chains of causality, and most crucially, notions of good and 
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evil.181 What is emphasized to enable this kind of attunement182 are 
values deemed universal elements of human nature, and cast aside are 
emotions which remain a part of an individual’s consciousness. But 
having lost this connection to their own consciousnesses, such 
abstractions in lieu of otherness of the Other are at the mercy of the 
powerful in whose image these abstractions are fabricated.183
Focusing on the negative basis, as in Hobbes and Locke, or a minimal 
basis for agreement among persons, as in the case of Rawls, those who 
remain marginal to these agreements persist as a problem for the 
realization of political order, and according to Michel Foucault, this 
leaves them at the mercy of state intervention in their lives so that their 
behavior can be normalized if possible,184 if they are so lucky. But in 
actual practice the violence used to normalize individuals never 
produces uniform results, and suffer from diminishing returns even if 
temporarily successful.185 Thus, as Giorgio Agamben argues in Homo 
Sacer, recalcitrants of order in the metaphysical, national community; 
a community - whose self-identity is understood to be an essential, 
unique national identity,186 but which conceal their essential 
constitution’s being made up by the negation of outsiders through the 
circulation of “discourses of danger”187 - which will be on the 
receiving end of violence aimed ostensibly at their reform, but, in 
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actual practice is mostly concerned with the prosecution of violence to 
make an example of the Other for the inhabitants of the state regarding 
what behavior and personal conduct is acceptable and what is not.188
To be clear, the determination of acceptable and unacceptable behavior 
cannot claim to operate for the discovery of an essentialized category 
that remains always the same for any given order. Rather, this idea of 
normality has to be produced and reproduced, and is not the matter of 
the pure conspiracy of evil beings - although there is some of that to be 
sure - but is rather better understood as an undulating and shifting 
consensus that emerges between the fears of common people, which 
are stoked amongst that group and by elites for psychological, 
economic, political, power-lusting, narcissistic, and other reasons, 
which, from time to time, brings into focus the idea that some 
behaviors are diametrically opposed to the good order of the nation. As 
William Connolly puts it, “The state today is a ministry for collective 
salvation through a politics of generalized resentment.”189 If we take 
resentment in the generalized sense invoked here, we can comprehend 
those who spontaneously conform to the being of the state, and who, in 
search of enemies, would rather have an “evil”190 enemy and despair at 
existence itself in order to produce certainty in the mind than entertain 
the possibility of a more thoroughgoing freedom that can only be 
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found in responsibility for oneself at the level of consciousness - which 
would at the least require self-reliance in the matter of 
phenomenological cognition of the world in relation to political lines 
of division. But in today’s world this is dashed, as is evident in the 
‘nature’ of the enemy as presented to the people of the state: a being 
who always exists but whose virulency and threat to established order 
emanates from a shifting array of others whose being muddled 
together is indicative of the failure of Cartesian epistemology that 
turns thinking into the internalization of social norms that have 
become systematic in their manifestation in political economy.191 The 
state, not only today, but in its very origins in ancient times as well as 
modern, in the traditions of western political thought, has been a tool 
for “collective salvation through a politics of generalized 
resentment,192” wherein its goal and that of those who act and reenact 
its presence - either consciously and self-interestedly or as per the 
disciplinary effects of hegemony - is to produce both the objects of 
resentment out of this more generalized sense of despair, as well as the 
belief in artificial solutions to those objects’ existence understood as a 
problem; these solutions become the policies that only the state can 
deliver. As such the state, in its normalizing logic of order, produces 
the enemy as well as the solution to the existence of the enemy - force 
and the suspension of the law which the enemy takes advantage of - to 
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secure its own ground.193
In Fear - The History of a Political Idea, Corey Robin has suggested 
that in the historical development of liberalism, seen as a political 
philosophy of individual freedom mainly from arbitrary governmental 
power, on the one hand, and from the coercion of other individuals, on 
the other, a premium is placed not on the development of freedom as 
an idea for maximum expression of the individual’s unique creativity 
and capacity for action in the world, but, rather, on freedom from all 
manner of fear, which is seen as the chief experience of individuals in 
relation to both one another and the world in general.194 This is an 
understandable position for individuals to take, evidenced, Robin 
argues, by the historical record wherein European polities - that is 
arrangements of people in groups - have been characterized by the 
omnipresence of fear, both of oneself through the doctrines of church 
teachings, and of the Other understood as everything outside of the 
Self.195 By naturalizing fear as the main reaction and impulse of 
individuals towards their world, and depoliticizing its occurrence - 
namely by treating it as a force of nature divorced from politics - early 
liberal theorists became absolutists of escapism altogether, neither 
facing fear resolutely and with maturity, nor admitting to its inherent 
role in the construction of civil society as a repose from the chaos of 
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non-political life in a state of nature.196 Even the name reveals the 
naturalization of fear - the “state of nature” where life is “nasty, 
brutish, and short.”197
But the effect of this thinking regarding the state of nature, and even 
the reverse mythology constructed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau wherein 
the state of nature was idolized as a space of total freedom before the 
inevitable and unavoidable degradation of freedom in the formation of 
the social contract198 is to obscure that this pre-social state never 
meaningfully existed in an empirical sense and any memory we have 
of it is simply a created memory - positively or negatively charged - 
whose function as a ward has been to safeguard the prevailing terms of 
order, lest fearsome effects be experienced by those who aren’t 
sufficiently disciplined by its status as truth.199 
However, since this memory is constructed and contingent, it always 
can be potentially revealed to be as such. Therefore liberals who 
defend individual freedom and the primacy of individual freedom as 
the goal of political organization of liberal society, time and again, 
have utilized this potential negative experience of fear, and more 
elementally, pain,200 to provide a ground for the need for politics; this 
has the epistemological effect of incentivizing at the biopolitical level 
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belief in the terms of order, despite their underlying mythical status. 
Robin writes the following on Richard Rorty, whose philosophical 
embrace of contingency maintains in it a veiled attack on all political 
activists who seek to change the status quo by admonishing any action 
that could possibly produce the experience of pain:
“Richard Rorty likewise agreed that negative experiences like cruelty made it 
possible to affirm liberal principles without resorting to an architectonic philosophy. 
Solidarity with victims of cruelty, he wrote, was “to be achieved not by inquiry” - the 
traditional route of liberals like Rawls or Dworkin - “but by imagination, the ability 
to see strange people as fellow sufferers.” The liberal need no longer worry about the 
grounds of her ideals once she realized that she was “more afraid of being cruel than 
anything else.” All she needed to recognize was that “traditional differences (of tribe, 
religion, race, customs, and the life)” were “unimportant when compared with 
similarities with respect to pain and humiliation.” She could forego the unanswerable 
philosophical question “Do you believe and desire what we believe and desire?” and 
ask instead, “Are you suffering?”201
But despite the humanist appeals seemingly embedded in these words 
from Rorty, surprisingly not noted in Robin’s otherwise fine treatment 
of what he terms “the liberalism of terror,202” - which he traces back to 
Montesquieu and the framers of the American constitution with regard 
to the need to check government power, on the one hand, and to the 
rhetorical power of Hannah Arendt’s theoretical analysis of “total 
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terror,”203 on the other - is Rorty’s controversial claim in defense 
“ethnocentrism,” justified, for Rorty, for the West because of the fact 
of the development of hegemonic liberalism that ultimately depends on 
the avoidance of pain that lies at the core of Rorty’s political thought204 
- which, as Giorgio Baruchello puts it in a 2000 journal article “could 
easily turn into a replica of nationalism, or of tribalism, or into a form 
of imperialism205” which limit empathy for suffering.
In the current political climate, of the division of the global 
consciousness of humanity on the basis of the nation, reinvigorated by 
the enactment of the tropes of statecraft in the post-9/11 terror wars,206 
evident in the use of drones to carry out what are claimed to be 
precision strikes, which in fact have killed thousands of non-
combatants,207 and the concomitant distancing achieved by ignorance, 
willful and otherwise, and rationalization, it is clear that to invoke 
suffering, and then to argue that this is the basis for a liberal 
community’s capacity to recognize itself in the Other, easily mutates 
into a kind of liberal triumphalism which obscures “moral 
equivalence” between “us and the terrorists;208” this rhetoric is made 
use of by democrats and republicans alike to justify air strikes and 
drone strikes that kill civilians.209 After all, those civilians are from a 
terrorist nation, are devoid of human characteristics, and their absolute 
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otherness to our liberal community with its apparent capacity for 
ironical subversion of the Self,210 displayed by their willingness not 
only to suffer on purpose but to kill themselves in the name of higher 
ideals which must be evidence of their non-individuality since these 
must be impositions on them from outside of themselves.211 To clarify 
here: an impermanent and contingent self is not the same as a liberal 
ironist, whose capacity for irony and contingency is seen as a capacity 
possessed permanently. How can we recognize suffering when we 
demand that the claim of suffering be put forth in a language we 
understand, especially when we demand from the Other that they 
speak in our terms to explain this suffering and that they cause no 
offense to our values by pointing out that these values are the place 
from with their suffering emanates?
Western liberal theory enables the avoidance of not only the obvious 
historical complicity of our community and its way of living in the 
world, requiring the arrangement of beings worldwide as the “standing 
reserve”212 made possible by the technologies of globalization, but, 
too, liberalism’s continuing emphasis on the formalization of choice 
situations obscures the regimentation and surrendering of the ability to 
make choices about the world and our political way of being together 
which come to be governed by the ideological naturalization of 
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political economy.213 While we lack the fast drama of suicide bombers, 
ours is a slow suicide with bloated defense budgets, spiritual suicide 
evidenced by historic levels of drug and alcohol addiction, slow and 
humiliating suicide through addiction to fast so-called ‘foods’ chasing 
after narcotic-like bodily sensations despite consequences on our 
health, cognition, and relationships to other persons and the earth. The 
ironist relativist thus transforms into the cultural imperialist, 
suggesting their ‘relativism’214 to be predicated on a pre-given 
stickiness of identities within any particular historical community. 
Baruchello continues:
“Cultural identities, in fact, are only partially a matter of agreement or peaceful 
conversation. Quite often, in order to determine and nurture a sense of “ethnicity,” 
“poetry” is accompanied by “force,” whether legal or illegal, and this applies to 
liberal democracy as well as to any other recognizable “community.” Perhaps, 
“poetry” itself is just an expression of “force,” insofar as a dominant section of the 
population selects from the “literary canon,” and the school programs. And we 
should not forget that cultures are fluid, living entities, incorporating other potential 
or actual “ethnoses” and cultures, thus involving profound tensions. Naturally, unless 
the dominant group succeeds in homogenizing all differences - and we shall all live 
in Rorty’s “liberal utopia”….”215
Concealing its cultural origins, either through the move to 
universalism, as the case has been until the very recent past, or through 
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a half-hearted embrace of contingency - half-hearted because relativist 
in the sense of taking group identity as essential but group designation/
membership as contingent and inessential to individuals who are free 
to choose membership in the best group if rational enough to do so, - 
resigned to ‘ethnocentrism,’ and retaining faith in group superiority, 
what has come to be understood as liberalism is hardly liberal if we 
take that word to signify open-mindedness, tolerance, openness and 
even acceptance and invitation to change, hospitality, and a full-
embrace of the contingency of the Self. This template, of progress of 
order, of “civilization,216” of worthiness for freedom - and an adjoining 
mission to free others not yet free, or to at least bring them some 
measure of freedom appropriate to their backwards state - has an old 
history in the West.217 Positing a universal template for civilization, 
and viewing nations as discreet groups capable of moving together 
only with the application of great compulsion, John Stuart Mill, 
writing on “harm” - analogous to the suffering that Rorty seeks to 
ground liberalism as a politics with reference to - has both claimed and 
warned the wayward that
“the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”218
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but quickly adds that 
“The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that 
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence 
is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign.”219
In the first instance, the vagueness of the idea of harm is precisely as 
vague as “suffering,” which Baruchello challenged in Rorty’s work, 
and since harm and suffering are tied up together, and neither Mill nor 
Rorty can offer a means by which to recognize either save for the 
subjective feeling of either, both are quite open to being abused, and 
indeed have been, to create the basis for various political projects. 
From interventions advocated by the now infamous Kony 2012 group 
in central Africa220 to the mission to bring freedom to Iraq - whose 
purported non-freedom was deemed an imminent threat to global order 
in 2002 and 2003,221 liberals are all too happy to prove how ‘free’ they 
are through this move to save others from themselves. Liberals, 
especially in America, as William Spanos has noted, take as their 
ideological hero Captain Ahab chasing the White Whale (of pure 
freedom and the sunnum bonum - binding their ship of state together in 
a recognition of a sunum malum, thus providing for a permanent 
replication of the friend-enemy distinction even when circumstances 
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change), and are employing rational and methodical approaches in the 
hunt for an impossible, insane, dream.222
Taking this mad quest to reenter the state of nature and tame the wild, 
to bring about global order to enable the possibility of their faith in 
progress, liberals have often looked to, and still need look no further 
than, the words of Mill to both provide succor to their own sense of 
supremacy and legitimize their castigation of the alien Other to a lower 
rung of social order:
“It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine [of freedom] is meant to 
apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking of 
children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of 
manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken care of 
by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as external injury. For 
the same reason, we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society 
in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. The early difficulties in 
the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of 
means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is 
warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain and end, perhaps otherwise 
unattainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with 
barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by 
actually effecting that end. Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any state of 
things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of being improved by 
free and equal discussion. Until then, there is nothing for them but implicit obedience 
to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if they are so fortunate as to find one. But as soon as 
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mankind have attainted the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by 
conviction or persuasion (a period long since reached in all the nations with whom 
we need here concern ourselves), compulsion, either in the direct form or in that of 
pains and penalties for non-compliance, is no longer admissible as a means to their 
own good, and justifiable only for the security of others.223”
Manifest in this position that, when reading Mill, leaps from his pages, 
is that freedom is a very dangerous property and while desirable, can 
only be trusted to certain kinds of individuals who would exercise it in 
accordance with the terms of social order. That social order itself, 
though, was to be separated entirely from the zone of freedom insofar 
as it, and its enforcers, would have to be excused from its ethical-legal-
moral framework in order to periodically preserve order. As such, not 
much freedom actually could persist, save for in the antechambers of 
the brilliant, the eccentric, the well-connected, and such others - and 
freedom would simply be for all those not found in the rarified climes 
of the elite nothing more than an ideology of conformity to the 
prevailing norms of the day, whatsoever their origins might be.224 
Robin, in his philosophical biography of Alexis De Tocqueville, who 
had considerable influence on Mill,225 discovered that in his private 
letters, Tocqueville, writing to his brother, decried the state of political 
apathy in France following the revolution (compare this to the point 
we have been making about freedom and identity being understood as 
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‘felicity’ in Hobbes’ formulation: “[Tocqueville] confessed to his 
brother that he often shared their father’s “devouring impatience,” his 
“need for lively and recurring sensations.” “Gnashing his teeth behind 
the bars of reason” (which, he admitted, had “always been like a 
cage”), he longed for “the sight of combat”; it “always excites me,” he 
wrote.226”). As an self-proclaimed aristocratic person with a complex 
relationship to the politics of the French revolution,227 however, we 
can easily see that his attitude towards the masses of French persons 
now liberated and infused with a new revolutionary spirit and 
confidence to change their life circumstances was one of decided 
condescension. “Tocqueville lamented,” Robin writes, “the end of the 
Reign of Terror,” because by contrast the increasingly regularized 
patterns of politics that had settled into place could never produce 
another “Napoleon” whom he admired as “the most extraordinary 
being who has appeared in the world for many centuries.”228 
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Just for fun let us compare Tocqueville’s words on Napoleon - and the 
desire for a dictatorship, something which Tocqueville would support 
in response to the uprising of 1848 - with Carl Schmitt, the German 
fascist, and Nazi legal theorist, on the same matter. Considering the 
question of morals and democratic authority to be one of the “program 
of “people’s education,” Schmitt says:
“The consequence of this educational theory is a dictatorship that suspends 
democracy in the name of a true democracy that is still being created. Theoretically, 
this does not destroy democracy, but it is important to pay attention to it because it 
shows that dictatorship is not antithetical to democracy. Even during the transitional 
period dominated by the dictator, a democratic identity can still exist and the will of 
the people can still be the exclusive criterion. It is then particularly noticeable that 
the single practical question affected is the question of identification, and specifically 
the question of who has control over the means with which the will of the people is 
to be constructed: military and political force, propaganda, control of public opinion 
through the press, party organizations, assemblies, popular education, and schools. In 
particular, political power, which should come from the people’s will, can form the 
people’s will in the first place.”229
Friedrich Nietzsche also agreed with the preceding assessment of 
Napoleon,230 and both Tocqueville and he shared a romantic longing, 
to break out of what both assumed to be a banal and increasingly mass 
society being made “unmanly”231 by the leveling effects of the 
prevailing understanding of liberalism. From liberalism and individual 
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freedom - which on some level Tocqueville, Mill, and Nietzsche each 
endorsed - we have come to the worship of power pure and simple, 
and a strong aversion to the freedom of individuals who might pursue 
their own lives without spontaneous consent to the parameters 
determined by the socioeconomic organization of power in the state 
and the hegemonic extension of the state in civil society. From the 
French masses whose supposed simpleness, to the non-European world 
- the castigation of which Tocqueville borrowed from Mill who decried 
“China” as a “warning example” of civilizational decline brought 
about by becoming “stationary,” whose possibility of being “farther 
improved,” “must” come at the hands of “foreigners”232 - the 
recommendation of Tocqueville, echoing Mill’s imperialism in style 
but going beyond it in romanticized tone, to overcome both European 
anomie and the prostration of excellence before the meek he thought 
endemic to democracy and the freedom of the small people whom he 
so despised and whom he imagined sated by their bourgeois creature 
comforts, was to be found in the crusade for progress; or, less 
deceptively,  conquests and imperialism. “In the domination of foreign 
lands,” Robin writes
“Tocqueville envisioned the regeneration of the European race, a 
continental awakening from the flaccid sleep that followed the defeat 
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of Napoleon. Witnessing Europe’s armies march across the globe, 
Tocqueville thought less as a Frenchmen or a republican than as a 
European. He cared less about which nation was doing the conquering 
than that conquering was being done. As the British prepared to fight 
the Opium War, he wrote, “I can only rejoice in the thought of the 
invasion of the Celestial Empire by a European army. So at last the 
mobility of Europe has come to grips with Chinese immobility!” It was 
a “great event,” “pushing the European race out of its home,” and 
“submitting all other races to its empire or its influence.” Against those 
- like himself - who normally would “slander our century” because of 
its piddling politics, Tocqueville insisted that “something more vast, 
more extraordinary than the establishment of the Roman Empire is 
growing out of our times, without anyone noticing it; it is the 
enslavement of four parts of the world by the fifth.233””
What each of these selections show about western liberalism, partially 
born out of a reactionary spirit against the masses of Europeans 
breaking free from the bonds of feudalism - fears that individualism 
would be subsumed by this mass’ depravity234 - which sought to 
selectively harness that newfound political energy to pursue projects 
liberals associated with greatness on a massive, even continental, and 
eventually, even global,235 scale, is that liberalism has been an 
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ideology useful as a tool for the self-conception of the individual as 
being identified with a transcendental notion of ‘the good’ as much as 
it has been concerned with individual freedom. In all these cases, from 
Rorty in recent times, back to Hobbes and Locke, who variously 
contested the question of the proper limits of individual freedom in 
order to create a space for state-sanctioned individual greatness in 
accord with the terms of order, what we witness is a liberal politics of 
identity, and not a liberal politics of embracing change, pondering the 
question of being, or experimenting with lifestyles and life-actions in 
the name of freedom itself.236 For Rorty, liberalism is about proving 
how caring ‘we’ are and how uncaring ‘they’ are, never mind that his 
endorsement of ethnocentrism licenses precisely the uncaring behavior 
towards the suffering of others by denying their essential role in the 
constitution of the Self (and selves) in a globalized world defined by 
the encounter with difference and the response to this.237
For Tocqueville and Mill, the overt appeals to laws of nature, or to a 
liberal metaphysics, is put aside in favor of an appeal to the 
metaphysicalization of what both imagine to be the freedom of an 
individual over and against a threatening world whose mediocrity 
would overwhelm the individual in the absence of certain political 
privileges, either for the eccentric, in the case of Mill, or for the 
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aristocratic for Tocqueville. Both became identified with civilization, 
freedom, progress, and, if we read Nietzsche right, the idea of the 
‘good’ itself. But, as Nietzsche also makes clear, a desire to define 
oneself in relation to the Other in such a way that sees the Other as the 
source of evil, as the source of problems to be overcome, is indicative 
not of the crusading spirit that Tocqueville and Mill seem to assent to 
and give the space of sovereignty to, but is indicative of “slave 
morality”238 of persons whose inability to tolerate difficulty and 
difference cause them to seek to reduce the world to manipulable 
objects devoid of agency in order to keep anything from surprising 
them.239
In Mill’s work, the goal posited, ‘progress,240’ remains vague, on the 
one hand, and on the other, when given concreteness, seems only a 
reinforcement of the values associated with the British Empire.241 By 
becoming civilized, and therefore progressing towards the goal of 
civilization - the selfsame ‘progress’ - a circularity, precisely the kind 
that Rorty admits to,242 is in evidence, and a metaphysical ideal of the 
kind of being to be made present, and whose presence is taken as 
evidence for the realization of civilization, is fabricated as a 
grundnorm243 for the operations of everyday politics. Such circularity 
on the ‘true’ nature of ‘the good’ goes back to Plato’s old trick positing 
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the realm of the ideas where the truth lives eternally, and belief in 
these ideas, which despite Mill’s seemingly open-minded 
deconstruction, appear in a radicalized form in On Liberty. Mill’s view 
is just such a radicalization of Platonic truth precisely because stripped 
of positive content - the aim of the discussions in The Republic about 
stories of Hades, the need to promulgate two teachings on the matter of 
death to different social classes to dispose them in different manners, 
discussions about the role of women, children and slaves in the ideal 
society, and the like are positive in the sense that they say something 
about the way society should be244 -it leaves the intellectual elite free 
to make case by case determinations in line with liberty and their 
understanding of the laws of nature as needed, on the basis of Mill’s 
modified utilitarianism.245 For persons such as Mill, who also 
measured civilization by the distance from which normal persons in a 
country were at a remove from bearing witness of pain,246 the 
apparatus of the state would be employed to create freedom for the 
eccentric - leaving aside the class prejudices and mistreatments this 
intellectual man survived in daily life out of consideration, 
scandalizing this man; indeed any thinker must be scandalized in such 
confines so long as they think - and the subsequent arrangement of 
persons, things, and orchestration of action in society must all be 
commenced in order to produce this notion of freedom. Mill, at least, 
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was honest about what this would entail; in his essay entitled 
‘Civilization,’ Mill writes:
“It is not difficult to see why this incapacity of organized cooperation characterizes 
savages, and disappears with the growth of civilization. Co-operation, like other 
difficult things, can be learnt only by practice; and to be capable of great things, a 
people must be trained to it in small. Now, the whole course of advancing civilization 
is a series of such training. The labourer in a rude state of society works singly, or if 
several are brought together by the will of a master, they work side by side, but not in 
concert; one man digs this piece of ground, another digs a similar piece of ground 
close to him. In the situation of an ignorant labourer, tilling even his own field with 
his own hands, and associating with no one except his wife and his children, what is 
there that can teach him to co-operate? The division of employments - the 
accomplishment by the combined labour of several, the tasks which could not be 
achieved by any number of persons singly - is the great school of co-operation….
… By these operations, mankind learn the value of combination; they see how much 
and with what ease it accomplishes, which could never be accomplished without it; 
they learn a practical lesson of submitting themselves to guidance, and subduing 
themselves to act as interdependent parts of a complex whole. A people thus 
progressively trained to combination by the business of their lives, became capable 
of carrying the same habits into new things. For it holds universally, that the one only 
mode of learning to do anything, is actually doing something of the same kind, under 
easier circumstances. Habits of discipline once acquired, qualify human beings to 
accomplish all other things for which the discipline is needed. No longer either 
spurning control, nor incapable of seeing its advantages; whenever any object 
presents itself which can be attained by co-operation, and which they see or believe 
to be beneficial, they are ripe for attaining it….
…The characters, then, of a high state of civilization being the diffusion of property 
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and intelligence, and the powers of co-operation.”247
At this point in our inquiry three theorists loom large over our 
imagination in light of Mill’s words, first, on the matter of who is 
qualified for freedom, and, second, as regards his recommendation for 
the use of expedients in transforming them into such should they not 
already be such, and, third, relative to his views regarding the pathway 
to this progress, as described in his much less well-known essay just 
quoted. Plato, whose most famous work cynically recommended the 
regimentation of the entire society for the purpose of bringing freedom 
to the intellectually-superior to pursue pure intellection248; Nietzsche, 
whose rejection of all training of individuals commenced in the name 
of civilizing humanity as the infection of humanity by a disease that 
will bring about their eventual downfall in an orgy of warfare and 
destruction as those sickened wage greater and greater destructive wars 
in the name of their proving themselves ‘the good’ - no, the GOOD-
est249!; and, brimming with a possibly optimistic vision, Fanon, who 
we included an extended selection from at the outset of this division, 
wherein he seems to be replying to precisely the coordinates explicated 
by Mill in the just concluded selection with the claim that the purpose 
of training is not to break people but to show men and women the 
pathway to an authentic, contingent, defensible, robust, and life-
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affirming freedom.250
But in the constructions of Mill, Rorty, Hobbes, and Locke, escaping 
entirely the state of nature and the manifold fears, intrusions on 
individuality, and property, and the extensive suffering we are likely to 
feel there without a sovereign agency, it seems that in order to be free, 
to be ourselves in the world, we must either surrender a bit of our 
individuality to either produce the orchestration of sovereignty to 
defend our property, to discipline us into coordinated action in the 
name of ‘progress’ while still taking the idea of national essence as a 
touchstone for organizing our actions, or, as Rorty has put it, we must 
sacrifice our strong, publicly-significant poetry and political 
fantasies251 in order to simply get along with each other. In the last 
instance especially, we are presumed to be more capable of enjoying 
life in a postmodern liberal utopia where we can fashion ourselves in 
accord with our wishes, despite the obvious limitation Rorty imposes. 
Oddly though, despite this seemingly post-metaphysical claim, Rorty 
still promotes an identity politics associated with avoiding suffering 
altogether, and also, oddly, links his version of the liberal project with 
Nietzsche, whose claim was that liberalism, especially the kind that 
shrinks from pain and suffering, either for oneself or in regard to 
inauthentically medicating the suffering of others in order to alleviate 
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it pure and simple - and not to address its root causes as would befit a 
heroic politics - would introduce disorder and disease into individuals 
who would be doomed to suffer in the same way, again and again, 
without overcoming the Self that they were that gave rise to the 
suffering in the first place.252 Thus, Rorty, despite claiming to be post-
metaphysical, continues to advance a metaphysics of the Self 
associated with identifying the Self with ‘the Good.’ The liberal desire 
to ensure identity with ‘the Good’ necessitates (1) foreign policy 
adventurism,253 (2) the contravention of the values of the supposedly 
‘Good’ in order to reproduce the bases for power relations that gave 
rise to the possibility of identifying with being liberal in the first 
place,254 and, finally (3) by the simple fact of the high cost of the 
regimentation of society that Mill has in mind, and the way in which 
this would also place similar demands on physis in Rorty’s version of 
Mill’s liberal polity (to ensure that devices to alleviate ‘suffering’ were 
aplenty)255, liberalism also results in the displacement of persons, 
natural resources, and living beings in general from their worlds would 
more or less invite dialectical reply by the displaced in assertion of 
their existence.
Is this to be the fate of liberalism, then? The fate of being liberal? The 
fate of freedom? Will freedom necessarily produce the kind of single-
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minded pursuit of self such that, (1) the eventual employment of 
technologies of physical separation (distancing) will be utilized to play 
(and thus reinforce the ‘reality’ of) zero-sum game of individuals 
against other individuals? And then between groups of individuals 
(nations) against other such competitive constellations of poli? And 
when this is successful (2), must those who produce that distance then 
generate an ideology that reinforces and normalizes that distance, 
crusading on behalf of socially-constructed ideology deemed ‘nature’ 
to reinforce this distance as an idea? After all, modern European 
metaphysics presumes the equality of all humanity, but must 
nonetheless differentiates those who are to be denied human status;256 
and as in the late, ‘postmodern’ era, through a resort to identity politics 
without universal and rationalist justifications of the Self’s being 
equivalent to ‘the Good,’ because of the unimpeachably noble 
intentions of the denizens of the West,257 seen as the locus of 
liberalism, and freedom.
Our contention is that there is a ground-floor betrayal of the idea of 
being liberal as a living, changing, and always emergent life practice. 
And this is no surprise, given that our entire premise is that the turn 
away from the emergent and towards the essential that underlies the 
attitude toward existence found in wealthy and powerful climes has 
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precisely this effect on values: it makes them relative.
But by relative we don’t mean that understanding of relativism that we 
find in neoconservative thought.258 There is nothing wrong with 
changing one’s views according to new information. What is a 
problem, though, is being disingenuous about the continuing validity 
of one’s position when sustaining such a view requires willful 
ignorance, which, as we shall see, is typical of the neoconservative 
position, which holds that there are absolute values and that belief in 
these values is a non-relativist position. This means that both the 
continuing belief in values out of alignment with one’s physis, as well 
as the incentive to reorder one’s as-yet-unfolding discernment of 
reality accordingly, strongly prejudice persons against that reality. This 
formula - which creates a gap between existential and metaphysical 
being - is an old one in human societies, and among its various 
psychological and political functionalities, we are most concerned with 
its enabling the valuing of the Self as superior the any others whose 
being is ‘contaminated.’ R.D. Laing has shown that this has led to an 
operationalization - and therefore relativization - of familial love, in 
order to use the apparent existence of it as the true metaphysical ideal 
around which the family must be oriented in order to obtain favors 
within the family unit.259 Love, thus, when enchained to the 
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reproduction of a particular kind of human behavioral pattern which is 
at its core political and the product of choice, but naturalized and 
spiritualized at the same moment, thus concealing the agency of 
individuals to shape the love relationship in accordance with their own 
feelings.
As such, love, like any other ideal, such as freedom, can be turned into 
a tool for political discipline imposed by artifice, but at the same time, 
because of its comportment with our seemingly universal human 
desires, this artifice is concealed under naturalizations of social order. 
In addition to serving the ends of established powers in society, such 
an understanding of these important human ideals turns the very notion 
of idealism, of searching for the possibility of  directing one’s life in 
accordance with one’s own self-given ideals, into a fugitive possibility; 
an abnormality to be controlled in the name of security. This is the 
ultimate cost of instrumentalization that seeks to store up all of being 
as power, as ‘the standing reserve.’
Once the reduction of beings, and being generally, to the status of 
‘standing reserve’ is achieved, for both Richard Rorty, the self-
declared liberal, and for the neoconservative Francis Fukuyama, we 
have arrived as a human civilization, at the ‘End of History.’260 Despite 
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the obvious silliness of the idea of history ending, or of philosophy and 
the competition between political ideologies in general being things of 
the past,261 not only does postmodern liberty produce the kinds of 
displacement discussed above, not only does it generate reaction 
across the world as the theft of land and social disintegration resultant 
for communities across the world takes hold, NOT only does it also 
produce revolutionary theories, organizations, and new forms of 
transnational solidarity in the name of socialism where nations and 
communities continue to value freedom despite immensely complex 
circumstances found in both the global north and south; it also, must, 
in the end also sow the seeds of the restarting of history in the West, as 
well since the drive to globalization on which it is dependent has 
shown itself to be unaccommodating to difference. 
And while many in the West claim Mill, or Fukuyama, or before either 
of them Hegel, and other theorists representing the varieties of 
liberalism,262 made allowances for change in their political 
philosophies, the subscription of each of these thinkers to the 
teleological understanding of history sees progress as a process of 
perfectibility that allows the eventual escape from history. This belief 
forms the theological core of the political ideology of modernity. But 
the partisans of modernity cannot validate their belief in progress 
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through scientific empiricism; their desire to answer the question of 
being in a final manner - the thinnest version being Mill’s answer 
about progress and then determining that progress to be in evidence in 
Europe; the same Europe which would later consume itself and non-
European lands in a destructive fury in the 19th and 20th centuries - 
and the thickest version being found in the dialectical idealism of 
Hegel with Fukuyama, wherein the ‘End of History’ is deemed a 
rational state that can be ruled over by civil servants and a rationalized, 
politically-integrated civil society, provides a managerial framework 
for the production of Mill’s ‘progress’ and ‘ordered liberty,’ - requires 
their turning away from empirical reality. This is not freedom. Nor is it 
an acceptable substitute, because, in the end, the malcontents of this 
concept of order will cause states constituted thus to embark on 
military campaigns that, while perhaps in the short run may provide 
the states an opportunity to construct an ahistorical mythology of 
victory that gives states’ populations a sense of the state’s enduring 
quality, will in the longer term unleash centrifugal forces that will 
undo their legitimacy and authority, producing counter-identities that 
unbind state-run social orders and threaten more generally human 
coexistence altogether.
—————————————————————————
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III. From Permanence to Obedience: Necessity, Security, and 
Consciousness. To Be (authentic) or Not to Be? Permanence in 
Material Relations, Permanence in Cognition, and Freedom as 
Identity Politics
Ultimate resignation - a matter on which we invoked the words of Karl 
Polanyi at the outset - reveals much about who we are and what our 
political commitments are. In The Power Elite, C. Wright Mills has 
radically observed the core of conservative resignation - a rung on the 
descending ladder into the depths of fascism and destructiveness263 - 
wherein a “conservative mood”264 settles in over individuals who feel 
disempowered by the overawing power of powerful institutions in 
society, like the state (and especially the military/police), global 
corporations, and the entire complex of social institutions engaged and 
not engaged in business, warfare and politics, and whose ubiquity and 
omnipresence seem to not only place individuals at a disadvantage in 
pursuing whatever life plans they may imagine they have that might 
have been entirely original and their own (as Rawls would base his 
free society on in theory)265, but causes the quieting, out of strategic 
reasons, of their spontaneous being of their authentic selves.266 In 
exchange for their individuality, individuals are given the right to be 
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free of insecurity (Hobbes), to be free to reign sovereign over their 
property (Locke), to theoretically be unrestrained in their subjectivity 
so long as their actions do not ‘harm’ another (Mill), and to be free of 
the imposition of “strong poets”267 whose political fantasies must be 
privatized for the sake of the liberal community (Rorty).
In each of these instances, constituted powers in the midst of social 
order can indeed provide the individual a measure of security. But 
failing to recognize the contingency of this state of affairs, and instead 
to see security in accordance with the order of nature, societies 
governed by the technological apparatus of the state (and the extended 
state) collectively conceal political artifice in order to loan to order a 
sense of naturalness and inevitability. Democratic and purportedly 
representative polities have often based legitimate authority on the 
provision of goods associated with the security of a normalized life, on 
the one hand, and the acquiring of the resources needed to provide 
these goods, accomplished by the projection of power beyond the 
nation-state, on the other.268 Imperialism has its own institutionalizing 
dynamic, and once accepted as reality, takes on inertia that 
characterizes the sense of permanence typical of institutions that 
comprise the social constellation. Mills, writing on the way in which 
the military-industrial complex institutionalized its worldview through 
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politics, communication, educational institutions, and the world of 
business and finance through complex, largely informal, linkages,269 
argued that the epistemology underlying the “military metaphysic”270 
would lead to the widespread incorporation of the military-defined 
codification of threat perceptions into common language.271 In the 
contemporary context of the ‘war on terror,’ the acceptance of the 
military-defined worldview has resulted in the general surrender of 
most Americans, including the anti-war political left, of both the moral 
significance of their views on war and peace, and also their capacity to 
even legitimately participate in a discussion of international 
relations.272 Freedom, therefore, seems to require obedience to experts, 
and a certain willingness to remain ignorant, as well, so as to not 
challenge expert views which assign epistemological tasks and 
ontological purpose concealed as nature.273
In a situation where individuals are left alone with an inability to trust 
their own perceptions, the basis of social solidarity is threatened in a 
radical manner. The ontology found in modern liberal thought is based 
on the idea that individuals are competing with one another in a social 
context defined by natural laws of human interaction, in either a 
straightforward manner, or, more insidiously, in a zero-sum game 
wherein trust and social bonds are so frayed that individuals begin to 
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perceive their neighbors’ gain as their own personal loss, thus no 
longer content to gain for themselves but to measure these gains in 
relation to those of their neighbors. Embedded in the ideas of Rene 
Descartes and Thomas Hobbes, both theorists of absolute subjectivity, 
is the idea that individuals are in search not only of the confirmation of 
their own existence as rational beings who know the truth in terms of 
the laws of nature discerned by the application of the systematic 
methodology validated by experts, but that the presence of another 
being whose similarly-confirmed rationality one can be certain of is a 
prerequisite to security for individuals. Hobbes, in casting aspersions 
on the “vainglorious”274 takes precisely this stand since individuals 
who refuse to submit to order are insufficiently prudent and it is the 
state’s duty to socialize them or neutralize them in order to maintain 
ordered social intercourse.275 Analogously, Descartes suggests that the 
internalization of rationality as science and as a guide for behavior is a 
mark of enlightenment in relation to the dark ages wherein such 
learnings were supposedly lacking. Fear of disorder and chaos that 
predominated in feudal Europe, due, according to him, to the reign of 
unreason, could thus be overcome, and people could gain the tools 
needed to discover the knowledge that would once again provide a 
baseline to their existence - a ground for being.276
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But both of these theorists have a peculiar attitude towards the 
question of being and therefore in regard to human existence. For 
Hobbes, it was to be feared because trust was foolish in the absence of 
reserve threat, and for Descartes, the idea that parts of the world were 
unknowable by reason, or that reason could fail in comprehending the 
object of thought - in this case a version of humanity’s Other - was 
intolerable.277 So for Hobbes greater and greater levels of security 
were needed to stave off threats to existence, and for Descartes, and 
later Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and the theorists and scientists who 
fabricated the modern sciences of nature, and eventually social 
science, too, greater rationality was needed to ensure the freedom of 
individuals from the all-consuming doubt that drove Descartes to 
ground being on the escape from doubt over existence.278 
From these philosophies today we have the national security state, and 
the emergence of panopticism as the basis for knowledge about the 
elements of social order.279
Freedom comes to be associated with control. And not merely control. 
This variety of control cannot be situationally-surrendered when such a 
course would be advisable: state security is defended with the power 
over life and death, and individual existential angst is guarded against 
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through the production of language, laws of nature, the circulation of 
economic objects in markets based on the myth of the rational and 
individual actor that serves to rationalize the normalization of capital 
and currency as a mass instrument on an unprecedented scale, and 
through the tokenization of personhood as objectively present through 
the orchestration of these ensembles of being(s) for that purpose.
Against this orchestration of being we can, Martin Heidegger writes, 
“answer the call of conscience”280 which makes us aware of our 
surroundings and, importantly, the way in which our surroundings - 
physis - are rearranged by metaphysics. If we respond to the call we 
can be said to be authentically free.281 On the other hand, if we take 
note of this orchestration, find ourselves dissatisfied with its 
implications in our consciousness, and it causes existential angst and 
nausea in our bodies, upsets our bowels, and we find it otherwise 
undigestible, and we seek to treat the symptoms of these concerns 
rather than address the root causes, and in the process lose our 
conscious awareness of the possibility of asking questions that get at 
the root causes, we can be said to be both inauthentic and unfree.282
Inauthenticity offers another approach in addition to the self-numbing 
just mentioned: fully identifying with the power that commences the 
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orchestration of beings in accord with the making present of the 
identity of ‘the good.’ Polanyi, as quoted above, has termed this the 
core of fascism,283 as has Erich Fromm,284 who has described recourse 
to this as evidence of a desire to connect with a leader to alleviate 
suffering - a role that ambitious, power-seeking persons are all too 
willing to fulfill.285 Susan Sontag has defined fascism as the 
“organization of violence,” pure and simple, and violence done in the 
name of ‘the good’ is equally organized; this should call our colloquial 
use of the term ‘fascism,’ radically into quesrtion. Good or evil, assent 
to the terms of order thus constituted mean an individual is complicit 
with coercive powers of social orchestration, and more so, are willing 
to alter their own ideas about the world - at least publicly - so as to not 
give the appearance of disloyalty to established powers in society. 
Some call this security, others, hegemony geared towards the 
oppression of their being.
—————————————————————————
IV. Beneath the Ensemble, the Screams
In a recent report on the treatment of detainees at the United States’ 
naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on the daily news program 
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Democracy Now, it came to light that the extensive use of medical 
technology in all areas of such technology, physical, pain relief, 
cardiac, nutritional science, and even psychology, have been deployed 
to alleviate the suffering of the men held there, who are generally 
innocent of any crimes, remain uncharged, and have even been 
declared eligible for release from the prison camp.286 In a chilling 
interview, a physician and activist has indicated that the symptomatic 
suffering of individuals at the camp is being treated in accord with 
certain elements of the ethical code of medical science, but that the 
political exclusion and oblivion to which their humanity is subjected, 
the division of their consciousness from the overall human world287 
has left them abject and with no other choice but to fast until the death. 
Their suffering, however, is not recognized by most Americans, who 
remain distracted with the problems in their individualized milieux. 
Atop this scandalous moral disengagement among most Americas, the 
use of medicalized language of care to alleviate their tormentors of the 
reality of the inhumanity of their continued abuse obscures the matter 
behind a veil of hypocrisy rationalized through immediately-deployed 
technology to bring about distanctiation between Self and Other.
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And somewhere in the distance, ‘California Über Alles’ by the Dead 
Kennedys can be heard.:
“I am governor Jerry Brown 
My aura smiles 
And never frowns 
Soon I will be president!
Carter power will soon go away 
I will be führer one day 
I will command all of you 
Your kids will meditate in school 
California über alles 
über alles California 
Zen fascists will control you 
100% natural 
You will jog for the master race 
And always wear the happy face 
Close your eyes, can't happen here 
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Big bro' on white horse is near 
The hippies won't come back you say 
Mellow out or you will pay 
California über alles 
über alles California 
Now it is 1984 
Knock knock at your front door 
It's the suede/denim secret police 
They have come for your uncool niece 
Come quietly to the camp 
You'd look nice as a drawstring lamp 
Don't you worry, it's only a shower 
For your clothes here's a pretty flower¡ 
Die on organic poison gas 
Serpent's egg's already hatched 
You will croak, you little clown 
When you mess with President Brown 
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California über alles 
über alles California…..”288
—————————————————————————
V. The Ugliness of Beauty
“When the people of the world all know beauty as beauty, there arises 
the recognition of ugliness. When they all know the good as good, 
there arises the recognition of evil.289”
—————————————————————————
VI. Freedom as a Technology of Governmentality, Isaiah Berlin’s 
Mystification of the ‘Cold War,’ and Resignation as an Element in 
Social Order
Martin Heidegger writes of the essence of technology as the gradual 
study, mastery, and utilitarian refinement of technique - or techne - 
which allows beings to be brought nearer or kept farther for various 
reasons.290 In the introduction we have discussed already how 
technologies of distancing have been used in human society in various 
ways, and more radically (in an analytic sense), that all technology is 
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essentially about bringing beings nearer and further from individuals 
and groups. It can be said that the essence of technology is to be found 
in machines, but in the end, aren’t machines devices used to bring 
beings - in this case resource inputs for productive processes - nearer, 
and therefore to make them ready-at-hand? Similarly, and in the 
opposite case, technology pushes beings - persons or things - further 
away through the use of military means, police techniques, 
incarceration, and other mechanisms of violent, less-than-violent, and 
ideological division.291 Ideas, because of their prescriptive effects on 
human interaction, are the bases upon which we develop our 
technologies. If we organize society on the basis of the worship of a 
particular dynastic family and their members, then indeed we would 
transform through art - technique, that is - the relatively uninteresting 
minutia of their lives into totems of worship, signifiers of existential 
lessons and meanings, and engage in other such activities that 
aggrandize their existences and make their continued communal 
aggrandizement the basis for rituals that give rise to social order.
But we have come to understand technology in a very different 
manner; in a manner that has itself replaced the idea of human 
possibility, creativity, and imagination with the worship of the Self 
understood as an essentially-truly-existing being. This is not the idea 
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of the authentic self. Instead, we have come to believe that the Self has 
a truth-status to it independent of the Other, and indeed, independent 
of technology and the orchestration of beings more generally. As such, 
the sustenance of the selfhood of the Self comes to dominate all social 
relations, and the effects of this expectation can hardly be considered 
to be politically-insignificant. Medicalizing Guantanamo prisoners’ 
torture, the misuse of yoga and meditation - as well as other 
approaches to health and fitness - for the purpose of psychological 
numbing not too distinct from drug addiction, widespread alcohol 
abuse, the transformation of mainstream psychology, marketing, 
religion, and entertainment into vehicles for providing the “cultural 
enjoyment of identity”292 (as opposed to the contingency-accepting 
identity’s enjoyment of radical cultural difference), and the 
instantaneous delivery of all these technologies - and more, the list is 
more immense than one book - in real-time to one’s smartphone-cum-
pocket computer (including live updating yoga class schedules 
complete with zip code search for the jet-set) are all used to provide 
not only support to our ‘true’ selves, but to also allow us to easily tell 
ourselves a nice story about what good people we are. In postmodern 
America at the outset of the new terror wars, this is what freedom is all 
about: a market-driven fantasy of escapism.
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Gone for the most part are the old freedoms associated with overt 
racial privilege of one group over another. These privileges are now 
expressed through the standard operating procedures of police 
departments with black and latino officers who still ruthlessly hunt 
young black men and boys but who hide behind the veneer of 
rationality and security which supposedly necessitate such terrorism; 
the “blue wall of silence” makes police departments often 
impenetrable.293 And in polite company, too, women have increasingly 
seized the new technologies of the Self with a vengeance often out-
doing their male counterparts in education, career, and social 
recognition. This is not to say that patterns of racial and gender-based 
violence and criminality are surpassed. Hardly. But it is to say that the 
public discourse of Jim Crow and formal sexism in many significant 
laws have been replaced with a color/gender-blind law that masks 
continued oppression along more or less the same lines of exclusion, 
and that one who speaks up against this is widely seen as needless 
cranky, or needlessly political; to engage in verbalized critiques of 
structures of domination is to complain about the nature of things. The 
technologies that produce privilege are still in operation, but 
increasingly, formerly-officially-subjugated groups are asked to stake 
their claims for dignity on the basis of assimilating those technological 
apparatuses - especially of selfhood - without criticism of a radical 
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nature. After all, we are now all free to be ourselves, right?
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But the cost of all this is the continued division of the world into those 
who benefit from the prevailing social arrangements, and those who 
continue to be on the receiving end of the violence used against them 
in order to effect the orchestration of the world’s resources to produce 
freedom for the wealthy nations and the wealthy in the impoverished 
nations. Eric Williams has made this argument about the dependency 
of freedom on the institution of slavery in his research,294 and the 
American founders’ immensely contradictory natures, revealed in their 
writings on liberty and on race confirm this.295 The machine I use to 
type these very words I write contains rare-earth minerals harvested in 
war zones by armed gangs partially constituted of children soldiers 
who sell their wares to unscrupulous middle-men, who then bring 
those precious resources to factories in China where workers have 
been put through misery, a police state, and the repression of culture 
seen as a threat by that very state, and are compelled to churn out 
MacBook Pro laptops at a blistering pace, leading to suicides of 
workers, revolts against factory owners, and much handwringing at 
Apple Computer about how to maintain that corporation’s image as a 
progressive company appealing to liberal, self-obsessed, but 
nonetheless, supposedly good persons such as myself.
The alleviation of suffering in this context, and the expectation that 
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suffering is abjured from normal life, produces a negative 
understanding of liberty which sanctions only those expressions of 
existence which lie safely within the parameters of politics prevailing 
at the moment and the orchestration of being brought about in the 
midst of such a politics. The normalization of this idea of existence, 
and the ‘right’ for all to enjoy it amounts to the normalization of 
structural and practical violence on a day to day basis that requires 
people to conform to the machine to secure its uninterrupted 
functioning. And the entire apparatus of the state, its educational 
institutions, disciplinary and punitive facilities and organizations, 
employment institutions ranging from the blue-collar to the white-
collar, from the military to the scientist, are all aimed at ensuring that 
people accept these terms of order.296
At the same time, within our institutions of political order, nominally 
aimed at the manufacturing of this sort of freedom, a narrow band of 
acceptable identity is policed through the vehicle of toleration, which, 
much like freedom itself, is an element of the overall transformation of 
spontaneous human existence into governmentality - the “conduct of 
conduct”297 - wherein spontaneous relations of persons to persons is 
governed by the codes of conduct in line with producing the requisite 
togetherness and apartness of beings needed for the reproduction of 
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social order. For liberals, because of their moral investment in being 
‘good’ in their own self-conception, the practice of political and public 
tolerance298 becomes a technology of government that carries a 
utilitarian function, but loses its ethical character insofar as ethical 
orientations are not merely utilitarian in the present instance but can 
also have a prescriptive effect. Written into Mill’s ‘harm principle,’ and 
into Rorty’s call to avoid suffering - is the implicit charge to never 
harm anyone which of course comes to include not challenging 
persons’ beliefs about themselves, the goodness of their nation.299 
Tolerance of others could be readily withdrawn whenever the Other 
was seen to be irrational (Locke), or hot-tempered to the point of 
losing their prudence (Hobbes). Wendy Brown has theorized that 
tolerance is like a switch that may be turned on and off, and that, if we 
extend this logic, it bears a great deal of similarity to the inversion of 
the famous war theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s claim by Foucault 
whereby it is claimed that “politics is war by other means.300” The 
extension of tolerance doesn’t grant freedom to the Other, instead it 
functions much like a temporary truce aimed at achieving proper 
distance, and it also confers onto the party doing the tolerating a sense 
of superiority in relation to the party being tolerated.301 As such, 
liberalism is hardly, in practice, a political philosophy with a consistent 
set of values, but, rather, can be seen as an evolving set of 
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compromises based on the lowest-common denominator in society that 
can serve as a basis for social order.302 In all these examples evident is 
the ideological function of technology in bringing beings near and 
holding them at bay; in keeping beings in a certain spatial and 
temporal relation to one another; at arm’s length now; thereafter, in a 
tight embrace; as needed.
Now we will turn to a consideration of the two main forms of freedom 
that have been developed in the West in relation to the oft-forgotten 
ontological fields of space and time that serve as the bases for human 
existences.303 Isaiah Berlin, and before him Benjamin Constant, have 
labelled these concepts ‘positive’ or ‘ancient’ liberty, and ‘negative’ or 
‘modern’ liberty.304 Despite his reactive, despair-driven sympathies, 
which led him to support a cynical “rollback”305 strategy in the ‘Cold 
War,’ Isaiah Berlin cautions against linking this sort of defensive 
cynicism in favor of western freedom into an absolute idea that would 
come to link that policy with an absolute justification any and all acts 
commenced in its name;306 in the instance of such a transpiration, 
instead of defending negative liberty at home in the West, the Western 
powers would get caught up in unsustainable military expansion in the 
name of what westerners would call freedom, but what the rest of the 
world would see as a drive for economic hegemony, at best, or as 
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outright neocolonialism, at worst. Despite his prescience in asking our 
caution in this regard - to be cautious about saying that things are 
permanent in this world and attempting to make them so307 - and his 
withering critique of the conservative and traditionalist fear of freedom 
and liberalism (understood here as an authentic liberal culture, politics, 
and way of being made possible through political commitment as 
opposed to resort to the naturalization of fear of the Other, the 
unknown, and of the inescapable suffering inherent to life itself)308, 
Berlin nonetheless evinces in his thought a continuing fear of political 
change and call for a retreat from the world of freedom and 
revolutionary change, preferring instead, as he puts it, the kind of 
freedom he imagines only possible in a “decaying,” “late modern,” 
“capitalist culture.309”
Berlin’s conception of liberalism leaves a gaping political void which 
thankfully we can turn elsewhere to fill with more optimistic theories 
that give succor to the claim of freedom in a complex age.310 However, 
for his contemporaries Berlin’s words became the source of their 
zealous counterrevolutions fought in the name of individual freedom, 
but which trapped both the West, and the newly-free world around the 
globe, in a competition over resources to posit the absolute and 
sublime selfhood of the Self over and against one another as nations on 
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the global stage, and, eventually, in an age of globalization that sees 
the relocation of the fault lines of conflict within nations, we are 
witness to precariously cobbled-together nations unraveling along 
numerous lines of division, threatening to tear apart the social fabric in 
those societies first, and perhaps subsequently, in the West someday, as 
well.311
—————————————————————————
VII. Liberal Resignation Explored: Negative Liberty, Shrunken 
Beings, and the Rationalization of Counterrevolution
Isaiah Berlin, whose political philosophy is decidedly not one with 
great sympathies towards those on the receiving end of European 
barbarism, is nonetheless a mature and honest western liberal 
philosopher on one extremely important count: in his philosophy he 
indicates, by way of a submerged warning, that the “measure of 
pluralism”312 that has been generated in the West is fundamentally 
threatened by the historical drive, found in the West and elsewhere, to 
become entirely free of uncertainties associated with human 
existence.313 Quite sweepingly dismissing the security-obsessions of 
Hobbes and Locke in regard to property, paternal privilege, posterity, 
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and prudence run amok, and also looking beyond the ideas of John 
Stuart Mill in regard to possibility of constructing an advancing 
civilization whose continual progress is marked by enlightenment and 
social orchestration that minimizes harm through disciplinary 
education, Berlin, in an existentialist ode to contingency, and with a 
general sense of resignation, writes:
“It may be that the ideal of freedom to choose ends without claiming eternal validity 
for them, and the pluralism of values connected with this, is only the late fruit of our 
declining capitalist civilisation: an ideal which remote ages and primitive societies 
have not recognised, and one which posterity will regard with curiosity, even 
sympathy, but little comprehension. This may be so; but no sceptical conclusions 
seem to me to follow. Principles are not less sacred because their duration cannot be 
guaranteed. Indeed, the very desire for guarantees that our values are eternal and 
secure in some objective heaven is perhaps only a craving for the certainties of 
childhood or the absolute values of our primitive past. “To realise the relative 
validity of one’s convictions,” said an admirable writer of our time, “and yet to stand 
for them unflinchingly is what distinguishes civilised man from a barbarian.” To 
demand more than this is perhaps a deep and incurable metaphysical need; but to 
allow it to determine one’s practice is a symptom of an equally deep, and more 
dangerous, moral and political immaturity.314”
So here we get a strong dose of resignation. Berlin is claiming that 
there is little that the West can do to spread its notion of pluralism, 
which he explicitly associated with negative liberty315 - the spatial and 
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temporal freedom from constraint guaranteed by either recognition or 
enforcement316 - to the rest of the world, on which he piles intellectual 
calumnies that are the fashion of political theory (“remote ages,” 
“primitive societies,” etc.) which mark as real the constructed 
boundaries between self and other on which western self-conception 
lie. The best those of us fortunate enough, like Berlin and myself, 
whose parents fled from the non-West to the haloed West, giving us the 
privilege of being reared in material largesse, can hope for is to engage 
in a slow defense of the hemorrhaging (“declining”) civilization we 
happen to find ourselves to be contingently a part of for no other 
reason than dumb luck. Insofar as this requires doublethink in order to 
permit us to either have such a novel and ideal self-conception as 
being inherently worthy of such a structural position, and/or the extent 
to which we must also identify with - contingently or however - with 
the political economy of power prevailing in society at the moment, 
once again ideological and material technologies of distancing are 
required to be ready-at-hand for our use. Our acculturation to these 
means may be incomplete and less fervent than what less capaciously 
thoughtful persons reveal by their daily thoughtlessness,317 but the 
effect is the same in spite of the maturity of the resigned perspective in 
admitting to the configuration of political economy. Indeed, Berlin 
wishes that we admit to the “decline” of our social order, rather than 
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seeking to reverse the decline through whatever creative means we 
may have at our disposal in our surroundings, if only we took the 
moment to look there.
Indeed, what are our surroundings? At the time of Berlin’s writing, 
despite his protestations to the contrary against metaphysics in the 
above quote, Berlin himself, and the West in general, were engaged in 
a defense of a kind of worldview typically metaphysical in nature.318 
Charles Taylor, following Berlin’s characterization of the victims of 
imperialism and racism the world over seeking not liberty but “simply 
recognition,319” has theorized the expanding significance of “the 
politics of recognition.320” Berlin, in ‘Two Concepts of Liberty,’ in 
claiming that this is not a specie of the freedom that he associates with 
pure, unadulterated , and rational individual consciousness, but that it 
is instead a mere “search for status” driven by the desire for group 
privileges, casts a blind eye to his own Anglo, European, white, and 
class-based privileges, the product of recent global history, which 
apparently has inured him from concern that his privilege is indeed 
contingent.321
But, this is again not because of his ignorance pure and simple, nor is 
it entirely ascribable to him as an elitist ‘Cold War’ liberal, British 
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foreign service officer and lecturer at Oxford.322 To understand this 
aspect of his thought, and to see how it serves as both an opening, a 
bridge really, to a world of worlds, but how it also explains his 
recoiling from that world of pluralism, settling instead for a cosmetic 
multiculturalism and pluralism in a world dominated by the Western 
alliance in the wake of the second world war, we have to turn to an 
analysis of the formalization of the rules of negative and positive 
liberty, then being constructed as rational science by theorists of 
mathematics, statistics, economics, and the social sciences, many of 
whom prominently worked for the RAND corporation in California, a 
United States Department of Defense-associated think tank.323 There, 
during the ‘Cold War,’ researchers initially developed ‘game theory,’ 
including the infamous “prisoner’s dilemma,324” in which individual 
persons were presumed to be (1) entirely alone, (2) confronted by 
essentially hostile dispositions from all others confronted in the world 
as a characteristic of rational human behavior, and thus (3) that placing 
trust in any other person was irrational.325 As a result, the only real 
way out of the game was to have another player, with different 
interests - a state in this case as a guarantor of order trusted by both of 
the initial players - whose own interest was to seek recognition as an 
objectively real institution which could provide a framework for 
cooperation by bearing certain costs associated with insecurity.326 So 
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in this context liberalism, pluralism, and the level of civilization, 
openness, and indeed freedom for the individual it was hoped would 
be provided, are all based on the same domestication Mill insisted 
upon in ‘Civilisation,’327 and that the following words from Hobbes 
confirm as deeply-rooted in the Western imagination, combining an 
analysis of individual human nature with an extrapolation about 
interstate behavior:
“as amongst masterless men, there is perpetual war of every man against his 
neighbour, no inheritance to transmit to the son nor to expect from the father, no 
propriety of goods or lands, no security, but a full and absolute liberty in every 
particular man, so in states and commonwealths not dependent on one another every 
commonwealth (not every man) has an absolute liberty to do what it shall judge (that 
is to say, what that man or assembly representeth it shall judge) most conducing to 
their benefit.328”
To escape from the security dilemma human beings confront in a 
“masterless” condition, where the “difference of manners” found in the 
“state of nature” meant the impossibility of trusting anyone and the 
absurdity of all significations that lack the force of law for 
regularization and clarification, Hobbes offers the following 
paradigmatic, in our current terminology, essentially fascist, solution:
“To come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a subject (that is to say, what 
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are the things which, though commanded by the sovereign, he may without injustice 
refuse to do), we are to consider what rights we pass away, when we make a 
commonwealth, or (which is all one) what liberty we deny ourselves by owning all 
the actions (without exception) of the man or assembly we make our sovereign. For 
in the act of our submission consisteth both our obligation and our liberty, which 
must therefore be inferred by arguments taken  from thence, there being no 
obligation on any man which ariseth not from some act of his own; for all men 
equally are free. And because such arguments must either be drawn from the express 
words I authorize all his actions, or from the intention of him that submitteth himself 
to his power (which intention is to be understood by the end for which he so 
submitteth), the obligation and liberty of the subject is to be derived, either from 
those words (or others equivalent) or else from the end of the institution of 
sovereignty, namely, the peace of the subjects within themselves, and their defence 
against a common enemy.329”
Organizing the community thus, with internal order for the purpose of 
external security in mind, Hobbes also states that
 “The liberty of subjects lieth, therefore, only in those things which, in regulating 
their actions, the sovereign hath praetermitted (such as liberty to buy, sell, and 
otherwise contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their 
own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit; and the 
like).330”
Those who operate outside the bounds of the social contract - the 
“covenant” - are deemed “vainglorious331;” their very inability to 
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submit to the terms of social order causes them to be considered by 
those thus prostrating to be dangerous outlaws. Unable to authorize the 
institution of sovereignty, the vainglorious remain, from our 
perspective, spontaneously free, but for the purposes of order they 
count neither as individuals with rational capacities, nor as members of 
the community with the same privileges and immunities of 
membership derived by other automatically conforming persons.
When studying recent western social orders, and many in other parts 
of the world where we locate the drive for security of life understood 
as permanence - needed to give succor to the functioning of the 
“ontologically insecure”332 mind - the prevalence of outlaws in relation 
to the social order can be readily observed. Indeed, rather than 
resembling a rational construction of social order, the Hobbesian-
inspired system under consideration here, which secures the negative 
liberty of individuals even at the cost of rendering individuals 
submissive in their very being, appears to license government officials 
to render those found in society and transform them into threats to 
order, to be made an example of. Hobbes is explicit about this 
maneuver, so we can at least appreciate his honesty - an honesty no 
other nominally liberal theorist following him would grant us in their 
discourse on matters political.333 In the context of a civil war, 
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individuals, according to Hobbes, have experienced the danger of 
violence, surely, but more significantly for the question of building a 
reliable social order on the ashes of a situation such as the kind of 
conflict Hobbes was warning posterity to be on guard for,  was the 
matter of freeing individuals from what Hobbes termed “absurdity,” 
which would arise when definitions, moral values, and all other 
socially-useful signifiers would be robbed of their meaning334; to re-
inject meaning into words themselves the definitional authority of the 
sovereign was necessary. Through this mechanism people could once 
again come to trust one another in the midst of a manufactured cold 
peace guaranteed by the threat of overwhelming force. 
But because of the inherent division of the world into spheres of 
existence on display in Hobbes’ thought - a division echoed variously 
in others’ subsequent thinking - the individuals who are the 
beneficiaries of the kind of violence against internal recalcitrants and 
external threats, who cannot bear to accept their own violence which is 
thus abstracted from their daily awareness, come to rely on a variety of 
charms, tokens, and, in essence, ego-ideals as projections of 
themselves to reinforce their worthiness to benefit from the divisions 
they have sown in the world through their variously collective 
agencies in order to procure the necessary resources to make manifest 
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their ability to be good persons. Although Isaiah Berlin appears to 
attune a certain maturity in his acceptance of contingency in his 
thought, he nonetheless fails to say anything about those who are on 
the receiving end of the violence that polices the boundaries of 
political economy in space, time, and in the soul of individuals whose 
spontaneity is most precluded by the status quo.335 In Berlin’s world, 
where positive liberty - a positive project aimed at producing a 
freedom to live life in accordance with one’s visions of justice336 - 
must always conclude in a totalitarian project, indeed, all we can hope 
for is a world of trinkets, in which we can become “men without 
chests,” who pass the time “bowling alone,” at history’s end.337 To 
accept that history has ended, a view that Berlin anticipated in his 
thought when he declares “our civilisation” to be in terminal decline, is 
to accept a way of life associated with negative liberty, but in its 
reactive, resigned, and defensive mode, activates the intervention of 
the state, social institutions, and other mechanisms of panoptic 
normalizing-individualizing training to bring about that way of being, 
which transforms negative liberty into a positive liberty doctrine.338
Essentially, the positive liberty doctrine of negative liberty - the right 
to be free to live the form of life free from insecurity, fear, 
impermanence, and other obstacles - by domesticating all positive 
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values and terming them expressions of individual choice from a 
rational actor’s tabula rasa mind, by calling the repressive expressions 
of identity formulated under such circumstances ‘culture’, and 
deigning their collective expression to be pluralism, by requiring the 
submission of all individuals to the terms of order as laid down by the 
political institution of a sovereignty that is seen as the guarantor of a 
cold peace between individuals who would otherwise be at each 
other’s throats, reduces the range of what can be called freedom, what 
evidence of rational behavior on the part of individuals can be 
regarded as indicative of the free actions of rational individuals, 
creates widespread social mistrust replete with all the human emotions 
associated with antipathy between persons (jealously and envy, fear, 
lack of respect, objectification and manipulability, etc.), and leaves 
persons in an “un-worlded,” disoriented, state of shock.339 Of course 
all of these realities contradict the stated purpose of freedom and a 
social order designed to guarantee freedom for individuals.
From Berlin’s resignation, which gives rise during the ‘Cold War’ to 
the foreign policy doctrine of “rollback” that saw wars of national 
liberation as threats for the West, to Hobbes’ dismissal of the 
“vainglorious” in favor of the prudential, to Locke’s castigation of the 
“quarrelsome and contentious” as being unworthy as inefficient land 
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stewards in relation to the goals of marketization and productivity that 
are found at the center of the capitalist existential ethos, to Rorty’s 
ethnocentric - albeit ironic - pride in liberalism as the progeny of the 
West that has necessarily given birth to its now global mission to save 
the world from suffering, and to Fukuyama’s claim of the same 
combined with an activist declaration in favor of spreading democracy 
through the beneficent agency of elites who had understood the 
necessity of domesticating humanity’s thymos for the sake of giving 
people what they really wanted - despite their protestations to the 
contrary - what we witness is a promulgation of freedom with limits 
affixed that reflect the panoply fears of social groups and individuals 
whose attitudes are structurally-situated for dissemination by various 
media.340
Berlin’s warning to the Western world to guard against the reification 
of liberty as a thing in itself went unheeded, but that the same 
proclivity which he was critiquing in fact characterized his idea of the 
individual: an abstraction of being from the community and the mind’s 
powers of rationality and reason from the physical body on which it 
depends for sustenance, developing an idea of a purer reason and more 
rational rationality individuals can be capable of that can then be taken 
as evidence of their being civilized and properly educated, and can 
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therefore rationally confirm for others their being(s). In other words, 
Berlin’s own notion of freedom is caught up with the search for and 
the guarantee of status, which, as it were, cannot be surrendered for the 
sake of adapting to a changed world condition that would cause one’s 
civilization to go into decline. When new forms of liberty are pressed 
for, when groups whose historical cultures have been denied by the 
depravity of colonialism and imperial domination by alien powers, are 
these newly-assertive political formations, nations and ideological 
movements both, seeking their freedom or “merely” their “status” as 
full human beings?341 Berlin indeed admits that “the craving for status 
is, in certain respects, very close to the desire to be an independent 
agent,”342 but subsequently concludes his discussion on the “search for 
status” stating that
“such revolutionaries have usually felt it necessary to argue that, despite this, they 
represented the part of liberty, or “true” liberty, by claiming universality for their 
ideal, which the “real selves” of even those who resisted them were also alleged to be 
seeking, although they were held to have lost the way to the goal, or to have 
mistaken the goal itself owing to some moral or spiritual blindness. All this has little 
to do with Mill’s notion of liberty as limited only by the danger of doing harm to 
others. It is the non-recognition of this psychological and political fact (which lurks 
behind the apparent ambiguity of the term “liberty”) that has , perhaps, blinded some 
contemporary liberals to the world in which they live. Their plea is clear, their cause 
is just. But they do not allow for the variety of basic human needs. Nor yet for the 
ingenuity with which men can prove to their own satisfaction that the road to one 
                    147
ideal also leads to its contrary.”343
Berlin fails to recognize his invocation of true freedom as a concept in 
his essay at this point, and, that in his favored doctrine of negative 
liberty which at its core presumes the provision of security for 
individuals to be able to be, entirely without impediment, commits 
precisely the same sin in relation to liberty generally that he has 
ascribed here to those who seek merely an equalized status as opposed 
to the true cosmonauts - such as Berlin himself and as well members 
from his social and intellectual circles - in search of the truer liberty. 
Sustaining these privileges in the face of the drive for status, logically, 
therefore, requires at the same time the distancing of the witnessing of 
violence inherent in the system from those who will enjoy negative 
liberty if this doctrine is supported by legitimization as the freedom of 
free human beings - since those not enjoying it must have their 
deprivation rationalized in some manner. However, even in the case of 
the fortunate ones with the ability to enjoy negative liberty - in Berlin’s 
time persons such as himself, in ours a good example being the 
middles classes and labor aristocracies of the  capitalist states - its 
production, and its continuing security, still require the harnessing of 
the technologies associated with some positive conception of life - 
even if that positive conception is paradoxically negating and nihilistic 
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in its practical effect on society by means of quantifying nature in the 
name of culture transformed into permanent institution to be preserved 
against all possible decay through the articulation of all values - of the 
human world and the natural world - towards the operationalization of 
physis permanently subordinated to the metaphysics of order.
—————————————————————————
IX. Rationalism and Nihilism at the End of History, or, Nietzsche’s 
Prophecy: “The War of Spirits”
Thus it is not controversial even in the most spirited homes of science 
to realize, despite our technologies, physis has become obscure to us as 
a result the way in which the systematization of knowledge has 
truncated the confidence of the individual in their own perceptions, 
and therefore in their unmediated experience of our surroundings. But 
physis, in its very way of being, always remains there, and, as such, 
teems and overflows the containers of conceptualization that 
characterize the hegemonic understanding of being, and so therefore 
must be tamed from its teeming if one is to retain faith in a 
metaphysical system. Such a feat must be impossible unless 
individuals organize through class, identity, nationalism, religious 
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nationalism, or even the normalization of individuality for the sake of 
making it functional for group-based maneuvers on which the system’s 
reproduction, material and ideological, is premised. In such a 
circumstance, freedom, conceived of as governmentality, has come to 
rely on economic activity organized with the assistance of the state and 
its associated institutional milieu - private and public - backed up by 
the decidedly illiberal machinery of sovereignty armed with the ability 
to decide on death, life, and, more to the point in crafting an ordered 
liberty, the form of life itself.344 So global elites have to fix “the 
economy, stupid” so that resources can be made available for ensuring 
selective benefits for those who accede to the terms of order and so 
that these can be credibly withheld as a sanction against those who fail 
to do so.345 Economic and technocratic political management is not 
merely a matter of applying a slide-rule to laws of nature and 
determining outcomes and policies to be utilized and sought after. 
Rather, a depoliticized politics of freedom emerges, judging some to 
be free, others not, some to be worthy of freedom, others not, some to 
be trainable for freedom, others beyond the pale, and so forth; this 
produces novel forms of exclusion based on an artificial division 
between the free and the unfree, on the basis of shifting, essentialized, 
but still inessential, criteria.346
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Aiming to discipline the conduct of society, and to do so in the name 
of freedom, requires the creation of an accountable subject whose 
actions can be measured against a proper standard for evaluation, and 
for Nietzsche, the emergence of free will, which would become the 
basis of this modern accountability, is a story thus etched in the 
dripping blood of slaves, subjugated persons, and out of the pains 
inflicted on oneself in the name of discipline.347 Most importantly, 
though, he has stated that the “civil servant,” who in a democratic age 
nominally-free of feudal titles of nobility, is, theoretically, every 
citizen in society who must presumably take responsibility for the 
sustenance of social order, and, who, in adhering to the terms of order 
as regards proper administration of rational behavior aimed at social 
progress348, confirms having achieved becoming a “thing-in-itself,” 
“raised up” over and above the actual individual (“the civil servant as 
phenomena”) such that judgment about right and wrong, about good 
and evil conduct, can be rendered.349 Thus can a person be said to not 
only be free, and here Nietzsche is critiquing Kant, but to be 
trustworthy enough to be left alone in their freedom since their identity 
with rationality means they wont disturb social order. If they were to 
disturb the order of the day, they could be deemed to be unfree and 
lacking in the requisite character for freedom.350 Nietzsche’s original 
words on the matter follow:
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“What is the task of all higher education?” To turn men into machines. “What are the 
means?” Man must learn to be bored. “How is that accomplished?” By means of the 
concept of duty. “Who serves as the model?” The philologist: he teaches grinding. 
“Who is the perfect man?” The civil servant. “Which philosophy offers the highest 
formula for the civil servant?” Kant’s: the civil servant as a thing-in-itself raised up 
to be judge over the civil servant as phenomenon.351” 
Cedric Robinson has pointed out the development and adoption of 
Kant’s political and moral philosophies in the predecessor states and 
cities of what would become Germany - as a philosophical ground for 
their nascent liberal legal orders - where a need arose to normalize 
bourgeois rationality came at the expense having a historically present, 
contingent, and authentic way of being and instead sought the 
securitization of social order352. Kant’s extreme doubtfulness of 
objective reality combined with his neoplatonist distinction between 
the higher faculties of the mind and the lowliness of the body - which 
had to be controlled for the sake of having any chance of accessing the 
real through objective laws of observation - made his philosophy 
appealing to those with sedentary, small-pleasures-filled lifestyles in 
the cities.353 These are the same people Nietzsche would later decry for 
the offense of yearning for the kind of freedom of “Christians, Cows, 
Shopkeepers,” etc. This class’ anxieties as the middle-classes between 
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the feudal lords and the very wealthy on the one hand and the 
impoverished, laboring, and bonded classes, on the other hand, which 
made them especially insecure about downward mobility and resentful 
of those above them, also encouraged the discovery of “a new social 
order”354 in which their creative energies could be unleashed and 
where those below them would also be clearly demarcated from them 
through new, reworked codes of social privilege and recognition that 
would serve as the basis for such.355 But as Charles Mill has written, 
this amounted to, when contextualized with Kant’s writings on race 
and empire,356 a theory of racialism that both distinguished the 
bourgeois from other classes, and, at least in Kant’s work, also sought 
to determine the basis for that distinction; and thus began a sad 
tradition of racism in German thought which would be found in the 
writings of Max Weber, Hegel, Marx and Engels, Nietzsche, and of 
course, Heidegger, as well. What Kant sought was not freedom per se, 
but what subsequent scholars have termed herrenvolk democracy - 
master race democracy - which would do away with titles of hereditary 
nobility restricted to family and would expand the circle of recognition 
to those within a nation whose identity with rational, moral, and 
universal law indicates their elevation and legitimate capacity to shape 
common affairs.357 But in addition to the overt racism of Kant’s 
philosophy, which advocated a European union of states that would 
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conquer and civilize the world in accord with European values in the 
name of taming wildness and uncivilized peoples,358 the strong 
emphasis in his work on following the moral law as revealed by reason 
which if applied properly would produce the same outcome in all 
similar instances tended to alleviate the individual of the actual need to 
think authentically about a given situation, and transforms freedom 
into a tool used by the judges of social order and comity to ensure 
compliance with normal functioning over and against the spontaneous 
freedom of the individual. Nietzsche writes:
“Becoming has been deprived of its innocence when any being-such-and-such is 
traced back to will, to purposes, to acts of responsibility: the doctrine of the will has 
been invented essentially for the purpose of punishment, that is, because one wants 
to impute guilt. The entire old psychology, the psychology of will, was conditioned 
by the fact that its originators, the priest at the head of ancient communities, wanted 
to create for themselves the right to punish - or wanted to create this right for God. 
Men were considered “free” so that they might be judged and punished - so that they 
might become guilty: consequently, every act had to be considered as lying within 
the consciousness.359” 
Seeking to make reference to a higher order as the source of all value, 
rather than seeing the idea of a higher order as a man-made idea 
fabricated under specific circumstances, placing the idea of freedom in 
the realm of this higher order - essentializing it - is not only not 
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empirical insofar as freedom cannot be described in this manner with 
any degree of stability lest actual expressions of freedom come to 
contradict it and judged therefore as species of unfreedom, but it also 
obscures the question of being by removing responsibility for one’s 
self.
On this question of value many seek to describe Nietzsche as either an 
extreme individualist or as an apologist for the genocides of the 
twentieth century which came after him by saying that those types of 
historic crimes were only possible because of the moral relativism his 
philosophy introduced with so much deadly poetry.360 However this is 
an unfair characterization leveled on him by people who have failed to 
comprehend the dialectical concept of repression-response, or 
sublimation-desublimation, centered on the bodily reality of human 
life, that is at the core of his philosophy. Seeking to escape the body - 
more to the point, death and decay - and not being content with the 
poetry of theologies that speaks of a return to the sacred realm or 
fusing with the universe, god, or whatever other holy concept, indeed 
seeking to prove the reality of this goodness for the law-abiding, for 
the conformist, such individuals are characterized by their total lack of 
belief since their reduction of belief and faith to rational categories of 
empirical science, in the end, must also reveal the illusion of their god 
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to themselves, as well. Tropes of the nation, of nationalist exception, of 
racial glory, of rational perfectibility of the rational self-interested 
actor whose superior knowledge makes them the representative of the 
consummated essence of all humanity (or at least of the nation), and 
negatively, tropes of the fear of otherness as threats to positive 
conceptions of the Self; these are all the circulating discourses of a 
culture and a society whose aim is to convince itself of its own 
existence, and atop, its goodness and worthiness for goodness.
Anticipating the desires of persons like Fukuyama to formalize control 
over human existence and the history-making quality that we find in 
each person, Nietzsche issued the following declaration in the name of 
the highest freedom, which, when we combine with Heidegger’s 
argument that the essence of being is “care,361” produces a radical 
insight about the activity of caretaking, the dialectical relationship 
between Self and Other as always already informing the becoming of 
beings, and, most importantly, that this process will never truly come 
to a close and we will never be alleviated of its’ needing to be 
practiced. 
“What alone can be our doctrine? That no one gives man his qualities - neither God, 
not society, nor his parents and ancestors, nor he himself. (The nonsense of the last 
idea was taught as “intelligible freedom” by Kant - perhaps by Plato already.) No one 
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is responsible for man’s being there at all, for his being such-and-such, or for his 
being in these circumstances or in this environment. The fatality of his essence is not 
to be disentangled from the fatality of all that has been and will be. Man is not the 
effect of some special purpose, of a will, an end; nor is he the object of an attempt to 
attain an “ideal of humanity” or an “ideal happiness” or an “ideal of morality.” It is 
absurd to wish to devolve one’s essence on some end or other. We have invented the 
concept of “end”: in reality there is no end.362” 
 
There is no escape from life other than death. Anything short of that is 
an illusion whose effects on the body and mind make life less than 
what it could have otherwise been, and, because our consciousness is 
spontaneous and our intelligence is coeval with physis and not with the 
realm of the pure forms and ideas whose various manifestations in 
ancient and modern philosophies have kept this old prejudice alive and 
well into the day and age of the sciences, our lives, if lived in a manner 
that takes those forms as the signposts of all meaning and existence, 
will be consumed by resentment against what is, what could have 
been, and could be. We will call those free, dialectically engaged 
persons interacting with their surroundings “terrorists” for reminding 
us of this immediateness of our existences, and in defense of our 
spiritualized notion of the Self, be it group-centered or individual-
centered; we will wage war against the Other. Policing the boundaries 
of the Self with the concept of morality, the accumulated resentments 
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of humanity coalesced around nation-states - “the ministry for 
collective salvation through a politics of generalized resentment”363 - 
which will then wage wars in ways never imagined possible in 
previous times lacking the extravagant, and therefore fragile and 
highly vulnerable, techno-political orchestrations of our age of the 
“world picture.”
“I contradict as has never been contradicted before and am nevertheless the opposite 
of a No-saying spirit. I am a bringer of glad tidings like no one before me; I know 
tasks of such elevation that any notion of them has been lacking so far; only 
beginning with me are there hopes again. For all that, I am necessarily also the man 
of calamity. For when truth enters into a fight with the lies of millennia, we shall 
have upheavals, a convulsion of earthquakes, a moving of mountains and valleys, the 
like of which has never been dreamed of. The concept of politics will have merged 
entirely with a war of spirits; all power structures of the old society will have been 
exploded - all of them are based on lies; there will be wars the like of which have 
never yet been seen on earth. It is only beginning with me that the earth knows great 
politics.364”
In the previous section we discussed Isaiah Berlin’s criticism of 
positive liberty on the lines of his general rejection of all absolute 
ideals of “armed prophets” who would force belief in a “final solution” 
to the problems inherent in the human condition on recalcitrant and 
aberrant individuals whose ways of living rejected totalized visions.365 
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Here we have a prophecy from Nietzsche about the rise of precisely 
those armed prophets whose notion of truth - systematic lies 
concerning the unfolding of existence in order to retain the illusion of 
permanence - as a spiritualized and essentialized collection of iotas 
eventually requires them to engage in precisely the sort of militancy 
Berlin associates with positive liberty doctrines including 
revolutionary doctrines of national liberation in the 3rd world. Fanon 
anticipated this development when he discussed how nationalist 
movements would be tempted by the tokenization of identity as a 
sufficient, even exemplary, triumph over the degradation of their 
societies by colonialism and the racist insults they had to endure under 
those systems of rule.366 Like Nietzsche, Fanon understood that the 
mind resides within the body and that attempts to discipline the mind’s 
apprehension of the unfolding of reality without taking heed of the 
basic human drives, including in the context of overcoming 
colonialism and racism the drive to overcome humiliation, are doomed 
to be inadequate.367 Berlin, on the other hand, yields to resignation 
about the inescapability of the situation of the late capitalist west, 
which, in seeking to preserve its’ pluralism and zone of negative 
liberty, would be met with multifarious challenges from the emerging 
world whose very ability to be human had been stripped from them in 
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order to bring negative liberty to the West, and as a result, is resigned 
to the state of affairs that predominated the early ‘Cold War’ wherein 
American power, as the leading power in the West, would come to be 
used against wars of national liberation because these wars, as “wars 
of spirit,” were contests over not only the decolonization of the 
physical world where colonialism once ruled with an iron fist, but also 
were threats to the very idea of freedom being based on the ability of 
the individual to proceed through life unimpeded that propelled the 
imperial vision in the first place.368
Berlin himself was a partisan of this idea of freedom, but failed to 
recognize that a metaphysical notion of the Self - contradicting the 
rejection of absolute ideals stressed elsewhere in his thought and 
ultimately the source of his liberal counterrevolutionary resignation in 
the face of a rising tide of positive liberty - called much of his 
philosophy of freedom radically into question for a burgeoning global 
physis:
“The desire to not be impinged upon, to be left to oneself, has been a mark of high 
civilisation on the part of both individuals and communities. The sense of privacy 
itself, of the area of personal relationships as something sacred in its own right, 
derives from a conception of freedom which, for all its religious roots, is scarcely 
older, in its developed state, than the Renaissance or the Reformation. Yet its decline 
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would mark the death of a civilisation, of an entire moral outlook.369”
Evident in Berlin’s words here, as well as the quote from him above 
where he indicated that pluralism and negative liberty were better and 
more humane than the alternatives, and that these ideals are the 
progeny of the West alone - an advanced West whose giving way to the 
non-West in regard to the mantle of global leadership would do all 
humanity a disservice - is that he somehow thinks that personal 
relationships and privacy were not human concerns before the rise of 
the Christian concept of the Self, and, at that, the Protestant version, 
since it is in that movement where many theorists have located the 
individualization of the Self, including even Polanyi and Fromm, 
whose work is otherwise more open-minded and reluctant to draw 
conclusions about the presence or lack thereof of these ideas in other 
parts of the world prior to or concurrently with European modernity.370 
Because of this view, Berlin, historicizing history in accordance with 
the narrative of progress associated with the Enlightenment, of course 
comes to think that the rise of new nations beyond the West will 
become a threat to the West.
Berlin’s feelings were hardly restricted to him. We have already 
considered some of those whose thoughts prior to those of Berlin’s 
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arrival prefigured this idea of the defense of the individual understood 
as a set of interests and possessions - both material and ideological - 
that led them to sound the alarms for the need to defend order at home, 
and to also export order abroad, in the name of what they imagined to 
be freedom. In fact, as Robin says about Tocqueville, this was not 
really much more than anxiety over the loss of privileges and status 
associated with changing political fortunes leading to a need to reassert 
oneself in foreign lands - a process he traces from Tocqueville to the 
modern day when observing the resignation of American liberals 
post-9.11 to the reactionary politics of the right-wing of the 
Republican party within the US resulting in the reassertion of their 
ostensibly liberal understanding of themselves by projecting their 
powers onto a world to be civilized abroad.371 The consensus that has 
emerged regarding neoconservative/neoliberal politics and economic 
theory, with privatization of public wealth and institutions, the 
attenuation of welfare policies, the rise of police state practices for 
those within the territory of the West - a mirror-image with allowances 
for sensitivities of sentiment relative to those practices elsewhere - and 
other elements of the political economy of forced austerity and the 
propaganda of discipline reflects anxiety over the loss of status. This is 
proven by the simple fact that liberals who might otherwise challenge 
these policies find themselves either being apologists for them or 
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increasingly in favor of some of them.372 Liberals can thus make 
common cause to be made with despotism in the name of liberty, both 
at home and abroad, as Mill endorsed at the height of Britain’s liberal 
imperialism projects aimed at the production of the political economy 
of empire geared toward the freeing of individuals (such as himself) 
deemed worthy of all the resources needed to enact eccentric liberty.373
Chris Hedges has recently indicated that this understanding of 
freedom, whose ultimate conceit is nothing more than selfishness, and 
an egoistic failure to engage in self-examination and self-criticism 
because oneself is deemed to be worthy of everything, eventually 
boomerangs. Americans prosecuting the ‘war on terror’ - a quest for 
global hegemony over resources masked in the language of ‘just war’ 
theory - with the importation of the tactics of the ‘war on terror’ into 
America itself indicates the veracity of this epistemological slippage 
since perceptions about the appropriateness of policy emerging from 
resignation about the chances of changing the world for the better, 
within America and abroad, and over the moral-ethical framework in 
which state policies should be conceptualized.374 Failure to change the 
world in America has led liberals to campaign beyond America to save 
nations from humanitarian catastrophes, but when those campaigns 
fail, which they seemingly always do recently if we consider the wars 
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in Iraq and Afghanistan, at least from a liberal perspective in line with 
the reasons prominent self-appointed liberals gave for favoring 
invasion in 2001 and 2003, those same liberals have sought to blame 
domestic American constituencies such as lazy American workers and 
students, whistle-blowers who have revealed immense corruption and 
criminality on the part of the government, and other marginal domestic 
groups.375 In this these instances liberals have replayed the same 
accusatory tone that conservatives spoke after the US withdrawal from 
Vietnam, wherein anti-war demonstrators, blacks, women, and other 
people on the move in the 1960’s and 70’s were seen as fifth-
columnists whose seeming disloyalty somehow influenced American 
soldiers abroad and led to a decline in their morale in that ignominious 
war.376
In such a context budget cuts at home and belief in military force 
abroad, for the ruling classes this belief becomes an ideology held in 
unison across the partisan divide. For to retreat into creature comforts, 
and to reorder society, at home and abroad, to protect these 
indulgences, regardless of whether one enjoys multiculturalism or 
football, burgers, and beer, is the same thing: the fascism of the Self. 
Combined and coordinated selves, conservatives and liberals alike 
have resigned themselves to a compromise on social issues - in the 
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form of a depoliticized agreement to disagree - in order to cooperate 
on economic and military/strategic ones. They thus preside over the 
“death of the liberal class.” “Support for the war” Hedges writes
“has allied liberals with venal warlords in Afghanistan who are as opposed to the 
rights of women and basic democratic freedoms, and as heavily involved in opium 
trafficking, as the Taliban. The supposed moral lines between the liberal class and 
our adversaries are fictional. The uplifting narratives used to justify the war in 
Afghanistan are pathetic attempts by the liberal class to redeem acts of senseless 
brutality. War cannot be waged to instill any virtue, including democracy or the 
liberation of women. War always empowers those who have a penchant for violence 
and access to weapons. War turns the moral order upside down and abolishes all 
discussions of human rights. War banishes the just and the decent to the margins of 
society. The power of modern weapons means inevitable civilian deaths or 
“collateral damage.” An aerial drone is our version of an improvised explosive 
device. An iron fragmentation bomb is our answer to a suicide bomb. A burst from a 
belt-fed light machine gun causes the same terror and bloodshed among civilians no 
matter who pulls the trigger.”377
Liberals, according to Hedges, used to critique capitalism but now 
have “embraced the market,” and have chased radicals out of their 
ranks. The result?
“Mechanisms of control…have produced the “patriotic” citizen, plagued by job 
losses, bankrupted by medical bills, foreclosed on his or her house, and worried 
about possible terrorist attack. In this historical vacuum, the “patriotic” citizen clings 
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to the privilege of being a patriot - or, perhaps, the double privilege of bring white 
and a patriot. The retreat into tribal identity is a desperate attempt to maintain self-
worth and self-importance at a time of deep personal and ideological confusion. The 
“patriotic” citizen, although abused by the actual policies of the state, unfailingly 
supports widespread surveillance and permanent war. The “patriotic” citizen does not 
question the $1 trillion in defense-related spending. The “patriotic” citizen accepts 
that the eighteen military and civilian intelligence agencies, most of whose work is 
now outsourced to private corporations, are held above the government. The 
“patriotic” citizen accepts the state’s assertion that it needs more police, prisons, 
inmates, spies, mercenaries, weapons, and troops than any other industrialized 
nation. The “patriotic” citizen objects when anyone suggests that military budgets 
can be cut, that troops need to come home, that domestic policies need more 
attention than the pursuit of permanent war. The military-industrial lobbies have 
ensured that military budgets are untouchable. The “patriotic” citizen admires the 
military and somehow pretends that the military is not part of the government. In the 
name of patriotism, the most powerful instruments of state power and control are 
effectively removed from public discussion. We endure more state control than at any 
time in U.S. History. And the liberal class, whose task was once to monitor and 
protest the excesses of the power elite, has assisted in the rout…
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… The failure by the liberal class to articulate an alternative in a time of financial 
and environmental collapse clears the way for military values of hypermasculinity, 
blind obedience, and violence. A confused culture disdains the empathy and 
compassion espoused by traditional liberalism. The cruelty runs like an electric 
current through reality television and trash-talk programs, where contestants endure 
pain and humiliation while they betray and manipulate those around them in a 
ruthless world of competition. These are the values championed by an increasingly 
militarized society and the manipulation and dishonesty on Wall Street. Friendship, 
trust, solidarity, honesty, and compassion are banished for the unadulterated world of 
competition.”378
 
Recent polls taken of Americans concerning the use of drones to kill 
people in supposedly hostile nations and regions, including a question 
that explicitly stated that it would be “acceptable to target civilians” 
produced astonishing results showing support by a portion comfortably 
higher than a simple majority.379 As Robin has also pointed out, the 
fear of being labeled unpatriotic has led to self-censorship among 
liberal media networks, has produced a total silencing of political 
activism in the workplace for fear of losing one’s job, has silenced 
Arab-American and Muslim-American communities with fear and 
concern over becoming targets for vigilante violence, and, Robin also 
indicates, all of this has become not only acceptable for influential 
liberals whose writings and speech set the tone for the culture of 
liberalism in America, but that beyond that, that they have actively 
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chided detractors for being unpatriotic in precisely the way Hedges 
indicates in the preceding selection.380
Berlin’s words foreshadow the kinds of compromises Hedges indicates 
in his essays, and that Hannah Arendt also understood to be at play in 
the racism that undergirded the halcyon days of European 
imperialism.381 Negative liberty in this sense is a universe of false 
pluralisms whereby what counts as plural is not the spontaneity of 
distinct consciousnesses - the chief reason for pluralism’s appeal - but 
instead the apparent, surface-level preservation of identities as 
essentialized iotas of culture which become impenetrable fortresses to 
the power of spontaneous reason flowing from the apprehension of 
physis and to the dialectical interplay between persons and nations 
inherent to freedom. Berlin, illustrating just this compromise of 
identification with the power that can provide protection, unwittingly 
reveals the fascist core of what has come to be understood as 
liberalism:
“[Another] characteristic of this notion of liberty is of greater importance. It is that 
liberty in this sense is not incompatible with some kinds of autocracy, or at any rate 
with the absence of self-government. Liberty in this sense is principally concerned 
with the area of control, not with its source……..The despot who leaves his subjects 
a wide area of liberty may be unjust, or encourage the wildest inequalities, care little 
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for order, or virtue, or knowledge, but provided he does not curb their liberty, or at 
least curbs it less than many other regimes, he meets with Mill’s specification…… 
The desire to be governed by myself, or at any rate to participate in the process by 
which my life is to be controlled, may be as deep a wish as that for a free area for 
action, and perhaps historically older. But it is not a desire for the same thing. So 
different it is, indeed, as to have led in the end to the great clash of ideologies that 
dominate our world. For it is this, the ‘positive’ conception of liberty, not freedom 
from, but freedom to - lead one prescribed form of life - which the adherents of the 
‘negative’ notion represent as being, at times, no better than a specious disguise for 
brutal tyranny.382”
All attempts, according to Berlin to change the prevailing framework 
of negative liberty to make space for new ways of being not presently 
accepted because of the long-term normalization of ways of being an 
individual and the social and political arrangements of resources as the 
“standing reserve” to bring about that state of individuality, must 
terminate in the curtailment of freedom in accordance with the 
presumption that all such attempts to change the world can only be 
aimed at the elimination of contingency.383 Berlin’s other point, that 
negative liberty is a special blessing of the West for the rest of the 
world reinforces this belief - ahistorically we are quick to add - and 
that therefore it is absolutely imperative to produce the social 
arrangement that will give succor to people of Berlin’s class’ self-
conception as free persons without obstacles in their way so that they 
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can strategically offer the rest of humanity bits of freedom as well, 
when they are so generous as to part with their precious time and 
resources.
Making the sublime body of the individual understood as a 
representation of the Self of more importance than the individual as an 
actual phenomena in the world as the world unfolds moment by 
moment has had the effect of alienating people from their own sense of 
self-interest, gearing them towards the defense of their idealized 
conception of what they imagine themselves to be: completely free, 
among the haloed and blessed, and not having to engage in explanation 
of their addictive patterns of behavior, either to others, or more 
importantly here, to themselves. Beholden to their drug-dealer who 
sells them their selves, individuals learn to not question authority.
This notion of the Self leaves individuals entirely at the mercy of (1) 
securing the signification of identity in the being of the Other 
understood as absolutely other, and (2) since this in the end will be 
deemed unreliable for the permanence-seeking being, this concept of 
the Self leaves the individual with no other option but to accept the 
intervention of a 3rd party to provide stability to the terms of order 
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undergirding the production of permanence in the midst of an 
uncertain existence. The RAND corporation undertook a series of 
experiments which produced an ideology that dismissed collective 
action as “irrational,” and that individuals behaving rationally would 
not act in “the common interest,” and that not only were forms of 
authoritarian statism with the outward appearance of communism and 
socialism to be feared as the deleterious outcomes of social 
organization, but that because “[unions must] require compulsory 
policies to achieve results,” the labor movement, too had the same 
“authoritarian overtones.”384
While much has been made of these theories of human behavior, their 
claim to empirical validity can be brought into question by the 
prevalence of movements to change the world that overcome the 
collective action problem purportedly insurmountable in the absence 
of a 3rd party to give confidence to the individuals, or groups of 
individuals, attempting to cooperate with each other. Other examples 
of socially-significant action on the part of individuals and groups 
abound such that these theories cannot be seen as much more than a 
systematized prejudice built on the assumptions of Hobbes’ political 
thought whereby what was understood by Hobbes to be the 
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characteristic of a limit situation of political conflict and an extremely 
prudent pathway suggested to be followed in such a conflict so as to 
maximize security and survivability, is transformed into a general 
theory of human behavior in places and times even when the question 
of political order is not as pressing as it was in Hobbes’ day. As a result 
a spectacularly disabling fear is promulgated throughout society, 
tearing asunder social formations, public worlds, communities, labor 
unions, and any forms of combination that could cause individuals to 
resent extra work.385 Indeed, the most influential game in the rational 
choice theory pantheon was named “fuck you buddy” wherein it was 
presumed that the Other would always have an incentive because of 
not being able to guarantee one’s own cooperation with them, to cheat 
and betray their fellow person, suggesting that betrayal was to be the 
norm in what would come to be understood as rational human 
behavior.386 What emerges, from the capitalist apologetics of Mancur 
Olsen to the liberal social democracy of John Rawls, and even to 
Amartya Sen’s oft-deemed liberalization of the project of rationalism 
apparently evident in his inclusion of social goods and preference 
rankings (only to then use rational choice modeling to create a basis 
for society on not withholding these in accordance with a measure of a 
social equilibrium that cannot accommodate too much difference), is a 
negatively secured social order that inverts the Kantian moral ethic - 
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itself problematic because of its universalism expressed through the 
categorical imperative - from searching for the universally-recognized 
good in any situation to the avoidance of danger through a universally-
recognizable bad that a rational person would always agree to avoid.387 
How, in practice, this can be anything other than the straight-jacketing 
of personality, independent judgment, and the fastening of the 
development of consciousness onto the normalized terms of order, 
appears to be impossible.
—————————————————————————
X. The End of History and its Discontents: Fukuyama’s Fascist 
Versus Fanon’s “Inessential” self
Taking aim squarely at the idea of freedom understood as a permanent 
zone of exclusion for the individual, Fanon makes short work of the 
tenability of such a claim, and also indicates that to all such claims 
there is a dialectical response:
“In its narcissistic phase the colonialist bourgeoisie, by way of its academics, had 
implanted in the minds of the colonized that the essential values - meaning western 
values - remain eternal despite all errors attributable to man. The colonized 
intellectual accepted the cogency of these ideas and there in the back of his mind 
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stood a sentinel on duty guarding the Greco-Roman pedestal. But during the struggle 
for liberation, when the colonized intellectual touches base again with his people, 
this artificial sentinel is smashed to smithereens. All Mediterranean values, the 
triumph of the individual, of enlightenment and Beauty turn into pale, lifeless 
trinkets. All those discourses appear a jumble of dead words. Those values which 
seemed to ennoble the soul prove worthless because they have nothing in common 
with the real-life struggle in which the people are engaged……
……And the first among them is individualism. The colonized intellectual learned 
from his masters that the individual must assert himself. The colonialist bourgeoisie 
hammered into the colonized mind the notion of a society of individuals where each 
is locked in his subjectivity, where wealth lies in thought. But the colonized 
intellectual who is lucky enough to bunker down with the people during the 
liberation struggle, will soon discover the falsity of this theory. Involvement in the 
organization of the struggle will already introduce him to a different vocabulary. 
“Brother,” “sister,” “comrade” are words outlawed by the colonialist bourgeoisie 
because in their thinking my brother is my wallet and my comrade, my scheming. In 
a kind of auto-da-fe, the colonized intellectual witnesses the destruction of all his 
idols: egoism, arrogant recrimination, and the idiotic, childish need to have the last 
word. This colonized intellectual, pulverized by colonialist culture, will also discover 
the strength of village assemblies, the power of the people’s commissions and the 
extraordinary productiveness of neighborhood and section committee meetings. 
Personal interests are now collective interest because in reality everyone will be 
discovered by French legionnaires and consequently massacred or else everyone will 
be saved. In such a context, the “every man for himself” concept, the atheist’s form 
of salvation, is prohibited.”388
And anticipating the temptation of positive liberty when the identity of 
the individual, in this case as an individual whose individuality is 
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premised, like Berlin’s, on their being an intellectual, Fanon preempts 
with concrete experience and an eye for the nuances of human 
existence by pointing out that a freedom and interplay of beings with 
beings is precluded because
“In order to assimilate the culture of the oppressor and venture into his fold, the 
colonized subject has had to pawn some of his own intellectual possessions. For 
instance, one of the things he has had to assimilate is the way the colonialist 
bourgeoisie thinks. This is apparent in the colonized intellectual’s inaptitude to 
engage in dialogue. For he is unable to make himself inessential when confronted 
with a purpose or idea. On other hand, when he operates among the people he is 
constantly awestruck. He is literally disarmed by their good faith and integrity. He is 
then constantly at risk of becoming a demagogue. He turns into a kind of mimic man 
who nods his assent to every word by the people, transformed by him into an arbiter 
of truth. But the fellah, the unemployed and the starving do not lay claim to the truth. 
They do not say they represent the truth because they are the truth in their very 
being.”389
But in response to the basic point Fanon is making, on behalf of those 
not positioned to make this point to a global audience of thinkers, 
liberals from the West have decried either Fanon specifically, as in the 
case of Arendt who referred to him as a fetishist of violence,390 and not 
as someone speaking a basic and radical truth about the world in which 
we live, or they have attacked the idea at the core of his philosophy: 
that human drives for freedom exist in all people and can only be 
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whittled through distortion and abjectness trained into them as 
addiction to sensation, disease both mental and physical, and through 
the compromises in their existence that become characteristic of those 
who accept their own debasement.391 Losing their drive, their desire to 
live a full life and to determine their own fate, they become “men 
without chests,392” and fear, prudence, racial similitude, and 
resignation - what C. Wright Mills termed “the conservative mood”393 
- become their existential realities. This infects the thinking of Isaiah 
Berlin, John Stuart Mill, Richard Rorty, and Francis Fukuyama from 
the direction of their either positing a teleological goal in history - 
metaphysical or otherwise - as well as the earlier liberals Hobbes and 
Locke, who are evidently essentially consumed by fears of imprudence 
expressing itself as non-conformity or inefficiency upsetting a 
prevailing social order already arrived at because of the eternal nature 
of natural laws they claim govern humankind. The fear of the Other, 
driven by a deep awareness of one’s own not living right, and 
suspicion that the Other is looming and seeking revenge, creates an 
incentive to depoliticize society, the world, indeeds politics altogether, 
and leads to omissions of reality - such as the “specter” of the Vietnam 
genocide - from the American imagination of exceptionalist 
triumphalism.394
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The violence on display, through the institutionalization of fear in 
American society, for those with the right kind of eyes, is not fathomed 
by Fukuyama, who uses his elite students as examples to describe the 
nature of American life,395 hardly a representative group for the 
desperation and loathing now found throughout the land. In so missing 
the point, he manages to essentialize those who wish to “restart 
history” as mere malcontents in the minority, not to be taken 
seriously.396 Dismissing those who are discontent with what he calls 
liberal democracy, Fukuyama, avoiding all responsibility for the 
criminality commenced in the name of American freedom and 
capitalism, assigns these errors to a secularized eschatology of 
capitalism and the rationalization of all life according to one image of 
human destiny, writes:
“Looking backward, we who lived in the old age of mankind might come to the 
following conclusion. No regime - no ‘socioeconomic system’ - is able to satisfy all 
men in all places. This includes liberal democracy. This is not a matter of the 
incompleteness of the democratic revolution, that is, because the blessings of liberty 
and equality have not been extended to all people. Rather, the dissatisfaction arises 
precisely where democracy has triumphed most completely: it is a dissatisfaction 
with liberty and equality. Those who remain dissatisfied will always have the 
potential to restart history.397”
Those who would restart history, then, abandon the holy project of the 
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enlightenment to know all truths, to determine all values, and to live in 
accordance with those rational prescriptions, which have obviously 
provided a framework for “liberty and equality,” which malcontents of 
course do not want. Or so Fukuyama would have us think. Even Hegel, 
who Fukuyama based his theory on, would disagree.
“Before the universal can perform a deed it must concentrate itself into the One of 
individuality and put at the head an individual self-consciousness; for the universal 
will is only an actual will in a self, which is a One. But thereby all other individuals 
are excluded from the entirety of this deed and have only a limited share in it, so that 
the deed would not be a deed of the actual universal self-consciousness. Universal 
freedom, therefore, can produce neither a positive work nor a deed; there is left for it 
only negative action; it is merely the fury of destruction.398”
In order to escape this two-bit ahistorical appropriation of Hegel’s 
dialectic - a statist approach we are not defending herein - Fukuyama 
spends a great deal of time dwelling on the Platonic conception of 
thymos - the spirited part of the soul assigned to the guardian class in 
his philosophy of the state - and argues that the rationalization of 
thymos in accordance with the modern sciences, whose goal he sees as 
the rationalization of desire per se, is threatened by historical forces 
that Nietzsche and Fanon explicitly took notice of. And while Hegel is 
honest enough to indicate the extent to which the state and civil society 
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merge in his theory of political order,399 Fukuyama offers a clouded 
vision that remains obscured to the reader so as to not appear as 
relatively fascistic as it actually is. His preferred solution to the 
dilemma of the will was to domesticate desire in the name of reason, 
and that liberal democratic capitalism would achieve this by giving 
free reign to domesticated desires to be fulfilled and depoliticized.400 
Sheldon Wolin has called this “Inverted Totalitarianism,401” where 
creature comforts are met, private domiciles are nominally inviolable - 
save for in exceptional scenarios - and individuals are divided from 
one another through market segmentation, the manipulation of identity, 
and the use of police state repression to discourage political 
mobilization and concern.402
None of this squares with Hegel’s criticism of bourgeois culture, and 
instead reveals congruity with Hobbes’ ideas expressed in the previous 
section of this division concerning what sorts of activities would be 
permitted and what would be prohibited,403 and the kind of 
corporatization of society as the state would be necessary for the 
preservation of order, secured by the individual’s authorization, 
because defined as rational, the institution of sovereignty is the 
collective corporeal body of society.404 Hobbes, honest enough to 
expand his analysis into the realm of foreign affairs between states, at 
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least had the decency to admit that the order between states in order to 
preserve a domestic realm arranged for the sake of market freedom and 
shallow, possessive, and therefore secure, individualism and freedom, 
would require each sovereign to confront each other as enemies and 
lords of incommensurate domains.405 Fukuyama, in the name of ending 
such conflicts, endorsed, for the sake of that old philosopher’s canard 
of truth and consistency, the “homogenization of mankind,406” for the 
sake of human freedom at ‘the end of history.’ Inherent to this process 
would be the last man’s usurpation of the noble Nietzschean and 
Fanon-inspired emerging world’s goal of making a new man and the 
transvaluation of all values in the name of a new internationalism 
where nations would be free and equal and part of a global 
consciousness aimed at increasing the freedom for all. This was the 
vision of liberal internationalism created in the revolutionary minds of 
persons like Fanon and Jawaharlal Nehru, whose sister Vijaya Lakshmi 
Pandit,407 as well as Paul and Eslanda Robeson, among *many* others, 
were involved in major international theorizing about the new world 
order based on development, modernity, socialism, and 3rd world non-
alignment in relation to the major power blocs of the then emerging 
‘Cold War.408’
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In his distortion of liberalism, bespeaking a greater betrayal of 
liberality and freedom - an ethos purportedly universal in nature 
because of its inherent accommodation of difference through creative 
decentralization, a maximum of individual liberty, and an ethical 
determination on the part of individuals to tolerate and accept one 
another - in favor of western identity politics crudely absorbing 
Hegelian teleologies of history to depoliticize American triumphalism 
licenses his intellectual and moral omission of the Indochina genocide, 
activates casual castigation of recalcitrants to his views as “Indians” 
attacking “wagons” on the path to destiny,* Fukuyama shows his 
cards:
“For while modern societies have evolved toward democracy, modern thought has 
arrived at an impasse, unable to come to a consensus on what constitutes man and his 
specific destiny, and consequently unable to define the rights of man. This opens the 
way to a hyperintensified demand for recognition of equal rights, on the one hand, 
and for the re-liberation of megalothymia on the other. This confusion in thought can 
occur despite the fact that history is being driven in a coherent direction by rational 
desire and rational recognition, and despite the fact that liberal democracy in reality 
constitutes the best possible solution to the human problem.409”
 
We have already shown that what Fukuyama and the pantheon of 
liberal thinkers prior to him consider democracy is actually an 
exclusionary politics decided upon by those who display the proper 
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showmanship of statecraft needed to imbue confidence into the mass 
of people through a manipulation of the iconography of the nation, and 
that what is considered liberalism fails to even include within it a 
robust notion of being liberal. Instead, a conservative, resigned, 
resentful individualism is what these thinkers have in mind, one which 
breeds exclusion, and the megalothymia that Fukuyama decried. As 
Nietzsche clearly understood, there is no end to history unless one 
wishes to surrender the capacity to make history, which is itself an 
oxymoron since the “there-disclosing”410 character of human existence 
is the source of history as an idea. Fukuyama places all rational values 
in the West, and denies them to the Other, whose clamoring for 
freedom is dismissed callously as the resort to a threatening relativism 
of values because (1) the West is the only rational source of the 
disclosure of historical instances in his work, and (2) pretensions to 
expand beyond the West and include the instances of existence of the 
Other in the truth of the truth would essentially threaten his 
triumphalist narrative. Fukuyama continues:
“It is possible that if events continue to unfold as they have done over the past few 
decades, that the idea of a universal and directional history leading up to liberal 
democracy may become more plausible to people, and that the relativist impasse of 
modern thought will in a sense solve itself. That is, cultural relativism (a European 
invention) has seemed plausible to our century because for the first time Europe 
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found itself forced to confront non-European cultures in a serious way through the 
experience of colonialism and de-colonization. Many of the developments of the past 
century - the decline of the moral self-confidence of European civilization, the rise of 
the Third World, and the emergence of new ideologies - tended to reinforce the belief 
in relativism. But if, over time, more and more societies with diverse cultures and 
histories exhibit a similar long-term patterns of development; if there is a continuing 
convergence of types of institutions governing most advanced societies; and if the 
homogenization of mankind continues as a result of economic development, then the 
idea of relativism may seem much stranger than it does now. For the apparent 
differences between peoples’ “languages of good and evil” will appear to be an 
artifact of their particular stage of historical development.411”
So here we see that instead of reading Nietzsche how we have read 
him - that repression of human agency results in resentment that 
creates violence, psychoses, and other forms of disorder in the 
individual leaving them weak and at the mercy of authority - and how 
Fanon politicizes our understanding of existentialist philsophy - 
Fukuyama reads Nietzsche as a straightforward exponent of 
undomesticated and dangerous forces that are ascribed to being the 
preserve of essentialized, non-western, not properly domesticated 
others whom we must be on the guard for for their wildness threatens 
the freedom of the “last man” that Fukuyama associated with why the 
West triumphed in the ‘Cold War.412’ This goes for people who reside 
in the West and have been rebellious and who have been renegades, 
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engaging in critiques of their own societies. The disparagement of 
Noam Chomsky, Michael Moore, Chelsea Manning, Daniel Ellsberg, 
Julian Assange, Martin Luther King, Sandra Fluke, Jane Fonda, and 
any and all cultural critics and political activists as some specie of 
crazy, evidencing madness in their affairs, being anarchist and 
otherwise psychologically unfit, or bringing them before the McCarthy 
Committee, or subjecting them to surveillance, shows that being 
American, or western, is not about where you’re at, but who you are - 
your identity being understood as presented iotas of signification that 
cause others to ‘trust’ you as a ‘rational’ person with a prudent 
disposition.
But the story of history doesn’t end here. Rather than living up to the 
liberal values associated with the project of democracy, the 
preservation of the systematics of democratic machinery is preserved 
at the expense of those liberal values, offering a curious inversion of 
Fareed Zakaria’s claim that democracies in 3rd world nations were 
showing signs of becoming “illiberal democracies.413” Perhaps this can 
be explained by projection, or, perhaps, by the kind of competitive 
envy that is there for all to see in Thomas Friedman’s opinion columns 
where we can find him frequently praising the Chinese and the Indians 
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for working hard and learning useful things like science and math, 
decrying Americans as lazy, too interested in cultural theory, and 
otherwise unfit to compete with undemocratic (China) and deeply-
conservative and collectivist/family-honor-based (India) societies.414 
Indeed, to look for a specific destiny for humanity and to seek to 
discover this in a consensus agreed upon by all can only come through 
the homogenization that is part of globalization of economic relations 
that make people so desperate that in many cases those whose spirit is 
broken in the name of the ‘Spirit of History’ seek no more than the 
tawdry trinkets afforded them as iotas of meaning, be these material 
objects circulated in the economy of capitalism, or be they the 
essentialized iotas of identity understood as essence which serve only 
as a cultural nomenclature of language and clothing for an 
homogenized, resentful, resigned, power-identifying being beneath.415
—————————————————————————
XI. The Essential Self and Fascist Liberalism: Betraying Freedom 
Via the Rationalization of Alienation, the Nation-State, and 
Beyond
In the absence of cultural meanings, those having been swept aside as 
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relativist by the transformation of humanity by technology in the name 
of serving rational desires and the desire for rational recognition, the 
person finds themselves in a peculiar position of alienation, isolation, 
loneliness, and powerlessness over their fate beyond a very narrow 
sphere. Fanon described that a result this was European’s way of 
seeing their “wallet as their brother” and their “scheming as their 
comrade.”416 Indeed, under the veneer of civil society, the anxieties of 
the war of all against all have returned to the fore, and the result is a 
widespread lack of faith in institutions and a similar lack of trust for 
one’s fellow human beings. As Fanon also indicated above, the 
inability of a person thus essentialized to make themselves inessential 
leads them into a communicative quagmire wherein not only is 
signification pared down to the bare minimum at the expense of 
loquacious and poetic ruminations that could point beyond the essence 
of what is, to a new world, but also even basic rudimentary 
significations are called into question. This is precisely the resignation 
that infected Berlin, and that ironically Fukuyama, despite his elitism, 
celebrated as a cultural achievement.
But the solution pointed to in Fukuyama’s words from just above, to 
this so-called “crisis of the West,417” is that nations should reinvest 
their energies in the myth of the nation for the sake of giving people 
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the needed outlets for their drives and desires, to sate them, and also to 
diffuse them. This curious blend of liberalism - concern for the lives of 
individuals however grudgingly and narrowly conceived - and statism 
incorporates an understanding of an individual’s complete personality 
that is essentially incomplete and inauthentic as we shall see, but that 
is supposed to cure them of their mistrust for one another through the 
mechanism of recognition understood initially anthropologically, then 
extrapolated and consecrated as the culture of the nation. Carl Schmitt, 
a close friend of and theoretical collaborator of Leo Strauss, and 
fervent Nazi political activist at the highest level of the party at a time, 
discerning the same crisis of liberalism in Europe, ascribed the 
inability of the liberal state to send people to their deaths and demand 
from them the ultimate sacrifice as the source of this crisis.418 As 
David Campbell has put it, for the state, “stasis means death,”419 so we 
can understand Schmitt’s point that what he called “constituent 
power,420” is something that states have to always harness in the name 
of identity. Identity is the expression of human life for Schmitt, and the 
state is seen as its ideal representative, in the national form, since, for 
Schmitt the political sphere of human existence is distinct from other 
spheres - economic, social, cultural, etc. - and this is essential to 
preserving the defense of a specific people - the nation - because for 
him politics is about the “distinction between friend and enemy.421” 
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With this in mind we can understand that the calls for the preservation 
of an authentic, essential, and unique west, are none too different than 
the calls for and Israel with a Jewish identity, a Hindu Rashtra in India, 
a Pakistan or Egypt with a Muslim character, a Nigeria or Philippines 
with a Christian identity, since, as we recall from the immediately 
preceding discussion of Berlin and Fukuyama, of Rorty, Hobbes, and 
Locke, that what connected all these thinkers was a desire to preserve 
an interiorized domestic space whereby certain behaviors, liberals like 
to call this freedom, can be unfettered in their practice, and other 
behaviors can be restricted and excluded altogether.
But because there are no guarantees for the permanence of these 
identities, and because the nomadic history of humankind immediately 
disproves the validity of nation-states as an essential and universal 
form, the deployment of technological resources to produce the kind of 
gathering of people near one another to form a nation-state is a 
necessity of such arrangements. So here we have a question of binding 
individuals together against their spontaneity and inclinations to 
explore their surroundings on their own terms. As we discussed above, 
from Hobbes through to the present, liberalism has been grounded on 
the fear of the state of nature, of other individuals, of other nations…
and because of this what has been called liberalism bears intense 
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similarity to Schmitt’s nation-state conception wherein the nation 
becomes a holy community capable of extracting from individuals the 
highest sacrifice: that of their lives. “In the case of need,” defending 
the idea of the state against individual freedom being the basis for 
politics, Schmitt writes
“the political entity must demand the sacrifice of life. Such a demand is in no way 
justifiable by the individualism of liberal thought. No consistent individualism can 
entrust to someone other than to the individual himself the right to dispose of the 
physical life of the individual. An individualism in which anyone other than the free 
individual himself were able to decide upon the substance and dimension of freedom 
would be only an empty phrase.422” 
But not just their lives. They are called upon to sacrifice something 
more valuable by liberal states. Two points. First, despite the apparent 
architectonic incongruity between Schmitt’s words here, and Hobbes,’ 
cited above, where he indicated that there was never a justified 
authority unless individuals authorized authority, Hobbes engaged in 
considerable backsliding on this point by concluding that living within 
a state is implicit authorization of the sovereign institution, and that 
rational fear of the end of social life and of individual life at the hands 
of the state of nature - war with other nations or through ravages of the 
planet - would propel the rational individual to thus authorize the state. 
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Schmitt’s portrayal of nationalist states as being comically devoid of 
individualism, and attendant caricature of liberal states being devoid of 
fellow-feeling fails to distinguish his view from Hobbes’ view. Second, 
Schmitt’s, and Hobbes’ emphases on life, its protection, its possibly 
being surrendered, its strategic employment by the state for various 
ends, foreshadows a most important distinction we will be addressing 
below, between zoe - or “bare life” - and bios - life with political and 
social identity conferred through formalized rules of recognition.423 In 
both cases, recognition, not individual freedom, is the aim of the state, 
because as Robin pointed out in relation to Hobbes, only a very narrow 
band of behavior is accepted within the state, with death as the ward, 
and fear its existential offspring, manipulated by the state to obscure 
reality in order to ensure stabilized recognition. Here we see the 
similarity in Hobbes’, Schmitt’s, and Fukuyama’s notions of order, not 
to mention other liberal theorists we have been examining. The 
individual is free to absorb the form of life on offer in their society, but 
not beyond the limits of the “law of nature,” “prudence,” “harm” 
arbitrarily defined (as it must always be when elevated to a principle 
for governance through which individuals will regulate other 
individuals in the name of absolute freedom as their core social 
expectation), “suffering,” and, ultimately, fear. Liberal states, defying 
their apparent charge, request individuals to sacrifice their integrity, 
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something that individuals have been known to be willing to die for.
Against both Schmitt and Hobbes, at times individuals, both 
individualists and those more group-minded, may see themselves as 
relatively inessential and on their own, may opt to sacrifice their 
comfort, themselves, their adherence to constructed national traditions, 
etc., for reasons ranging from the magnanimous to the utterly 
pragmatic. From the struggles for civil rights and freedom in the 
heyday of the black struggle to overcome American racism, to the 
volunteers in the Spanish civil war assisting the forces fighting against 
fascism in that country in the 1920’s and 1930’s, and in many other 
moments in the recent past, evidence abounds whereby liberals 
sacrificed their lives and well-being for causes they deemed just. What 
they wouldn’t sacrifice their lives for was the state understood in a 
repressive and violent manner, often times being willing to give their 
lives for the causes in opposition to such a state of affairs. What 
Schmitt is decrying is not the inability of liberals to sacrifice 
themselves due to their inherent hedonistic depredations, but his 
inability to imagine that the state could not command that sacrifice any 
longer in the name of the social order of which he was the beneficiary, 
affording him status, privilege, recognition and a relatively easy life 
relative to the swathes of humanity relegated to the receiving end of 
                    191
the state’s violence. The same goes for Fukuyama, whose focus on his 
own students as being somehow representative of American life and 
society in general is a dead giveaway of his being out of touch with 
reality.
Schmitt is correct, though, on one point: that the liberal state whose 
mission was to satisfy individual wants and needs would not hold quite 
as much ability to command those individuals in its’ midst to die in the 
name of the state, since, as we have been discussing in this division, 
those individuals reared in such a context with the expectations for life 
inherent therein, would not be able to make a calculation for the 
common good, however defined, leaving liberal states even more 
dependent on the use of fear to ensure this critical agency. So 
liberalism, versus Schmitt’s conservatism, merely produces individuals 
free to be conservative and left alone, as opposed to simply 
conservative because that way of being has been imputed a naturalness 
associated with the traditions of the nation.
Two developments ensue. First, a new way of understanding 
individualism was developed that abstracted individualism from social 
contexts that precede contextual drives for creating loyalty to a state 
formation. To achieve this rational human behavior was modeled on 
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the basis of (1) individuals not being able to trust one another and 
besides that not wanting to for the sake of their own advantage, and (2) 
this model of human behavior was recirculated through disciplines of 
social sciences ranging from political science and international affairs, 
where these ideas were used to justify US foreign policy realpolitik in 
the ‘Cold War’ to convince policy-makers and the people alike that 
hard-nosed alliances with dictators holding back the tide of wars of 
liberation were necessary to the preservation of their own freedoms 
back home, to the rapidly developing sciences of modern economics 
where similar ideas of a mutual standoff between individuals were 
naturalized. This had the effect of undermining alternative economic 
arrangements and production calculi whose immediate goal was not 
short-term profit, such as development projects, social investments in 
community life, and other invaluable but difficult to monetize and 
quantify aims of social organization geared towards production.
So this first set of developments, generally understood under the rubric 
of rational choice theory, sought to delay the reckoning of a social 
order lacking the poetic imagination of individual and community 
history-making by giving a naturalness to selfishness, which on a 
micro-scale mimicked precisely the behavior of American policy-
makers abroad operating in the context of “the military metaphysic”424 
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that Mills said was the result of anxiety over status among military-
industrial-complex operators whose very sense of self was so insecure 
that they sought the recreation of “primary bonds”425 by recreating 
certainty on the basis of a status hierarchy scaleable by those with the 
darkest imagination of threat and the consequent confidence-producing 
abilities to sell security from those imagined threats, thus reinforcing 
the institution’s position in society through enlarged, because thus 
justified, budgets, and also invigorating and sustaining belief within 
the organization in the organization’s reason for existence.426 
Identification with the military through cinema, television, and news-
cum-propaganda reinforces the worldview underlying the confidence 
strategies of the military-industrial-complex’s operatives, but, as we 
can rightly anticipate, is always already threatened by the 
consciousness of veterans of wars whose rapidly expanded awareness 
from being in war zones, and from the massive economic disturbance 
in society caused by war spending whose ripple effects are felt 
throughout society. As a result pressure always exists in this context to 
find new ways of reinforcing belief in the state, so performance of 
statecraft, the deputization of much of the population as “civil 
servants,” the creation of reward and punishment hierarchies 
associated with employment and recognition (turning back 
Fukuyama’s point about recognition being naturally desired on its 
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head),427 and the looming threat of exclusion at the conceptual and at 
the practical level for failing to adjust one’s cognition in line with the 
prevailing epistemology. But there is simply too much world, too 
much empirical fact, too much lived life, for this to hold indefinitely 
and in all places, so eventually, servants of permanence must move 
beyond the confines of the state to reproduce their terms of order.
This leads to the second point, that the transnationalization of the state 
apparatus becomes necessary since persons will eventually realize that 
their own interests don’t match with those seeking to make things, 
especially themselves and their rule, permanent. In Promoting 
Polyarchy William Robinson conducts research into the foundations of 
the drive towards the global dispersal of production, consumption, 
cultural circulation, and security patterns and shows that a number of 
intellectuals closely associated with the foreign policy elite in America 
and their allies and contemporaries in other countries - very 
prominently Samuel Huntington, whose significance we will address 
below - conspired to deliberately cannibalize the accumulated wealth, 
monetary and social, of the working and middle-classes of their 
respective countries, long based on industrial production and middle-
level trading functions, by utilizing new technologies of transportation 
and communication to take advantage of governments around the 
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world whose internal order and legitimacy was weak, was based on 
coercive domination of civil society through mechanisms of physical 
violence, and who could become dependent on the three poles 
represented by the US, Japan, and the powerful European states’ 
provision of largesse for their internal power politics exigencies. In 
return for their largesse, the countries and corporations represented in 
transnational fora such as the Trilateral Commission would have 
access to ready-made outlets for excess production of consumer goods 
which would increasingly become less affordable to the immiserated 
middle-classes in their own countries, and to a massive supply of 
impoverished and repressed laborers who would be presented with the 
demonic fait accompli we are now familiar with in the form of the 
global material, textile, manufactured goods, and electronics 
sweatshop/maquila system whereby production costs are kept low 
through political repression, and we in the West come to enjoy our 
freedoms once again, with new low, low prices.428
At the core of all this is the ontology of being that we base our notion 
of “world,” upon. We began this division by quoting it directly from 
Hobbes, who declared that “felicity” is ceaseless consumption that 
ends only in death. In the absence of a nationalist dogma that Schmitt 
thought necessary for the cohesion of the state, which was always thin 
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and based upon an elite’s prejudice against the masses borne out of 
their essential disconnection from reality, we have come to replace that 
not with a profoundly egalitarian and loving society, but one whereby 
humanity’s negative self-image is medicated through endless 
consumption, all the more made effective as a marketing slogan 
because we are the ‘good’ ones who deserve to be happy.
But the prevalence of nationalist dogma, or the lack thereof, is 
irrelevant, since, in the end both Hobbes and Schmitt favor the use of 
material power to reinforce the status quo, with the former asking 
permission from the authorization of individuals rationalized through 
fear, and the latter commanding the same because of the fear and 
trembling instilled by traditions that divided the world metaphysically 
into friend and enemy. Corey Robin has also indicated in an article 
about Edmund Burke that this erstwhile traditionalist and conservative, 
portrayed as an isolationist multiculturalist at times, actually favored in 
uncompromising terms a Europe-wide counterrevolutionary rollback 
of forces that threatened the status quo, all in the name of preserving 
the idea of a traditional society with elites who would rule because 
they knew better than the masses - a vision essentially the same as 
Huntington’s and of other elites who have sought alliances with elites 
of other nations than their own in the face of the breakdown of social, 
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political, and economic consensus.429
On closer examination this is precisely what Schmitt had in mind 
when he spoke of national identity, since in his imagination, as Giorgio 
Agamben points out in State of Exception, he is attempting to fill what 
he perceives to be the terrifying ‘void’430 of human existence without 
meaning, and as Schmitt himself indicates in his writing, this meaning 
can only be given to people through their community, whose 
organization politically as a nation, is the consummation of their 
destiny as a people; and to this they can only be led by elites. Elites 
therefore should collude across borders to preserve the idea of borders. 
In a world without states, Schmitt writes, all distinction becomes 
impossible, and the ability of states to use war as a tool to gain 
obedience of their citizens is lost.431 So statecraft, like modern 
capitalist marketing of the “ideology of consumerism,”432 is aimed at 
overcoming the same inherent problem associated with the despairing 
attitude toward life and community on the part of isolated individuals: 
their resignation to an alienated fate that has centrifugal effects on 
social organization, especially since that organization of society in the 
first place is based on dividing humanity (the bundle of emotions and 
feelings whose locus in classical theory is the body - such as love, 
friendship, honor, joy, etc.) against itself and its now abstracted 
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consciousness (the mind, the rational controller of the body, etc.). The 
capacity for obedience in both situations relies upon an intervention by 
another actor in the social system outside of the dialectical relation 
between two individuals, providing them a framework of signification 
for making “common sense” possible and therefore reciprocal 
recognition, as well.
In a sense, then, the prisoner’s dilemma situation is overcome in both 
the consumerist and the nationalist formulas because in both the 
individual contra another individual is given a template for signaling 
amongst themselves for the sake of trustworthiness. The conundrum of 
recognition is solved, as is the arbitrariness of the harm principle in 
Mill’s theory. By this provision the state reduces its own burdens of 
reinforcing its political discipline in civil society, and it also, by 
transferring this burden onto individuals, gives seekers of permanence 
a means to police the boundaries and limits of their own day to day 
existence in accordance with their own needs. The result is an identity 
politics, in positing an identity as the case is with nationalism, and in 
negating all identities, as the case is in accelerating global capitalism, 
that articulates what normal, regular, and even free behavior is 
considered to be in society to the exigencies required for authority.433 
As Hobbes puts it, freedom is what the sovereign decides is permitted, 
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and as Schmitt puts it, the sovereign is the agent in political society 
who can decide upon (1) the suspension of normal functioning of the 
laws and the spontaneous existence of society to conduct interventions 
outside of the normal functioning of law and order, often in 
contravention of that order, but for the sake of securing the illusion of 
order in society, and (2) which forms of life are to be excluded from 
society as examples to the rest that certain transgressions of the 
sovereign’s will will not be tolerated - something achieved through the 
use of violence against bodies, recriminations against ways of living, 
and other means of distancing to produce the social distance required 
to ensure the lesson is learned.
In an essay on Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political, Leo Strauss has 
suggested that none of this goes far enough, and that something more 
akin to universal moral leadership on the part of the West is required 
for the preservation of world order because in the absence of the 
universal principles of a moralizing force - especially in the context of 
the ‘Cold War’ - the prisoner’s dilemma always threatens to 
reemerge.434 Strauss makes this point clear when he chastises Schmitt 
for citing Hobbes’ understanding of sovereignty in theorizing about the 
nature of decision-making authority. If people realized the implication 
of Hobbesian sovereign relativism, Strauss argues, then they could 
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always determine that there is no natural law and therefore that all law 
being conventional needn’t be respected, threatening nationalist 
projects even of the kind that Schmitt argued would be conservative 
enough to secure the compliance of the masses with the diktat of 
tradition in one country. Keeping this in mind, Fukuyama’s desire for 
using the power of modern science to determine ‘what people really 
want’ and combining those insights to be gained with a need to project 
an image of stable order in which those desires could be ministered to 
would seem to require on a global level the kind of imperial order the 
neoconservatives have long cherished.
In this way neoliberal economics, with its despairing view of human 
nature, makes common cause with neoconservative politics offering 
shallow identity structures based on the ritualization of culture and 
religion for the sake of producing a sense of belonging in order to bind 
nations together such that they can be a part of the global order of 
production and consumption.
—————————————————————————
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DIVISION TWO
XII. Shock and Awe: The March of Freedom, The State of Exception, 
and Disciplinary Effects of Exemplary Violence on a Global Scale
Our efforts have motivated by a remarkable documentary film, The Trap: 
What Happened to Our Dreams of Freedom, by the filmmaker Adam 
Curtis. In the opening montage of each of the film’s three hour-long 
installments, a brief clip is played where we witness an American soldier 
in Iraq, apparently without irony, yelling at a crowd of Iraqis to “get the 
fuck back; we’re here for your fucking freedom.435” For Americans, on the 
one hand, that freedom is understood as the ability to do whatever one 
wants without obstacles, complemented by the notion that such a desire is 
entirely natural and entirely salutary for human beings. But, as we have 
seen, on the other hand, this freedom also requires submission and 
conformity, and most essentially, an agreement on the objects of fear in the 
world. This agreement extends to codifications of personal conduct to 
avoid improper signification that might threaten either the positive 
conception of national order in a nationalist/fascist doctrine of identity 
(secretly pined after by some of today’s liberals)436 or the negative 
conception of liberty formed around the exclusion of certain behavior as 
threats to the security of individual freedoms to be privately enjoyed.437 
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What emerges in this vision of public order is an enforceable guarantee on 
ways of life, ideally decentralized when possible to achieve efficiency 
through everyday enforcement by citizens amongst each other, but of 
course at times requiring the use of coercive violence to indicate both the 
unacceptability of a way of life, and to give vent to resentments among 
citizens who have repressed their spontaneity in order “fit in,438” who can 
prove for themselves their supremacy and identification with power 
through the ‘real’ victory they can thus feel over the Other.439
In , The Shock Doctrine, Naomi Klein argues that the purpose of 
American foreign policy interventions - through the agency of “shock and 
awe” - is to “de-pattern” existing behavioral practices in societies around 
the world and to re-articulate activities for connection to the ostensibly 
free-market of global capitalism.440 Without these critical interventions, 
Klein argues in her critique of Milton Friedman’s economic theories’ 
claim to naturalness and universality, individuals as they are conceived by 
neoliberal economic theory wouldn’t be ‘free’ in terms of their choices in 
the market, their ability to own property, and, thus, ultimately, in their 
ability to securely exercise free-choice over their fates in life absent 
dreaded social coercion emanating from what are usually decried as 
primitive, unfree, subversive, backwards, and otherwise traditional 
mechanisms of social control, and in the end anything that led them to 
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insist on solidarity. Writing about the war against socialist subversives and 
anyone, ultimately, deemed insufficiently loyal to the government of Chile 
under Augusto Pinochet - and that government’s ability to use sovereign 
violence and invoke a state of exception to license the legality of that 
violence - Klein writes that
“Many torturers adopted the position of a doctor or surgeon. Like the Chicago economists 
with their painful but necessary shock treatments, these interrogators imagined that their 
electroshocks and other torments were therapeutic - that they were administering a kind 
of medicine to their prisoners, who were often referred to inside the camps as apestosos, 
the dirty or diseased ones. The would heal them of the sickness that was socialism, of the 
impulse toward collective action. Their “treatments” were agonizing, certainly; they 
might even be lethal - but it was for the patient’s own good. “If you have gangrene in an 
arm, you have to cut it off, right?” Pinochet demanded, in impatient response to 
criticisms of his human rights record.441”
David Campbell has written that “discourses of danger” underly the 
efficient operation of the state, since its operationalization as a real object 
requires the conducing of behavior, and often relies on similar languages 
of disease and diseased bodies, invasions, foreignness, impurities and 
contamination, all in addition to the more generally understood 
manipulations of morality and social normativity.442 This both naturalizes 
the idea of the threat itself, concealing the role of political choice in its 
fomentation, and also appeals to the idea of nature to gain adherents to 
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order who have been themselves systematically blinded by state-centric 
epistemologies, and so cannot see that theirs is a perspective among others 
and nothing more.443 The only source of interconnection between people 
could be their allegiance to the same political order, and not their 
recognition of humanity in the Other, whose body was marked with 
taboos, ancient and modern, that society had to be protected from.444 For 
example, The Argentine junta and the Chilean dictatorship of Augusto 
Pinochet, Klein writes, employed economic and political shocks in a 
fashion they represented to themselves as “medical.445” “[Milton] 
Friedman likened his role in Chile to that of a physician who offered 
“technical medical advice to the Chilean government to help end a 
medical plague” - the “plague of inflation.446” And Klein adds
“Arnold Harnberger, head of the Latin America program at the University of Chicago, 
went even further. In a lecture delivered to young economists in Argentina, long after the 
dictatorship had ended, he said that good economists are themselves the treatment - they 
“serve as antibodies to combat anti-economic ideas and policies.” The [junta’s] foreign 
minister, Cesar Augusto Guzzetti, said that “when the social body of the country has been 
contaminated by disease that corrodes its entrails, it forms antibodies. These antibodies 
cannot be considered in the same way as the microbes. As the government controls and 
destroys the guerrilla, the action of the antibody will disappear, as is already happening. 
It is only a natural reaction to a sick body.447” 
The use of violence is thus justified. Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt 
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have written, echoing Nietzsche’s thoughts on the matter,448 that the very 
notion of “just war theory” is necessarily an aggressive doctrine seeking to 
license imperialist war when no such agreement on adventurism could 
exist because of its obvious immorality in a given situation.449 Hardt and 
Negri write that “Democratic violence can only defend society, not create 
it,450” and that “just war theory” is linked to the “premodern” tradition in 
Europe of “religious wars” that have nothing to do with a “democratic 
position on violence.451” In one case violence is accepted as a sad 
necessity, tragedy really, in the defense of a community with no options, 
whereas “just war theory” is, if it is framed as being defensive, only 
defensive of “values” and not of communities, and therefore is caught up 
with the desire to make the world anew. This might seem odd for a 
moment, but consider that in the world at any given moment there are 
many values to be found, and to declare that one value is truer than 
another will require convincing many to surrender their values, either 
symbolically, or in actuality. “This Language is, of course,” Klein 
continues
“the same intellectual construct that allowed the Nazis to argue that by killing “diseased” 
members of society they were healing the “national body.” As the Nazi doctor Fritz Klein 
claimed, “I want to preserve life. And out of respect for human life, I would remove a 
gangrenous appendix from a diseased body. The Jew is the gangrenous appendix in the 
body of mankind.” The Khmer Rouge used the same language to justify their slaughter in 
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Cambodia: “What is infected must be cut out.452””
And what would be cut out? According to Klein’s research into the torture 
program the southern cone countries introduced by the United States’ 
clandestine security services, coupled with the academic and scholarly 
intervention of the group of Economists who came to be labeled “the 
Chicago Boys” after the University of Chicago economics department 
where many of their more influential number held positions, had as its 
goal exorcising people of “the only transcendental theology: solidarity.453” 
Solidarity is, after all, the basis for human social life, the source of social 
support, of family, of friendships, of culture, of healthy forms of 
recognition and authentic togetherness between persons, and therefore is a 
source of alternative loyalty not defined by states or corporations. During 
the ‘Dirty Wars,’ the depths of selfish indulgence of entitlement and 
privilege by the ruling class included theft of children from leftist families 
whose parents were being tortured and murdered to have them brought up 
by families the regime approved;454 in Israel the expanding purview of the 
state  and civil society in banning Jewish-Arab/Muslim romantic 
relations;455 in Nazi Germany, and in today’s Russia, the exhortation to 
women to be the mothers of the nation and to make a new generation of 
nationalist children;456 and in the United States, the use of overt forms of 
sexual control and racial segregation, as well as less obvious forms of 
                    207
class, intelligence/educational, regional, and cultural/behavioral 
inducements and sanctions.457 Giorgio Agamben has suggested that 
nothing really distinguishes democracy from totalitarianism in an era of 
biological-political control, since the fear of disease - in this context 
virally-spreading uncontrolled solidarities emerging spontaneously always 
already as being - is the primary threat to order.458 Indeed, in the word 
‘disease’ are the two words ‘dis-ease,’ and solidarity makes both states and 
those who identify with them rather uneasy.
“The torturers understood the importance of solidarity well, and they set out to shock that 
impulse of social interconnectedness out of their prisoners. Of course all interrogation is 
purportedly about getting valuable information and therefore forcing betrayal, but many 
prisoners report that their torturers were far less interested in the information, which they 
usually already possessed, than in achieving the act of betrayal itself. The point of the 
exercise was getting prisoners to do irreparable damage to that part of themselves that 
believed in helping others above all else, that part of themselves that made them activists, 
replacing it with shame and humiliation.459”
Klein writes that Muslim prisoners at Guantanamo, Cuba, are similarly 
abused by their captors with a torture program specifically designed to 
humiliate that which they love and that which is the source of their sense 
of solidarity and togetherness: Islam. Sexual torture began immediately, as 
did desecrations of the Koran, to which is now added today forms of 
force-feeding and physically-invasive searches for “contraband” (from 
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where said contraband would be procured at a US military base remains 
an unasked question in the minds of the enforcers), all designed to destroy 
the camp inmate’s humanity, and potential for healthy, loving, social life, 
and that most essential element of trust.460 Klein points out that these types 
of beliefs about ways of life that don’t immediately appear to be coeval 
with one’s own belief are characteristic of “fundamentalists.461” So it is 
without apparent irony, but replete with actual irony, that liberals who 
practice liberalism as an identity politics as opposed to an existential 
praxis label non-Western cultures with precisely that designation as 
fundamentalists.462 But this lack of irony, brought about because of an 
inability to (1) make the self “inessential” as Fanon has put it, and (2) 
because of the need to create distance between us and them, as we 
discussed in the introduction in relation to R.D. Laing’s hypothesis about 
the desire to make experience permanent to escape the contingency of 
human existence, should not surprise us at this moment. From Nazism to 
Capitalism, to Stalinism, the ontological basis of modern human life is 
based on an existentially-divided global physis seen as lebensraum for 
some, and necessitating relegation of others to dark places from where 
their screams can be quieted.
What this boils down to in essence is the imbalance introduced into the 
world-concept itself by the idea of freedom understood strictly as 
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permanence - as permanent access to experience and the ability to deny 
this to others through distancing mechanisms - and the transformation of 
other individuals, nations, cultures, communities around the world in all 
forms, into what Heidegger has called “the standing reserve.463” As Karl 
Polanyi has put it, this is also comprehensible as “disembedding”464 of 
social life from the surroundings that sustain social life, leaving 
individuals and the communities they formed without their bases of 
support, self-respect, and meaning, and thus leaving them at the mercy of 
the state and its allies in the production and maintenance of private 
privileges over and against any conception of the public.
The orchestration of beings and things in order to secure negative liberty - 
meaning for groups the absence of obstacles to group identity and the 
same for individuals plus a small zone for tolerated idiosyncrasies - in any 
implemented version, will be characterized by one underlying 
commonality. Without removing unordered elements in the overall 
conceptualization of order in play, there remains a possible alternative to 
the prevailing worldview. The prevailing view, whose premise remains the 
mobilization of resentment against spontaneity, infinity, nothingness, and 
change, cannot tolerate alternatives because these offer something other 
than the alienation of the body from consciousness, of individuals from 
each other, and of individuals from their own sense agency and potential 
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for authenticity. Thus the following attitude towards violence becomes 
necessary to secure identity as norm:
“…the state of exception is the opening of a space in which application and norm reveal 
their separation and a pure force-of-law realizes (that is, applies by ceasing to apply), a 
norm whose application has been suspended. In this way, the impossible task of wielding 
norm and reality together, and thereby constituting the normal sphere, is carried out in the 
form of the exception, that is to say, by presupposing their nexus. This means that in 
order to apply a norm it is ultimately necessary to suspend its application, to produce an 
exception. In every case, the state of exception marks a threshold at which logic and 
praxis blur with each other and a pure violence without logos claims to realize an 
enunciation without any real reference.465” 
As the agent of the sovereign exception, seeking to realize the creation of 
a norm - in this case a normalized way of being free gone planetary - the 
American soldier in the scene described above relies on a kind of violence 
that at its root is absurd because it purports to impose a normative order 
but in so doing violates that idea of order by invoking an exceptional 
circumstance to rationalize its own commission. As Agamben points out in 
discussing the work of Walter Benjamin, - whose work he frames as a 
reply to Schmitt’s normative concept of “sovereign violence” - “pure 
violence” which does not seek to create a social order by its commission, 
“severs the nexus between law and violence,466” long deemed necessary 
from liberals like Hobbes and fascists like Schmitt, to ensure that the 
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state’s use of violence would not be questioned. Pure violence, because of 
its being an immanent development - this being the source of Hardt and 
Negri’s “democratic violence”467 which we pointed about above was the 
opposite of “just war theory” - is “bloodless” but also “lethal” and 
fundamentally undermines the legitimacy of the state and reveals the 
presence of a society that exists regardless of the state form.468 For 
sovereign violence to function, as Klein has shown, people have to be 
abstracted from their connections in the world, made into a tabula rasa, 
and then through what Schmitt calls “constituent power,469” have to be 
rebuilt in the image of reward and punishment, identity and difference, 
good and evil, such that their new identity cannot be eclipsed by 
recollections of their old one, that their new identity is seen as the only 
possibility. Klein also indicates that this precise anti-rational logos, 
masqueraded as rationality, as reason itself, serves the purpose of undoing 
people’s constituent connections to the world around them, their society, 
their community, their friends, their language, their cultures. For too long, 
humanity has been guided by such an ideology that has both made us 
“homeless”470 and diverted our senses away from a radical apprehension 
of physis; what Klein’s work adds is a systematic understanding of this 
violence has been the primary mechanism of making the world safe for 
negative liberty and the neoliberal/neoconservative consensus that has 
emerged to cater to the material and psychic needs of tortured individuals 
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whose only way back home is through identification with a corporate 
hierarchy or ideological advertisement of a political party that grants them 
material and psychic protection in an uncertain world defined by terrorist 
violence by states, and through the power politics practiced by these 
governments which have pressurized the international political order, 
forcing neutral states and revolutionary states to rely on just such an 
understanding of the human being in order to recalibrate and then harness 
individuals for the production of national security.471
The ideology of national security took root in powerful countries, and then 
was, and continues to be, mimicked across the world.472 Of course 
realpolitik precedes the ‘Cold War,’ but there are a few things that set apart 
that era from previous ones. In the time preceding the ‘Cold War,’ there 
were no weapons of the same destructive potential that the US, and USSR 
following the US’ lead, came to possess. Hydrogen bombs could 
annihilate entire nations, capital cities, and indeed the world population 
over and again. This made the imperative of orchestrating individuals 
within states in line with the perceived needs of national security all the 
more pressing for controllers of states; and made citizens all the more 
likely to press for it, too. But there is a corollary for states without nuclear 
weapons: either as allies of nuclear weapons states, or as the users and 
victims of destructive weapons not as powerful as nuclear weapons but 
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nonetheless stronger weapons than had been previously available in 
history, second-tier powers had stronger incentives to discipline their 
citizenry for analogous ends. Clearly other processes, related but with 
their own internal logics, such as the globalization of economic processes, 
the new-fangled migrations and dislocations of nations across the globe 
made homeless by the consolidation of states for single nations, and the 
mechanization of transport - including military transport - exacerbated 
these anxieties.
Applying this analysis to the social terrain in the ‘Cold War,’ what we find 
is not a battle between capitalism and communism, but rather a 
confrontation between two power blocs, each held together by 
technologies of violence, torture, distancing, making objects present, and 
reproducing the identity of the state and/or nation as a locus of security 
guaranteed by the ideology of permanence, brought about through either 
through the discipline of politically-crafted depoliticized markets or in 
planned economies exhibiting various overt forms of ideological 
voluntarism.
Individuals who are not properly disciplined into fear as a productive 
emotion will not be able to prudentially conduct themselves in the midst 
of an ordered political economy, and, as a result, fear must be generated 
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for the sake of keeping order together. At the heart of all these 
technologies then, is fear, and if one does not fear, one must be made to 
fear.473 This must happen irrespective of the nature of human beings and if 
they indeed are naturally fearful or not. Such questions are not particularly 
important since it is unlikely that we can really ever know the answer, and 
deployments of tropes regarding human nature are always political in 
nature. 
Combining Agamben’s insight about homo sacer - the excluded being in 
western political ontology from antiquity through to current times474 - as 
the exemplary negation that functions as a cognitive boundary and 
warning concerning the kinds of behaviors that would be anathema to the 
polis,475 with Klein’s critique of the creation of the tabula rasa individual 
with market-articulated interests in what we might term hyper-capitalism 
after its obviation of a concrete ground for strictly manufactured 
groundings,476 we can see that via state-sanctioned violence and the 
nominal democratization of these functions in the popular imaginary 
expressed through the decentralization of political control and the 
generation and sating of popular tastes for supremacism through the 
circulation of images as a reinforcer of identity,477 Western liberalism has 
re-imagined freedom of identity understood as unchanging essence, and 
must negate the real world for the sake securing the realm for the 
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essentialized individual and community to even be imaginable in the face 
of the always already plural world of beings.478
But there is an uneven reception for freedom and liberalism across the 
world, indicating political and ontological difference, and alerting us to the 
matter of people’s attitudes towards existence, their disposition towards 
the Other, and how this orientation informs their choices in life. People 
have often accepted the segmentation of social reality for the sense of 
permanence they can derive therewith, and this has been done in various 
ways all over the world; such is why the Western empire of Europe and 
America has found frequently collaborators in disparate locations 
supposedly hostile to the West. At best, though, such persons ignore the 
richness in their surroundings - and at worst they are choosing a restricted 
understanding of their existential possibilities; restrictions which have 
been created through the agency of imperial powers, disciplinary 
institutions normalized as part of life that simply must be accepted whose 
purpose is the further normalization of that life, and the violence these 
institutions, domestic and foreign, rely upon to divide the self against itself 
in order to hold the possibility of a true self as a dangling reward for 
conformity.479 But as our analysis should make clear, this can be 
understood easily in the colonial context because of the readily-grasped 
difference between the colonizer and the colonized, but is not therefore 
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somehow not in evidence within non-colonized nations, where indeed, 
such divisions within selves, across social class, between men and women, 
and such, are politicized and utilized to debase everyone as potentially 
excludable from order, and to therefore strongly pressure individuals to 
conform to the terms of order or stake out a lonely existence in dissent.480
——————————————————————————
XIII. Free-Markets, Human Nature, and the Disciplining of Physis: 
Permanence, Contingency, and Freedom
Writing on the middle-classes in the emergent “shining” India, Arundhati 
Roy has discovered a most fascinating element in that class’ sense of 
identity as Indian, modern, liberal, secular, and, increasingly, as 
wealthy.481 Writing on the issue of the abrogated sovereignty and military 
occupation of Kashmir and the subjugation of the Kashmiri people by the 
Indian military since 1947, and secessionist movements around India, Roy 
indicates that with all the brouhaha that accompanies Indian middle-class 
banter about preserving the nation’s unity and proving to the world that 
Indian secularism can accommodate the various nationalities, religious 
groups, and various diverse people of India, this selfsame middle-class, 
perhaps seeking to emulate their more wealthy upper-class cousins in both 
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India and elsewhere, has forgotten that their own apartment complexes, 
shopping malls replete with submachine gun-toting guards, paramilitary 
operations aimed at taming tribal rebellions so that mining and other 
resource-gathering operations can commence, also indicate an ironical 
desire to secede from India, too. “A vertical secession,” that would take 
them to “another planet.”482  For India, like any place, is a present and a 
physis, and not merely a degraded physical world whose true essence is 
found in a select group of representative people or institutions, public and 
private. The state, or any social class using the state and other mechanisms 
to create a sense of essential truth, indicates of a drive for permanence in 
the world, but in the end these drives must rely on sectioning off that 
deemed essential from the rest deemed inessential.
Negative liberty, and its supposed opposite, positive liberty, are linked 
together by the underlying assumption in both that liberty can be made 
permanent and securely enjoyed in perpetuity. This has been the goal of 
influential Western theorists of freedom, who must, in addition to speaking 
of freedom, also theorize a justification for secure status - that exact notion 
of freedom that Isaiah Berlin either decried as not true freedom at worst, 
or at best a hybrid of freedom with other less grandiose visions mired in 
primitive collectivisms that defined the non-Western world for him.483 The 
effect of this rhetorical maneuver is to normalize the possession of status 
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for Westerners, and to diminish movements on the part of other groups to 
seek such status as a specie of positive liberty that Berlin, through his vast 
influence, would direct people to be suspicious of, giving rise to a need to 
contain these movements, and, in previous times, as evidence of behavior 
threatening the progress of ordered liberty of the civilized.484 But this idea 
of progress and order is not a specific property of the West, as Roy’s work 
will show us, because the desire to both have privilege over and against 
one’s own countrymen and women, as well as to be recognized as 
rightfully possessing that freedom, both by one’s neighbors and to feel it 
for oneself, is much in evidence in modern India.
However this is ideologically-premised, we can witness the sublimation of 
the human existence as logos, on the register of both culture more broadly, 
and in the specialized case of the culture of economic organization, 
wherein the socially-dependent and contingent logics of making being 
present in the world are increasingly “disembedded” from their 
constitutive surroundings. Karl Polanyi wrote that this move to disembed a 
way of life, a rationalized system for making a way of life present, would 
require the willful ignorance of the contingency of such systems, always 
already impermanent because of their reliance on “fictitious 
commodities.485” Land, labor, and capital, the fictitious commodities, 
behave quite unlike the inputs in the formulas of classical economics, 
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which assumed the externalities of production - which include resource 
depletion, environmental effects, unstable value-measures, and the 
exhaustion of labor - associated with impermanence to be insignificant for 
inclusion in the models of marketplace behavior. Simply, commodities are 
assumed to be available, and their depletion is not modeled into the 
theories of market economics; but obviously land, labor, and capital are all 
limited by nature. Ignoring this was made possible by the ideology of 
seeing money as a thing-in-itself that existed as a natural element of 
existence, myths of support for which vary from the treatment of gold as a 
“shiny metal” that people agreed upon as a store of value that was never 
subject to “spoilage,” to the current fashion, where floating exchange rates 
are not formally pegged to the value of precious metal but where currency 
values are determined by the reliability of a currency as a unit of account 
based on “market fundamentals” that conform to expectations for profit, 
“sound” management of resources, and as an accurate reflection of the 
value of value.486 Beneath these vague terminologies lies the 
industrialist’s, and the financier’s, capacity to reliably mobilize land, labor, 
and capital, which is nothing other than an orchestration of beings and 
things for the aim of producing permanence, in this special case. The drive 
to amass power in this way is disembedding economic practices from 
society’s overall economic patterns, and is driving the sublimation of the 
identity of powerful social groups through nationalist, capitalist/
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progressivist, religious fundamentalist, and similar political ideologies that 
have as their aim the essentialization of their group’s privileges and social 
standing.487
Polanyi, writing about the advent of market society in Europe, anticipated 
this sort of development in other parts of the world. In The Great 
Transformation, regarding the naturalness of the free-market economy, 
and therefore the “rational actor” - the individual at the core of the market 
system - Polanyi observes:
“The road to the free market was opened and kept open by an enormous increase in 
continuous, centrally organized and controlled intervention. To make Adam Smith’s 
“simple and natural liberty” compatible with the needs of a human society was a most 
complicated affair. Witness the complexity of the provisions in the innumerable enclosure 
laws; the amount of bureaucratic control involved in the administration of the New Poor 
Laws……; or the increase in governmental administration entailed in the meritorious task 
of municipal reform. And yet all these strongholds of governmental interference were 
erected with a view to the organizing of some simple freedom - such as that of land, 
labor, or municipal administration. Just as, contrary to expectation, the invention of labor-
saving machinery had not diminished but actually increased the uses of of human labor, 
the introduction of free markets, far from doing away with the need for control, 
regulation, and intervention, enormously increased their range. Administrators had to be 
constantly on the watch to ensure the free working of the system. Thus even those who 
wished most ardently to free the state from all unnecessary duties, and whose whole 
philosophy demanded the restriction of state activities, could not but entrust the self-same 
state with the new powers, organs, and instruments required for the establishment of 
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laissez-faire.488”
Liberals have sought to orchestrate society for the sake of producing 
freedom of the individual in a manner that is entirely unbounded from 
responsibility to apprehend the reality of the physis we all share. This 
requires, just as it would in the life of an individual who would live out of 
sorts with their surroundings, the institutionalization of the ability to make 
a sovereign decision to alter the course of existence in favor of avoiding 
the kinds of shifts that accrue as a matter of course in the life of a person, 
community, and world. Polanyi’s example, vastly expanded upon by 
Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 
where we see the use of administrative technologies of organizing and 
mobilizing human beings in accordance with the need to make present 
certain products - in the case of Polanyi’s analysis of the rise of market 
society whose legitimacy is premised on the widespread availability of 
these products for mass consumption - and to make present beings 
themselves on the order of their conformity with the terms of good and 
evil found in a society - in the case of Foucault’s theory of the use of 
“panopticism”489 - clearly illustrates  Agamben’s analysis of the state of 
exception - the suspension of the normal functioning of the law - that is in 
fact required for the possibility of setting up something like an idea of the 
normal functioning of the law and the understanding of social relations 
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under the law as being normal in the first place. This requires both 
exemplary violence, as well as the generalized conducing of conduct in 
line with the vision of social order through state intervention in civil 
society and social life.490
This is because, just as Fanon discovered in the midst of struggle, as 
Nietzsche discovered in his own tortured thoughts in the stultifying air of 
decaying and fearful Christendom, and as Polanyi discovered in his study 
of the rise of market society and market man, “hope springs from ultimate 
resignation,” even though resignation can also drive a person to identity 
with “power,” instead of “a more abundant freedom.491” We can call this 
development, which really existed in many places and at many times in 
history, ‘the dialectic of freedom.’ In the context of the 
“countermovement”492 against the disembedding of the essentialized 
autonomous subject as a thing-in-itself, much like Nietzsche’s ‘civil 
servant’493 we discussed above, Polanyi writes that “while laissez-faire” 
was not possible in the absence of “State action,” the response to the 
fabrication of the order of industrial society came about in a 
“spontaneous,” and therefore, relatively more natural way (keeping in 
mind our distinction between nature understood as what is, and artifice 
simply denoting the willful efforts aimed at construction human beings 
undertake, and that we are making a claim about relative naturalness here, 
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since, by definition nothing human beings make is natural per se, although 
always already part of the natural world)494. Our claim is simply that free-
market theories require the orchestration of human life and, as 
Heidegger’s radical insight about technology clarifies, the reduction of 
people and things to “standing reserve” in order to prepare the ground for 
reorganization of social order requires a great deal of human intervention 
than action in the opposite direction aimed at restoring the sense of simple 
everydayness that accompanied pre-capitalist life; our imagination of this 
era remains a powerful memory of freedom in our consciousness as 
human species.
“Laissez-faire was planned; planning was not… […] … if ever there was a conscious use 
of the executive in the service of a deliberate government-controlled policy, it was on the 
part of the Benthamites in the heroic period of laissez-faire. The other half was first 
mooted by that eminent liberal, Dicey, who made it his task to inquire into the origins of 
the “anti-laissez-faire” or, as he called it, the “collectivist” trend in English public 
opinion, the existence of which was manifest since the late 1860s. He was surprised to 
find that no evidence of the existence of such a trend could be traced save the acts of 
legislation themselves. More exactly, no evidence of a “collectivist trend” in public 
opinion prior to the laws which appeared to represent such a trend could be found. As to 
later “collectivist” opinion, Dicey inferred that the “collectivist” legislation itself might 
have been its prime source. The upshot of his penetrating inquiry was that there had been 
a complete absence of any deliberate intention to extend the functions of the state, or to 
restrict the freedom of the individual, on the part of those who were directly responsible 
for the restrictive enactments of the 1870s and 1880s. The legislative spearhead of the 
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countermovement against a self-regulating market as it developed in the half century 
following 1860 turned out to be spontaneous, undirected by opinion, and actuated by a 
purely pragmatic spirit.495”
So recalcitrant elements, generally first among the most despised classes, 
are always already rebelling against efforts to consecrate one way of being 
as the cardinal virtue of social order; unless they can be depoliticized in 
their understanding of their rebellion through institutional and educational 
mechanisms that cause them to believe in their lower status and caught in 
a spirit of epistemological dependency and robbed of agency. But 
enforcing this understanding of the possibilities for being-in-the-world is 
costly, must be outsourced beyond the state and its agents be they police 
or military, or institutional in nature, to civil society and even to families, 
where ideologies of disempowerment are transmitted across generations in 
the form of resentment, child abuse, normalized sexual violence against 
women to enforce the gender hierarchy found in many societies and 
certainly still prevalent in the West and in America, and through 
internalized racism and other forms of essentialized self-hate that police 
the boundaries of identity in order to ensure that children don’t stray too 
far from ‘one of their own’ in friendships, romantic relations, eventually in 
the generation of new families, and in seeking out the Other experientially 
in whatever way possible, in their lives.
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But this multitude of points of enforcement suggests the impossibility of 
forever policing these boundaries reliably in the absence of the use of 
violence, and the threat of violence to instill fear in individuals. In 
particular young people whose physical stamina and stature is deemed a 
threat to the physical humiliation-premised terms of order followed by the 
self-identified majority in democratic states are treated with suspicion. 
This (1) instills in them some variant of second-class existence, and (2) 
punctures for those who hold onto their physical spirit and refuse in 
however small (or large) a fashion the terms of order prevailing in society 
the essentialness of precisely those terms, enabling and galvanizing their 
vision and ability to resist.496 W.E.B. DuBois referred to this phenomena 
as “second sight,497” which he said would give African-Americans a 
special kind of epistemological vision unavailable to whites, who, as 
Fanon indicated above in his critique of colonized intellectuals whose 
adherence to the mission civilastrice of the European nations, like the 
colonized intellectual who had doubled-down on identification with the 
ruling power for the sake of whatever advantages gained, similarly were 
unable to “make themselves inessential”498 enough to see the world anew.
Individuals going through the great transformation of humanity that 
marked the beginning of the capitalist era found themselves in a trap, 
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whereby to be free they had to make themselves permanently present, both 
for the sake of being trusted with that freedom by others with more power 
and in a position to deny it to them if deemed untrustworthy because of 
not signifying thought properly, as reflected in emerging consensuses on 
human nature, and for the sake of their own self-conception having 
already internalized division and judgment of their spontaneity. On this 
register liberalism as it has been understood, and as it has been spread 
through imperialism throughout the world, produces a stratified and 
internally-differentiated hierarchy of people and groups that comes to 
encompass all elements of human life and affords only to a very small 
number at the commanding-heights of society a true measure of negative 
liberty that Isaiah Berlin thought so worthwhile. For most of the rest it is a 
governmentality that leaves us in a trap of having to demonstrate 
worthiness for freedom, and having to equally subject our ‘free’ choices to 
the scrutiny of measuring its’ conformity with the terms of order.
——————————————————————————
XIV. The State Colonizes the Polis: From Speenhamland to the Camp
Combining our perspectives on economic liberalism, as deconstructed by 
Polanyi, and on liberalism as an identity politics for the good people, we 
find the curious reality that indeed both of these ventures to term the self 
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as being a liberal self whose openness, generosity, and capacity for 
unaccountable and unrestrained action requires the use of sovereign 
violence to discipline contingent and spontaneously becoming beings 
becoming their being in defiance of metaphysical templates. We thus 
discern a doubled process of disembedding of identity understood as the 
essence of being from the world itself; a world deemed to be fallen, sinful, 
polluting, poisonous, and thus comprised of dangers to be defended 
against; and the only defense against such a world is the use of violence in 
the name of transforming the body, or existence, of the recalcitrant 
element(s) within the Self or the Other, into an object lesson for the people 
what fate awaits them should they insist on being.499 To ward off the 
freedom of becoming, sovereign violence, as Agamben’s reading of 
Schmitt suggests, harnesses “constituent power” which is flowing through 
the social fabric always already and, if not garnered for the reproduction 
of identity, can be realized as a revolutionary force associated with 
freedom of biological life - zoe.500 Instead of embracing animal existence, 
zoe, traditional Western political theory has sought to discipline existence 
in the name of reproducing bios - or political life;501 based, we wish to 
add, on a very narrow definition of the political as that associated with the 
state, as opposed to our more capacious invitation offered to beings in the 
desire for all of our freedom.
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This duality, which dates back to Aristotle and has found various forms of 
expression in subsequent thought (state of nature versus civilized 
humanity, human life existing between “beast” and “god,” etc.502) was 
most pronounced in terms of significance for our political moment in the 
work of Hannah Arendt, who argued that “statelessness”503 as a 
widespread phenomena in then Europe, and clearly a phenomena whose 
significance continues to increase since Arendt’s day, threw into question 
the ability of nation-states to consistently bequeath rights and protections - 
what is deemed required for the security of human status - to the people 
living within its borders.504 In her work on totalitarianism Arendt indicated 
that the purpose of the concentration camps was to completely denude 
people of their politically-significant public characteristics of identity, 
which was the aim of torture and regimenting of daily life according to 
both the abstract directives of order and the arbitrary and whimsical 
minutiae and sadistic idiosyncrasies of camp administrators indulged in 
the name of order.505 These administrators of course were in a position of 
absolute power over those in the camps, and so even if a hefty dose of 
bureaucratic normalization coupled with the kind of moral disengagement 
that masks barbarity in hierarchical organizations permitted the general 
sense of not being involved in the worst sorts of crimes made the evil in 
the camps “banal” rather than “radical,” the effect of administering life in 
the camps was the systematic torture of those who were held there.506 This 
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is identical to Klein’s point about the use of “shock therapy”507 by 
localized use of electroconvulsive therapy for one individual, destroying 
them through dissociative pain,508 or in the globally-significant sense of 
shocking populations of enemy nations with tools ranging from the 
apparently subtle macroeconomic tinkering through global, national, 
public, and private financial institutions issuing various veiled and not-so-
veiled threats to meet demands or risk capital flight,509 to the readily 
apparent desire to “shock and awe” nations into compliance through aerial 
bombardment and other displays of force.510 
Speenhamland was a predecessor to the camp. Polanyi describes this 
economic support system for the poor who were swept up by the policy of 
government-sanctioned land theft (enclosure) which had “ghastly” effects 
on the “self-respect of the common man.511” The predecessor of what 
came to be known later as “the Poor Laws,” the policies that Polanyi 
places under the signifier “Speenhamland” guaranteed the “right to live” 
but not access to education, or the corollary right to organize and 
collaborate with fellow poor, and, too, restricted and even annulled the 
ability of England’s poor to remain on their ancestral lands where they 
resided as serfs and laborers for centuries.512 In addition to this, residents 
in the various estates for the poor set up under these laws were not 
permitted to move about the country as they wished, which had the effect 
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of increasing dependency on the state through the arresting of what 
dynamism may have been possible, and locking adults into an 
economically-depressed provincialism. The laws themselves produced the 
contradictory outcome of apparently caring for the poor, but severely 
degrading them at the same time - not due to the capitalist reading of the 
situation as a straightforward result of social welfare’s softening effects; 
Polanyi indicates that welfare coupled with modern labor innovations like 
trade unions would have produced a new concept of individual and 
community security and self-reliance in the midst of rapid economic 
changes513 - for the reason that once the process of industrial and land 
consolidation had secured the economic and social hegemony of the newly 
powerful middle-classes in England whose livelihoods depended on ever-
increasing trade in the now global market of the British empire, the 
protections under the Speenhamland laws, which had increasingly become 
the law of the land in most of rural England,514 were rescinded in order to 
increase labor productivity through negative incentives that now 
characterize not only Britain’s but much of the world’s labor markets (i.e. 
! ‘Don’t work don’t eat).515 The collapse of the “self-respect of the 
common man” whose previous pre-capitalist livelihood had been robbed 
from him by enclosure was now thrown into a frightening, dangerous, 
perilous new world. This fundamentally degraded not only his ability to 
survive, but his entire way of life, being tossed this way and that, was 
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annihilated.
“Speenhamland was designed to prevent the proletarianization of the common people, or 
at least to slow it down. The outcome was merely the pauperization of the masses, who 
almost lost their human shape in the process…
…The Poor Law Reform of 1834 did away with this obstruction of the labor market: the 
‘right to live’ was abolished. The scientific cruelty of that Act was so shocking to public 
sentiment… Never perhaps in all modern history has a more ruthless act of social reform 
been perpetrated; it crushed multitudes of lives while merely pretending to provide a 
criterion of destitution in the workhouse test. Psychological torture was coolly advocated 
and smoothly put into practice by mild philanthropists as a means of oiling the wheels of 
the labor mill…
…The bureaucratic atrocities committed against the poor during the decade following 
1834 by the new centralized Poor Law authorities were merely sporadic and as nothing 
compared to that most potent of all modern institutions, the labor market… If 
Speenhamland meant the snug misery of degradation, now the laboring man was 
homeless in society. If Speenhamland had overworked the values of neighborhood, 
family, and rural surroundings, now man was detached from home and kin, torn from his 
roots and all meaningful environment. In short, if Speenhamland meant the rot of 
immobility, now the peril was that of death through exposure.516”
While we can safely admit that Speenhamland was not organized for the 
purpose of “production of corpses”517 as Arendt would write about the 
Nazi camps following the end of the second world war, there is a 
congruity between the two in the maintenance of unreality and closing off 
individuals from their world that eventually robs them of their humanity 
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by obscuring them from the world - the “world”518 in the Heideggerian 
sense as the totality of references that form our home as human beings. 
Writing about the “incredibility” of the “horrors of the camps,” and their 
unworldly, even non-worldly “uselessness” Arendt correctly states that “in 
the midst of war,” despite shortages that came to undermine the German 
war effort, the Nazis “set up enormous, costly extermination factories and 
transported millions”519 to them. Such miscalculations on their part as the 
war was being lost “gave the whole enterprise an air of mad unreality.520” 
It is precisely this madness, this unreality, that, as analysts of current 
political trends, that we do not ascribe to similar situations precisely 
because of the, perhaps, theatrical insanity of the Nazi camps, and of 
course the extensive documentation of that insanity by the Nazis 
themselves in the organized manner of their bureaucratic legacy.521 But 
other holocausts are well-documented too, so it behooves us to revisit this 
matter.
Extending our analogy from Speenhamland as a template for the 
production of homeless populations unable to fend for themselves and 
leaving them at the mercy of powerful factions whose interests they would 
then serve after being rearranged, into our analysis of the insanity - and 
ultimately, eventually, the ubiquity, too - of the camp - a move inspired by 
the trajectory of our criticism which will become apparent below - Arendt 
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faces this particular theoretical abyss of dehumanization.
“This atmosphere of madness and unreality, created by an apparent lack of purpose, 
was the real iron curtain which hides all forms of concentration camps from the eyes 
of the world. Seen from outside, they and the things that happen in them can be described 
only in images drawn from a life after death, that is, a life removed from earthly 
purposes. Concentration camps can very aptly be divided into three types corresponding 
to three basic Western conceptions of life after death: Hades, Purgatory, and Hell. To 
Hades correspond those relatively mild forms, once popular even in non-totalitarian 
countries, for getting undesirable elements of all sorts - refugees, stateless persons, the 
asocial and the unemployed - out of the way; as DP (displaced persons)522 camps, which 
are nothing other than camps for persons who have become superfluous and bothersome, 
they have survived the war. Purgatory is represented by the Soviet Union’s labor camps, 
where neglect is combined with chaotic forced labor. Hell in the most literal sense was 
embodied by those types of camp perfected by the Nazis, in which the whole of life was 
thoroughly and systematically organized with a view to the greatest possible torment…
… All three types have one thing in common: the human masses sealed off in them are 
treated as if they no longer existed, as if what happened to them were no longer of any 
interest to anybody, as if they were already dead and some evil spirit were amusing 
himself by stopping them for a while between life and death before admitting them to 
eternal peace.523”
And in a comment that foreshadows her later shift in analytical focus from 
the “radical evil” of the camp to the “banal evil” of the perpetrators of the 
carnage therein, but that also prefigures Robin’s analysis about the 
retention on the part of the victims, bystanders, and even the collaborators 
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of their humanity, Arendt indicates that an attunement towards one’s own 
uselessness, one’s own inability to think, and a belief in the inevitability of 
power - and one’s powerlessness in the face of power - potentially dooms 
postwar humanity to the same fate suffered by millions in the second 
world war. Indeed, the connection between Speenhamland and the camps 
was that in both cases, apparatuses of distinguishing humans from 
humans, of creating two species out of one, were presided over by 
humans, not monsters, and our humanity contains both strands. We can be 
terrified or liberated
“…we may say that radical evil emerged in connection with a system in which all men 
have become equally superfluous. The manipulators of this system believe in their own 
superfluousness as much as in that of all others, and the totalitarian murderers are all the 
more dangerous because they do not care if they themselves are alive or dead, if they ever 
lived or never were born.  The danger of the corpse factories and holes of oblivion is that 
today, with populations and homelessness everywhere on the increase, masses of people 
are continuously rendered superfluous if we continue to think of our world in utilitarian 
terms. Political, social, and economic events everywhere are in a silent conspiracy with 
totalitarian instruments devised for making men superfluous. The implied temptation is 
well understood by the utilitarian common sense of the masses, who in most countries are 
too desperate to retain much fear of death. The Nazis and the Bolsheviks can be sure that 
their factories of annihilation which demonstrate the swiftest solution to the problem of 
overpopulation, of economically superfluous and socially rootless human masses, are as 
much of an attraction as a warning. Totalitarian solutions may well survive the fall of 
totalitarian regimes in the form of strong temptations which will come up whenever it 
seems impossible to alleviate political, social, or economic misery in a manner worthy of 
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man.524”
This warning has not been heeded, however, and the lesson of taking our 
concept of political life, which Arendt saw as essential to providing the 
new stateless masses of pre-second world war Europe the physical 
security needed for human life, inessentially, rather than essentially with a 
notion of necessity, is lost on her as well. Her emphasis always remained 
on what Cedric Robinson has called “the order of politicality,525” wherein 
the being of the state is overdetermined by thought, literature, culture, 
forms of organization, and ritual practice of social form, producing an 
actually-existing authority with a monopoly on the political sphere of life 
understood as essentially-determined by the agency of the state as a 
transcendental, theological, being.526 But in recent times this has also been 
historically confirmed as requiring the consummation of a singular order 
within a state, usually through the vehicle of mutual recognition found in 
nationalism. Arendt discusses this at length in Origins, but does so in a 
manner that ascribes to it an epistemological inevitability she associated 
with the Tocquevillian trope of the inexorability of mass society and the 
overwhelming power of anomie.527 Robin has suggested this lent Arendt’s 
work a distinctly elitist tinge, which saw the masses as hopeless in the 
absence of certain structured myths that would guide them through a 
swamp of immorality and confusion they were otherwise destined for.528 
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The best she could offer was patriotism and an understanding of freedom 
in her essay “What is Freedom?” that was hopelessly caught up with a 
worship of French Resistance fighters in the second world war, many of 
whom not only were complacent prior to the formation of the Nazi threat 
to French sovereignty, but who, also, subsequent to the liberation of their 
country, would go on to participate in France’s various attempts to 
recapture colonial outposts lost at the end of the war for a brief time.529
While indeed it is true that a strongly identified people with a strong sense 
of themselves can draw on that identity as a reserve to withstand the 
imposition of tyranny, as Arendt points out in her discussion of the 
heroism of the Danes in resisting the Nazi occupation of their land and in 
highlighting their protection of the nation’s Jewish population through 
ingenious and inventive forms of collective action,530 what is obscured in 
her account, which focused on Danish identity, is that many individuals 
acted from deeply present, aware, conscious, and authentic places in their 
experience, and that it would be unfair to give credit to the nation when in 
fact in each case remarkable individuals working together overcame the 
kinds of collective action problems that had come to characterize Western 
life.531 Zygmunt Bauman has pointed out that defensiveness in relation to 
changing social constitution is what gave rise to the machinery of order 
which eventually reached its pinnacle in the Holocaust, itself a product of 
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modernity.532 What the Danes refused was not that they would lose their 
national pride, but that they would lose their humanity if they allowed the 
world of references, their world, that is, that they made their home within, 
to be destroyed. This home would be degraded by the technological, 
alienating, destructive power represented by the Nazi occupiers if they 
failed to resist on all fronts. Indeed, they conspired to save their Jewish 
neighbors not merely to save Denmark - it was uncertain at the time if 
Denmark would survive the war as an independent nation at that point - 
but because the Jews were a part of Denmark, and Denmark happened to 
be the setting for the enactment of their humanity.
Economic beings, as described in Polanyi’s discussion of the 
transformation of human society from traditional to market-based society 
and culture, and political beings, as described in Agamben’s, Arendt’s, and 
Schmitt’s work, and endorsed in the thought of the liberal theorists whose 
work we surveyed above wherein a distinction between the individual as 
phenomena and the individual as a properly constituted, identified being, 
as either a citizen, a fellow national, or as a haloed member of the sacred 
circle of the free, are a specie of the differentiation and distancing that was 
sought to be protected through the sequestration of the Other in the camps. 
This gave rise to the kind of policy manipulations that are now fully-
integrated into our world through the idealized notion of macroeconomic 
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discipline that arguably transforms the entire world into a camp for being 
tinkered with by independent central banking authorities in the private, 
public, and increasingly globalized finance; in effect, forms of life have 
become behavioral experiments to be carried out by economic policy-
makers at the commanding heights of the global financial architecture.533 
And although Arendt states that she wishes that a kind of politics could be 
used to preserve human plurality, much like Berlin claims, too, basing that 
plurality on a plurality of essences - nations or entirely self-contained 
individuals primed with the expectation of guaranteed impermeability and 
individual identity as a charm, a ward, against being engulfed - is 
precisely what resulted in the carnage of the second world war, where 
more nations than Germany fought for the crown of being the leader of the 
human race. America was one such nation, but Arendt often shrank from 
the broader implications of her insight about the “banality of evil” when 
this could be applied to the society in which she would come to find 
refuge from the camps herself. But where she failed to go, we certainly 
can, and must.534
——————————————————————————
XV. Western Modernity and the Holocaust: American Destruction of 
Vietnam as a Product of Freedom and Liberal Democracy
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The creation of modern identity, rooted in the systematized presencing of 
the self understood as a true self depends on the orchestration of beings, 
things, the environment, social patterns, forms of governance, and beliefs - 
ideology - all for the sake of disembedding individuals from their 
surroundings. The sublimation of identity as an idea is a process fraught 
with actual violence in the extreme, and this only threatens to become 
worse as the technology of warfare becomes more destructive; and as this 
technology subsumes domains of existence thought distinct from military 
affairs, such as information technology, or neuroscience, for example, 
vastly expanding the scope of violence in human affairs.535 This violence, 
to be clear, while of course sadistic, is encompassed in the broader 
concern of states to retain purchase over the manifestation of the polis - 
the gathering - and to ensure that its spontaneous development is 
constrained and disciplined in line with the reproduction of the state. 
Technology is not an inexorable development, nor is its precise 
manifestation a required, unavoidable expression of either pure knowledge 
or human nature.
“The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the 
unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such…
…The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit. The 
field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears differently than it did 
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when to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain. The work of the peasant 
does not challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in the 
keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the 
cultivation of the field has come under the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which 
sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the 
mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, 
ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can 
be released either for destruction or for peaceful use.536”
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In each of these examples, of agribusinesses, atomic energy, and the 
expansion of resource extraction to a planetary scale, Heidegger makes 
clear that technology, techne, one of the most ancient and singularly 
definitive elements of humanity’s being-in-the-world, in the current age, 
developed out of necessity to sustain the prevailing understanding of being 
as a terminal response to the question of being, has come to “enframe”537 
all of existence. If anything, he wasn’t radical enough given recent 
developments in the global biotech agricultural industry, and the events 
that have scandalized the nuclear power industry with the catastrophe at 
Fukushima. Atop these calamities, we can add the globalization of the 
camp as a technology of making people superfluous for the sake of 
harnessing negative destructive energies to keep the process of planetary 
domination ongoing by disposing camp inmates to desperation, and those 
outside the camp loyal to the terms of order through the understandable 
and ardent desire to never be in a camp.
For Heidegger a terrible irony abounds in these statements. And this irony 
is the route to the extremely significant, and radical message, of his 
political philosophy. After the second world war, he remained silent on the 
matter of public contrition for his involvement with the Nazi party, and 
that same party, which his scholarly stature lent a great deal of legitimacy 
to, also carried out that most modern of massacres - the Holocaust. 
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Bearing in mind his response to his former student Herbert Marcuse on the 
matter - that “after 1945 a confession was impossible for me,538” - for 
Heidegger an inauthentic confessions in the style of other Nazis who 
sought to appease political currents was simply not responsible; it used 
traditions of signification and symbolic speech to excuse oneself through a 
masquerade of good and evil. Hinting at Heidegger’s own silence being a 
willfulness to hold his own complicity forever next to his own soul 
because of his immense guilt, rather than a mark of a lack of contrition as 
many have suggested - we can expand on this point by way of Leslie 
Thiele’s commentary on the matter, which both usefully excavates 
Heidegger’s own candor on the matter - which got him in considerable 
trouble - and also indicates on the part of Thiele, a scholar otherwise quite 
sympathetic to Heidegger’s philosophy, the same metaphysical maneuver 
inherent in seeking the permanence of values of good and evil, values, 
which, as it were, were completely obscured in the experience in the 
camps where operatives, collaborators, relative bystanders, and victims 
formed a painful cooperative embrace of humanity’s death drive in the 
name of making Germany modern.539 In Germany’s quest for modernity, 
she was merely following in the footsteps of her European neighbors. As a 
result, all of the West, and its idea of freedom as the mastery of life and 
the world, are utterly scandalized.
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“[In a lecture in 1949] Heidegger twice announced the essential equivalence of the 
extermination camps and other phenomena - first the motorized food industry, the 
blockades of East Germany, and the manufacture of hydrogen bombs, and then the 
perishing of millions from hunger in China. The effect of these comparisons, and 
probably their intent, was to diminish the significance of the Nazi atrocities. The Reich’s 
premeditated annihilation of millions in an attempted genocide is equated with sundry 
modern technological developments, along with the wantonly destructive effects of 
ideologically based politics…. Place against the all-encompassing problem of the global 
will to technological mastery, fascism, Heidegger declared, was essentially 
indistinguishable from modern democracy. Therefore his “mistakes” as a proponent of 
Nazism may be judged “so insignificant that they may not even be called tiny…”
…The important difference comes down to one of intentions. And this difference - 
between the hateful, cruel, and genocidal intentions of the Nazis and the generally 
irresponsible and covetous ones of agribusiness, for example - remains a far from 
insignificant concern.540” 
Thiele fails to understand that Heidegger’s thought is not concerned with 
the categories of good and evil, which, following Nietzsche’s analysis of 
this question - an analysis that arguably was among the most significant 
influences on Heidegger’s philosophy541 - are categories created by the 
harnessing of the world’s resources, made possible through the breeding of 
the human animal with these ideas of who they truly are into them through 
the use of instruments of discipline. To be sure we are not pointing at a 
pure free being to be discovered beneath acculturation. Rather, in seeking 
what people are we are looking for an infinity of potential, a way of 
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countering the idea of human nature - what Heidegger called the 
“restriction of being”542 - itself. The categories of good and evil, and their 
essential influence on ideology associated with current political practices 
and human identity, do indeed spring from the same root: the inability to 
make oneself inessential. Richard Polt offers the window to another 
interpretation of Heidegger’s controversial equation of nuclear weaponry, 
factory farming, mass starvation during the ‘Great Leap Forward’ in 
Mao’s China, and the camps.
“In one of his rare references to the Holocaust, Heidegger proposes that [the totalitarian 
horrors of the twentieth century are the consequences of the technological worldview]. 
But he says so in a way that is most disturbing: “Agriculture is now a mechanized food 
industry, essentially the same as the manufacture of corpses in gas chambers and 
extermination camps, the same as the blockade and starvation of countries, the same as 
the manufacture of hydrogen bombs.” Most interpreters find this passage shocking and 
understandably so. For although Heidegger does not condone mass murder, the 
implication of his claim seems to be that modern farming is just as bad. In addition, the 
references to blockades and hydrogen bombs allude to the Soviet Union and the United 
States, and imply that there is no significant difference between these countries and Nazi 
Germany. Do all these phenomena really spring from the same root, and does that mean 
they are all ‘essentially the same?543”
The very drive for permanency, revealed in deep narrative structures of 
American exceptionalism in texts from the founding of America through 
the modern day, leads to the destruction of ways of life seen to be 
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conducted on a different material and existential basis than our own. 
Indeed, to the above quote we can add the depredations of the biotech 
corporation Monsanto, the ongoing violence against the nations of Iran 
and Cuba by American blockade, and the blockade against Iraq which 
killed upwards of half-a-million children - which then Secretary of State 
Madeline Albright deemed to be a worthwhile cost in pursuing US 
geopolitical goals - which terrorized that nation in between the two wars 
America has waged upon it, just to pick a few glaring examples, of 
American behavior entirely in concord with Heidegger’s insight.
In the aftermath of Vietnam war, to consecrate ourselves ‘the good’ and 
the Vietnamese our objects for saving and as our enemies, and to excuse 
our own actions there, we have lost Heidegger’s insight and the lesson of 
his own life’s fragility, his own ethical scandalousness, which would 
inform us of our own complicity in great crimes that rise to the level of the 
Holocaust itself.
“the American command… […] …violently uprooted a traditional - stable, agricultural, 
and family-oriented - people (those who survived), transforming them into a population 
of spiritually as well as physically mutilated refugees…
…For the Vietnamese peasants, we recall, the cultivation of rice was not simply a matter 
of the production of another food commodity. It was a traditional way of life, bearing 
little resemblance to Lyndon Johnson’s representation of Vietnamese society as one of 
“hunger, disease, and despair.” As the English combat photographer Phillip Jones Griffith 
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says in his great photographic history of the American destruction of the culture of 
Vietnam:
“The Vietnamese are a rice-growing people. For two thousand years their adeptness at 
pursuing this perennial task has been sustained by their belief born of Buddhism, 
structured by Confucianism, and mystified by Taoism, sees every man, every thought, 
every action as significant and interrelated within a universal order. It transcends Western 
religious dogmas: it is a collective acceptance of the values recognized by all of their 
self-evident virtue…
…The secret of their strength lies in the nature of their society…Harmony as the supreme 
virtue - and being a part of that harmony - was the motivating force, enabling villagers to 
accept toil in the fields. Rites and rituals gave meaning to the work far beyond simply 
providing food to eat. In the fields were buried one’s ancestors whose spirit passed 
through the soil into the rice, so that eating it became the ritual by which one inherited 
one’s ancestors’ souls…”
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…the callously indiscriminate bombing of the the countryside, the use of herbicides, the 
designation of free fire zones, and the forced relocation of the peasants in “New Life 
Hamlets” - the technological relay we can call, on the authority of the American 
Command’s own rhetoric, the “pacification” of the radical difference that was Vietnam - 
all contributed to the destruction of this “alien” rice culture. What did the United States - 
the agricultural knowledge industry and the technical agencies whose responsibility it 
was to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the Vietnamese - offer the peasants in compensation 
for the destruction of their rice fields and the burning of their nuclear villages? It was not 
simply American rice, which, according to Griffiths, “the people hate”… It was also - and 
here, at last, we rejoin Heidegger’s “unpardonable pronouncement” - the introduction of 
IR 8, the higher-yielding and faster-growing - ‘miracle’ - rice strain developed in 
‘international’ experimental stations controlled and ideologically manipulated by 
American capital…
…Understood in the light of the above retrieval of the historical specificity of the 
American involvement in Vietnam, we recognize the essential continuity between the two 
practices. We see that the massive introduction of the technologically produced ‘miracle’ 
rice strains was in essence the same as the massive introduction of the technological war 
machine, that indifference to human suffering betrayed by the ‘liberal’ discursive 
practices of American agricultural aid agencies was complicitious with the indifference to 
the human suffering of the Other betrayed by the discursive practices of the political and 
military commands.544”
The concept of freedom we have been discussing, the concept that 
traditional liberals, and even the capacious-minded Berlin whose 
resignation about the possibility of forcing Western ideals onto the world 
was a signpost of appreciation of a larger humanity, have clung to, have 
sought after, and have praised as the greatest human goal is clearly in 
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league with uncivilized barbarism. In this case, apparently the Americans 
couldn’t tolerate, or even permit to exist on the other side of the planet, a 
way of life radically-different from their own. This hardly seems to be 
liberal. Furthermore, the evidence suggests we cannot be considered free 
since we cannot brook the world’s unfolding without holding a gun to the 
head of humanity, literally in Vietnam, and figuratively in the 
formalization of Hobbesian resentment in the science of rational choice. 
We shall force them to be free:
“refugees who fled the increasingly inhospitable countryside and flooded into South 
Vietnam’s urban areas were among those for whom the war made everyday life a 
misery…..refugee ghettos housed huge numbers of Vietnamese in hovels made of 
garbage.
…At a senate subcommittee hearing dealing with the plight of Vietnamese refugees, Dr. 
Herbert Needleman, the head of a charity devoted to child war victims, painted a striking 
picture:
“Saigon itself is becoming a garbage heap rising out of a cloud of smog. We lived in a 
Vietnamese home on a small, urban street. In the morning on the way to breakfast, we 
would encounter the bodies of rats run over by motorcycles at night. One sees garbage 
piles 8 feet tall by 20 feet square with children picking through them. Homeless children, 
sometimes completely nude, walk the streets and sleep in doorways.”
In a 1968 Foreign Affairs article, the Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington 
suggested that the United States “may well have stumbled upon the answer to ‘wars of 
liberation’” through what he called “forced draft urbanization and modernization… […] 
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… the urban slum, which seems so horrible to middle-class Americans, often becomes for 
the poor peasant a gateway to a new and better way of life.” In the cities, he claimed, 
unemployment was low, and some peasants earned five times as much as they had in 
their villages… […] … as Huntington saw it, bombing the Vietnamese out of the 
countryside and into the slums represented a marked step up for them.545”
Huntington, in his own words, coldly adduces that the urbanization of 
Vietnamese society, a precursor to the rearrangement of the political 
economy of postwar Vietnam on the basis of capitalist development with 
strong bureaucratic centralization, was the beneficial outcome of the 
“intensification of the war effort.546” This undermined the fashionable 
counterinsurgency theory of Robert Thompson - of British-Malaya war 
fame - whose ideas are generally credited with giving voice to the notion 
of “winning hearts and minds” through the use of small troop corps and 
developing working relationships with “the natives.547” Contra Thompson, 
Huntington argues that “if the direct application of mechanical and 
conventional power,” “takes place on such a massive scale as to produce 
massive migration from the countryside to city, the basic assumptions 
underlying Maoist doctrine of revolutionary war no longer operate. The 
Maoist-inspired rural revolution is undercut by the American-sponsored 
urban revolution.548”
Seeking the destruction of the world of old Vietnam, Huntington offers the 
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general theory of the “strategic hamlet”549 - or concentration camps - to 
which people were rounded up and forced to live - much like 
Speenhamland denied free mobility and made to rely on largesse - without 
access to their traditional sources of livelihood.550 Huntington chillingly 
writes with mechanical precision about human lives, in a manner not too 
dissimilar from those who planned the “final solution”551 at the Wannsee 
conference a quarter century prior, where calmly matters concerning 
“forced evacuation,” the selection of strong Jews for “operating the 
extermination machinery,” the need to draw up the “necessary legislation 
for making the victims” technically “stateless,” and the provision of “the 
necessary railroad cars” and that “trains did not conflict with other 
timetables.552” “In an absent-minded way the United States in Viet Nam” 
Huntington wrote
“stumbled upon the answer to ‘wars of national liberation.’ The effective response lies 
neither in the quest for conventional military victory nor in the esoteric doctrines and 
gimmicks of counter-insurgency warfare. It is instead forced-draft urbanization and 
modernization which rapidly brings the country in question out of the phase in which a 
rural revolutionary movement can hope to generate sufficient strength to come to 
power.553”
This betrays a few conceits about American freedom. First, there is a 
powerful element of messianism involved in negative liberty, and that 
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Berlin’s warning about flipping it into positive liberty was not only never 
heeded, but comes to sound more like a prophecy born out of resignation. 
Even the mild-mannered Hobbes, who fancied himself a messenger of 
moderation against “vainglorious” revolutionaries willing to die for a 
cause, realized that for his vision of negative liberty to be successful that 
state intervention in society was necessary which must either involve the 
state in the use of violence, or must require the agents of the state to be 
willing to die for the state, necessitating some form of proselytizing 
sentiment on the part of enforcers. Huntington indeed speaks of a better 
way of life for the Vietnamese as something that the Americans could 
literally bring to the Vietnamese by bombing the country mercilessly, and 
to achieve this the entire US state institution, as well as civil society, had 
to be brought in line to quell dissent, supply troops in large numbers, and 
engage in war production. There is one word that best describes this: 
regimentation.
Second, the very idea that somehow liberal democracy is different in its 
intent in relation to the Other in comparison to formal fascist governments 
is revealed to be at best a question of degree of hostility/toleration - 
something which fascist governments take note of as well despite the all-
powerful caricature that has come to occupy the Western imaginary 
regarding such - and at worst is revealed to be more or less the same. 
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Gassing people in a discrete individual incinerator, or a group in a shower 
of Zyklon B appears here to be the same as ‘death from above’: the 
annihilation of wood-thatch dwellings and forests with incendiary 
ordinance. Intentions seem meaningless. 
And third, both the Holocaust itself and the prosecution of the war in 
Vietnam with extreme violence and cruelty seem to be examples of wars 
against the Other insistent on existing of their own terms outside of the 
ontological cartography of the nation - and in both cases the connection of 
these actions towards the Other in a war, one for national purity and 
lebensraum, and the other for global dominance in the geopolitical 
competition in the ‘Cold War’ and another variant of lebensraum - reveals 
the fallacy of Schmitt’s distinction of the enemy from the enemy within. 
States cannot be understood as essential and sole representatives  of single 
nations. In reality they must be unfinished bodies, and the demonstration 
of closure through the raising up of the figure of homo sacer to be the 
receiver of exemplary violence is a performance of identity, and the only 
way that states can speak for the nation - be this a regionally/culturally/
racially confined notion (Germany), or be it a global project of producing 
deracinated individuals and communities embroiled in the circuits of 
global capitalism and the reproduction of freedom (America).
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Destroy their world. Destroy the village to save it.
“The soul is, of course, not a purely metaphysical concept, for it signifies a personal 
history in life as well as in death. For the Vietnamese to leave the land was to leave a part 
of the personality. When in 1962 the Diem regime forced the peasants to move behind the 
barbed wire of the strategic hamlets, the peasants found that they no longer trusted each 
other. And for an excellent reason. Once landowners and tenants, they became overnight 
improvidents and drifters who depended for their survival on what they could beg or take 
from others…
…The American war only completed the process the Diem regime had begun, moving 
peasants out of the villages and into the refugee camps and the cities, the real strategic 
hamlets of the war. For these farmers, as for their distant ancestors, to leave the hamlet 
was to step off the brink of the known world.554”
And the fate of those in the countryside? As per Huntington’s 
recommendation? 
“With artillery, helicopters, and tactical bombers at its disposal, the Allied command 
declared whole areas outside the strategic hamlet belt “free fire zones,” where anything 
moving might be shot. Inside the belt it permitted the artillery to fire out almost at 
random every night on suspected Viet Cong concentrations, trails, and staging areas - a 
tactic known as “harassment and interdiction.” All this unguided firing naturally 
dissuaded many peasants from following what would have been their normal course of 
slipping away from the crowded, squalid enclosures. At least one American admitted that 
the NLF were not far wrong in calling these settlements concentration camps.555”
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Fitzgerald also offers the following reply to Huntington:
“But there was nothing absentminded about the manner in which the U.S. armed forces 
went about their program of “forced-draft urbanization.” Nor was it a simple oversight 
that they neglected the corollary of “modernization.” Since 1954 - indeed since 1950 with 
the American sponsorship of the French war in Indochina - the United States has had only 
one concern and that was the war to destroy the revolutionary movement. It has not won 
that war and it has not destroyed the revolution, but it has changed Vietnam to the point 
where it is unrecognizable to the Vietnamese.556”
This nihilistic fury against the Other is America’s legacy in Vietnam, and 
was commenced in the name of freedom. This much was believed in by 
individuals like Huntington, however cynically, and by American rank-
and-file soldiers who either suppressed their memories of that war and 
found various mechanisms of escape from the truth, or became in many 
cases radical anti-war activists.557 Some of these soldiers would sustain 
their truth-telling for the rest of their lives - those lucky enough to survive 
the madness of war on physical and psychological fronts. Others, 
however, would eventually come to inauthentically cast aside their 
memories, leaving its lessons behind for opportunism of the kind that led 
Martin Heidegger into the nihilism of national socialism for a time.558
The camps perversely inverted people’s sense of selfhood and their 
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interests; their capacity for love and trust withered into despair and 
cynicism. Combining our analysis of ‘the Shock Doctrine,’ Speenhamland, 
the Nazi camps, the strategic hamlets of the American war in Vietnam, and 
the production of what Thiele calls “homelessness”559 in the supposed 
search for a metaphysical order to the world, it is clear that the 
reformulation of individuals along the lines of such orderings is a 
chimerical, insane process. Baumann agrees, indicating that in opposition 
to prevailing assumptions of the barbarity of the Holocaust - signifying its 
supposedly being a break on the march of progress - a retrogression - in 
fact the Holocaust could only be a product of modernity.560 In seeking to 
quantify the world, bring it to objective presence for the sake of making it 
manipulable, human beings have become homeless in the world because 
this afflicts all of us potentially, and unleashes a competition amongst all 
of us to ensure it doesn’t happen to us. What is lost? The ability to be at 
home in the world: Heidegger calls it “dwelling,” which he explicitly 
connects to what he believes ought to be called “thinking,561” and Polanyi 
calls it “habitation,562” which, like Heidegger’s concept of dwelling, 
invokes a quality of being present with what is rather than seeking to 
reorder the world for the sake of improvement, the origins of which are to 
be found in the salesmanship of the market and the expectations it spreads 
across the globe, magnifying desires to keep up with one’s neighbors in 
accumulations for the sake of self-worth.563
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But the production of homelessness is now so total that the victims and the 
perpetrators of this idea have long since lost the notion of being at home in 
the world that Heidegger writes about when he invokes the idea of the 
“heimisch”564 quality of existence. Dwelling, which is activated by a 
mindful-staying-with, by being’s authentic “getting-ahead-of-itself,” and 
most of all by care, by stewardshp of one’s “thrownness,” or contingency, 
brings about this heimisch quality, and this cannot be accessed or 
comprehended if one is fixated entirely on bringing to presence a certain 
understanding of being-in-the-world definable by only that notion of 
presence.565 To “think” Heidegger says, is “to dwell”566 on a matter before 
consciousness, to mindfully-remain-present-with, and in so doing, one 
creates a home - a dwelling. But those who would forget Vietnam, who 
refuse to dwell on the war, and its significance for America, excuse 
barbarity, which, just like the Nazi Holocaust was commenced in the name 
of civilizational order. This indicates a desire to anoint oneself within the 
fold of morality, leaving reality behind, since it is of less import than 
identification with this theological notion of modernization as the 
inexorable destiny of humankind, both enabling future atrocities, and 
erasing the complicity we have with those committed.
“The war in Vietnam, it should not be forgotten, was inaugurated and escalated to its most 
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intense and destructive violence by both liberal Democratic and conservative Republican 
presidential administrations …[…]… and was debated globally, not in terms of the fate 
of democracy in America, but of the very idea of liberal capitalist democracy. This 
spectacle of the self-destruction of the “benign” logic of liberal democracy - this 
inadvertent rendering visible of the genocidal violence latent in its otherwise invisible 
because banalized imperial “center elsewhere” - was the essential witness of the Vietnam 
war at large. It was, if the grotesquely comic banality (to which the highly serious 
American speaker is utterly blind) is understood as a carnivalesque trope of the 
inexpressible horror of the event he, like the Pentagon planners of the war, routinizes, 
perfectly imagined in synecdochical form by the major who, in the aftermath of a large-
scale search and destroy operation, told a reporter, “in a successful attempt at attaining 
history, ‘We had to destroy Ben Tre in order to save it.’” Ben Tre…was not simply 
geographical/political space occupied by the “enemy”; it is an earth…inhabited by a 
people whose culture sacralized this earth’s very (spatial and temporal) being…
…We must, that is, not be seduced by the emergent “larger pattern” of History into 
forgetting that America’s intervention in Southeast Asia was undertaken in the name of 
“winning hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese people to the fundamental and historically 
realized ontological principles of the “free world” and that it eventually took the visibly 
contradictory form of an all-out - undiscriminating - linguistic, ecological, cultural, 
economic, and military violence. We must also not forget that this polyvalent violence 
was read by a significant portion of the people of the United States, of Europe, and of the 
Third World, including responsible representative Western intellectuals such as Jean-Paul 
Sartre, Bertram Russell, Noam Chomsky, and Martin Luther King, as genocidal in its 
intent and in its proportions. Nor must we forget that, however symptomatically enacted, 
the protestation of the war in the United States - its “refusal of spontaneous consent” to 
the truth discourse of liberal capitalist democracy, to invoke Antonio Gramsci - brought 
the American government to a crisis that only the disruption of the Civil War has 
surpassed in critical intensity. The examples (among many others) of President Lyndon 
Johnson’s decision not to run for reelection and the ensuing violence unleashed by Mayor 
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Richard Daley at the Democratic national convention in Chicago and a little later by 
Governor James Rhodes at Kent State University attest to this crisis of hegemony…
…What, […] happened in that time, […] was, […] something akin to an epistemic break. 
The unspeakable violence perpetrated in the name of the principles of freedom by the 
United States during the Vietnam War symptomatically disclosed at multiple sites on the 
continuum of being the contradictions inhering in the truth discourse of liberal capitalist 
democracy. To put it concretely and positively, America’s inordinately violent conduct of 
the war made visible the polyvalent global imperial will to power that, under normal 
conditions, strategically remains invisible in the (onto)logic of the “free world.567”
The American people, whose status as citizens of a nation considered the 
beacon of freedom for the world has been a source of much self-
satisfaction and self-worth over the last several decades, and whose 
lifestyle is the main beneficiary of the instrumentalization of being, are 
also an unfinished people, which Spanos’ point about the anti-war 
protests, the challenges to the democratic party old guard and the violent 
repression unleashed, and many, many other moments in the public record, 
imagination, and memory confirm. But there is a peculiar division of labor 
in the maintenance of this concept of American identity and order, wherein 
many of the soldiers who fight wars have to live the rest of their lives in 
some form of denial - ranging from an inability to talk to an inauthentic 
braggadocio - about their deeds, and elites and elite intellectuals concoct 
the narrative opiates that enable all those who refuse the task to thinking to 
bask in the unremitting glow of triumphalism. Rounding out our analysis 
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of the Vietnam war’s singular importance in offering a grounded and well-
reasoned critique of negative liberty and the way in which this manner of 
freedom is made possible by a tenuous, conceit-ridden discourse about the 
nature of human beings and the destiny of peoples, as expressed by 
Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis, Spanos combines our several 
themes concerning freedom, liberalism, violence, and the use of official 
narratives in the search of permanence, all in the employ of, and 
commenced by, the extinguishing of thought:
“As [Fukuyama’s] representation of the likely future “setbacks and disappointments in 
the process of democratization” as mere distractions “from the larger pattern that is 
emerging in world history” inexorably ordains, Fukyama’s “Hegelian” metaphysical 
problematic compels the trivialization of the history of the Vietnam war, if not the 
complete obliteration of its epochal significance. In his only more or less direct reference 
to that globally disruptive occasion, he violently reduces the resonant double differences 
that was/is the Vietnam War to the reified status of one in a series of vaguely affiliated 
historical “accidents” (a “fluke”) that reflects our attention from the planetary eventness 
of this war. From his Hegelian perspective - and reminiscent of the nineteenth-century 
American discourse of Manifest Destiny - Fukuyama transforms the Vietnam War into a 
minor, passing, and mere (i.e., fundamentally irrelevant) digression in the grand, 
inexorable, and necessary progress of the dialectical (meta)narrative of History toward its 
self-devouring end. In short, just as his mentor effaces the historical presence of Africa 
from his dialectical history of the world - “At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it 
again. For it is no historical part of the World; it has no movement of development to 
exhibit” - so Fukuyama pacifies the disruptive force of the (non)event of Vietnam:
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“It is possible, after all, that the present trend toward democracy is a cyclical 
phenomenon. What reason, then, do we have to expect that the situation of the 1970s will 
not recur…?
…Can it not be argued, moreover, that the current crisis of authoritarianism is a fluke, a 
rare convergence of political planets that will not recur for the next hundred years?…
…But it is precisely if we look not just at the past fifteen years, but at the whole scope of 
history, that liberal democracy begins to occupy a special kind of place. While there have 
been cycles in the worldwide fortune of democracy, there has also been a pronounced 
secular trend in a democratic direction… Indeed, the growth of liberal democracy, 
together with its companion, economic liberalism, has been the most remarkable 
macropolitical phenomenon of the last four hundred years.…
…Fukuyama’s ocularcentric obliteration of [the Vietnam War’s] disclosive singularity in 
his euphoric representation of the end of the Cold War assumes a glaring visibility of 
epochal historical proportions. The totalizing and encompassing - panoptic - “look” he so 
casually advocates against the “merely” immediate event comes to be seen, not as the 
means of a disinterested reading of the itinerary of modern (Cold War) history as he 
claims, but as a powerful enabling agency of a polyvalent imperial interpretive project. It 
takes on the lineaments of a lethal act of reduction and pacification that repeats at the 
site of thinking the indiscriminate violent practice that destroyed Vietnam in order to 
“save it.” It is for this reason that this fissure in his totalized text - this visibility of his 
representational obliteration of the thisness of the war - needs to be carefully thought not 
only for its ideological implications but also for its implications for thinking as such.568”
The reason Fukuyama, and Huntington, who will be remembered for his 
cartoonish depiction of civilizations in conflict as the new global 
geopolitics after the ‘Cold War, will be always adjoined in their theories is 
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precisely the manner in which both theorists seek to extinguish thought, 
by crafting a phony home for the West, either as triumphant, or as 
triumphant but needing to police the boundaries of civilizational order lest 
the retrograde ‘cultures’ of the rest of the world’s civilizations (they can 
hardly be even deemed such, Huntington seems to repeatedly suggest) 
drag the West back into history. Naturalizing history as inexorable and 
identity as essence for essentialized (read: racialized, tribalized, 
nationalized, etc.), individuals are reduced to automatons fulfilling a role 
determined for them by those who claim to know their true being. It is 
difficult to imagine a less free way of being, or a less thoughtless way of 
conceptualizing existence. Fighting a ‘war on terror’ at the ‘end of 
history,’ it appears as though a wild pack of genocide-deniers are hell-bent 
on destroying freedom and its always already present twin: thinking. By 
failing to acknowledge the indeterminacy of good and evil, by gearing up 
for the production of identity as goodness, we (1) fail to recall Heidegger’s 
insight into the nature of what we call modernity: that it is ontologically 
about using technology to reduce all beings to “standing reserve,” and (2) 
we are forced to inauthentically portray complex human events and 
persons as scapegoats to ensure our own sense of affirmation. It doesn’t 
matter what we do the Other, because we’re good enough, we’re smart 
enough, and gosh darn it, people like us.
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——————————————————————————
XVI. The Ideology of Progress in India - Thoughtlessness, Fascist 
Democracy, and Civilized Savagery
“Thinking,” Martin Heidegger has written, is “thanking.569” Thinking 
returns us through a gratitude for existence to the things themselves, to the 
unconcealment, the disclosure, of phenomena. Thoughtful awareness must 
be eliminated if negative liberty is to be accepted across the globe. 
Because of the fear of each other, and of the Other more broadly 
conceived as a foreign element, that undergirds Western political ontology, 
negative conceptions of togetherness have been forged over time with an 
eye to necessity of combination undertaken in the name of removing 
uncertainty and doubt brought about by the human experience that can 
always be revealed by thought. These approaches have been increasingly 
globalized, either by the West itself, or through admirers of the West found 
in societies traditionally understood as being non-Western. But, as Robin 
points out in his discussion of Hobbes, political fear has to be constructed 
if it is to be regularized.570 Without a predictable, and normalized 
individual, the orchestration of negative liberty becomes impossible, since 
some will accept some things, and will reject others, while the opposite 
will be the case for other persons. Thinking, more than anything else, is 
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the way out of this morass for individuals. By revealing the entirety of a 
situation, thinking overwhelms and overawes individuals into a moment in 
time, where they are then capable of gradually revealing the myriad 
references that constitute a moment; this opens the doorway to authentic 
being-together-with and at the very least, tolerance, of the Other.
Thinking, thankfully, is a spontaneous human capacity that can be 
awakened in various ways.
But thoughtlessness was become dominant in the modern world.  It is 
quite useful to cite the words of the former Indian finance minister, 
Palaniappan Chidambaram, who in an interview in 2008 with news 
magazine Tehelka, had the following to say about the modernization and 
urbanization of India; his words match Huntington’s.
“Urbanisation cannot be stopped. It is an inexorable process. All you can do is mitigate 
the harmful effects of mindless urbanisation by building new cities, by limiting the size 
of cities, by creating more green and open spaces in cities. I don’t think it’s within the 
power of any country or people to stop this natural progression. We must try to manage it 
rather than interfere with it. My vision of a poverty-free India will be an India where a 
vast majority, something like 85 percent, will eventually live in cities. Not megalopolises 
but cities. In an urban environment it is easier and more efficient to provide water, 
electricity, education, roads, entertainment and security rather than in 6,00,000 villages. I 
also believe a significant number of Indians would want to live in the countryside and 
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continue farming. That should be welcome and we should encourage it, but it would be a 
much smaller number than people who have moved to cities. My vision again is that we 
must continue to emphasise the imperative need of growth over a long period of time. We 
get weary easily. We have three to four years of high growth and we sit back as though it 
is a given. Growth is not a given. You have to work hard for it. We have to ensure that the 
growth process continues for the next 20-30 years. When we have eliminated poverty, 
illiteracy, some of the most debilitating diseases, when we have immunised every child, 
when we have eliminated very basic deficiencies like lack of drinking water, electricity, 
rural road connectivity — at that point of time, the process will become automatic and 
people will themselves ensure that growth continues at a fairly sustained pace. But for 
that that moment to arrive, to get rid of poverty in our lifetime, we need to work very 
hard to sustain a growth rate of nine percent moving up to 10 percent. If you want to get 
rid of poverty over the next hundred years, you can have a different model or system. But 
if you want to get rid of it in the next 20 years, we have to work very hard for it.571”
The inexorability of progress, which Chidambaram and Huntington clearly 
both take faith in, leaves them free of any obligation to tolerate difference, 
especially when these differences vehemently cling to a vision whose 
ontological completeness in identification with their surroundings gets in 
the way of reducing of the world to “standing reserve.”  Evident is the 
failure of thinking, of the imagination, and of the capacity to understand, 
welcome, become friends with, or even minimally tolerate the presence of 
the Other. The search for permanence has rendered the mere otherness of 
the Other - their continuing existence and ontological difference - to be a 
threat. Echoing the Vietnamese reverence of Xa, the Dongria Kondh 
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people have worshipped hills now marked for bauxite extraction (to the 
tune of four trillion dollars in value)572 by Vedanta, a transnational mining 
corporation.573 The hills are their god, and, for the inhabitants of this part 
of India that is today in a state called Orissa, “it’s as though god has” now 
“been sold.574” But “Vedanta is only one of many multinational 
corporations closing in on Orissa.575” This land is under siege by an Indian 
state operating not only in the name of development - which led even the 
much-admired Jawaharlal Nehru to build dams atop tribal villages576 - but 
in the name of capitalist development closely tied with global financial 
centers far away from India. It is no wonder that the Dongria Kondh, and 
many peoples like them in India’s heartland have taken up arms against 
the state, since they, as well as many family-farmers across India, now, are 
victim to the expropriation of their land under the 1894 “Land Acquisition 
Act,” which, as the date should imply, was a law brought into force while 
India was a colony of England.577 Who indeed, rules India (and Pakistan)? 
“If the…hills are destroyed,” Arundhati Roy writes
“the forests that clothe them will be destroyed too. So will the rivers and the streams that 
flow out of them and irrigate the plains below. So will the Dongria Kondh. So will the 
hundreds of thousands of tribal people who live in the forested heart of India, whose 
homeland is similarly under threat…
… In our smoky, crowded cities, some people say, ‘So what? Someone has to pay the 
price of progress.’ Some even say, ‘Let’s face it, these are people whose time has come. 
Look at any developed country, Europe, the United States, Australia - they all have a 
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‘past’.’ Indeed they do. So why shouldn’t we?578” 
And this attitude has led to the development of India’s own strategic 
hamlets program, free-fire zones, the imprisonment of human rights 
activists who cite India’s own constitution that declares that the rights of 
tribal people must not be violated and their land not taken from them, and 
the institutionalization of a war-footing in relation to vast tracts of India’s 
internal territory.579 For the poor in India, be they rural people like the 
tribals who are either caught up in, sympathize with, receive token 
protection from, or participate in the Naxalite army - also known as ‘the 
People’s War Group,’ -  ‘progress’ means civil war.580
For Chidambaram and his allies, it means profits. The finance minister 
himself was previously a lawyer for Enron corporation,581 which had 
bribed the center-right Bhartiya Janata Party government in the 1990’s in 
order to gain a foothold in the tempting Indian energy market of rising 
middle-classes seeking access to a modern lifestyle. To bring about the 
orchestration of beings to produce accumulations and concentrations of 
power as measured in terms of capital, Indian elites are turning India into 
a vast labor camp.582 Employing the disciplinary logic of freedom 
demanding conformity of the rising middle-classes with a program of 
genocide, creating illusory permanence for a relatively new social order 
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through appeals to nationalism and religiosity, and granting the poor in 
India’s cities the right to work for a pittance, to be abused by their social 
betters as a due course of “nature,583” having already lost their land and 
dignity in the “forced-draft urbanization” that Huntington and 
Chidambaram have both thought to be the gateway to prosperity, India’s 
new ruling and privileged classes of administrators - the petty bourgeoisie 
- have sought security over freedom, and persecute individuals with 
conscience and awareness with as much zeal if not more than their 
officially-Western counterparts.
Ashis Nandy has written that the transformation of India by colonialism 
had, among other effects, the highly significant consequence of priming 
the new Indian nation for its entry into global power politics, but that this 
would require the disciplining of India’s “subcultural differences” and 
“asymmetry” in a manner that would, like Robin shows in Edmund 
Burke’s reactionary thought, require a more activist project than 
something that could simply be called “conservatism.584” India’s 
traditional pluralism and anarchy are thus to be replaced with a unified 
and centralized state, and into the void generated by the lack of this 
presence in India in relation to her competitors on the global stage, the 
Indian fascist projects “middle-class Western values.585” And thus keeping 
up with the Joneses now become maintaining honor among the Kumars, 
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Rajputs, Singhs, Ashrafs, and Advanis.
For their cousins in the jungles of Dantewada, Operation Green Hunt, an 
elite commando military campaign, and strategic hamlets, is rapidly 
destroying ancient cultures that predate the Vedas, and for their brothers 
and sisters involved in farming, the increasing sell out of their livelihoods 
and land to global agribusinesses (yes the same that Thiele described as 
‘irresponsible’586 rather than genocidal) through monetary debt vehicles 
that have driven 180,000 or more to the despair of suicide.587
The purpose of the preceding discussion, other than marshaling valuable 
empirical support for our theory, is to show that the contingent 
acceleration of these processes in India is not a necessary development 
and it requires the active complicity and decision-making of powerful 
social agents. Masking their decisions in the air of inevitability, the elite 
reveal their own unfreedom, since they are ascribing their actions to forces 
other than themselves, and they create a social framework of denial which 
must always be defended against spontaneous awareness. India has 
millions of displaced people and was itself born out of the forcible transfer 
of millions, too.588 As the refugees in urban slums, in resettlement camps, 
and in other desperate places cut off from their livelihoods, their homes, 
and their communities, entire societies have been relegated to desperation 
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and are hanging at the edges of survival. Their lives and deaths become 
irrelevant to the new rising middle-classes and the democracy that 
purports to be that shining class’ authentic representative.
“It’s not very surprising that [the necessity of progress] it into the version of the New 
India currently on the market. That’s because what is on sale is another form of denial… 
In this universe, systemic horrors are converted into momentary lapses, attributable to 
flawed individuals, and a more “balanced,” happier world is presented in place of the real 
one. The balance is spurious: often Union and Progress (the BJP and Congress) are set off 
against each other, a liberal secular critique of the Union project used to legitimize the 
depredations of the Progress project. Those at the top of the food chain, those who have 
no reason to want to alter the status quo…[have the] job…to patrol the border, diffuse 
rage, delegitimize anger, and to negotiate a ceasefire.589”
This identarian fascism feasts on the poor, both as its foot-soldiers, and its 
victims, and is historically-linked to economic failure, social inequality, 
and the opportunities these present for politicians who will become the 
“harvesters of sorrow.590”
“Right now in India we have to negotiate the dangerous cross-currents of neoliberal 
capitalism and communal neo-fascism. While the word capitalism hasn’t completely lost 
its sheen yet, using the word fascism often causes offense. So we must ask ourselves, are 
we using the word loosely? Are we exaggerating our situation, does what we are 
experiencing on a daily basis qualify as fascism…?
… When a government more or less openly supports a pogrom against members of a 
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minority community591 in which more than one thousand people are brutally killed, is it 
fascism? When women of that community are publicly raped and burned alive, is it 
fascism? When authorities collude to see to it that nobody is punished for these crimes, is 
it fascism? When one hundred and fifty thousand people are driven from their homes, 
ghettoized, and economically and socially boycotted, is it fascism? When the cultural 
guild that runs hate camps across the country commands the respect and admiration of 
the prime minister, the home minister, the law minister, the disinvestment minister, is it 
fascism? When painters, writers, scholars, and filmmakers who protest are abused, 
threatened, and have their work burned, banned, and destroyed, it is fascism? When a 
government issues an edict requiring the arbitrary alteration of school history textbooks, 
is it fascism? When mobs attack and burn archives of ancient historical documents, when 
every minor politician masquerades as a professional medieval historian and 
archaeologist, when painstaking scholarship is rubbished using baseless populist 
assertion, it is fascism? When murder, rape, arson, and mob justice are condoned by the 
party in power and its stable of stock intellectuals as an appropriate response to a real or 
perceived historical wrong - committed centuries ago - is it fascism? When the middle 
class and the well heeled pause a moment, tut-tut, and then go on with their lives, is it 
fascism? When the prime minister who presides over all this is hailed as a statesman and 
visionary, are we not laying the foundation for full-blown fascism.592”
The Indian state now defends itself with Orwellian-sounding laws named 
“the Prevention of Terrorism Act,” which was repealed in 2004, only to be 
reintroduced in 2008 as a new amendment to the already in place 
“Unlawful Activities Prevention Act,” which, among other things, 
institutionalized the state’s ability to prevent peaceful assemblies, impose 
gags on free speech, and to take other preventive measures as the 
                    271
government sees fit in the name of national security.593 Under these laws, 
and the regime of lawlessness legalized under their rubric, millions, 
including Muslims, indigenous Aadivasi tribal peoples, communists, land 
reform activists, social justice campaigners, advocates of Kashmiri 
autonomy and/or independence, organizers seeking greater freedom from 
Delhi in India’s untamed northeast, and many others, have had their rights 
abridged.594 This has also transformed whole classes of law-abiding 
citizens into unfree persons, who, by virtue of their thoughts - the 
spontaneity of the awareness - are criminalized.
The paranoia of this state of affairs is reflected clearly in India’s activities 
in Kashmir, a land to which they hold a conflicting, irresolvable claim to, 
along with Pakistan; irresolvable because of the very idea of the need to 
produce permanence as the basis of national order. In Kashmir, Roy writes
“even junior commissioned and noncommissioned officers of the army [are allowed] to 
use force (and even kill) any person on suspicion of disturbing public order or carrying a 
weapon. On suspicion of! Nobody who lives in India can harbor any illusions about what 
that means. The documentation of instances of torture, disappearances, custodial deaths, 
rape, and gang rape (by security forces) is enough to make your blood run cold. The fact 
that despite all this, India retains its reputation as a legitimate democracy - in the 
international community and among its own middle class - is a triumph.595”
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Laws like these are designed to promote a sense of normalcy within a 
country for those who are ostensibly the beneficiaries - however actually 
temporarily - of this state of affairs. War is the reality for much of India, 
“But in urban India,” Roy tells us
“wherever you go… you have TV monitors in which election promises have already 
come true. India’s Shining, Feeling Good. You only have to close your ears to the 
sickening crunch of the policeman’s boot on someone’s ribs, you only have to raise your 
eyes from the squalor, the slums, the ragged broken people on the streets and seek a 
friendly TV monitor and you will be in that other beautiful world. The singing-dancing 
world of Bollywood’s permanent pelvic thrusts, of permanently privileged, permanently 
happy Indians waving their tricolor flag and Feeling Good. It’s becoming harder and 
harder to tell which one’s the real world and which one’s virtual. Laws like POTA are like 
buttons on a TV. You can use it to switch off the poor, the troublesome, the unwanted.596”
——————————————————————————
XVII. Bios, Zoe, and the Creation of Superfluous Beings - 
Identification with Arbitrary Power
The two preceding sections have been included for the purpose of giving 
direct evidence to the claim that not only is freedom itself transformed 
into a narrow vision of conformity when conceived as permanent 
possession, but that the very notion of being free - being open for the 
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disclosure of being - is betrayed through the institutionalization of the 
capacity for decision-making to determine insiders and outsiders. This 
capacity must eventually blur foreign and domestic spatial distinctions. 
Because of the inherent uncertainty of these designations, to secure the 
self, the group seeking permanence embarks on adventures beyond the 
domestic space to give succor to its resource base on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, as Tocqueville’s praise of France’s and Europe’s racially-
based adventures abroad makes clear, these journeys to new lands are also 
undertaken to prove to the self the self’s superiority to other beings whose 
being is thus brought into question.597 This relational and negative 
understanding of the self can only be meaningful in the context of the 
relationship between Self and Other. Domination, the destruction of the 
Other, and the vaunting of the Self, the garnering of the means of selfhood 
through physical violence or through a combination of physical violence 
and supremacist ideology, can, in the end, only result in the degradation of 
the idea of freedom. Quite simply, freedom is about choice, and the 
justificatory reference to necessity as the reason behind colonial ventures, 
behind the stockpiling of power understood as the holding in reserve of 
beings and things, and behind the inability to remain still and await the 
disclosure of existence, all obscure both choice and the awareness of 
choices. Even simpler, can we characterize the impatient, anxious, and 
utterly fearful as free? As per the Hobbesian formula, as assented to by 
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Locke, Mill, Tocqueville, and those in favor of the liberal variant of 
disciplinary governance, authentic choice is surrendered to the sovereign. 
In some cases, the sovereign agency recreates relatively inconsequential 
choices for persons in society, i.e - elections and choice of political party 
membership in officially-sanctioned groups. But even the rudiments of 
choice, for both the commoner and for the elite, are self-mystified with 
appeals to inexorable processes and human nature; indeed Chidambaram’s 
words about the necessity of harsh discipline for 20-30 years before 
progress would became automatic seem to echo Mill’s infamous assent to 
the idea of despotism being necessary for barbarians to be governed 
properly until they could make spontaneous progress manifestly on their 
own without tutelage.598
Western modernity is a contingent spatiality and temporality. But failing to 
recognize it as such, we conceive of ideas of progressiveness, historical 
destiny, and the naturalization of violent processes in which choice plays a 
fundamental role because they are the product of artifice, as being simply 
there, as objectively present, and thus revelatory sources of duties to be 
fulfilled.599 If viewed in this manner, the very unfree eventuality of 
needing to prove that one is indeed a ‘free one’ worthy of freedom will 
come to consume not only domestic political and social interactions - and 
indeed because of the near-total absence of regulation in the private realm 
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of the American workplace, in economic interactions600 - but also activates 
a foreign-policy footing aimed at producing and reproducing the basis of 
this distinction between the free and the unfree abroad. In our discussion 
of the Vietnam war this much should be obvious. So too should be the 
fascist nature of the American intervention there and the cultural fascism 
associated with denying the significance of the Vietnam war. In our 
discussion of the production of the same kinds of privileges in Indian 
politics and economy - which Roy satirizes by referring to it as the 
secession of the rich and the middle-classes from India - an upwards 
secession freeing the elite from planet Earth itself601 - we can also witness 
the abrogation of not only the liberal legal framework, but the cultural 
effect of this on the people who are trained towards progress at any cost, 
in opposition to countermovements in society that refuse to go along.
“modern totalitarianism can be defined as the establishment, by means of the state of 
exception, of a legal civil war that allows for the physical elimination not only of political 
adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated 
into the political system. Since then, the voluntary creation of a permanent state of 
emergency (though perhaps not declared in a technical sense) has become one of the 
essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called democratic ones…
…This transformation of a provisional and exceptional measure into a technique of 
government threatens to radically alter - in fact, has already palpably altered - the 
structure and meaning of the traditional distinction between constitutional forms. Indeed, 
from this perspective, the state of exception appears as a threshold of indeterminacy 
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between democracy and absolutism.602”
The long-standing erasure of difference in Western political philosophy 
through the metaphysical mechanism of disciplining the unfolding of 
existence - the becoming of being - in order to fit it into a template 
associated with making being permanent, which Heidegger was also 
charged as being complicit with because of the manipulability of his 
concept of authenticity in the wrong hands,603 is given new intensity in the 
current globalized moment since the spread of systems of power and 
production globally have undermined nations’ self-conceptions and 
notions of destiny.604 We also witness the assertion of power over the bare 
life of individuals, zoe, in the name of an order of power no longer capable 
of using sovereign violence associated with re-inscribing political order 
for this same reason, since it cannot clothe persons in the armor of bios in 
a rational manner that allows individuals to make their lives stable unless 
they precede their sense of identity and the authentic possibilities for being 
found in their connection, through their identity, to their surroundings, 
with simply the idea that the sensation of permanence itself is what their 
identity is coeval with.605 Following our recovery of Heidegger’s heresy 
about the ontology of modernity understood as the production of the 
standing reserve to be rendered manipulable for the making present of 
beings in accordance with the orchestrations of power, in which he 
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equated the Nazi genocide with the advent of mechanized agriculture, the 
point here is that there is an inner logic to this drive - not because 
metaphysical truths about it are true, but simply because of its own self-
conception as worthy of, and through the will capable of, mastery of the 
world amounting to permanent security.606 But because this sovereign 
violence always shifts its targets, always finds faults in the construction of 
order, even the most seemingly secure identities can be on the receiving 
end of violence, and somehow this fact must be ignored by those who 
identify entirely with that order.
Disembedding a political being from the plurality of beings, and holding it 
up as it were, as an example for all to follow - and holding up a 
constitutive opposition in the body of homo sacer as a counterexample of 
failed discipline - political institutions and other institutions that remain 
political, since the question of being circulates as a specter in their daily 
operation, quiet the infinities of freedom that can emerge from 
spontaneous expression and spontaneous thought and redirect people’s 
energies toward the material and ideological reproduction of the sublime 
body understood to be the common identity of people within the organized 
framework in question. This was the case in Plato, remained the case in 
Hobbes’ sovereign, continued to be the case in each of the liberalized 
forms of rule associated with the liberal critique of absolute power that in 
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the end only democratized the capacity for sovereign decision but didn’t 
question the corporatized body itself,607 and even remains the case in the 
theories liberals like Richard Rorty and John Rawls, who, in seemingly 
calling for a maximum of pluralism, nonetheless fail to accommodate 
difference in their concepts of ordered liberty.608
In the context of economics, in a “zone of indistinction” at the precipice of 
modernity that we have suggested was a predecessor of the camp, the 
exposure of people to the decisions of individuals and groups who operate 
several removes from the reality that they will come to influence by virtue 
of the organization of social interaction in places like Speenhamland, the 
the subsequent Poor Laws regime in England, and in the sudden 
privatizations accompanied by an increase in unaccountable state power 
whose mission is to ensure compliance of the people at all costs, creates a 
sparser, more rarified sublime body than that of the nation ostensibly 
clothed in the coverings of culture. This is the idealized notion of the 
individual as a rational actor, divorced from cultural meanings, in theory, 
since rationality now comports with its ‘realistic’ measure through the 
market mechanism whose expression of value in terms of money - 
monetary numbers to be specific - is taken as a reliable indicator of their 
trustworthiness with freedom.609 But just like the scenario of the sublime 
body of the nation - and in modern times because of the residue of the idea 
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of race, the purportedly biological and ideal body of the race as the nation 
- an ultimately unsustainable idea of existence is held up as an example to 
the rest of the people in society as a basis for their disciplinary behavioral 
goals.610
In both cases, the economic and the political, insofar as we can even 
conceive of these domains as separate from one another, the process of 
idealization has been characterized by a negative ideal of purity, 
rationality, and other codes of belonging through the exclusion of chaotic 
elements. Most importantly, the raising of of the specter in question is a 
fundamentally violent process, though this violence is frequently 
concealed. As Klein indicated in The Shock Doctrine, the violence can be 
broad and social in scope, such as through the widespread use of sovereign 
violence to mortify the body of homines sacri with slow death from 
economic blockade or fast death through the familiar instrumentality of 
militaries, or can be pinpoint precise through the use of psychological and 
physical technologies of torture that separate an individual from their own 
experience and their own perceptions of reality.611
In the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, often taken as the “father of modern 
moral philosophy,612” this precise division of the self from their own 
faculties is taken as being empirically true for all beings, and in this regard 
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Kant follows Descartes, whose philosophy as we discussed above has 
been recast in a dozen lights since his time in all subsequent philosophies 
that on some level divide the actual person, seen as deficient, as a bundle 
of emotions and passions that cloud their vision - their senses - from the 
idealized person, whose dispassion, whose ability to resolutely control 
their emotions, their ability to ‘see the big picture.’ The picture is decided 
in its constitution in advance. But if we have read our Plato correctly, there 
is nothing new about this view of the human being, and Fukuyama’s 
negative invocation of thymos, or spirit, as a thing to be held in check by 
rationality brings this trope right into the current moment.
At their core, economic determinism associated with market economics 
and theories of human nature that emphasize disconnection and alienation 
between persons, and that point the route to community through the 
internalization of rational fears which produce discipline, and, too, 
supremacist and fascist theories of political identity and order associated 
with the nation-state as a destiny of a peoples, both share the commonality 
of requiring an orchestration of material and thought for the purpose of 
reproduction of order. This orchestration is brought about through the use 
of sovereign violence, which, unlike violence used for the purpose of 
defense, has no restrictions on its operation - it is simply meant to 
introduce artificial suffering into the world atop the suffering human 
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beings will already likely experience as a element of existence. For this 
very reason it must be justified through doctrines such as just war theory, 
which are usually understood as mere justifications by those on the 
receiving end of action, and should therefore be understood as a salve on 
the minds of the perpetrators since they themselves lose their humanity in 
the process of commission; through bringing death to the Other, torment to 
the Other, and doing so in a manner based on the use of arbitrary, but 
sanctified, power, but that retains the character of being arbitrary always 
already since there is no recognition of the sacrificing of homo sacer, for 
the terms of order to be preserved. Therefore, on some level, the 
production of the division between the factical, instantiated, empirical 
human being, and the disciplined, idealized, essential human being as 
subject whose objective presence allows them to remain dispassionate and 
perceive objective being truly and universally necessitates the 
transformation of both the victim and the victimizer of organized violence 
into something less than fully human.
“The inhabitants of a totalitarian country are thrown into and caught in the process of 
nature or history for the sake of accelerating its movement; as such, they can only be 
executioners or victims of its inherent law. The process may decide that those who today 
eliminate race and individuals or the members of dying classes and decadent peoples are 
tomorrow those who must be sacrificed. What totalitarian rule needs to guide behavior of 
its subjects is a preparation to fit each of them equally well for the role of executioner and 
the role of victim. This two-sided preparation, the substitute for a principle of action, is 
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the ideology.613”
——————————————————————————
XVIII. The World is a Camp: Negation, Power-Seeking and Power-
Worshipping as Freedom
In the camps, be they actual camps or nations made into camps by the 
totalitarian logic of technology in service of permanence, where the 
double-disembedding of the rational actor and the sublime national body 
is made real, where the defense of the reproducibility of the permanent 
and essential understanding of the national people and the self is actuated, 
where it eventually is revealed to the self and the nation that the last line 
of defense for permanence is the application of force, we witness the 
decay and supersession of the nation-state as a concept of order; but in its 
demise lashes out, seeks final adherents, internationalizes its patterns of 
loyalty and security, and becomes deterritorialized.614 Especially in the 
case of the powerful nations with the most complex issues internally, since 
these states have had to overcommit their resource base and their reserves 
of legitimation devices for the sake of (re)producing their internal empires 
of freedom and wealth.615 This is the prophecy of Nietzsche’s war of 
spirits, and the second world war was a precursor to this. Most 
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importantly, this war was itself at least partially a product of German 
desires to prove their being equal of the other European imperial powers, 
and thus to play power politics, and to show that they too were a force to 
be reckoned with.616 Not only were they technologically strong and 
organized in carrying out the conquests befitting a machine civilization, 
but they would seek to prove they were purer,617 as well. But this is 
nothing that hadn’t already been commenced by the other European 
nations in the name of their empires in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 
and to forget this point is fashionable, but it is incorrect.
But, nonetheless, the German example is instructive since the conflicts 
between these new countries in the 3rd world have taken on characteristics 
of the kind of racism once exported there through imperialism. Fanon 
anticipated this development as a mechanism of the colonized bourgeoisie 
in these countries who would seek to make themselves the new permanent 
masters of the newly free countries.618 Scholars who have relied on the 
categories of political realism associated with the rise of the Westphalian 
system in European history therefore fail to understand the incentives and 
the forces at play in the attempt to construct states in the former colonized 
world, where the energies of negation, racism, and hyper-competitiveness, 
all layered onto societies with very different ontological underpinnings 
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that the West, are now witness to violent processes that are tearing 
identities asunder not on the basis of aristocratic competitions that were 
the stuff of feudal Europe, but on the basis of the naturalized artificiality 
of biological-political divisions articulated to a mass understanding of 
human nature. And for this we can thank the Germans, who in defeat, 
managed to set the stakes for nationalist movements throughout the world, 
which became replete with many elite admirers of Hitler unafraid to 
manipulate the iconography of the nation, harness the popular will, and 
kill many more persons in the name of their fiefdoms than was ever done 
in feudal Europe. 
And so the war of spirits has come to engulf India and Pakistan, Shia and 
Sunni, Mestizo and Indigenous, Congo and its many nationalities which in 
the fog of war seem to be less meaningful than people’s immediate circles 
for cooperation to enhance survival prospects in war zones, Arab and 
African, Khmer and Vietnamese, Muslim and Christian Filipino, Tamil 
and Sinhalese, Chinese and Tibetan, and, in the former Yugoslavia as well, 
all the nationalities of that former-cosmopolitan nation-state, carved into 
protectorates, at loggerheads with each other, with peace amounting to a 
stalemate policed by NATO soldiers and arms. Preceding the cold peace 
that emerged in Southern Europe between religions and ethnicities, during 
the war, the resort to the widespread reliance on rape as a weapon of war 
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marked, for Agamben, a new biopolitical phase in international conflict, 
whose main purpose was the creation of a nationalist political force. 
Agamben writes:
“the camps have, in a certain sense, reappeared in an even more extreme form in the 
territories of the former Yugoslavia. What is happening there is by no means, as 
interested observers are quick to declare, a redefinition of the old political system 
according to new ethnic and territorial arrangements, which is to say, a simple repetition 
of the processes that led to the constitution of European nation-states. At issue in the 
former Yugoslavia is, rather, an incurable rupture of the old nomos and a dislocation of 
populations and human lives along entirely new lines of flight. Hence the decisive 
importance of ethnic rape camps. If the Nazis never thought of effecting the Final 
Solution by making Jewish women pregnant, it is because the principle of birth that 
assured the inscription of life in the order of the nation-state was still - if in a profoundly 
transformed sense - in operation. This principle has now entered into a process of decay 
and dislocation. It is becoming increasingly impossible for it to function, and we must 
expect not only new camps but always new and more lunatic regulative definitions of the 
inscription of life in the city. The camp, which is now securely lodged within the city’s 
interior, is the new biopolitical nomos of the planet.619” 
The use of feeding tubes to break hunger strikes; the indefinite detention 
of persons without formal charges or even an inkling of evidence proving 
their guilt of any crime, let alone terrorism against America in that nation’s 
‘war on terror;’ the herding of immigrants globally into detention camps 
and the proliferation of these camps where multitudes make their home; 
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the transformation of wide swathes of land into free-fire zones of the kind 
we are now acquainted with; the sacrifice zones where environmental 
decay, economic abandonment, security vacuums, and social decay are left 
to do their work on people whose mobility and capacity to seek refuge 
elsewhere is legally or informally limited; the introduction of police state 
technologies and strategies into urban environments; the planetary scale of 
slum-dwelling; the emphasis on middle-class family honor expressed 
through social self-segregation ranging from gentrification to the formal 
and informal arrangement of marriages to reproduce social 
class…..Agamben’s analysis appears to bear out. In these desperate places, 
people still want freedom. But freedom is a bodily urge, a unity of the 
consciousness with one’s actions that require support at some point even 
for the strongest and most strident individual. And so desperation becomes 
a technology of rule: the creation of isolation through ideologies of 
selfishness, racism and other forms of group-essentialization whose 
apparent resolution can only be warfare, and through other concordant 
means, and the absence of these artificial bindings leaves the individual 
alone in their abjectness.620 Dissolvent forces spread and rip apart 
communities, nations, and individuals, and in desperation, the state is 
sought as a provider of relief - so much so that being transformed into a 
cog in the machinery of the state is seen positively as a source of security, 
and, also, as coeval with the modest modicum of freedom imaginable.
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——————————————————————————
XIX. Technological Fanaticism: Death From Above, The Logic of 
Genocide, and the Production of Homelessness
Arendt was quoted above saying that “totalitarian rule needs to guide 
behavior […] to fit each [citizen] equally well for the role of executioner 
and the role of victim.621” the self-victimization of Americans who accept 
their powerlessness over politics, and whose empowerment and potential 
is refracted through the lens of party politics that has lost all meaning,622 
who zealously defend their party identifications through mass media,623 
and through the castigation of dissidents and members of third parties as 
being hopeless idealists, reveal in their machinations to identify with 
authority a certain resignation to having their fate determined by authority, 
consequences be dammed. Writing about the “fanatical” quest to improve, 
during the second world war, aerial warfare techniques to exact maximum 
carnage at the lowest possible cost - carnage which consumed the lives of 
millions of Japanese civilians in a drawn out, coldly statistically-refined 
campaign before the use of nuclear weapons at the end of the conflict624 - 
Michael Sherry indicates that (1) “almost 4 percent of the [air force sortie] 
were killed or missing in action on each mission, and the mean number of 
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missions completed was 14.72, barely past the halfway point,625” and that 
thousands of pilots died in training accidents, and were likely to suffer 
from major psychological disorders,626 that (2) tactical considerations such 
as those made to carry out the infamous fire raids on Tokyo required 
exposing the airmen to even more dangers than normal by stripping 
aircraft of defensive gunnery and flying at very low altitudes in the sight 
of enemy anti-aircraft fire,627 and, (3) that the insanity of all of this could 
be rationalized through the cult of “aggressive potency” associated with 
male status in a world defined by patriarchal power and assertion of pride, 
in this case expressed through a drive to destructiveness that would prove 
its presence through numerical data.628 This is a precise example of 
Hannah Arendt’s point about the interchangeability of individuals in 
functional roles, as well as in their roles as victims or victimizers, in 
fascist, totalitarian social formations. American airmen were only less 
expendable to American military planners than the Japanese were because 
they needed the American airmen, whereas the Japanese civilians below 
were completely expendable, as evidenced by the huge numbers killed, 
and the utter indifference to their suffering revealed in Army Air Force 
documents.629 But the various decisions made to expose American pilots 
to increased dangers, which in many cases were made in the context of 
militarily questionable fire-raids that followed 2-3 fire raids on towns and 
cities that had already been reduced to ashes, whose inhabitants had fled 
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the cities to the countryside, simply to conduct experimental calculations 
on the effectiveness of flight formations for dropping incendiary 
ordinance, from certain altitudes, in certain concentration mixtures within 
the ordinance packaging, at various angles of deployment, etc., should 
give the most nationalist Americans pause in contemplating the nature of 
their state.630
Liberal democracy, when organized for the preservation of individuals 
who see themselves as essentially-identified with their nation, with their 
community - itself seen as emanating from an essentially-true identity - 
and with the family understood in a neo-tribalist way, apparently can be a 
more flexible technology of fascism than even what are called formal 
fascisms, since, by appealing to the individual’s own sense of self as 
articulated to a community that by definition gives him freedom, liberal 
democracy can retain the trappings of being common-sensical - as Kant 
would have it - but also flexible enough to shift the nomenclatural terrain 
of rule when expedient. As a result individuality is limited to narrow 
terrain, and authority is seen as its guarantor. But when this transpires, 
individuals suppress themselves. Sherry argues that the compensation 
evident in air force programs, and in militarism more generally is 
“technological fanaticism,631” which allows for identification with the 
machines of power, that, through their operation by man, give men the 
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sense of power they’ve lost by being implicated in hierarchies that rob 
them of their spontaneity.632
Focusing on the minutiae of complex technological systems which were 
themselves as deadly as combat at times, Sherry argues, the airmen were 
able to forge a solidarity with each other unavailable to them in civilian 
life, and which, in a moment of animosity towards the Other - whose 
threateningness was exaggerated and caricatured to make them appear the 
repository of all that was evil and unmanly - they could forge a sense of 
national purpose and identify with it, as well as see themselves as 
individually-talented and intelligent elements within a larger ‘natural’ 
whole - the nation at war - which would treat them as heros on their return 
from combat someday.633 But these tokens of hyper-masculinity served to 
pacify the consciousness of the airmen in the victorious American Army 
Air Force in the second world war, leaving them often emotionally void, 
and morally disengaged from the consequences of their actions.634 This 
moral escapism went straight up to the top of the bomber command, with 
Curtis LeMay, the commander in the Pacific, who relied on econometric 
data to make decisions about Japanese and American losses alike in the air 
war, relying on a transforming criteria not guided even by strategy but 
merely by a short-term notion of efficiency gains, to calculate acceptable 
losses on the American side versus a proportionally acceptably victorious 
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rate of losses on the ground for the enemy below in Japan. This turned the 
islands of Japan into a vast concentration camp, the Japanese reduced to 
Pavlovian dogs in the eyes of the American war planners, to be made to 
jump this way and that through the application of disciplinary sovereign 
violence, where experimental forms of warfare were made more deadly 
through iterations informed by application of the latest advances in 
statistics, computing, and applications of the  scientific method aimed at 
the refinement of techniques. Robert McNamara, who would later 
implement the same strategy in Vietnam as Defense Secretary,635 one of 
LeMay’s top aides, would later claim, “we were acting as war 
criminals.636” Japan was a laboratory for these experiments, to an extent 
far more than Germany; although, the destruction of German cities, as we 
shall see, was also no trifling matter.
But the congruity to Agamben’s Arendtian invocation of the camps here is 
because of the prevalence in both the Nazi camps and the nothingness to 
which the American Army Air Forces reduced Japan: a zone of 
marginalization from all of human existence, removed from the world. 
The experimentation conducted from the vantage point of a disciplinary 
all-powerful, panoptic eye, whose self-transparency was impossible, was, 
in both the Nazi camps and the American transformation of Japan into a 
free-fire zone, irregardless our admission, commenced in the name of 
                    292
progress. The “Fifth Air Force’s intelligence officer declared on July 21st 
[1945] that “the entire population of Japan is a proper Military Target…., 
THERE ARE NO CIVILIANS IN JAPAN.637” So fighter pilots took to the 
“strafing of passenger trains,638” and also after all the cities were 
destroyed, combat effectiveness would be gauged by moving operations to 
“all urban areas with a population greater than 30,000 peoples.639” and yet 
“another possibility lay in new methods of starvation to supplement the 
interdiction of food transport: the rice paddies might be sprayed with oil, 
defoliants, or biological agents….”640 Indeed, the momentum of 
destruction spun the war against the Japanese out of control, beyond the 
limits of the laws of war - and came to encompass raids on Chinese, 
Taiwanese, and Filipino cities, where the indifference to the lives of 
civilians nominally considered to be friendly to the United States 
government and military was evident in the fire-bombing of infrastructure 
they too depended upon.641
In one night in 1945 estimates place well over 100,000 killed in Tokyo, 
and this process was repeated several times over in every major Japanese 
city during the war. In the aftermath of each raid, statistics were gathered, 
flight formations and ordinance strategies were scrutinized, and loss rates 
among flight crews were compared.642 52,173 American air force 
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personnel were lost as were 70,252 British Royal Air Force pilots - mainly 
in similar campaigns over Germany which saw the horrific fire bombing 
of the city of Dresden, where 40,000 were also killed in one night.643 
Reports even suggested that American commanders were aware of the 
existence of American POW camps nearby Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but 
ruled out considerations for the lives of their fellow comrades-at-arms in 
making the final decision to use the bomb, whose use would usher in a 
new era of American world sovereignty.644
How exactly is the brutality of the Nazis any different from this? The 
Western philosophical tradition, which has had a decisive effect on the 
formation of political societies in the West, infects liberalism and fascism 
alike with the need to make present the objectiveness of being. In seeking 
to make being present, the being of being itself - the existence of humanity 
- is threatened with extinction.
William Spanos, whose courageous intellectual inquiry has inspired our 
efforts, was a young American soldier in 1945, taken prisoner of war 
during the Battle of the Bulge by the German army. Shortly thereafter, he 
ended up in a POW camp near Dresden, Germany, where, following raids 
on that city, he was taken by his captors to dig out and sort dead bodies for 
mass burial and disposal otherwise. In his memoir of his experiences in 
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the second world war, where his not quite fully white American status as a 
son of Greek immigrants to America  gave him DuBoisian second-sight of 
his own sort, which opened up the factical nature of the world itself as 
opposed to the metaphysical criteria of world as ‘History,’ Spanos quotes a 
student of his asking him the question: “Did you ever return to Dresden 
Professor Spanos?” To which he replied “I never left there.645”
“This singular event of World War II perpetrated by the Allied high command in London 
was systematically muted by the media of the “free world” and most of the histories of 
the war written by the victors in its aftermath in order to celebrate Western democracy - 
its humanity - over Western and later Eastern (Soviet) totalitarianism. Subsumed under 
then larger “global” story of victory against an evil that was infecting Western 
civilization, this terrific event was “localized,” and the enormity of its calculated brutality 
- its terrorist goal - was, like Hiroshima and Nagasaki, virtually obliterated from the 
West’s cultural memory. The Allies justified their attack on this undefended city at the 
time by representing it as a strategic center for the German war effort against the Soviet 
Union on the Eastern front. The firebombing of Dresden, it was claimed, was intended to 
aid the Soviet army’s defense… Despite the fact that the Soviet army was at that time on 
the offensive, that rationalization, it seems, took hold and over the years since then 
became a historical truth. In thus viewing this singular temporal event from above - an 
event intensely lived by massive numbers of human beings below - the official histories 
enabled the forgetting of the firebombing of this defenseless city. In so doing, they tacitly 
put its horror out of play in the debates over later military actions undertaken by the 
United States in the period of the Cold War, the excessive violence of which might have 
been illuminated by the inhumanity of the bombing of Dresden - the mass slaughter 
perpetrated by Britain and the United States. I am referring, above all, to its scorched-
earth policy (the use of napalm, herbicides, and other chemicals, the B-52 bombings) that 
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killed and maimed over a million Vietnamese civilians, destroyed their land, and 
transformed an ancient rice culture into a population of refugees during the decade of the 
Vietnam war, all in the name of “saving Vietnam for the free world.646”
The world is a camp. 
From the destruction of Falluja, in the present, and for generations to come 
through the saturation of that Iraqi city with depleted uranium 
munitions;647 to the support for torture policies on a mass scale conducted 
by US and Western-allied states in Latin America’s dirty wars of the 
1970’s and 80’s;648 to the continuing explosions of bomblets leftover from 
the US war throughout Indochina that to this day claims hundreds of lives, 
mostly of children, every year in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam;649 to the 
cutting of social and economic programs to needy people the world over, 
often being undertaken through policies clothed in the theories of 
economic liberalism seeking to create an accountable rational actor - a 
being-in-itself to be the standard of judgment for beings as phenomena;650 
to the countless daily aggressions by authority figures - official and un-
uniformed - against social outcastes in the name of order and purity; to the 
pavlovian command to “mellow out” or else in the world’s richer climes, 
where consciousness of the division sown into the being of being is 
rejected as “negative thinking” rather than being taken as a warning, seen 
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as a symptom of uppityness and maladjustment rather than as a prescient 
warning of things to come;651 in all these instances and many more the use 
of terror by the authorities scattered around the world, where successful, 
has been internalized as the naturalization of hegemony, as human nature, 
yielding a ready-made pathway for being, traversable by some - the 
privileged - and pined after by many others: those without privilege and 
who have had their own self-regard beaten out of them. The ontology of 
the modern world has made conformists and “herd-animals” among us 
into hunting packs traversing the globe for meat;652 most of the rest of us 
are homeless.
This radically threatens the very possibility of freedom, which, as a social 
phenomena, is a beautiful idea more flexible and beautiful than all other 
concepts because, by inhering to our physical instincts for love, joy, 
nourishment, intellectual and artistic stimulation, communication, 
interconnection, and new and meaningful experiences, all to bring about a 
life worth living, free of the fear that Kweli warns us about, freedom, as an 
idea is unlike all the other forms imagined by Plato. These fossils exist in 
an invisible heaven, a temple of Sarastrao,653 to which we can only gain 
admission if we prove our worthiness through conformity with another 
person’s will. This conformity requires us to forgo our consciousness and 
our perceptions, which, in a system that defines terror as the absence of 
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order, reduces all free peoples to terrorists.
But the erasure of consciousness is, in the end, impossible. There is always 
the sneaking suspicion that those named terrorists are not really such, and 
that those charged with prosecuting holy wars of what has been called 
freedom, are not the benevolent henchmen they seem. On the march to the 
eventual use of the nuclear bomb against Japan, collective guilt of 
American war planners increased more and more, leading to measures to 
censor the presses,654 and to establish the collective guilt of the Japanese 
in deserving their fate.655 Much like the later Western liberal inquisition 
against Martin Heidegger for speaking the truth of being,656 LeMay 
insisted that in Japan “there are no innocent civilians,657” and that the 
government’s decisions about treatment of prisoners of war justified his 
own not being bothered so much “to be killing the so-called innocent 
bystanders.658” Relying on claims to moral superiority in the end, officers 
like LeMay either disowned the attacks in terms of their intent, claiming 
that their purpose was not the indiscriminate bombing of civilians, but was 
“to destroy the industrial and strategic targets concentrated in urban 
areas.659” Sherry adds
“In reasoning similar to that employed in defense of the bombing of Dresden, it seemed 
that because “these operations were not conceived as terror raids against the civilian 
population,” they were in fact not such. LeMay’s raids were undertaken “without 
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abandoning the concept of precision destruction.” Because the shift to area incendiary 
raids had been so long in the making, because precision attacks did continue, because 
economic effects (however diffuse) remained an objective, and because precision 
methods remained so central to the defense of American strategic air power, even airmen 
did not always realize they were crossing the threshold…
…But the denial of intent to destroy entire cities and create terror became increasingly 
hard to maintain. The weeks following the [first Tokyo raid] saw self-deception gradually 
transformed into deception of others. The air force was alter to any signs that the 
criticism it feared after the Dresden raids might reappear regarding Tokyo. [An officer on 
Guam] was informed that “commentators were having a field day searching 
implications… which imply this is area bombing and speculating whether this means 
departure from policy of precision bombing.” [The officer] was quickly instructed to 
counteract “editorial comment…about blanket incendiary attacks upon cities….Guard 
against anyone stating this is area bombing….”
…[Air force public relations officers] faced…a dilemma: wanting on the one hand to 
exploit LeMay’s blitz for all the prestige and publicity it was worth, on the other hand to 
head off the growth of a barbaric image for the air force. One solution was to resort to a 
rhetoric of cost-benefit analysis, contrasting the B-29s’ strikingly low loss rates with 
stunning statistics: “1,200,000 factory workers…made homeless” and “ at least 100,000 
man-months” of labor lost to Japan and “369,000,000 sq. ft. of highly industrialized 
land… leveled to ashes” in the Tokyo raid alone. Of course the human carnage was 
implicit in such statistics, but they kept the emphasis on the economic objectives of 
precision bombing. Of course there was no denial that incendiaries were the weapon and 
great conflagration the result, but incendiary attack was simply “the economical method 
of destroying the small industries in these areas… of bringing about their 
liquidation…”660
——————————————————————————
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XX. The Containment of Democracy and the Existential Significance 
of Terror for Freedom as a Mechanism for Depoliticization
At some point, people will rebel against the reduction of their existence. 
The actuarial mapping of individual behavior for the sake of social 
control, which plays on individuals’ fears of death, uncertainty, and the 
willfulness of other individuals and the randomness of nature that can 
produce death and uncertainty, has transformed freedom into an insurance 
strategy for security, and has greatly narrowed the terrain of acceptable 
forms of life as a result. But the problem with these strategies is that 
beyond their being repellant for partisans of freedom, they fail on their 
own terms, as well. At first glance, the rebounding effect on unintended 
targets - “blowback” - produces the very uncertainty sought to be secured 
against in the first place. In fact, “blowback” bears striking resemblance to 
the need for the state to make enemies to justify its continued existence in 
prevailing form: namely, as a centralized concentration of authority and 
power over the economic, political, and military domains of life.661 
Centralization is seen as a means for individuals to cooperate with each 
other in the absence of authentic social trust, and is producing political 
formations, that are tightly controlled by coteries of decision-makers in 
formal public and informal private roles throughout the world.662 
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William Robinson has argued, citing our old friend Samuel Huntington, 
that the United States and its allies, with economic and political interests 
throughout the world, favored the deliberate restriction of democracy 
wherever possible, and, if possible, when democracy become more and 
more seemingly inevitable as a result of mass movements that seemed to 
always bloom to confront authoritarianism, the use of political 
intervention tools throughout the US’ military, intelligence, and civilian 
government capacities (read: DOD, CIA, and State) to steer the outcomes 
of democratic revolutionary surges towards the manageable outcome 
called “polyarchy.663” By balancing the use of coercive power with the 
political production of consensus for elite domination through the use of 
identity politics playing on people’s fears, sorrows, hopes, and desires, and 
other emotions, through the use of electoral politics designed to give vent 
to popular angers and frustrations, Huntington and other leading “organic 
intellectuals”664 of the ruling class hoped to preserve the basic coordinates 
of anti-democratic mechanisms of exploitation, but in a new context where 
the voices of people for the possibility of an authentic life simply was no 
longer avoidable. But the cost of this was a shockingly cynical attitude 
towards expressions for freedom, now in a democratic age, wherein the 
symbology of rule was undertaken in the name of humanity itself. As 
such, freedom has been restricted to the prerogatives of authority. 
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Freedom had been transformed into a technology of government. Such a 
strategy runs up against limitations. The lack of on the ground knowledge 
in the institutions of the new political intervention, and difficulty in many 
countries of finding an elite that could play a tutelary role in relation to the 
mass of the people that would also secure the ongoing trust of the people 
limited this strategy to only a few countries. 
The terms of order in all these societies are fragile, and, to whatever extent 
they remain functioning societies, for the people, that is, not for the 
expediencies of the state, we can witness a response to the process of 
disembedding. The response to the sublimation of objective presence as 
identity, what we are calling disembedding following in Polanyi’s 
thoughts on the matter and combining them with Agamben’s paradigmatic 
insight into the idealization of the sublime body of the nation through the 
internal negation of the Other as homo sacer - the representative of wild 
nature to be tamed as opposed to civilized, purportedly permanent artifice 
as man - requires the commitment to pay attention to one’s surroundings, 
as the integrity, as Cedric Robinson has put it, “to know what one 
knows.665” Because this radical knowledge of the physis that one finds 
themselves in always already is immediately evidence for the contingency 
of artifice, all quests for permanence are revealed as contingent and 
revealed as artifice therein, it brings to the fore of consciousness, 
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especially for those who wish to abjure such comprehension, (1) the 
requirement to work to produce the naturalization so long taken for 
granted, and (2) usually, for those at the apex of the production of 
permanence, their reliance on others who are considered to be their social 
inferiors - a self conception that has come to have epistemological 
significance for the elite and the possibility of their self conception being 
defensible - which essentially threatens their sense of self-worth, 
deservingness, and similar rationalizations on which the stabilization of 
their positions depends. Thus, Robinson points out, they seek camaraderie 
in similarly-afflicted elites in other countries, since the naturalized basis 
for their authority and its benefits within their own society is coming 
apart. This reveals polyarchy for what it truly is: a stop-gap on the way to 
authoritarianism:
“A situation of anomie is becoming endemic in life around the world… : pandemics of 
crime and drugs, crises of “governability,” the disintegration of family and community 
bonds, widespread personal alienation and despondence, and so on. The type of 
hegemonic order we are witnessing…[…]…is…[…]… what some…might refer to as 
“hegemony based on fraud,” in which a rapacious global elite is thrusting humanity into 
deeper levels of material degradation and cultural decadence. Under such conditions, 
there are no no guarantees for the personal security of any members of society, even…
[…]… the privileged stratum… The United States seems to be the model, not the 
exception. While the United States “promotes democracy” around the world, Amnesty 
International released annual reports in the early 1990s documenting a growing pattern of 
systematic human rights violations inside the United States. The US prison population 
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doubled between 1960 and 1980, and then tripled between 1980 and 1990. Robert 
Reich…describes a situation of “fortress cities” and “social class apartheid” which is 
nearly identical to patterns found in most Third World countries. In Latin America…
between 1980 and 1990… 90,000 people were “disappeared” by government and security 
forces. A frightening new phenomenon appeared in the capitals of nearly every Latin 
American country: “social cleansing,” or systematic killing, sometimes by official 
security forces but most by shadowy private paramilitary groups and security guards tied 
to the wealthy, of indigent people pushed by economic forces beyond their control to the 
margins of society.666”
And for those who are lucky enough to not face the distancing 
technologies of “containment,” what is available is “repressive 
incorporation” which functions as intended for some, but for the vast 
majority serves as a temporary check on the formation of political 
awareness. How long this lasts is a function of the availability of, and 
skillful orchestration of, resources needed to fuel the engines of 
consumption. “Escalating global inequalities” Robinson continues
“mean that only a shrinking minority of humanity can actually consume. But the “culture-
ideology of consumerism,” disseminated through omnipresent symbols and images made 
possible by advanced communications technologies, is a powerful message that imbues 
mass consciousness at the global level. Its manifest function is to market goods and make 
profits, but its latent political function is to channel mass aspirations into individualist 
consumer desires and to psychologically disaggregate intersubjectivities.* Induced wants, 
even though they will never be met for the vast majority, serve the purpose of social 
control by depoliticizing social behavior and preempting collective action aimed at social 
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change, though fixation on the search for individual consumption. Personal survival, and 
whatever is required to achieve it, is legitimized over collective well-being. Social bonds 
of pre-alienation (pre-capitalist bonds) dissolve but new bonds are not forged among 
marginalized supernumeraries.667”
And as it goes for individuals whose desperation drives them to cling to 
power presenting itself as authority through the guise of permanence of 
the will, so too it goes for nationalist collectivities based on the exclusion 
of Otherness, which come to emphasize their own survival over and 
against the survival of civilization, the planet, and of life on earth. The 
congruity of these points, from “man” to “state” is revealing. Our 
metaphorical analogy is that the consumption of material objects dovetails 
with the ‘consumption’ of identity, in this case understood as something 
like nationalism in the purer sense or in the sense of nationalism clothed in 
the language of religion or ideology, because it requires the orchestration 
of inputs to bring about the enactment of the material-ideological nexus 
underpinning the production of identity. At the same time the opposite 
holds: the ability to consume material goods as a matter of course, as an 
element of privilege or right, requires the orchestration of ideational inputs 
to activate acquisitiveness as a way of life. As William Robinson points 
out that this depoliticizes social behavior, transforming complicity in 
circuits of exploitation expressed materially as ownership of class-status 
symbols into ‘mere fun,’ and the ritualistic and repetitive performance of 
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identity is to be left alone as simply what one does because they are 
members of such and such group, irregardless that group’s ethical 
dispositions and if these do or do not accord with individuals’ 
consciousnesses.
Cedric Robinson has argued persuasively that those with the “decency” to 
own up to their awareness, that same honesty which Ali Shariati, the 
Iranian existentialist who mixed Shia Islam, Third World Internationalism, 
and Marxist revolutionary philosophy, called “martyrdom,” the courage to 
“bear witness”668 to the indeterminacy of existence, were thus accountable 
for the revelation of contingency when events in the world overtook 
conceptions of order. Of course this is a very simple point, but its 
simplicity - its incredible easiness - is lost on those who are caught up in 
their identification with the terms of order; for them, revelations such as 
these amount to terror, chaos, and the complete absence of any notion of 
order; this presumes both the perfection of order on the basis of the 
metaphysics of making things present, as well as, in the absence of 
presence, the prevalence of chaotic terror. Now indeed, terror and chaos 
are no fun, even if interesting for a short while, but the problem here is the 
(1) exaggeration of order and the expectations produced thus, which 
disable authentic action in one’s physis since the experience of terror will 
be unbearable and will lead persons to seek order again at all costs, and (2) 
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that this exaggeration has epistemological consequences for the ability of 
people to properly understand their surroundings. Indeed, must the 
absence of order be understood as terror? Is there something absoluteness 
necessary in this view of things?
“Terror must be understood as the absence of order and bearing no other relationship to 
order. Terror is neither the presence of too much order, regardless of administration, nor 
order's midwife. If, as Camus suggested, decency is the resolve to know what one knows, 
then the decency of order – what one knows – is always potentially terror. The intuition 
here that there is no true existential order is constantly available to the human being. 
….....And this is an intuition which is terrible in the extreme. If we remember this, R.D. 
Laing's characterization of the schizophrenic individual 'suffering' from 'ontological 
insecurity' becomes a remark on the psychosocial process by which human society 
reproduces the human condition in microcosm: the absence of order.669”
But, as it were, adherents of the terms of order have a paradigmatic option: 
covering up this existential absence of their haloed order through the 
deployment of a conceptual political structure which consigns the 
individual to an hierarchical location, obviating the need for the individual 
to confront existential terror and freedom, and to only have the 
responsibility of playing a role defined by identity to provide support for 
order. This conditioning is reflexive, and can function more or less 
efficiently, and has the ability to distort the individual's apprehension of 
the world – transforming existence into a metaphysics of presence – 
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leaving the world impoverished for the imagination and unfathomable in 
one’s awareness.
“It is in the the same fashion that terror and order may be said to articulate. Order results 
from the observation of terror at the level of gross phenomena. And it is this insight 
which propels the follower and the phenomenon of followership, as a device to avoid the 
experience of terror, into preeminence. There are, of course, important differences to be 
perceived between different order from the various vantage of observation. But their true 
richness – true as an authenticity to their participants – is the capacity for integrating the 
elements, the facts, of experience. All else that is historical, that is superfluous.670”
And so individuals retain a choice: they can join in the production of 
order, and remain - or become - oblivious to the technological 
orchestration of beings that underlies their notion of security, freedom, and 
even life itself; or they can try to remain deeply present in their 
surroundings. For those who opt for oblivion, actions that pierce this 
oblivion - and words and analysis that do the same, either as harangue or 
as warning - are graded on an proto-actuarial scale of terror within their 
consciousnesses, ascribing to some the label “terrorist,” or the increasingly 
common “terror-sympathizer”671 reactively and without delay. And indeed, 
nobody is safe from these designations. Such designations not only serve 
to prolong actual hot conflicts around the world, but also serve as a check 
on domestic populations ranging from minorities - for whom the threat of 
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being labeled as an “internal enemy”672 serves to nullify the freedoms 
which so many migrated to Western countries in search of during the 
‘Cold War’ - to majorities, whose potential for identifying with humanity 
writ-large, enemy nations’ civilians, and minorities in their own society 
whose origins could be in some cases traced back to those nations or who 
the majority are ignorant of due to the cognitive effects of supremacist 
communal irrationality that prides itself on casually-confused in fits of 
casual racism.
In either case, either the retail therapy of consumerism, or the groupthink 
of nationalism, for so-called liberals and conservatives, combined with the 
appeal of leaders to channel political feelings into the proper avenues for 
expression (voting and party membership), leaves individuals entirely at 
the mercy of a political order that bases its own justification on its ability 
to deliver the means of consumption to its citizens, but all the while bases 
its security on its citizens’ loss of imagination and the capacity to think. In 
countries where this becomes less and less possible to sustain, William 
Robinson has written that the failure of nation-states, organized around a 
singular identity, to contain the economic processes necessary for the 
functioning of polyarchic regimes in the peripheral regions of the system 
of Western and American-led globalization has unleashed forces which 
now threaten to tear states apart in a conflict which may at times remain 
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localized to those peripheries, but constellations of global conflict now 
truly globalized through various technologies of communication and 
transport.673 And so the West will hardly be spared. In peripheral 
countries, the elite understand what is taking place, and attempt to 
ruthlessly crush threats to their rule, and promulgate localized formulas for 
inuring their populations to the violence conducted in their name.674
In the West, however, it appears as though populations have been stupefied 
by consumerism such that the normalized veneer of civil society and 
social life, in which the imperative to be happy and consume - indeed, to 
happiness through consumption - both functions as a behavioral 
expectation as well as a mechanism by which the political acts of persons 
from either the physical or ideological peripheries of existence come to 
interpreted as “terrorism.” Note that this discussion largely conforms to 
Nietzsche’s prophecy of a war of spirits, whereby the spiritualized - 
essentialized - understanding of the self, standing either alone or with 
others like itself, defines the self and its quest for dignity, which it simply 
must impose on any who threaten its dignity, and wherein the resort to 
depoliticized terminology like “terrorism” to describe those attempts 
simply reinforce the need for additional such violence to break this veneer. 
Once the veneer is broken, of course, then those formerly in a position of 
privilege in the relation of Self and Other see themselves as victimized, 
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and under threat because of their own essentialized view of themselves,675 
and are quite willing to forgo even the shallow democratic niceties of 
polyarchy in favor of greater and greater executive action conducted in the 
name of the unified nation placing its quest for political order to be 
reinstated entirely above politics in a depoliticized conceptual terrain; as if 
they were fighting sub-humans, necessitating no explanation thence, for 
their actions, either to the Other, or to themselves.676
Ward Churchill expressed with radical clarity the consequences of 
accepting this view of the Other for the sake of getting along with the 
business of being American. Churchill points out in the absence of a 
process of “national introspection,” regarding the message sent by the 
attackers on 9.11.2001, which might allow Americans to begin thinking 
about the need to “fundamentally rework [their] relationship with those 
upon whom [they have] heretofore proven so cavalier in visiting the worst 
sorts of oppression,” there is little chance of there being peace on lasting 
terms - which strongly suggests that the ‘war on terror’ will continue for 
the indefinite future, and, that prosecuting such a war is in many ways the 
destiny of countries whose ontological basis is the concept of being and 
the freedom of that being we have been discussing thus far.677
When the consequences of American violence are brought up, Churchill 
                    311
points out that conservatives rely on a discourse that casts the violence an 
aberration, and that this does nothing to disprove “the rule” and that when 
pressed, “conservatives invariably retreat in to a level of diversionary 
polemic excusable at best on elementary school playgrounds, arguing that 
anything ‘we’ have done is somehow excused by allegations that ‘they’ 
have done things just as bad.678” But worse still, for those of us for whom 
it is insufficient to criticize conservatives - not a difficult endeavor - but 
whose concern is to speak up in the name of freedom, is what Churchill 
describe as progressives’ “far more refined, hook-free analysis.”679 Having 
given up a searches for perpetrators as “crudities” of “conspiracy theory,” 
liberals “have become quite monolithic in attributing all things negative to 
handy abstractions like ‘capitalism,’ ‘the state,’ ‘structural oppression,’ 
and, yes, ‘the hierarchy.”680 Churchill says this enables them to conjure up 
what he calls “‘the miracle of immaculate genocide,’ a form of genocide…
in which…there are no actual perpetrators and no one who might ‘really’ 
be deemed culpable by reason of complicity. The parallels between this 
‘cutting edge’ conception and the defense mounted by postwar Germans…
are as eerie as they are obvious.”681 Thus Churchill offered a critique of 
those who sought to use 9.11.2001 as a mechanism to further secure the 
globally-disembedded rational actor, who was born again in the twilight of 
Jimmy Carter’s America, emerging into the full light of day in the go-go 
1980’s that ‘restored America’ during Reagan’s rule, that debated eating 
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take-out and renting movies or going out for dinner at the end of history 
with Jerry and Elaine, and who has become the ideal of success not only 
for young Americans, but, increasingly for people the world over. Quietly 
contemplating their next business deal, their after-work yoga class, what 
they’ll purchase from Whole Foods Market for dinner later that night, how 
they’ll spend their next holiday in a more fabulous place dripping in 
authenticity and culture, the conservative diversionist merges in their 
being with the liberal illusionist. Churchill writes:
“The implications of [the failure of consciousness] were set forth in stark relief during the 
aftermath of 9-1-1, when it was first suggested that a decided majority of those killed in 
the WTC attack might be more accurately viewed as “little Eichmanns” - that is, as a 
cadre of faceless bureaucrats and technical experts who had willingly (and profitably) 
harnessed themselves to the task making America’s genocidal world order hum with 
maximal efficiency - than as ‘innocents.’ The storm of outraged exception taken by self-
proclaimed progressives to this simple observation has been instructive… The objections 
have been mostly transparent in their diversionary intent, seeking as they have to focus 
attention exclusively on janitors, firemen and food service workers rather than the much 
larger number of corporate managers, stock brokers, bond traders, finance and systems 
analysts, etc., among those killed…
…Left unstated…is the more accurate term we should employ in characterizing a 
representative 30-year-old foreign exchange trader who, in full knowledge that every cent 
of his lavish commissions derived from the starving flesh of defenseless Others, literally 
wallowing in self-indulgent excess, playing the big shot, priding himself on being a 
“sharp dresser” and the fact that “money spilled from his pockets…flowed like crazy…
[spent] on the black BMW and those clothes - forgetting to pack ski clothes for a Lake 
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Tahoe trip, dropping $1,000 on ‘new stuff’ and so on.” As a “cool guy” with a “warm 
heart”? A “good family man?” Just an “ordinary,” “average,” or “normal” fellow who 
“happened to strike it rich?” How then are we to describe Eichmann himself?…
…Clearly, either the devastating insights concerning ‘the banality of evil’ offered by 
Hannah Arendt in her 1963 study Eichmann in Jerusalem, have yet to penetrate the 
consciousness of many American progressives, or American progressives are in the main 
every bit as mired in the depths of denial as the most hidebound of their conservative 
counterparts. Irrespective of whether there is an appreciable segment of the US 
population prepared to look the matter in the face, however, the same condition of willful 
blindness cannot be said to prevail throughout much of the rest of the world.682”
When these costs sustaining the illusion of democracy and equality in the 
midst of such obvious inequality at the very level of existence itself 
become overwhelming, authoritarianism, legitimated through the 
invocation of the “state of exception,” lays in wait for its chance in the 
sun.
——————————————————————————
XXI. Freedom as Governmental Technology: Permanence, and the 
Transformation of Liberalism into Fascism
To train individuals to accept (1) their own lack of knowledge, which 
leaves them unprepared for life’s eventualities, and (2) the annihilation of 
the other’s being, an “epistemology of ignorance” has developed to 
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reinforce the type of knowledge needed to sustain “racial polities”683 and 
to systematically ignore information that could threaten political 
consensuses derived on the basis of ‘race’ and other such essentializations 
of being.684 This, Charles Mills argues, prepares persons to agree 
spontaneously through their cognition and understanding of the world - 
and the choices and commitments they make therein - to engage in 
conquest collectively and systematically.685 Freedom is thus transformed 
into something other than a universal political idea applicable to 
humanity; it becomes a thing ‘we’ shall possess, and that must be denied 
for the sake of our possession, to ‘them.’ With regard to liberalism, 
ostensibly a theory of government designed to protect individual liberty, 
this division of ‘worlding’ facilitates the inconsistent way that freedom 
permits certain social intervention as being necessary for freedom - which 
can change situationally in accordance with perceptions of threat. “The 
securitization of identity,” Nik Rose has written, is
“a strategy for securing the obligatory access points for active citizenship… [producing] a 
ceaseless manipulation, the obligation to continuously and repeatedly evidence one’s 
citizenship credentials as one recurrently links oneself to the circuits of civility. In a 
society of control, a politics of conduct is designed into the fabric of existence itself, into 
the organization of space, time, visibility, circuits of communication. And these enwrap 
each individual life decision and action - … - in a web of incitements, rewards, current 
sanctions and forebodings of future sanctions which serve to enjoin citizen to maintain 
particular types of control over their conduct. These assemblages which entail the 
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securitization of identity are not unified, but dispersed, not hierarchical, but rhizomatic, 
not totalized but connected in a web or relays of relations. But in policing the obligatory 
access points to the practices of inclusion, they inescapably generate novel forms of 
exclusion.686”
What C. Wright Mills has described as the corporate personality of the 
power elite,687 through the “securitization of identity,” is democratized and 
dangled, as freedom, in front of broader and broader populations - in 
theory - and the only thing they have to do is to learn how to properly fear, 
enjoy, desire, move, and, eventually if they are ambitious enough, how to 
think as well. Rose, agreeing with our assessment of the confusion of 
Isaiah Berlin, suggests that Berlin failed to understand the “link between 
liberty and discipline,688” and that “responsibilization” was required if 
people were to be trusted on their own in a society designed around the 
imperative of control;689 whose control? Everyone’s sense of being in 
control690; to participate in the sustenance of the administrative combine 
that supports the ‘free-market’ that forms the basis of materially-
determined freedom. C. Wright Mills, however, echoing Polanyi’s analysis 
on this point, argues that the corporate person is indeed defined by their 
conformity, which constrains so very much of their existence that an 
honest analyst taking appraisal of the human condition must wonder if the 
material objects they receive, along with the adulation and praise whose 
basis is their production of the tell-tale signs of prestige, and which forms 
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their self-worth, are all truly worth the costs.691
The cost of ‘freedom’ in the first place is the loss of a rooted 
understanding of existence that makes space for community, for human 
interaction, for language itself and the ability to have a personal history 
that is of consequence for an individual. Because people cling to these 
things, the community and their memory, Polanyi argues those who sought 
the disembedding of the rational agent wholly individualized in their being 
from the social terrain altogether were, despite their purported drive for 
what was called freedom, always met with a “countermovement” and that 
thus it would be wiser to characterize the “market pattern” as a “double-
movement” that corresponded to the deployment of, and reaction to, 
power.692 As Milan Kundera has written, “The Struggle of Man against 
Power is the Struggle of Memory and Against Forgetting.693” Polanyi, 
echoing this sentiment, indicating that the peoples’ refusal was/is 
“governed by a double movement: the market expanded continuously but 
this movement was met by a countermovement694 check the expansion in 
definite directions. Vital though such a countermovement was for the 
protection of society, in the last analysis it was incompatible with the self-
regulation of the market, and thus with the market system itself.695” 
Because “man and nature,” must be made “subject to the laws of supply 
and demand,” and thus into “commodities” “produced for sale,” they 
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would be recast as such, effectively abstracting individuals from their 
social and natural base, and transforming nature through what Polt, 
interpreting Heidegger’s analysis of Descartes, calls the impoverished 
vision of the world in the latter’s philosophy of that tied that which can be 
thought to that which was reliably verifiable to the senses as being 
objectively present.696 Thus, being is measured in terms of money, capital, 
and economic input/output productivity (much like the free individual in 
Rose’s account of the actuarial concept of freedom now yearned for 
globally as a marked of advancement).697 Harnessing these materials, free 
individuals can, it is said, achieve nearly anything.
This point will have implications in our closing discussion in this chapter 
on the matter of freedom and authenticity. For now the point to take away 
from it is that through this sleight of hand beings who place their faith in 
willfulness as the source of all agency (1) must be always disappointed in 
the failures of the will, since this is literally unavoidable, even with 
excesses of violence and effortful striving, and (2) that the drive to secure 
the idea of individual will, and therefore of individuals’ perfect security 
produces the ironical situation wherein individuals seek to bind people in 
society together in a manner that produces reliable and predictable 
behavioral outcomes. 
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So while Polanyi locates the rise of pauperism698 in the transformation of 
world trade that saw the elevation of a new standard of profitability, 
rendering the lives of the poor in the English countryside superfluous, the 
half-hearted attempt at preventing the mobility of laboring classes created 
by enclosure policies - the substance of the Speenhamland scheme - led to 
misguided attempts to protect the new poor in the name of maintaining 
social order.699 But this came at the expense of their dignity and the 
interconnectedness-wholeness of society; costs which were intensified by 
the cruel state interventions symbolized by the Poor Laws. These laws 
played on the frustrations of the new wealthy in relation to their inability 
to get the poor to do just as they wished, which they imagined would 
benefit the new social order, and eventually had the effect of dividing 
society altogether and overturning the older morality. What emerged from 
the ashes of at least moral if not practical and effective solidarity was, 
Polanyi indicates, the scientific production of happiness for the greatest 
number.
“…if the workers were physically dehumanized, the owning classes were morally 
degraded. The traditional unity of a Christian society was giving place to a denial of 
responsibility on the part of the well-to-do for the condition of their fellows. The Two 
Nations were taking shape. To the bewilderment of thinking minds, unheard-of-wealth 
turned out to be inseparable from unheard-of-poverty. Scholars proclaimed in unison that 
a science had been discovered which put the laws governing man’s world beyond any 
doubt. It was at the behest of these laws that compassion was removed from the hearts, 
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and a stoic determination to renounce human solidarity in the name of the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number gained the dignity of a secular religion…
…The mechanism of the market was asserting itself and clamoring for its completion: 
human labor had to be made a commodity…Out of the horrors of Speenhamland men 
rushed blindly for the shelter of the utopian market economy.700”
In these divisions, Polanyi argues, lay the foundations of an intensified 
double-movement of disembedding-reembedding, the consequences of 
which were a “perilous deadlock” that eventually became the groundwork 
for a reinvigorated identity politics of the ruling classes seeking to keep 
themselves separate from the poor and the partisans of a socialist freedom 
in society. The identification with power, versus the desire for freedom 
that questioned this power and social arrangement would produce “the 
twentieth century fascist crisis.701” In seeking to turn labor, land, and 
money into the needed unlimited resources required for the production of 
the market-concept of individual freedom, the expectation of wealth and 
the right to do whatever one wishes to do would drive these partisans in 
the direction of the utopianism of market-ruled society, obviated of moral 
dilemmas and the authentic choices beyond the simple transaction of good 
and capital.702 Contrarily, those whose labor would be taxed unto their 
debility or even death, whose lands would be alienated from them through 
the consolidation of ownership effected by financial conglomeration,703 
and whose money, earnings, real estate equity, and savings would be 
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manipulated in accord with the whimsical whims of central bankers 
responsive to industry and not the needs of society in general, would see 
themselves as objects circulating in the marketplace, too, and would, when 
they could, reject these terms.704 But often they wouldn’t be in a position 
to do so because in the absence of labor organizations, their ability to 
survive depended on their receiving a wage, no matter the psychological, 
physical, and emotional costs inflicted in a demeaning work environment. 
But the desire to attend to their consciousness - intellectual and physical - 
would mean that in opportune moments workers would act on such 
instincts to cooperate and create mechanisms of social protection against 
the demands of the market.
In The Great Transformation, Polanyi locates the rise of fascism in the 
failures of market society because of the expectations that it unleashes 
when its social formation comes to be seen as natural, and its adherents 
begin to treat those variously unadapted to it: the poor, temperamental 
malcontents, artistic persons unbound by social conventions regulating 
space and time, etc.; as the enemies of nature. From Argentina to the 
recent attacks on the homeless and “Occupy” protestors, from both private 
individuals and from the state, this pattern is confirmed.705 This treatment 
becomes the fate of non-conformists - by choice and by happenstance - 
despite the fact that in most cases it is safe to say that such persons simply 
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seek to remedy the insecurity which they are made to experience by those 
who command the political economy, whose decisions in complex, large, 
modern societies, necessarily expose many to artificial - i.e - man-made - 
uncertainty. Failing to recognize this, before the second world war and 
after the first, during the interim, democratic societies gave way to 
increasingly totalitarian ones who would go to war to defend the idea of 
the historical spirit of the nation in a desperate struggle to preserve their 
identities - understood as the unchanging, and besieged essence of who 
they were as individuals and as communities. In some cases the war was 
brought to nations by Germany and Italy, the leading fascist states in 
Europe, and in other cases, the fascism of racist imperialism had long 
over-extended the traditional European powers of the time, leaving them 
unprepared for the Nazi blitzkrieg which was lying in wait for a moment 
of weakness. Such is the reason much of the second world war was fought 
in North Africa. 
In all these cases, young men were regimented into a neotraditional social 
order to achieve again the disembedding of the nation and its idea of the 
rational actor, borne out of the dismal science of market economics that 
reduced men and women to things to be infinitely exploited, and out of the 
quest for national essence that put their lives in the hands of the state 
understood as the authentic representative of the pure nation. Against the 
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drive to re-embed the abstracted rational actor and the sublimated essence 
of the nation into the essentially plural social, economic, and communal 
situation in each regional spatialization of physis - this being the 
countermovement generated by the impulse for freedom - the fascist, as 
Polanyi wrote, “rejects the postulate of freedom,” and “glorifies power,” 
that is considered to be the “reality of society,”706 by those with impaired 
social and political vision. “The fascist solution,” Polanyi writes
“of the impasse of the market economy is achieved at the price of the extirpation of all 
democratic institutions, both in the industrial and in the political realm. The economic 
system which was in peril of disruption would thus be revitalized, while the people 
themselves were subjected to a reeducation designed to denaturalize the individual and 
make him unable to function as the responsible unit of the bodypolitic. This reeducation, 
comprising the tenets of a political religion that denied the idea of the brotherhood of 
man in all its forms, was achieved through an act of mass conversion enforced against 
recalcitrants by the scientific methods of torture.707”
In order to make the ‘trains run on time,’ as the saying goes, fascism 
emerged as a solution to the inability to ensure the operations of the 
market economy in a liberal polity. “Submission to the impersonal forces 
of the market,” Friedrich von Hayek argues, “made possible the growth of 
civilization.708” But in his philosophy, like in all the purported liberal 
philosophies we have been attending to, the question to sovereignty 
remains looming large: who will decide which are the natural and 
                    323
impersonal forces? The permanence sought after would necessitate the 
cessation of questioning and thus the annulment of democracy. Hayek 
suggests, much like Hobbes, that anyone who seeks to force their opinion 
on another is a dangerous person - but he forgets that he himself does 
precisely this through his appeals to nature.709 Polanyi points out that the 
simultaneous collapse of market systems, because of their inherent 
artificiality, in much of the world led to fascist, socialist-authoritarian, and 
New Deal-style Keynesian responses - but that in every instance the free-
market itself was cast aside as a source of instability, the source of anti-
democratic and anti-social instincts for individuals and groups of 
individuals which would tear society apart as these were organized into 
cartels, on the one hand, and into fascist political movements, on the other. 
To make these new social organizations seem necessary, indeed to make 
these artificial constructions seem natural and thereby “denaturalize” 
persons, Bauman shows that historically rulers and powerful social groups 
in modern European societies relied on “boundary-drawing practices” 
which, much like the basic ontological politics of exclusion at the center 
of Agamben’s theory, served to reinforce an essentialized notion of 
belonging, and which, ironically, could be reworked and suspended at any 
time to create a new sense of order and belonging, ejecting formerly 
included persons as threats to the in-group.710 When Polanyi uses the term 
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“nature” in the above quote, he is referring to whatever is, and not what 
has been naturalized, that being the result of artificial processes aimed at 
producing nature as artifice to give it the appearance of permanence. 
This is what fascism is all about, as Erich Fromm argued in Escape from 
Freedom, wherein he argues that negative liberty relies on (1) “automaton 
conformity”711 so as to ensure the productive engines of negative liberty 
are undisturbed by spontaneousness and difference, (2) and intensifies 
from there into the urge for domination and eventually in desperation, into 
destructiveness, even before the formal institutionalization of fascism as a 
governmental mode;712 the seeds of this type of human behavior are sown 
in the expectations, fears about not meeting those expectations, the objects 
of those fears being circulated through the economy of language and 
symbolic meanings in a society. In subsequent iterations these values can 
be reinforced as natural, resulting in the multiplication of fear-based self-
alienation with its reinforcement in language itself.
The poor and the Jew, the immigrant and the terrorist, the slave and the 
thug and the welfare queen - the moral sufferer and the immoralist whose 
audacity, which could be as minimal as their audacity in persisting to exist 
on their own terms, breaks open the cycle of fear to an alternate view - 
these persons are a threat to the seekers of permanence and so when things 
                    325
go awry in relation to the ontology of being prevailing in a 
metaphysically-ordered physis, they become the scapegoats, the 
receptacles of all blame, and, therefore, the targets of furies of violence 
sanctified in the name of order. The disembedding of economic rationality 
from society, and the sublimation of communal rationality expressed in the 
form of the nation-state understood as the destiny of a civilized and 
rational peoples, and transforming it into a permanent identity, are 
processes which must be reenacted over and over again through the rituals 
of organizations that make up the state. This transforms freedom into 
governmentality and authentic individuality into terrorism.713
Such fear and conformity is more simply managed and reinforced in an 
atmosphere of fascism - where the fasci are bundled together with a tight 
rope - than in a free society.714 Ironically, however, the use of freedom as a 
propaganda device, succored by the use of rewards both material and 
ideological, both indicates the extent to which freedom in practice has 
become its opposite, but also that the desire for freedom remains all the 
while, because it was never, and indeed can never be, extinguished. What 
does this tell us about freedom?
——————————————————————————
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XXII. Disembedding as a Political Structure: Freedom Found in Hell, 
And the Farce of Ordered Liberty and Nation-States
The process of disembedding is never complete. First, individuals never 
quite surrender their being, and, even though it may appear that they do, 
there is no possibility of them being able to maintain complete purity of 
thought and action in the name of their metaphysical ideal. This could 
change; indeed it appears as though there is a major drive in the existence-
fearing nations of the world today to reinforce structures of authority, but 
even then there will arise incompleteness when this is mapped onto reality 
because the creation of authority as an idea cannot match the billions of 
history-making agents in the world whose experiences, no matter how 
repressed their spontaneousness, will at some point overflow prevailing 
conceptions of being. This is not hard to understand, since, as it were, we 
have imperfect systems in place at the moment, these systems repeatedly 
create unanticipated beings, and if we begin to fathom a transhistorical 
system encompassing all cultures and future generations the idea of there 
being a complete narrative that encompasses being and existence seems 
rather absurd. Examples of this abound, from blowback in foreign policy, 
to side effects in medication, and to the more mundane everyday failures 
of the disembedded worldview - like planning one’s commute to work 
only to be thwarted by a car accident - which must omit elements of 
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unfolding reality in order to maintain itself as an idea.
Second, the sheer level of resources required for the maintenance of the 
sublimated individual or group, because this is based on the use of 
authority to convince us that the three fictitious commodities - land, labor, 
and capital - are indeed unlimited, either through the direct agency of 
coercion in the name of the race or nation expressing its superiority and 
historical destiny, or in the indirect harnessing of individuals’ labor power 
by producing confidence in productive activities that make investors, 
governments, and regular workers and people want to invest in an 
entrepreneurial undertaking, thereby producing faith in the delimitation of 
financial activity, in the end cannot be sustained. There are limits to 
growth, which, once reached, must be administered by individuals and 
groups who agree with the terms of order. But eventually, as even 
partisans of imperial rule admit, from time to time the economics of 
empire require purges of upper-level functionaries for the simple reason 
that there (1) isn’t enough wealth to go around, and (2) the dearth of 
unlimited wealth creates a centrifugal effect that tempts corruption in 
favor of the actual, embodied self, over and against the consecrated and 
idealized self whose selfhood is derived from their connection to the terms 
of order.715 The greater the application of resources understood as a 
manifestation of power to control outcomes, the more evident, therefore, 
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the weakness of the agent seeking to control those outcomes since at such 
a moment, their rule can no longer be termed hegemonic; this is a mark of 
desperation.716 From the naval battles that saw the destruction of the 
Spanish Armada by the rising English sea power in the sixteenth century, 
to the accelerated importation of African slaves prior to the Civil War in 
the United States in the nineteenth century, to the deployment of extra 
troops by the United States in the so-called ‘surge’ strategy in Iraq and 
then later in Afghanistan at the outset of the twenty-first, the empirical 
record of history confirms this.717 
Third, the process of disembedding, because of the magnitude of resources 
required, the level of orchestration and control required, complicated by 
the inability of even the most technologically-buttressed projects to 
guarantee outcomes and the concomitant need to produce faith in the 
process in the face of inevitable failures and shortcomings, must 
eventually enlist the aid of some of those who will be harmed by the 
process. This is a great weakness of these systems, and the fact of 
resistance illustrates that choice was itself never lost. Human social 
relationships and their actual history doesn’t involve clear moral choices 
that deign one group to be the embodiment of good and another that of 
bad or evil. Significantly, this means that freedom cannot be a specie of 
identity politics, and, that in freedom there are no guarantees of moral 
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action, so clothing freedom as such transforms it into a metaphysical ideal 
that gives justification to political action after the fact, but occludes the 
choices made at the time of decision and unburdens members of a group 
from reflecting on the ethical, moral, emotional, and empirical 
consequences of their choices in favor of a narrower understanding of 
their group’s identity, enabling a performative and ritualized faith in 
nationalist exceptionalism.
But this constellation of choices necessarily casts out individuals from the 
community, even entire communities from the larger community, that a 
residue of bad conscience is inescapable. From this treatment of the Other 
arises the fear of the Other, and ultimately, the fear of death itself as that 
which is absolutely Other. From Machiavelli, who advocated a mature 
acceptance of the founding violence that gave rise to cities,718 to the 
ancient philosophy of Christianity and Judaism that focused on the 
betrayal of Adam by Eve in eating from the tree of knowledge that made 
mortal life a reality, to the expressions of sacrifice and salvation in other 
cultures, too, a significant trope adjoining the rise of national, imperial, 
and ideas of religious polities, has been the notion of original sin,719 which 
casts violence and immorality as both necessary and unavoidable, and 
therefore in need of being redeemed. Quite simply, this is nothing other 
than the drive to disembed the existence of being from the world, which is 
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seen as dangerous to being, even though it is the place of being. Erich 
Fromm, in an essay called On Disobedience, revalues Eve’s so-called 
betrayal by saying it was an act of courage that made both responsibility 
as well as freedom human potentialities.720 
Forgetting original sin has been a human activity ever since, so much so, 
that its implication has been transposed onto ‘the son of God’ in the Judeo-
Christian tradition, and other narratively-recast charismatic saviors 
throughout the world, a world which is now increasingly influenced by the 
spread of economic globalization and the secularization of Judeo-Christian 
ideas about existence contained in that conjuncture of notions.721 This isn’t 
to say that ‘original sin’ in the Christian sense - that we must be doubtful 
of ourselves because of our being inherently contaminated by sin - is 
appropriate to resurrect as a ward against human rapacity. Rather, we 
simply ought not turn away from the real, either as born-again types 
freeing ourselves of sin and responsibility by ritualistically worshipping 
Jesus Christ and fetishizing his crucifixion,722 or as neo-Catholics who 
would reinvigorate our internalization of sinfulness in the name of a 
conservative orthodoxy.723 Instead, we should embrace contingency, with 
its good and evil, and authentically take responsibility for what we have 
been and seen, in order to better guide what we may yet become, seeing 
the past as both prelude and warning - rather than a self-fulfilling 
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prophecy of unfreedom and renewed drives for the sublimation of the self 
in the name of permanence - that can be the source of an empirical lesson 
that may inform our ethics.
But, as Ashis Nandy has pointed out in relation to the effects of 
colonialism in forming a hegemonic conception of spatiality and 
temporality that has survived into modern India, the internalization of the 
desire to see oneself as an essence developing, progressing, ‘in time,’ and 
therefore capable of organizing space in regard to rationalized social 
organization that seeks the maximization of utility has only intensified.724 
This, we recall from our preceding discussion of Polanyi’s theory of the 
rise of market society, has now come to acquire the status of a political 
“religion”725 that has dealt a body blow to the notion of solidarity. Hindu 
nationalism, which was a response to Hindu ‘original sin,’ understood in 
the literature as the plague on Hindu self-conception because of the 
“Hindu defeat,” was used by its proponents to aggressively push for the 
transformation of both the Hindu religion and the Indian nation, a 
heretofore non-existent historical entity, into a religion of “hard gods” and 
a nation with a unified identity cooperating to achieve progress.726 Rather 
than “accept Hindus as they were,” as Nandy suggests Gandhi’s politics 
was defined by, Hindu nationalists, were more interested in not only 
preparing India to become a modern country, but also to even perhaps 
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someday prove India’s more essential essentialness than the Western 
nations that were a source of India’s colonial humiliation. Nandy writes 
that
“The newly created sense of linear history in Hinduism - an internalized counterpart of 
the Western theory of progress - was a perfect instrument for this purpose. It allowed one 
to project into history the sense of inferiority vis-a-vis an imperial faith and to see the 
golden age of Hinduism as an ancient version of the modern West.727”
And the effect of this recasting of Hindu ‘original sin,’ the source of Indian 
exceptionalism and the inability of Indian nationalists - those who seek to 
disembed the idea of India from the richly plural physis found in the South 
Asian subcontinent - to acknowledge their own histories since this would 
open up the contingency of Indianness and Hindu identity in a manner that 
wouldn’t fit with progressiveness and improvement tropes, is to transform 
history into a series of registers of good and bad actions, whose judgment 
and surveillance in the name of the disembedded, ideal identity, is totally 
necessary.728 The implications for freedom of individuals and for 
liberalism as a political practice aimed at producing broader and broader 
freedom for each should be fairly obvious. In the name of the 
consummated history of essentially-existing nations and peoples, whose 
objectively-verifiable presence is proof of so much, “myth” comes to 
define anything outside of the official history, including, ironically, the 
                    333
real, non-mythical lived realities of everydayness for people. Contrasting 
this idea of myth as everything outside of the register of official history 
reorganized spatially and temporally by colonialism and its internalization, 
to the actual mythical concept of space and time at the core of Western 
ontology productive of  the political structures of the Raj and now modern 
South Asian states, Nandy states that
“The core of such a concept of time - produced in the West for the first time after the 
demise of medievalism - consists in the emphasis on causes rather than on structures (on 
“why” rather than “what”), on progress and evolution as opposed to self-realization-in-
being, and on the rationality of adjustment to historical reality (pragmatics) and of change 
through constant dramatic action (rather than on the rationality of a fundamentally critical 
attitude towards earlier interpretations and change through only critical interventions and 
new interpretations). For the modern West, and for those influenced by its concept of 
time, history itself is a chronology of good and bad actions and their causes, and every 
revolution is a disjunction which must be either protected against counter-revolutions or 
reduced to the stature of a false ‘coming’ on the way to a real revolution.729”
But all the while actual history and actual truth, understood as simply that 
which has happened, threatens to be remembered and made significant for 
people’s awareness, choices, and actions. Writing on the decidedly-
difficult to accept, but extensively well-documented historical fact of 
Jewish collaboration with Nazis in the second world war, Corey Robin 
revisits Jewish councils’ attempts to variously save some Jews, protect 
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some Jews with high social standing (many of whom were on the 
councils), use various tactics to delay mass murders which of course 
eventually took place, and also preserve elements of dignity and choice in 
eventually opting to die in lieu of the continuation of torture practices 
visited upon them, was indicative, not of Jewish depravity or evilness as 
certain Jewish political groups today are fearful this is a revelation of, but 
that humanity was actually never quashed entirely in the camps, and even 
that forms of resistance continued.730 So much so, that Robin indicates that 
this blurs the line between collaborator and resister sufficiently so that 
what becomes of the essence for analysis of these sorts of terrible, fear-
magnifying circumstances is to focus on the structure of social and 
political institutions that give rise to the framework in which fear is so 
significant, rather than relying on an individualized analysis of moral 
potency found in any given person, or, as in this case, the moral status of 
groups. The question is one of ontology of the individual and of society - 
an essentially structural question about the existence of beings - since our 
aim is to think about a politics of freedom, and not to judge willful people 
as worthy of freedom and apparently will-lacking people as unworthy, 
since, as Nandy has pointed out in relation to colonialism, and as Robin 
shows in his discussion of the camps through Arendt’s important 
theorizing on the matter, individuals seem to retain some vestiges of 
agency and freedom even in these most dire circumstances, and that for 
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individuals to stop making choices altogether beyond the external 
application of violence as torture, people must also internalize their own 
lack of agency.
This point suggests that the psychological internalization of the structure 
of being that essentialized oneself or one’s group as being ‘the good,’ or 
those who see themselves as noble victims has the effect of removing 
agency from individuals and groups, as for example in the case of the 
Israelis - the self-appointed nation-state representative of the world’s 
Jewish peoples - which was made evident in a recent controversy over a 
series of scholarly inquiries into precisely this issue of the Jewish role in 
the Holocaust, as well as the fabricated nature of the connection of 
European Jews to the land in the Middle East that has come to be the 
location of the Israeli state.731 Having to see their suffering as entirely 
unique, their enemies as essentially evil in nature, and their new neighbors 
as undeserving of trust, the core group of Zionist political activists who 
would agitate across more than one-hundred years to the present day have 
internalized the same spatial and temporal conception of order that led to 
the Nazi’s invocation of lebensraum.732 That such a foreign policy requires 
the commission of crimes goes without saying, but in the case of Israel, 
the United States, and India, each of these nation’s elite classes and 
subordinate classes from poor to well-off that identify with the state as an 
                    336
organic extension of the nation, a powerful element of denial, again 
premised on the division of existence into good and evil, of history into 
discreet adjudicable moments, and of space into civil society and that 
which lay beyond as the realm of barbarians, enabled by harnessing 
needed material for ideological production, is readily observed in practice. 
Media systems, including advanced forms of commercial propaganda that 
coincide with the consumerist ideology - viewing identity as both token to 
be possessed and activating element enabling both material consumption 
and political conquest as its ongoing physical basis, which circulate the 
significations of identity, institutional order, and politics throughout civil 
society, produce a being - a conception of existence - held above the 
physis as a metaphysical ideal, discipline social order in accordance with 
these ideas of good and evil - and far from passively consuming these 
images, people acculturated thus tend to demand these images as a 
mechanism of fantasy and escape from an underlying reality that has left 
them alienated from the world, others, and themselves.
The use of structural adjustment, aerial warfare, the proliferation of the 
technological police state through public and private space to the point 
that surveillance is increasingly the norm and not the exception, and the 
demand for technologies of distancing that operate on the registers of 
space and time combine to produce a docile subject, and as Foucault 
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pointed out, this external structural situation is internalized through a 
negative dialectical relationship that winnows individual self-conceptions 
in line with the essentialized identity of their social, ethnic, political, etc., 
group.733 For example, because the Jews were so thoroughly scapegoated 
in German society - “they lacked allies in the wider population”734 - 
because “like all peoples the Jews were divided between elites and 
followers, and […] the leaders […] counseled their followers to take the 
path of cooperation and non-resistance”735 when facing deportation to 
concentration and death camps, because they were well-organized under 
the rubric of the Jewish councils, which had the trust of the Jewish 
communities under Nazi rule, and “because they subscribed to a belief in 
eternal Jewish victimhood,”736 their overall structural position in German 
society, and in Nazi-occupied Europe more broadly, was one that, because 
of its precariousness demanded an attitude of “realism,737” valued 
conformity and obedience over rebellion, identity and essentialism over 
the discovery of new solidarities, and ultimately, left them lacking the 
types of political resources that could have helped in combating the 
Holocaust’s evil. Nonetheless, Robin adds that despite all this, Arendt’s 
account reveals that there were a number of choices about what course to 
take that involved the Jewish leadership at the time - including armed 
resistance and flight to the forests, both of which produced survival rates 
higher than rates for those who complied with Nazi commands - and this 
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proved that despite the terror of their situation, the residents of the camps, 
despite being reduced to an abjectness most horrible to contemplate, “no 
longer” were, Robin writes “the victims terror” in Arendt’s Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, in comparison to her earlier work on totalitarianism 
“simple, unthinking automatons. Instead, they were rational agents, making calculations 
similar to those described by Hobbes. They assumed that if they cooperated in the here 
and now, they might buy enough time to survive until the Allies arrived. It was not a 
crazy calculus, but its claims to rationality supported a logic of fear and induced 
obedience.738” 
So choice, thrust upon human beings by circumstances, and decided upon 
by human beings who retained the existential traits that characterized their 
humanity - chiefly the finitude of space and time - remained all the while 
despite the systematic torture they met. What is important, though, is the 
way in which ontology pre-conditioned those choices in a manner that tied 
collectivities together in such a way that their members couldn’t defy the 
leadership of those above them, and that leadership was itself carried out 
by those in such roles with the panache of legitimate authority.739 But 
those Hobbesian calculations, which require the internalization of fear on 
the basis of presuming that there is a rational agent who essentially exists 
in one way for all time and that fear is a useful ward for that agent to 
navigate their way through life, cuts off the dialectical understanding of 
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individual existence in relation to others, to the community in general, and 
to the natural world. 
This leaves individuals entirely at the mercy of power, whether this power 
is organized on the basis of positive liberty that presents the fulfillment of 
identity as the destiny of a people, or on that of negative liberty, since 
without the ability to bear witness to their own lives on their own terms, 
being told what to fear, and therefore how to think, persons come to rely 
on the edicts of the sovereign to make decisions for them; to think for 
them. Heidegger anticipated that the transformation of thinking itself into 
the internalization of the dictums of rationality established by the sciences 
on the basis of establishing objective presence would dispose persons to 
imagine themselves to be thoughtful, even to be free agents, because their 
successful internalization of iotas would convince them that indeed they 
existed on the terms of existence established by metaphysical politicality. 
Taking structure for granted, both of the human being as individual and of 
the supposed reality of the world, the “automaton conformist” imagines 
themselves free:
“The decisive point is not what is thought but how it is thought. The thought that is the 
result of active thinking is always new and original; original, not necessarily in the sense 
that others have not thought it before, but always in the sense that the person who thinks, 
has used thinking as a tool to discover something new in the world outside or inside 
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himself. Rationalizations are essentially lacking this quality of discovering and 
uncovering; they only confirm the emotional prejudice existing in oneself. Rationalizing 
is not a tool for penetration of reality but a post-factum attempt to harmonize one’s own 
wishes with existing reality.740”
We can add that it is quite clear that these were choices made in response 
to the structure of order and the ontological assumptions of that order’s 
effects the nature of creating ‘true’ human beings. But in fact these are 
individuals who have replaced their selves, understood as the actual 
existing and decaying selves, with something less. Fromm called this a 
“pseudo-self,741” which because it was down the road of losing itself more 
and more, and more and more engaged as a result in the rearguard defense 
of its inauthenticity, it would become more desperately attached to the 
terms of order governing the physis in accordance with metaphysics. But 
when threatened, this individual, with pride in their apparent individuality, 
would insist on their apparent freedom, and would not take kindly to the 
interruption found in radical critique.742 Recent controversies over the 
necessity of fearing Muslims that have erupted in Western countries have 
found, for example, prominent self-proclaimed liberal commentators 
insisting on the superiority of Western values of tolerance in related to the 
intolerant Muslim world, but who at the same moment they make such 
statements also excuse the extreme forms of violence prosecuted by 
Western nations against a number of countries across the Muslim world 
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under the banner of the ‘war on terror.743’ What is made clear by our 
discussion is that for groups of people whose identity is caught up with 
essentially-belonging, to a notion of nation, or to a notion of good, have 
their cognitive capacities distorted as a result, and are unable to face the 
sheer chaotic contingency of human existence, preferring to utilize 
identity as a key to inauthentic, but apparently actual, belonging to banish 
such thoughts.
The response by Jews who were the victims of the Holocaust, and by 
many who survived, suggests that the disembedding of identity is never 
complete, and the process itself begets in the end either a form of fatalistic 
collective suicide commenced in the name of identities that utilize the idea 
of essentialness to retain authority until the very end, or, if the relative 
powerfulness of the groups involved is different, with the weaker group 
being capable of survival, then rather than collective suicide what will 
ensue is collectivist politics based on exclusions of the Other to ensure 
group security once and for all. The first scenario describes the choices of 
Jews who became variously resigned to their fate in assisting in the 
machinery of death concocted by the Nazi’s evil, and the second one refers 
to the politics of the state of Israel, which, built by Zionist survivors of the 
Holocaust who arrived in large numbers in the area that would become 
Israel before and immediately after the war in Europe, has since its 
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founding forever been premised on the politics of exclusion not merely 
aimed at Arabs and Muslims whom they have ethnically-cleansed from 
their country, but increasingly towards anyone who fails to spontaneously 
consent to the myth of Israeli exceptionalism - such as African migrants, 
Jew and non-Jew alike - who, because of their life experiences and 
memories cannot but refrain from such mindless adulation.744 But in either 
case, the reenactment of the decision taken in the name of the artificial, 
but naturalized identity must be commenced over and over again, which 
implies that the role of structural position of groups in the formation of 
consciousness looms large, and the the ontological division of the world 
into good and evil on the basis of ‘progress’ or ‘order’ - all fundamentally 
categories of essentialized identities - influences individual will more than 
most of us would like to admit; especially those of us who imagine 
ourselves to be free.
Both of these responses are blurred, though, since the self-perception of 
power is uncertain, and within the camp, the reservation, the casbah, the 
ghetto, and the favela, as zones of indistinction, where absolute power 
operates absolutely, reversals of power and powerlessness, of life and 
death, of presence and absence, occur frequently, quickly, and in 
unpredictable ways. The recent - and ongoing - hunger strike at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where the US military controls a major prison 
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camp for suspects detained in the ‘war on terror,’ is evidence of this 
reality. First, it is obvious that indefinite detention amounts to 
dehumanization, none too different than the Nazi camps or the strategic 
hamlets from the Vietnam-American war era: prisoners are simply 
removed from the world. Second, this level of dehumanization is 
compounded by the reversal of sovereign power that informs Agamben’s 
theorizing about the state of exception wherein now the need to protect 
life - understood as the biological expression of essential human nature - 
becomes the anchor of “biopolitical”745 legitimacy. Thus prisoners are 
subjected to force-feedings, involuntary psychological and psychiatric 
evaluation, being perversely goaded into docility with access to high-tech 
entertainment products, and other elements of middle-class American life 
that conservatives eagerly to point out, making indefinite detention 
apparently equivalent to a “Club Med” vacation. But, third, these elements 
of control - the carrot and the stick, if you will - have failed to prevent the 
men held there from commencing a massive hunger strike - whose 
massiveness and threatening nature is attested to by the media blockade 
imposed by the military - which, if it results in deaths, will ironically show 
these men to be free until their last breath and reveal the powerlessness of 
the powerful in producing a dehumanized identity for the powerless to 
resign themselves to. American freedom’s dark underbelly of torture and 
sadism will thus be revealed.
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The scandalous understanding of being as objective presence, with the 
material resources, the intellection capacity measured as the 
internalization of rationalizations, and the ability to back up words with a 
resort to violence, traditionally, and technologies of distancing more 
generally since now violence has come to encompass the ability to 
conduce a form of living in a particular way through torture, through 
forced-feedings, through the use of legislative subsidies for the farming of 
unhealthful ‘food products’ linked to a myriad of conditions that kills and 
depreciate the quality of life, is all fully on display. All these 
manifestations are connected. At their root, returning to Heidegger, is 
humanity’s temptation to reduce being to manipulable inputs in the 
orchestration of existence with a teleological aim in mind. Because this 
teleology is always an illusion of the future to come, its main significance 
is its prescriptive effects in the present. Simply put, some beings are 
something, other beings are nothing, and the evolution of ‘freedom’ in the 
name of permanence is greatly aided by the way in which freedom is 
falsified as the ability to do what one wants no matter what. Whomever 
can effectively punish the enemy of ‘freedom’ then becomes the one to 
who the essentialized individual, incapable of “making themselves 
inessential,” will surrender their actual freedom. 
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——————————————————————————
XXIII. Metaphysics and the Willful Denial of the Worldliness of the 
World: From Freedom to Judgment; From Love to (In)Tolerance - 
Freedom as a Thing-In-Itself as Judge of Freedom as Phenomena
We now turn to a discussion of another vision of freedom, which, we will 
argue is (1) older and universal, (2) cannot be extinguished even with the 
most awful violence - examples of which we have discussed - in the 
absence of acquiescence by persons to artifice which they become 
convinced is nature, and (3) whose recovery will offer humanity a way out 
of the terrible prophecy of our age being a “great war of spirits”: 
cataclysmic clashes between zealous individuals and groups whose 
attachment to their artifices that emanate the illusions of permanence is so 
strong that any insult, perceived or actual, no matter how irrelevant to 
their everydayness in the absence of the artifice’s bask, becomes the 
source of building resentment. Nietzsche said that the redirection of this 
resentment - ressentiment, in his terms, resentment against life itself746 - to 
alleviate suffering, to numb, temporarily, feelings of resentment through 
the distraction of identity and the games of metaphysics - which make 
people “interesting” by turning themselves into “an adventure”747 - would 
become the new programmatic of authority in a fallen, post-religious age. 
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Manipulating spiritualized selves and feeding delusions of grandeur, the 
self-hatred of one’s own inferiority,748 and coaxing people into acceptance 
of the status quo, where individuality is a threat to the the stability of 
manufactured presences, leaders - Nietzsche calls them “ascetic priests”749 
who orient human activity in the service of an ascetic, life-denying, ideal - 
impair cognitive function directly and indirectly, hoping to produce a 
society of individuals who stroke their egos and idealized selves as 
precious gifts, whose ontological insecurity causes them to cling to these 
visions all the more.750
So with this insight the question shifts to a concern with how ontology 
comes to inform the development of consciousness. If the idea of being 
that prevails is one that sees being as a transcendental idea, rather than 
simply being itself, replete with all of its’ characteristics and ripeness for 
observation and consideration, eventually, and even immediately, a 
narrowed consciousness of possibility will guide the process of becoming: 
the essence of being at the core of the facticity of existence.751 Theorizing 
on the nature of being as “care”752 for that which is, and casting aside the 
kind of regimentation of existence found in hierarchic and bureaucratic 
organization - the division of being and the obscuring of the totality of 
references that make up the “worldhood” of the “world” - Heidegger 
writes that the capacity to see ahead of the moment, for beings to be able 
                    347
to “be ahead of themselves” is made possible by attunement to “facticity” 
that is the authentic basis of existence because
“being-ahead-of-itself means being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in-a-world. As soon 
as this essentially unitary structure is seen phenomenally, what we worked out earlier in 
the analysis of worldliness becomes clearer. There we found that the referential totality of 
significance (which is constitutive for worldliness) is “anchored” in the for-the-sake-of-
which. The fact that this referential totality, of the manifold relations of the in-order-to, is 
bound up with that which dasein is concerned about, does not signify that an objectively 
present “world” of objects is welded together with a subject. Rather, it is the phenomenal 
expression of the fact that the constitution of dasein, whose wholeness is now delineated 
explicitly as being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-in….is primordially a whole. 
Expressed differently: existing is always factical. Existentiality is essentially determined 
by facticity.753”
Heidegger continues immediately thereafter making clear the relationship 
between “facticity,” “care,” “authenticity,” being “free,” and finally 
“politics” understood existentially in a manner inherent to the unique 
position in the “world” of each person.754  Choices, no matter how odious, 
and human values, no matter how despicably debased, continue to exist in 
the worst situations, and didn’t require the buttress of state authority to 
create situations of consumer choice in marketplaces and electoral politics 
to remain real - calling into question the narrow vision of freedom-plus-
security bandied about as the real deal today. Consciousness is not 
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equally-distributed, and so we bear witness to the contest of wills, even in 
one individual, between authenticity and inauthenticity, and just how 
difficult it becomes to resolutely choose one or the other simply on the 
basis of the will. Individuals, to be free, require support. This requires a 
doctrine of public, social, political, and relational freedom.
“Since being-in-the-world is essentially care, being-together-with things at hand could be 
taken in our previous analyses as taking care of them, being with the Mitdasein of others 
encountered within the world as concern. Being-together-with is taking care of things, 
because as a mode of being-in it is determined by it fundamental structure, care. Care not 
only characterizes existentiality, abstracted from facticity and falling prey, but also 
encompasses the unity of these determinations of being. Nor does care mean primarily 
and exclusively an isolated attitude of the ego toward itself. The expression “care for 
oneself,” following the analogy of taking care and concern, would be a tautology. Care 
cannot mean a special attitude toward the self, because the self is already characterized 
ontologically as being-ahead-of-itself; but in this determination the other two structural 
moments of care, already-being-in…..and being-together-with, are also posited…..
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….In being-ahead-of-oneself as the being toward one’s ownmost being free for authentic 
existentiell possibilities. It is the potentiality-for-being for the sake of which dasein 
always is as it factically is. But since this being toward the potentiality-for-being is itself 
determined by freedom, dasein can also be related to its possibilities unwillingly, it can 
be inauthentic, and it is so factically initially and for the most part. The authentic for-the-
sake-of-which remains ungrasped, the project of one’s potentiality-for-being is left to the 
disposal of the they. Thus in being-ahead-of-itself, the “self” actually means the self in 
the sense of the they-self. Even in inauthenticity, dasein remains essentially ahead-of-
itself, just as the entangled fleeing of dasein from itself still shows the constitution of 
being of a being that is concerned about its being.755”
The conscious choice to be what one can be, then, is not a matter of 
choosing from displayed options as in a marketplace, or in terms of of 
such a choice understood metaphorically in the midst of human existence 
beyond the actual confines of the situation of transaction, but rather, 
comes to encompass a conscious awareness and action upon one’s 
contingency - what Heidegger called “already-being-in”756 - and one’s 
community through which a person becomes the kind of self that they are, 
and indeed, could be - this denoted by the term “mitdasein,” German for 
“being-together-with.757” Access to this awareness, something which is 
always available, and is extremely simple to grasp - despite being 
“ungrasped”758 - is found through the action and attunement called “care,” 
which, as care, literally brings before consciousness the question of being: 
why are there beings rather than nothing? Answering this question is 
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impossible, but rumination upon it, mindfully being-present with it, is the 
mechanism by which all philosophy and knowledge are born.759 It is the 
purpose of political authority to orchestrate beings by removing the 
urgency of this question from consciousness, producing a de-humanized 
being whose ability to respond to their consciousness is gone because they 
lose awareness of the ontological priority of care that implicates them in 
being always already.
“……As a primordial structural totality, care lies “before” every factical 
“attitude” and “position” of dasein, that is, it is always already in them as 
an existential a priori. Thus this phenomenon by no means expresses a 
priority of “practical” over theoretical behavior. When we determine 
something objectively present by merely looking at it, this has the 
character of care just as much as “political action,” or resting and having a 
good time. “Theory” and “praxis” are possibilities of being for a being 
whose being must be defined as care.760”
However, liberalism is essentially about conceiving freedom as ‘freedom 
from’ - negative liberty - which is structured to facilitate unawareness of 
the question of ontology and the phenomena of care that it points up to. 
Because of this internalization of ignorance, for the sake of survival in a 
world thus arranged, this must come at the expense of the Other; who shall 
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recompense in kind. But since we cannot ultimately shake our character of 
existence, irregardless our effort - we can only create greater and greater 
illusions through the use of technologies of distancing - negative liberty 
breeds a sense of paranoia about the Other; and therefore about existence 
in general, since the being of the Other is also everyone’s own experience 
as the Other of another person’s notion of selfhood.761 Translation: take 
negative liberty far enough in its material and ideological grandeur, 
support its practice with consumption patterns that inure individuals to 
pain and gear them towards pleasure, real or mediatized, and give them 
the full-reign to indulge themselves however they wish so long as it 
doesn’t conflict with the expedients of state. 
To avoid reckoning with one’s consciousness, the will is used as a sword 
to attempt the division of reality in the name of freedom for the individual. 
But to what end? As previously discussed, the connection of the 
appearance of the free will ! a trait of the free and willing being, meaning 
one with a certain capacity for accountability - with the contemporaneous 
appearance of the idea of duty understood as obligation and the 
solemnization of obligations to the community understood essentially 
transformed freedom into conformity; into an identity politics of an 
identity that couldn’t make itself inessential. The will is thus revealed to 
be, as such, the essence of metaphysics: to will to be such and such being, 
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the will to an identity, the will to truth, ultimately, the “will to power”762 
where power simply means ability understood as force, and where willing 
is the means by which this power is disciplined in accordance with what is 
considered to be being. In this light Descartes’ famous dictum - “I think 
therefore I am” - is understood in a more explicitly Platonist fashion: I am 
because I have used my will to indicate through my disciplined speech and 
iotas of consciousness that I truly think. Failing to make this resolutely 
present as one’s way of existing in the world, individuals are not to be 
trusted with freedom, and those who claim to possess freedom are 
released, on the terms of negative liberty reproduced by the terms of order, 
from the impulse and proto-ontological call of conscience to care for such 
individuals.
Several connecting remarks are in order. The move to create negative 
liberty for individuals requires the possibility of individuals disembedding 
themselves from their surroundings and the contingent but dependent 
social interactions that constitute them. This doesn’t mean that individuals 
are to be elements of a collective pure and simple, but, rather, that their 
very individuality exists in a dialectical relationship with the community, 
with the language of the community, and the culture of that community 
that can either promotes or restrain their individuality. The development of 
a personality, its potential for autonomy, and its’ depth, is something that 
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cannot be accounted for by the utopian vision of negative liberty as Berlin 
himself understands. The problem is that most liberals are scarcely as 
honest as Berlin on this register, and fail to consider any authentic 
consideration of the social framework - positive liberty doctrines - that 
give rise to negative liberty. Hobbes and Locke both invoke fear, paternal 
discipline, and conservative culture as a defender of liberty - but 
vainglorious persons can easily ask what sort of liberty is this…
“My conception of freedom. The value of a thing sometimes does not lies in that which 
one attains by it, but in what one pays for it - what it costs us….there are no more 
thorough injurers of freedom than liberal institutions. Their effects are known well 
enough: they undermine the will to power; they level mountain and valley, and call that 
morality; they make men small, cowardly, and hedonistic - every time it is the herd 
animal that triumphs with them. Liberalism: in other words, herd-animalization……
…..These same institutions produce quite different effects while they are still being 
fought for; then they really promote freedom in a powerful way. On closer inspection, it 
is war that produces these effects, the war for liberal institutions, which, as a war, permits 
illiberal instincts to continue. And war educates for freedom. For what is freedom? That 
one has the will to assume responsibility for oneself. That one maintains the distance 
which separates us. That one become more indifferent to difficulties, hardships, privation, 
even to life itself. That one is prepared to sacrifice human beings for one’s cause, not 
excluding oneself. Freedom means that the manly instincts which delight in war and 
victory dominate over other instincts, for example, over those of “pleasure.” The human 
being who has become free - and how much more the spirit who has become free - spits 
on the contemptible type of well-being dreamed of by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, 
females, Englishmen, and other democrats. The free man is a warrior.763” 
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What Nietzsche is saying here is that modern liberal society has 
domesticated people, and has labeled that domestication to be one and the 
same with freedom, with being free. There are two general approaches to 
producing this kind of security on an ongoing basis, and usually both are 
found together at all times: by either producing an ideology which confers 
the name of freedom onto a select people, or by using the world’s 
resources and orchestrating them appropriately for the sake of creating the 
physical political economic base for the mass production of the telltale 
effect of freedom and distributing these sufficiently to create a sense of a 
normal state of affairs, making it possible for people to lose awareness of 
their fragile origins and obscure their always unknown fates. Released 
from responsibility for either thinking about, or from actually participating 
in, the provision of the resources needed for life being possible, 
individuals think themselves free. But as Robin pointed out with respect to 
Hobbes, and as we have expanded that view of being educated for fear 
found in Hobbes’ thought where it is suggested as generalized wisdom of 
fear of existence and the change central to it (Berlin), and the fear of pain 
(Rorty), and even fear of the historical history-making capacity of 
conscious action (Fukuyama), that encompasses a great deal of what has 
been called liberal thought, this creates a truncated understanding of the 
self whose very possibilities for existence are limited to their spatial-
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temporal parameters assigned to them by power, controlling thus their 
very unfolding as living beings.764 Such socialization, Nietzsche suggests, 
will cause those who value their freedom to lash out against all structures.
We propose to read Nietzsche ironically here. Rather than seeing his above 
statement as straightforward endorsement of warlike mentalities, the 
section at the end of the quote concerning the comparative element of 
freedom wherein Nietzsche points out how his loathing the freedom of 
those whom he deems “the last man” - and whose way of life Fukuyama 
sees as the pinnacle of human achievement765 - suggests another reading 
other than a sweeping aside of all those deemed weaklings. Instead of 
seeing the warrior as a template of freedom per se, the context of the 
whole quote suggests a timeliness (or perhaps untimeliness) to the claim 
that the “free man is a warrior.” When Nietzsche says this, he is saying 
that those who wish to be free in the world bequeathed by liberalism - the 
so-called modern world -  defined by the “leveling of mountain and 
valley” must indeed resort to a warrior-footing - a siege mentality - in their 
attunement to existence. 
Liberal institutions are the products of war, but are now institutionalized. 
Liberal institutions naturalize the violence of the state - essentially 
artificial - and, as Mill said in his essay ‘Civilization,’ outsource the 
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legalized commission of official violence to designated purveyors of it, 
leaving the overwhelming majority of the populace free to be ‘civilized’ in 
accordance with his definition of the term as being capable of great acts 
through “combination” between individuals. But, as we shall see, Mill’s 
criteria for great acts of combined forces of individuals is simply greatness 
itself, understood as utility in his specialized reformulation of that term 
decided upon by the intellectual class who becomes the self-referential 
point-of-departure for evaluation as such. The result of this has been to 
domesticate violence in the name of collective defense of the community 
defined by intellectuals acting in their masked interest, with the semi-
ironic outcome of encouraging hostility towards the Other, whose very 
Otherness is seen as a threat to the products of the combined efforts of 
‘our’ civilization; the internalization of the identity of which serves as the 
main structural support for continued elite rule. This effectively shifts the 
instinct for free action to a class of deciders. Having given up the instinct 
of conquest, be it physical and military, or be it social, artistic, sexual, or 
intellectual, having internalized domesticated manners, common people 
have become inured to the ongoing violence conducted in their name by 
elites: or, those whose own resentment is so strong that they have 
commandeered the heights of the state and other powerful institutions, so 
they can achieve the permanence associated with accumulations of power 
- still an illusion that cannot escape death - and achieve concentration and 
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centralization by transforming stridency into ‘defense.’ “No government,” 
Nietzsche writes
“admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. 
Rather the army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that 
approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's 
immorality; for the neighbor must be thought of as eager to attack and conquer if our 
state must think of means of self-defense. Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an 
army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much does our 
own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a 
hypocrite and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a 
harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against 
each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good 
disposition. This presupposition, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. At 
bottom, indeed, it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because as I have said, it 
attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act. We 
must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the 
desire for conquests.766”
To become free of this morass of fanaticized and aggressive domesticity, 
be as a free person, “the free man” must be a “warrior” and nothing less, 
since, in the absence of the capacity for war, negative liberty domesticates 
individuals into narrower and narrower bounds of acceptable conduct 
within the prevailing laws; these laws being the product of a negative 
dialectic of social regulation and control indulgent of the whimsical 
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desires of domesticated peoples to enact moral prohibitions against that 
which they imagine threatens them but in actuality they are simply 
intolerant of. Free expression is channelled into narrower and narrower 
modes of intellection as acceptable forms of expression, and even this 
intellection itself will come to rest on the edifice of the ongoing search for 
knowledge understood as the amalgamation of the laws of nature 
understood as a relay of objective presences to be accumulated, stored, 
arranged, and eventually, orchestrated, to further effect the process of 
knowledge as mastery over the world.767 But the simply maddening 
element in all this is that the idea of ‘world’ that underlies this drive for 
mastery is itself an impoverished concept of world set up in advance 
already as something that mastery can be gained over. The only reply to 
this state of affairs imaginable to Nietzsche, despite his iconoclasm, was to 
reassert the self purely through the will, because, as he most thoroughly 
revealed in his philosophy, the entirety of the Western philosophical 
cannon was nothing more than various truncated and domesticated 
expressions of “the will to power.”
“…like Nietzsche’s identification of freedom with radical individualism, the 
identification of freedom with mastery is pathological. By pathological I mean something 
born of and nourished by existential resentment. When postmodern libertarians, like their 
positive and negative counterparts, completely equate freedom with mastery, they are 
effectively striking out against an ambiguous and overpowering world. The mastery that 
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is sought relieves the individual from fully acknowledging and hence authentically 
experiencing its own thrownness in the world.768”
Political freedom must admit to the shared nature of existence and the 
rationally unfathomable plurality of beings therein, and cannot accept the 
restiveness of resentfulness aimed at mastery over oneself as a counter-
sovereignty that liberal theories utilize as their negative ground for social 
order. The liberal individualist, to exist authentically freely, must 
“mitigate” their “pursuit of sovereignty,” so they can “eschew 
resentment.769” The use of the ideal of collective defense of the 
community, and concepts of race, nation, religious identity, class, and 
other designations denoting in and out groups must at some point be relied 
upon, necessitating the institution of governmental authorities capable of 
rendering legitimated decisions to protect the community against a 
dangerous world and internal dissension that are perceived by those 
possessed by resentment as essential threats to their existence. 
Western concepts of being, be they liberal or conservative, or even 
postmodern, are predicated thus on some notion of willing, and this sort of 
distinction of the self from the society has given rise to the self as an idea 
whose premise is violent rupture and division from others. Negative 
liberty masks this rupture through normalization, and positive liberty 
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justifies it on the basis of some positive truth discourse of, say, the nation 
as an idealized community peopled by exemplary and disciplined 
individuals. As we have discussed previously, this distinction between 
negative and positive liberty is a canard, but one that been put to social use 
by liberal theorists - Isaiah Berlin comes to mind again - to indicate the 
superiority of negative liberty over positive as an aim of, perhaps a special 
trait of, higher orders of civilization. 
Chief among its virtues, cited all the way back in Aristotle’s times, where 
magnanimity was associated with liberality that was the province of those 
freed from daily labors through a socio-economic system whose basis was 
mass enslavement along racial lines, through the work of John Locke and 
John Stuart Mill, and up to the present day in the writings of a great many 
partisans of liberal internationalism/imperialism, supposedly, is tolerance. 
Wendy Brown writes that tolerance, praised as evidence of elevated 
morality made possible through the rational domestication of warring 
instincts that historically are manifest in religious battles, nationalist 
conflicts, rather than indicating loving indulgence of the Other, in fact, to 
the contrary engages an aspect of the overall governmentality of liberalism 
that demarcates the space between the civilized and the barbarians.770 
Instead of tolerance being a value among other values, to be practiced, to 
be cast aside in moments of passion, liberal thought understands it as a 
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property of persons entitled to tolerate others and thus also as a propriety 
to maintain in order to maintain the claims of status. Writing an analysis of 
Susan Okin’s - a prominent liberal feminist - call for Western and liberal 
societies to speak out against illiberal social practices beyond the West, 
Brown argues that
“Tolerance, is not … repudiated [by Okin] as a value but rather becomes a practice of 
demarcation, drawing the line at the “barbaric” or the coerced [by illiberal social 
practice]……all instances of the barbaric and the coerced are found on the non-Western 
side of the line - that is, where culture or religion are taken to reign and hence where 
individual autonomy is unsecured. No legal Western practice is marked as barbaric, 
including feasting on a variety of animals except those fetishized as pets; polluting the 
planet and plundering its resources; living and dying alone; devoting life to the pursuit of 
money; making available human eggs, sperm, and infants for purchase by anonymous 
strangers; performing abortions; stockpiling nuclear weapons; tolerating sex clubs, 
indigency, and homelessness; enjoying flagrant luxury in the presence of the poor; 
consuming junk food; or undertaking imperialist wars.771” 
Our above discussion of American atrocities in Japan and Vietnam, and the 
spread of these ways of thinking - accepting the violence of modernity as a 
natural progression of the species - to India evident in that its’ 
government’s was against its own people and the importation of large-
scale mechanized agricultural production causing hundreds of thousands 
to lose their land through financial scheming driving them to suicide, 
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should make clear that Brown’s analysis has much empirical support. 
Tariq Ali has written of the current global moment being a “clash of 
fundamentalisms”772 where arrayed on one side are the tribal rebellions 
that variously make up the irredentist and obscurantist religious 
movements and ultra-violent ‘terrorist’ organizations challenging states 
around the world; on the other side we have “capitalist 
fundamentalists,773” whose devotion of neoliberal economic order whose 
basis is austerity when necessary to keep confidence in the engines of 
overproduction and to give succor to the “culture-ideology of 
consumerism”774 has led them to lay waste to democratic governments and 
movements the world over through various political and military 
interventions going back at least a century and perhaps more. Capitalism 
and the politics of “technological fanaticism” is as fundamentalist as its 
enemies - if not more so - save it has developed, through the long 
trajectory of moralization that Nietzsche amply critiques in his 
philosophical corpus, a mechanism of escaping responsibility for actions 
flowing from its underlying system of thought through the naturalization 
of their artifice, the universalization of their morality as morality as such.* 
Tolerance, a straightforward and useful concept for survival and avoidance 
of needless tensions of mind, when universalized, like when freedom is 
universalized has, as Isaiah Berlin anticipated
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“The effect [of labeling] the non-West [as] intolerable for harboring certain practices that 
are not only named barbaric, that is, uncivilized in contrast to our practices, but coerced, 
that is, unfree compared to our practices. The limits of tolerance are thus equated with the 
limits of civilization or with threats to civilization. Indeed, insofar as both invoke a 
civilizational discourse to broker the tolerable, those who worry about tolerating what 
portends the unraveling or decline of Western civilization (Samuel Huntington, the 
neoconservatives, right-wing Christians) converge ideologically with those who worry 
about tolerating non-Western practices that are outside civilization’s pale (Susan Okin, 
liberals, human rights activists). Conservatives and liberals alike deploy this colonially 
inflected discourse to establish a civilizational norm by which the tolerable is measured, a 
norm that tolerance itself also secures.775”
By transforming our values into eternal values, and seeking to make the 
world in our image, making exceptions for those liminal others we can 
tolerate (because they are not a threat to us), and ensuring that threats to 
our orchestration of the “standing reserve” are neutralized in the name of 
our freedom, we retire the question of being and doom ourselves to a 
narrow vision of life. This vision of life may be enough for some for some 
time, even for many, but alarming rates of drug use, divorce, spousal 
battery, eating disorders, obesity, resentment against minorities, and other 
forms of ressentiment - resentment towards life itself from which people 
seek respite in the enactment, illusion, or both, of mastery - have produced 
a resigned attitude that gives the lie to the pretension of liberalism. When 
Brown points out that Okin ignores the major problem of young women in 
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America and the West more broadly starving themselves to become 
thinner - not merely to satisfy men’s desires, but more so to avoid the kind 
of negative peer-shaming associated with being perceived as fat - or when 
we can add to this important point the similar one about homophobia 
among young men whose possibly being associated with homosexuality in 
any way causes them to reinforce masculinist and machismo virtues that 
emphasize their willfulness and strength at the expense of their inner life, 
their friends, their family, and their emotions - these points may strike 
some as being strange examples of a critique of Western freedom. But 
they are obvious. By restricting being, by focusing all our energies on the 
reinforcement of a metaphysical ideal of the self, we have to turn our 
vision away from our surroundings, which, is where opportunities for 
friendship and love, the basis for human life and society, and is where our 
freedom ultimately lies.
The restriction of being transforms not only choices but cognition, and 
leaves the actions of the Other unexplainable. This not only transforms 
foreigners into potential terrorists, but it also masks actions that could be 
understood quite easily as terrorism on the part of Westerners by the 
naturalization of what is essentially artifice, thus concealing its deleterious 
implications for freedom, everywhere. “In sum,” Brown writes
                    365
“why is Okin more horrified by the legal control of women by men than by the 
controlling cultural norms and market productions of gender and sexuality, including 
norms and productions of beauty, sexual desire and behavior, weight and physique, soul 
and psyche, that course through modern Western societies?…
…When individual rights are posited as the solution to coercion, and liberalism as the 
antidote to culture, women’s social oppression and subordination (as opposed to their 
contingent or domestic violation or maltreatment) appears only where law openly avows 
its religious or cultural character - that is, where it has not taken the vow of Western 
secularism. But as the examples above suggest, by formulating freedom as choice and 
reducing the political to policy and law, liberalism sets loose, in a depoliticized 
underworld, a sea of social powers nearly as coercive as law, and certainly as effective in 
producing subjectivated subjects. Indeed, as a combination of Marcusian and Foucaultian 
perspectives reminds us, choice can become a critical instrument of domination in liberal 
capitalist societies; insofar as the fiction of the sovereign subject blinds us to powers 
producing that subject, choice both cloaks and potentially eroticizes the powers it 
engages. Moreover, Okin’s inability to grasp liberalism’s own cultural norms - in which, 
for example, autonomy is valued over connection or the responsibility for dependent 
others (with which women are typically associated), liberty is conceived as freedom to do 
what one wants (for which women are so often faulted), and equality is premised on 
sameness (while women are always conceived as different) - blinds her to the deep and 
abiding male superordination within liberalism: not just in “liberal cultures” or in the 
sphere of the family but in liberal legalism and political principles.776”
To be absolutely clear, our position is that there is always choice, that 
choices can be made at any time, but that the existence of these choices is 
not the same thing as freedom and that to present choices being presented 
to individuals as the provision of freedom by the social order is to, as 
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Brown has put it, both “cloak” and eroticize social order that produces the 
circumscribed choices associated with the prevailing liberal concept of 
freedom. Rather, freedom precedes the notion of choice altogether, and to 
fetishize the existence of choice as evidence of freedom transforms 
choices into part of the technological machinery of power that seeks to 
perpetuate itself and organize constituent human activity in its name. 
Rather freedom understood as being confronts individuals with choices in 
regard to how they will exist, rather than the narrower idea of choosing 
which product or political party they identify with, and therefore choice 
must be understood in an altogether more original manner. Concealing the 
big questions and redirecting people towards the smaller ones, liberalism 
limits peoples choices in the name of giving them choices, and so masks 
the power relations in society. Liberals and supposed partisans of freedom 
fail to recognize, as Brown points out in regard to Okin, the continued 
existence of many coercive, choice-free, situations that undergird the 
apparent production of choice.
Corey Robin points out that the notion of private property, that institution 
that undergirds our freedom in liberal political philosophy, either of 
material things or in relation to our bodies as the source of labor and 
independent thought, and our capacity for independent thought and 
judgment supported by our apparent material independence evident 
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because of our possessions and capacity to produce more possessions for 
ourselves or to trade with others, conceals beneath its depoliticized facade 
significant unfreedoms kept in place by the use of fear as a legitimate tool 
of governance of hierarchical organizations that typify the American 
workplace777 - and we can add, that are typical of workplaces reorganized 
by capitalist reforms in other countries, as well.778 Focusing our fears on 
the apparent difference of the Other interpreted as danger to be saved 
from, instead of focusing on injustices in our own countries we can rectify, 
we engage instead in the chimerical pursuit of freeing Others from social 
structures that are widely recognized as antiquated in their own societies 
anyway for which a struggle for change is generally in the offing, and 
which, in many cases, our own political alliances with the most retrograde 
elements in other countries have been essential in sustaining, from 
Afghanistan to Argentina.779 All the while, we accept our own increasingly 
narrow social, political, spatial, behavioral, and everyday, truncation of 
liberty in the name of empire abroad, economic expedience domestically, 
and the preservation of the privileges of those strata whom we identify 
with our own life goals in lieu of creating a social democratic economic 
systems in which we could pursue our dreams since such changes are 
understood as threatening to the prevailing order of things; with change 
we could lose our sense of dominion.
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All these things were necessary to preserve the fetish of choice in a world 
where choices for most people were no longer evidence of freedom and 
therefore a rational and willful agent, but were options between worse and 
less worse - as in the camps - because the preservation of the self 
understood as coeval objectively-present goodness ruled out new 
solidarities lying about the physis waiting to be taken up. So there are 
terrible choices, and these are where our freedom is truly to be found. 
Instead we remain focused on choices associated with our right to indulge 
ourselves with some or other pleasure. Concluding her critique of liberal 
feminism and addressing this point, Brown writes that
“the putative legal autonomy of the subject combines with the putative autonomy of the 
law from gendered norms and from culture more generally to position women in the West 
as free, choosing beings who stand in stark contrast to their sisters subjected to legally 
sanctioned cultural barbarism. From this perspective, liberal imperialism is not only 
legitimate but morally mandated. “Culture” must be brought to heel by liberalism so that 
women are free to choose their antiwrinkle creams…
…There is a final irony in Okin’s formulation of “culture” as the enemy of women. This 
focus sustains an elision of the conditions imposed on Third World women by global 
capitalism, conditions to which Western critics could be responsive without engaging in 
cultural imperialism or endorsing political and military imperialism. These hardships 
range from the hyperexploitation of labor in export platforms and free trade zones to 
global capitalism’s often violent disruptions of dislocations of family and community. If 
the aim is to secure possibilities for modest self-determination for Third World women, 
what could be more important that addressing and redressing these circumstances? 
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Instead, in her obsession with culture over capitalism, indeed in her apparent indifference 
to the mechanics of poverty, exploitation, and deracination, Okin repeats a disturbing 
colonial gesture in which the alleged barbarism of the native culture, rather than imperial 
conquest, colonial political and economic deformation, and contemporary economic 
exploitation, is made the target of progressive reform.780”
Such thinking has led to feminism lending a hand to American war-
making in Afghanistan, and the humiliation of Pakistan and Afghanistan’s 
Pashtun people, in the name of freeing ‘their women’ from the clutches of 
the Taliban. In recent years, with the intensification of that conflict with 
the use of aerial drone warfare that has killed thousands of persons, likely 
the overwhelming majority of them being civilians,781 it is increasingly 
likely that desperate persons whose very way of life is deemed illegitimate 
and excluded from political dialogue, in a desperate desire to make their 
point of view present for global communication, will resort to irregular 
military assaults, as evidenced by the recent bombing in Boston.782 It is 
also increasingly likely that government officials, knowing this dynamic 
intimately, will stoke it, will invent it, and will fabricate it to instill fear in 
the public, and increase their authority and budgetary powers through 
these mechanisms; in fact this has already occurred on a widespread 
basis.783
 This fear, of the world, of death, of the Other, because “we ain’t livin” 
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right’ is the driving force of the political ontology of exclusion, whose 
ultimate consequence is to transform freedom into an identity politics 
regulated by a governmentality - operationalized self-regulation - and 
threatens to do the same with all other human values too.
But the infection of freedom with the idea of essentialized human nature is 
more pernicious, since freedom is being. Only those who have forgotten 
the question of being could possibly negate the being of the Other in a 
manner similar to George W. Bush’s infamous declaration: “they hate us 
for our freedoms.” From the liberal feminists in Brown’s critique, to the 
colonized intellectuals unable to “make themselves inessential,” to the 
broader population whose desperation in the face of political and 
economic exploitation and whose expectations for the good life and 
identification with that which is good as such cause them to cling to the 
terms of order and guarantors of these terms, and to all those who have 
abjured the unfinished nature of existence, the dialectical unfolding of 
reality itself becomes an experience in terror.
Securing of social space (lebensraum), securing of the rationality of the 
individual mind and the community space of recognition on the basis of 
the recognition of rationality and desires as the core of humanity and 
human similitude, and the postmodern move to extend strategic tolerance 
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to those deemed unthreatening, all lead us into the trap of security. We 
have traded our freedom for an essentialized vision of ourselves, the 
security of which is understood as freedom. This is why Berlin couldn’t 
see that the movements of the Third World rising from colonial rule to 
rebuild social order were seeking freedom, since he associated their rise 
with threats to his lofty perch he inhabited comfortably with his social 
class of armchair deliberators and adjudicators of the fates of others.
Freedom is denied in the name of freedom. Even in the postmetaphysical 
and postmodern conceptualization, the insistence on equal recognition 
from authorities, in giving the final say on conferral to those in the state 
who control the law attached to freedom a bunch of conditionalities which 
restrict and spatialize being physically and temporally in accordance with 
the terms of order. So even the freedom of the warrior is an illusion that is 
packaged, marketed, and sold to those whose temperament would 
otherwise be irreconcilable with the needs of order.
——————————————————————————
XXIV. Nationalists of Enframement Versus Spaces of Dwelling: The 
Limits of Western Political Ontology and Heidegger’s Human, All-
too-Human, Dilemma
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“…helplessness and doubt paralyze life, and in order to live man tries to escape from 
freedom, negative freedom. He is driven into new bondage. This bondage is different 
from the primary bonds, from which, though dominated by authorities or the social 
group, he was not entirely separated. The escape does not restore his lost security, but 
only helps him to forget his self as a separate entity. He finds new and fragile security at 
the expense of sacrificing the integrity of his individual self. He chooses to lose his self 
since he cannot bear to be alone. Thus freedom - as freedom from - leads to new 
bondage.784”
At the end of Escape From Freedom, Fromm asks if  there is “an 
inevitable circle that leads from freedom to new dependence?”785 Freedom 
has come to be understood as “felicity” in which a person would progress 
from “one pleasure to the next”; a process only terminated in one’s 
demise. Rendering permanent the artifice - technologically enhanced 
organized social power relations - that must be created and naturalized, as 
Hobbes honestly admitted, no matter the cost in terms of obedience and 
conformity, is worth it, because from this we can get things for our 
security. The political philosophy of liberalism has sought to make  social 
and political space for this understanding of the individual; but at the cost 
of banning behavior considered a threat to social order no matter the 
erroneousness of such a designation: the vainglorious, the irrational, and, 
in a recent modulations of this understanding, those shaped by 
essentialized cultures and ethnicities which have not been deracinated in 
the name of modern life.786 Such persons cannot spontaneously and 
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reflexively consent to the inherent goodness of social order because they 
retain their constituent connection to the worlding of the world. 
Nandy has documented the manifestation of newfound anomie in India 
that was to be elemental in Indian culture at the end of British imperial 
rule and which has continued into the independence phase, showing that 
this sort of alienation led people to give up their negative liberty - which 
was sought to be instituted in India by the agency of the British 
governance system that was aimed at producing the greatest good for the 
greatest number - because the anxiety individuals from privileged strata 
felt in their lives as a result of exposure to social and economic insecurity 
was intolerable in regard to their high self-conception.787 Positions in the 
Indian Civil Service were opened up to Indians, who competed intensely 
over these new opportunities among each other; competitiveness manifest 
along the lines of communal identities now beginning to be expressed as 
identities for the first time in a political form in accordance with the 
central goal of metaphysics: to ensure the recognition of presence. 
Inherent racism of the colonial situation, and the manner in which 
indigenous knowledge and learning was castigated by British imperialists 
as evidence of continuing backwardness, alongside official censuses, laws 
aimed at reforming Indian society, and economic and social flux made 
anxieties all the more intense.788 In a rush to prove themselves to 
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themselves, and to the British, as well, Indians from all social 
backgrounds with privilege - perceived, expected, desired or otherwise - 
competed against one another to secure the avenues to their continuing 
privilege, which offered little challenge to British imperial agents, who, 
sitting astride the political economy of imperialism, were content to 
manipulate factions against one another to their own benefit.789
From the Hindu fundamentalists to their Islamic counterparts, to the arch-
nihilists who terrorize American schools and ethnic and religious 
minorities, the reactionary malcontents of the prevailing order are all 
seeking some form of the confirmation of the ability to exist on the terms 
of identity made manifest through the agency of the disciplined will. 
Those who fall through the cracks of modern societies whose terms of 
acceptance are based on identity, because political order is predicated on 
exclusion to create a sense of inclusivity and security, will either have to 
invent a new society for themselves to exist in, or will seek either revenge 
or suicide as their remaining options. The first option generally leaves 
individuals increasingly alone - and therefore exposed to arbitrary power - 
as a result of the atomizing effects of negative liberty; the remaining two 
choices are terrifying to contemplate, and are the source of what we call 
‘terrorism’: violence against the terms of order born of desperation and 
with no apparent aim in mind other than to feel the intensity of one’s 
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extreme empowerment through the guise of violence before death;790 to go 
out with a bang, as they say. This view is important because some have 
argued that suicide terrorism, for example, is evidence of “collective 
rationality”791 found in cultures that are “pre-modern” or that don’t value 
individualism or human rights. Such orientalist canards only serve to 
exaggerate the inhumanity of the Other, and avert our gazes from the 
massacres of innocent people committed by Western governments, 
concealed by militarist-sanitized language of “collateral damage,” and 
from the attitude that prominent Western statesmen have towards human 
life even in the West: “Military men are just dumb, stupid animals to be 
used as pawns in foreign policy.792” 
For the alienation spread thus when people become aware of 
powerlessness, to be survivable on the determinations of order, individuals 
must be “tranquilized”793 in relation to the question of being, because 
intense discontent is always possible in a society based on alienation of 
oneself from oneself. When Heidegger writes about “inauthenticity,794” 
alienation and one’s accession to it is what he has in mind, and not, as has 
been suggested by his liberal critics, failure to live up to a transcendental 
idea of a true self that metaphysical philosophies - or those premised on a 
pure reactionary inversion of metaphysics, such as Rorty’s postmodern 
liberalism or Berlin’s cynical resignation to the inability to change the 
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world without such movements eventually turning totalitarian - have 
presumed whenever words like ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ are 
confidently uttered. Heidegger writes of “entanglement”795 as always 
already present for all beings, and is inescapable save for a chance 
moment here and there: solitude, meditation, flight from community that 
nonetheless is simply a response to community as entangling (indicating 
the power of entanglement, ironically), and, he also says, in moments of 
“anticipatory resoluteness”796 where a person is open to the unfolding of 
their existence in a manner of gratitude (“thinking is thanking”), 
“solicitude,” and “releasement.797” Once the question of being is retired 
from consciousness, “the way in which things have been publicly 
interpreted holds fast to dasein in its falling prey,798” which makes it very 
difficult for people to step back from the bustle of everydayness and 
reflect on who they are in relation to the totality of references; which is to 
say that “falling prey,” which is made possible because because of total 
“faith in a worldview,” which “hovers”799 over everydayness and its 
entanglements, leads one to literally fall prey to alienating ideals since 
these pronounce a judgment of how a person should be, and that their 
“thrownness” is an essentialized, “finished fact.800” To accept, and then to 
remain self-alienated, requires individuals’ being entangled with the relay 
of restricted signifiers associated with the “they-self,
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“idle talk and ambiguity, having-seen-everything and having-understood-everything, 
develop the supposition that the disclosedness of dasein thus available and prevalent 
could guarantee to dasein the certainty, genuineness, and fullness of all the possibilities 
of its being. In the self-certainty and decisiveness of the they, it gets spread abroad 
increasingly that there is no need of authentic, attuned understanding. The supposition of 
the they that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine “life” brings a 
tranquilization  to dasein, for which everything is in “the best order” and for whom all 
doors are open. Entangled being-in-the-world, tempting itself, is at the same time 
tranquilizing…
… This tranquilization in inauthentic being, however, does not seduce one into stagnation 
and inactivity, but drives one to uninhibited “busyness.”… Tempting tranquilization 
aggravates entanglement… Entangled being-in-the-world is not only tempting and 
tranquilizing, it is at the same time alienating.801” 
“This alienation,” Heidegger continues, “which closes off to dasein its 
authenticity and possibility,” and therefore “forces it into its 
inauthenticity,” which fluctuates between poles of total disempowerment 
since persons as such will be unable to accept their their contingency 
understood positively as possibility because of their resignation which 
propels them to accept the signs of hegemony, on the one hand, and the 
illusion of mastery over being and things as an avenue of escape from the 
admission of contingency, and, most importantly, finitude, on the Other. 
Agamben’s political theory regarding the role of homo sacer in activating, 
legitimizing, and defining the boundaries of the community, the role of the 
state in creating and maintaining those boundaries, and in producing the 
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fear of otherness explains precisely this situation: where all of us are 
potentially homo sacer, all are tasked with the dictate of mastering of 
ourselves and of our surroundings in the name of social inclusion and 
high-functioning conformity - often called ‘success’ - and where we must 
bend reality, understood as what is, to our life plans, life stories, self-
conceptions, notions of the good and of moral order, for the sake of 
ensuring our belonging. The phenomenology of being are a person’s 
drives, emotions, and propensity for spontaneous behavior; but in this 
model of mastery people are forever at war against otherness in 
themselves, and that they see in, and frequently enough project onto, 
others. The result is self-alienation that is especially intense in the modern, 
Cartesian-inspired reduction of the world to objective presence confirmed 
as present through the activity of thinking understood as the cognitive 
processes of the rational mind having successfully internalized the 
prevailing criteria for what counts as being. “A Cartesian orientation that 
objectifies the world fuses our who and our how,” Thiele writes
“our identity and our behavior, in a specific way. The world becomes the raw material for 
representation, acquisition, control, and domination by the subject. The dangerous self-
confidence expressed in humanity’s unsustainable exploitation of the earth is the fruit of 
this equation of freedom and sovereign power. The result is that humanity is now 
threatened by the ecological limits of a world it has unceasingly sought to possess and 
master.802”
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The profound irony of human existence is that the increasing drive to 
control the world in the name of certainty ultimately must fail for all 
persons because of the inherent limits to the existential human condition. 
These limits are physical, spatial, and temporal, and take on the character 
of “finitude.803” But there is freedom in recognition of limits because on 
the one hand, death, the paradigmatic marker of finitude in all the senses 
encompassing physical, spatial, and temporal limits, discloses to people 
the “nothingness” to which each will return at some point, and the 
potential meaninglessness that can come to define life itself in the absence 
of some sort of authenticity, which comes about when one takes a stand 
on their being; a possibility obviously only when a person remains 
resolutely open to asking the question of being, and also patient in 
awaiting the disclosure of being. 
Authenticity is essential to our thesis on freedom understood as a singular 
human value. Freedom is something which precedes all other values in a 
manner that configures us towards other values. Freedom can be a 
decision to be risk-averse as much as it can be flamboyant 
rambunctiousness. It can be solitude as much as it can be passionate 
engagement with the world. But what divides freedom from unfreedom, 
and what divides authenticity from inauthenticity are the same: namely, 
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that freedom and authenticity require acknowledgement of the self’s 
thrownness in the world, and cannot be equal to the quieting - either actual 
or through an unlived repression that remains voluble - of the conscious 
memories, promiscuous thoughts, and futural projections and desires of 
the person flowing therewith. On this register Isaiah Berlin and Heidegger 
both agree, with the former decrying the “retreat into the inner citadel”804 - 
the desire to attenuate one’s attachments to the world in order to retain 
mastery within a smaller and smaller space of possibility - and the latter, 
quoted above, pointing out the dangers of “falling prey” to the “they-self,” 
leading beings to a “fall into publicness,805” which foregoes the 
spontaneity of the self so that the individual can safely identify with 
society and its’ prevailing formalization of freedom. In both cases, Berlin’s 
a critique of privatist retreat, and Heidegger’s critique of a public one, 
individuals surrender their possibility of being authentic in order to gain 
the trappings of a secure existence, where self-care is greatly restricted to 
become manageable (Berlin’s negative liberty), or is augmented with 
publicness so that individuals can become secure in their thinking by the 
rote repetition of rationality understood in the Cartesian sense to secure 
consciousness against the absence of order.
But elites everywhere see themselves as a privileged social class, so thus 
individuality, of persons either within or beyond their own nation, if 
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spontaneous, is seen as a threat to the frequently unearned status that 
marks the elite as elite. Elites are typically “conservatives without 
ideology,806” whose primary interest is the garnering of the resources of 
privilege while risking as little as possible. But this often cannot continue 
in perpetuity, so the organized irrationality of such a mode of class politics 
must be in defiance of the limits on growth imposed on human artifice by 
the reality of limits on labor, land, and capital. The fear of death - 
remembering Kweli’s epistemological claim about the emergence of that 
sentiment - is strong in elite circles since defiance of these limitations to 
secure privilege in perpetuity must on some level leave elites with an 
easiness about how they live. 
But when we are opened up again to the experience of insecurity and and 
the finiteness of existence, we have the chance of becoming free. By 
becoming aware of our surroundings understood primordially as physis 
and not as metaphysics, in a way that is entirely our own, our awareness of 
the precariousness of life, obviates the structures of mastery, and makes us 
free. The state cannot save us, nor can our money, and having been a 
“good” person is also just as irrelevant. “Death,” Heidegger writes
“is the ownmost  possibility of dasein. Being toward it discloses to dasein its ownmost 
potentiality-of-being in which it is concerned about the being of dasein absolutely. Here 
the fact can become evident to dasein that in the eminent possibility of itself it is torn 
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away from the they, that is, anticipation can always already have torn itself away from the 
they. The understanding of this “ability,” however, first reveals its factical lostness in the 
everydayness of the they-self…
…The ownmost possibility is nonrelational. Anticipation lets dasein understand that it 
has to take over solely from itself the potentiality-of-being in which it is concerned 
absolutely about its ownmost being. Death does not just “belong” in an undifferentiated 
way to one’s own dasein, but it lays claim on it as something individual. The 
nonrelational character of death understood as anticipation individualized dasein down to 
itself. This individualizing is a way in which the “there” is disclosed for existence.807”
But technology used to increase and refine the mastery of the world 
through the use of technique precludes people’s awareness of their own 
radically-individualized existences, rendering them elements in a larger 
“world-picture.808” The manifestation the world as a picture, a copy of the 
real based on the search for the idealized forms of truth understood as 
essence - which Plato somewhat ironically, from our perspective, 
understood as more real than present physical objects - has transformed all 
of reality into the “standing reserve” enframed by technology rendering 
everything from nature, to humanity and human communities, to 
experiences and even possibilities themselves, as reduced and manipulable 
resources, with the purpose of being stored up as potential to be 
judiciously expended for reproducing the terms of order conceived of as a 
material and ideological ensemble of interventions aimed at essentializing 
beings, and naturalizing their place in the operation of machines.809 
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This radical insight calls into question the entire Western tradition of 
political thought, since, as that tradition developed over the years, until 
Nietzsche’s radical rebellion, and Heidegger’s radicalization and 
systematization of Nietzsche’s criticism, it was always insistent that the 
truth about the world, about good and evil, about causality, and about what 
beings were in actuality, was to be found “behind” the world and not “in 
it.810” Perhaps the world is too frightening for philosophers in this 
tradition, and perhaps it is for people in general reared in its epistemic 
wake, but the effect has been to produce the perception that the world, 
because of its impermanence, couldn’t be true, and that only that which 
always remained present, was, in fact, true. It is difficult to think of a less 
empirical attitude towards reality, and despite the apparent correction that 
emerges from the rise of the sciences, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, have 
pointed out that these prejudices against the truth of impermanence have 
passed from Christendom into the world of science.811 Among the 
sciences, the sciences of society emerged through the circulation of 
normalizing ideations of human nature, measured, refined, re-postulated, 
and so forth. But these methodologies were deceptive in the stated 
objectivity. Foucault has shown that underneath apparently accurate 
measurements of designated behavioral categories lay political exigencies 
associated with the naming and relegation of individuals and communities 
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for the sake of depoliticizing political conflict and projecting an image of 
normalcy.812 Failing to question this, then, would prevent individuals from 
understanding their contingent constitution by power relations, and would 
leave them an essentialized being, members of such and such ethnicity 
understood, as a permanent identity as opposed to one forged in struggle 
(such as that of “Black” Afro-diasporic peoples, and “secular” Jewry of 
that diaspora), or as belonging to one side  any number of opposed dualist 
conceptions roughly marking good and evil. But good people still die, just 
like evil. And there is no amount of science that has yet altered this fact.
In response to the fear of death, then, states are formed but they are also 
always the expression of the ability to expose some to death and relatively 
shelter others from it for perhaps some time longer.813 The current 
international system is defined by the “world picture” in which good and 
evil states are arrayed against each other, and the citizens of these states 
are presumed to be authentically represented by states which are taken as 
the authentic and organic representative of the nation and the community. 
In a remarkable passage Heidegger connects his insights about modernity 
that have been the source of so much controversy and diversionary 
maneuver by so-called liberals who have come to view freedom as their 
fundamental property, lacking in others:
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“The fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture. The 
word “picture” now means the structured image that is the creature of man’s producing 
which represents and sets before. In such producing, man contends for the position in 
which he can be that particular being who gives the measure and draws up the guidelines 
for everything that is. Because this position secures, organizes, and articulates itself as a 
world view, the modern relationship to that which is, is one that becomes, in its decisive 
unfolding, a confrontation of world views; and indeed not of random world views, but 
only of those that have already taken up the fundamental position of man that is most 
extreme, and have done with the utmost resoluteness. For the sake of this struggle of 
world views and in keeping with its meaning, man brings into play his unlimited power 
for the calculating, planning, and molding of all things. Science as research is an 
absolutely necessary form of this establishing of self in the world; it is one of the 
pathways upon which the modern age rages toward the fulfillment of its essence, with a 
velocity unknown to the participants. With this struggle of world views the modern age 
first enters in the part of its history that is the most decisive and probably the most 
capable of enduring…
…A sign of this event is that everywhere and in the most varied forms and disguises the 
gigantic is making its appearance. In so doing, it evidences itself simultaneously in the 
tendency towards the increasingly small. We have only to think of numbers in modern 
physics. The gigantic presses itself forward in a form that actually seems to make it 
disappear - in the annihilation of great distances by airplane, in the setting before us of 
foreign and remote worlds in their everydayness, which is produced at random through 
radio by the flick of the hand. Yet we think too superficially if we suppose that the 
gigantic is only the endlessly extended emptiness of the purely quantitative. We think too 
little if we find that the gigantic, in the form of continual not-ever-having-been-here-yet, 
originates only in a blind mania for exaggerating and excelling. We do not think at all if 
we believe we have explained this phenomenon of the gigantic with the catchword 
“Americanism.814””
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The clash of world views, themselves essentially a part of the apparatus of 
the worlding of the world understood as a world picture is a clash that in a 
race to secure being for perpetuity, a certain velocity overtakes the 
production and reproduction of social order, with new technological 
inventions aimed at mastery over the world being fabricated all the while, 
with these inventions eventually coming to increase the extent to which 
the world is enframed by technology in the name of making beings and 
things present for the purpose of harnessing. Quite obviously all thinking 
is lost in such a reduction - assuming we accept its effects on us - since in 
producing more and more material needed to succeed in this clash, 
thinking understood as mindfully staying with the object of thought, as 
rumination, in a manner reminiscent of Heidegger’s use of the term 
‘dwelling’ to describe the nature of existence along with the fundamental 
role of consciousness in existence, is lost in favor of an instrumentalized 
understanding of thought itself; articulating thought to the exigencies of 
the state understood as an institution designed to preserve the status quo 
social relations. When Heidegger concludes this thought by suggesting 
that we have to expand beyond merely equating this acceleration and 
exaggeration with “Americanism,” - to  which we can even add 
‘Westernness’ - he is in agreement with our general thesis in this project: 
namely that the so-called modern world is defined by a generalized project 
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of instrumentalization and this is drive found in all of the world’s societies 
thanks to the spread of technology understood as a naturalized artifice that 
awakens certain insecurities in human beings at the level of ontology. 
These insecurities, however, do not rise to the level of consciousness and 
authenticity quite often because of the allure of technological oblivion in 
relation to the question of being. The result of this is an increasingly 
accelerated drive towards “gigantism,” along with its twin phenomena of 
the making of things “increasingly small,” the perfect expression of which 
is the development of atomic weapons which make impossibly large-scale 
explosions and city-busting devastation possible in one fell swoop, but 
rely on technologies that harness sub-atomic particles arranged in 
extremely precise processes. Nuclear technology, along with industrialized 
biotechnologies that splice genes to sow massive fields owned by 
monopolistic firms, the industrial prisons which micro-manage the lives of 
individuals prisoners held in abjectness and terror in a massive housing 
institution that one can frequently observe thousands held in a single over-
crowded facility, and other modern technologies, such as computerization, 
and telecommunications, and unmanned drone aircraft guided by radars 
across the globe but small enough to be launched with the flick of a wrist 
in some cases, all bear more than a mere resemblance to Heidegger’s 
concerning “gigantism,” and in fact point to a generalized temptation for 
mastery over the world now sought in country after country, of which 
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America was merely the first major global exemplar.
This point has a few important implications for the idea of authenticity. 
First, this idea is readily transferable across cultural boundaries, although 
still associated strongly with the West and “Americanism.” International 
relations in an insecure world has a reflective effect wherein states observe 
each other’s developments and copy, and even try to surpass, one another. 
This is precisely the temptation which seduced Heidegger to Nazism and 
support the Nazi movement in the name of the German nation.815 
Internationally, this creates a climate of world wars and epic conflicts 
between neighboring states. Domestically, this rips apart essentially plural 
countries made up of many nations and peoples, many of which are not 
readily classifiable along the lines of race, ethnicity, and other traditional 
designators of community identity, and forces people to define themselves 
in essentialized ways, to join these communities they don’t necessarily 
identify with, and indeed to see themselves as members of these 
communities in many cases for the rest of their lives.
To be like America, nation-states have tried to define themselves in line 
with the benefits of the provision of negative liberty and economic 
freedom through the rule of law. At the twilight’s inception for the 
American post-world war two consensus when counter-hegemonic 
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warfare against the US’ empire of global capitalism struck a blow in the 
United States, the President’s reaction was “you are either with us, or with 
the terrorists.” And so Pakistani liberals are termed agents of Israel, Indian 
liberals as agents of Pakistan or of Western ideas, African-American 
freedom activists as agents of Communism, etc., and all are marked for 
destruction or marginalization by states seeking to prove their ability to 
assert “effective control” over territory and a monopoly on “legitimate” 
violence. Dualism is an assault on pluralism, the latter which requires an 
infinite dialectical engagement, as opposed to the former, necessitating the 
far less intellectually-demanding deployment of a negative dialectics of 
pre-given essentialized identities proving themselves to be in existence 
through the will to power.
Second, this acceleration of identity-practices associated with a 
normalized notion of being secured by the apparatuses of technology 
produces a confrontation of world views, which, as we recalled from the 
above discussion of Nietzsche contra Fukuyama, takes on the character of 
a “war of spirits,” wherein the ironic battle of highly technological and 
materially-destructive powers are commenced in the name of the 
spiritualization of identity understood as a sublime essence giving 
meaning to a fallen material world. We had to destroy the village to save 
it. Heidegger’s contribution on this point is not insignificant: “as soon as 
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the gigantic in planning and calculating and adjusting and making secure 
shifts over out of the quantitative and becomes a special quality, then what 
is gigantic, and what can seemingly always be calculated completely, 
becomes, precisely through this, incalculable.816” From debates 
concerning true nature of reality in recent breakthroughs in subatomic 
physics to debates about the true nature of a Muslim religionist in seeking 
to provide a firm footing for the identity of the nation-state of Pakistan,817 
and of course those same debates about Germanness and authenticity that 
consumed Heidegger and other German conservatives in the 1920’s and 
1930’s,818 the desire to know, to organize and assemble, and to produce 
out of beings a standing reserve of objects summonable to enact identity - 
or essentialized truth in the case of particle physics - is on some level 
always a mad project of social planning and social control, and such 
arrangements at the least raise a question about the naturalness of the truth 
being sought, and usually and worse still, reveal such projects to be the 
product of deep existential needs to produce totems of certainty to arrange 
the world just so; and a corresponding inability to let beings be.
Third, holding a gun to the other’s head, now to be quantified and 
transformed into a represented object for consciousness, states and their 
managers project all of their own negating instincts about existence onto 
the Other, and so a cycle of violence is born. Part of this cycle, which 
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denies the being of the Other as an epistemological precondition, is to 
ensure as best as possible this way of organizing reality over and against 
the Other being capable of revealing itself to be different, but yet similar, 
to the self. As Nietzsche pointed out, we live in an era of defensive 
standing armies among nations prepared to destroy their enemy at a 
moment’s notice, but who effectively suppress, by method of their 
panoptic, bureaucratic, form of organization, the instincts for conquest 
which could easily have been vented in gentler and more productive ways 
than in organized modern barbaric warfare. So the world of different but 
similar others is understood not as one world shared among such beings, 
but as a limited terrain inhabited by radically different others whose 
insistence on otherness cannot be tolerated. 
But as Kweli warned us, our fear of death, as the absolute Other of human 
consciousness, transposed onto other people, other states of being, onto 
change itself having come to be associated with decay, is most pronounced 
when we “ain’t livin’ right.” The truth, our surroundings, what is, is 
overwhelming, both because of the task of quantifying it - gigantic and 
infinitesimal - and because these quantifications represent qualitative 
notions that un-thinking beings who are alienated from the promiscuity of 
the intellect find no meaning in. Science, like metaphysics and religious 
theology before it, is one worldview among others, and not a source of 
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practical knowledge that becomes an essential element of being-in-the-
world as Heidegger describes the hammer in the workshop of the 
workman in the first part of the existential analytic in Being and Time as 
being a tool, information or a knowledge that is “ready-at-hand”819 for 
practical application. This charge of thoughtlessness is not a moral 
judgment - rather it is a generalized claim about the current moment, 
because ultimately, even the scientists who pursue the mysteries of the 
cosmos must, of necessity, become less aware of the machinery - either 
willfully or otherwise - that they employ, its origins, its social opportunity 
cost, to pursue their experiments. That thinking remains present in the 
world at all seems incomprehensible. For those who safeguard thinking as 
a possibility, whose willingness to admit this fortuitous presence is evident 
in lieu of relying on its presence as a mechanism of judgment over and 
against the possibility of being, the only attitude that can be adopted is one 
of safeguarding and caretaking that which gives rise to thinking as a 
possibility. Such an attitude always makes contingent that which is 
essentialized. “Criticism is the art of making facile gestures difficult.”820
Authenticity can therefore be salvaged because the incalculable becomes 
the shadow, the specter of order and discipline, “that is” Heidegger writes, 
“cast around all things everywhere when man has been transformed into 
subjectum and the world into picture.821” In this residue lies the space for 
                    393
thought, for the unthought, for the wandering mind, and for the 
questioning, wandering consciousness seeking to live its own life - which, 
as a thrown singularity towards death, must always already be completely 
unique because the contingent nature of language and the factical 
historicity of each person is always creating more and more history. Even 
as ‘anti-history’ or ‘post-history.’ After all, at some point enough time will 
have elapsed, and someone will see the need to write the history of the 
time subsequent to the ‘end of history’ and will find human actions, in 
concert, in solitude, and in the struggle with, collaboration with, and love 
of, nature, to have played some role in the formation of our collective 
existences. The transformation of tradition into shallow repetitive acts; the 
transformation of knowledge and rationality into the same through the 
Cartesian reduction of being to thinking and of thinking to the 
internalization of rationalizations that confirm the objective presence of 
being; the subversion of subversiveness by the designs of postmodern 
marketing and advertising that creates niche population subgroups for the 
sake of selling Che Guevara t-shirts; the opposite but related and overall 
controlling phenomena of producing at an accelerating pace the kinds of 
technological machinery that further subdivides being simply for the sake 
of harnessing it as “standing reserve,” to lend the illusion of mastery 
greater omnipresence; in each the worlding of the world, the possibility of 
authenticity, and of being-together-with, which is in dialectical relation to 
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being-in-the-world - the source of our only worthwhile conception of 
freedom - is something people have taken flight from. 
But acknowledging the unknown, and safeguarding the unknowability of 
the unknown as a limit idea that puts the sciences in their place, and 
therefore brings technology - understood as the orchestration of beings for 
aims that can only be classified as artificial - can lead us in a different 
direction. “By means of this shadow the modern world extends itself out 
into a space withdrawn from representation,” Heidegger writes
“and so lends to the incalculable the determinateness peculiar to it, as well as a historical 
uniqueness. This shadow, however, points to something else, which it is denied so long as 
he dawdles about in the mere negating of the age. The flight into tradition, out of a 
combination of humility and presumption, can bring about nothing in itself other than 
self-deception and blindness in relation to the historical moment…
… Man will know, i.e., carefully safeguard into its truth, that which is incalculable, only 
in creative questioning and shaping out of the power of genuine reflection. Reflection 
transports the man of the future into that “between” in which he belongs to Being and yet 
remains a stranger amid that which is.822”
Poetry, as Heidegger understands it, is the use of language in as-yet-
unmapped modes that explore the “shadow,” the unknown, in a manner 
that revels in its unknowability. The most astounding advances in particle 
physics and in microbiology cannot exhaust that which is knowable, and 
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the use of these technologies lies not in a complete mapping of the world, 
but in their ability to illuminate newer questions about human potentiality, 
and on a greater scale than that, about the potentiality for being, and of 
beings, generally. As such the best science and technology is itself poetry. 
This puts technology in its place, because failing that, technology defines 
human life in accordance with the image of the powerful factions that 
control political orders. This is precisely the problem with the falsification 
of reality in the name of permanence that figures heavily in our thinking. 
Rather than seeking stability, or order, language - a spontaneous faculty of 
the mind - is anticipatory in mouthing guttural sounds that only after later 
are stabilized as meanings. And even then these words we play with are 
merely signposts on the way to unconcealing that which remains 
concealed about existence, and will become concealed again when people 
stop talking about it. What is undeniable, though, is that these sounds have 
a proto-linguistic meaning indicative of some notion “world” connected to 
an idea of “home” understood as that space in which people “dwell.” 
“Poetically, man dwells.” 
Authenticity is simply the ongoing commitment to bear witness to the 
unfolding of one’s existence and to always question the structures of 
perception and becoming that have been presented for oneself, and to 
remain aware always of the indivisibility in the final analysis of self and 
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other that the unfolding of existence is dependent on. This doesn’t mean 
that the self is immersed in a sea of others to whom the self must always 
conform in behavior, thought, and speech. Hardly. Rather, it means that 
the self cannot be the unique, interesting, and worthwhile experience - 
called life - in the absence of others. Heidegger makes this interplay of 
self and other clearer in his discussion of death in Being and Time. 
Despite death being one’s “ownmost possibility” as we quoted Heidegger 
as saying previously, in understanding and accepting that facticity of 
death, this possibility is immediately recognized in others, too, since these 
others are all participating with all selves in caretaking beings through the 
experience of life. Part of this caretaking is the co-creation of poetry and 
language, as opposed to receiving the so-called truth from authorities and 
then blandly recycling these as what one thinks and as what one does. 
But inauthenticity can also linger if individuals take care as merely 
“leaping-in,823” to do things and provide things for other beings. 
Heidegger understands this as a “deficient mode” of the existential 
phenomena of “care.824” In doing things for a person or providing them 
things, as per the apparentness of needs determined by the political 
economy underlying people’s terrain of action in the name of physical 
survival, the failure to accompany beings in the present produces an 
understanding of care that essentializes the Other as needy, the self as the 
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provisioner, and reinforces the structure of reality as it has been defined 
metaphysically. Beings require each other understood as beings unfolding 
in an non-preconceived manner in order to authentically be. Accepting 
existential limitations, pushing against these when possible and assisting 
others in the same, building a community and a freedom on the “fact of 
death,” as Polanyi has put it, allows people to develop freedom as a social 
practice that provides individuals made homeless by the ravages of 
modern technology with a possibility of creating a home in this life.
“The ownmost nonrelational possibility is not to be bypassed. Being toward this 
possibility lets dasein understand that the most extreme possibility of existence is 
imminent, that of giving itself up. But anticipation does not evade the impossibility of 
bypassing death, as does inauthentic being-towards-death, but frees itself for it. 
Becoming for for one’s own death in anticipation frees one from one’s lostness in chance 
possibilities urging themselves upon us, so that the factical possibilities lying before the 
possibility not-to-be-bypassed can first be authentically understood and chosen. 
Anticipation discloses to existence that its extreme inmost possibility lies in giving itself 
up and thus shatters all one’s clinging to whatever existence one has reached. In 
anticipation, dasein guards against falling back behind itself, or behind the potentiality-
for-being that it has understood. It guards against “becoming too old for its victories.” 
Free for its ownmost possibilities, that are determined by the end, and so understood as 
finite, dasein prevents the danger that it may, by its own finite understanding of existence, 
fail to recognize that it is getting overtaken by the existence-possibilities of others, or that 
it may misinterpret these possibilities, thus divesting itself of its ownmost factical 
experience. As the nonrelational possibility, death individualizes, but only, as the 
possibility not-to-be-bypassed, in order to make dasein as being-with understand the 
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potentialities-of-being of the others. Because anticipation of the possibility not-to-be-
bypassed also disclosed all the possibilities lying before it, this anticipation includes the 
possibility of taking the whole of dasein in advance in an existentiell way, that is, the 
possibility of existing as a whole potentiality-for-being.825”
Because death is certain, and because awareness of this fact about 
existence requires a certain “attunement” that opens one up to the feeling 
of “angst,826” - “anxiety about nothingness” - nothingness remains a 
possibility for all beings and behooves all beings who are aware of it to 
bear witness to the some-thing of their being - the phenomenal reality - 
that is their own, that is each’s own. “Dying is care”827 at the level of 
ontology, so being aware of this process of decay, and taking care of our 
own as well as others’ experience of this process is necessary insofar as 
we may care to keep the possibility of being free for one’s own factical 
existence as a real one. Keeping in mind that care for oneself is related to 
care for the world, and for the beings and things in the world authentically 
- as opposed to the deficient mode just discussed that reinforces the 
essentialized and therefore inauthentic conceptualization of beings and 
things - the possibility for freedom and authenticity is thus summed up:
“What is characteristic about authentic, existentially projected being-toward-death can be 
summarized as follows: Anticipation reveals to dasein its lostness in the they-self, and 
brings it face to face with the possibility of itself, primarily unsupported by concern 
taking care of things, but to be itself in passionate anxious freedom toward death which 
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is free of the illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself.828”
——————————————————————————
XXV. The People against people: Agamben, Heidegger, and Immanent 
Freedom Without Metaphysics
Liberation cannot be achieved in one country at a time since this will 
necessarily relegate that country, if liberated, to confront a sea of 
colonialism which it will be forced to contend with all the resources of the 
colonial powers arrayed against it. Power in this case, essentially military 
and economic might in conjunction with propaganda aimed at recycling 
tropes of ‘barbarism’ and ‘savagery’ that are the old line of the 
conservative and metaphysical world order speaking fallaciously in the 
name of liberalism and freedom, will severely challenge the freed nation 
and peoples to the limit. Globalization as it is presently conceived has 
been a process led by the powerful nation-states in the system along with 
the corporations that are more or less entirely connected to the formal state 
apparatus. As a result, the circulation of essentialized understandings of 
people as representative of various classes of labor, or as entirely devoid 
of humanity because of their belonging to certain severely loathed groups, 
has predominated over the dreamy vision of mobility for all. Indeed, most 
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persons are now subject to major insecurities and dislocations brought 
about through various means which cannot but be described as terrorism.
“The camp is the new biopolitical nomos” - the normative order - “of the 
planet.829” Let us clarify. First, the circulation of norms of being, the 
ranks, organizing, and judging people in accordance with these norms, and 
then deploying technologies of distancing to control and transform 
individuals - shock therapy, economic shock, cultural imperialism, 
imperial conquest, genocide, etc. - combines the paradigm of the camp 
from Arendt’s work, where the camp dwellers were subjected to much the 
same and as a result were stripped of their humanity in the eyes of even 
many of their own number - although not entirely - and most of the 
citizens of Germany and the other contending powers in the second world 
war who would eventually liberate the inmates in the camps, with 
Foucault’s work, which depicts the transformation of imprisonment in the 
modern age into a scientific technique for the transformation of 
individuals - both inside and outside the walls of the prison - through the 
institutionalization of the panopticon, - which, in surveilling all inmates, 
and in producing eventually an epistemological overflow of data driven by 
the necessity of knowledge creation, encompasses persons outside the 
prison walls as well in an expanding network of social control, in the 
name of control and order.830 Gone are the myths of privacy, pure 
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individuality, communities, and identities, violence-free lives and 
consciousnesses, and the possibility of perfect security - these all being 
implicated in an overall system of control, cross-cut with the operations of 
power and knowledge.831 In the place of these fantasies are 
interconnection, postmodern “beasts of no nation,832” a clash among those 
who are fighting to control the “age of the world picture” at the “end of 
history” inhabited by a power elite comfortable with seeing itself as 
unbounded to location, family, culture and tradition understood 
existentially, ruling over an era of “das man,833” “internationalized states” 
whose power projection capacities are being developed, in concert with 
private military contractors,834 to corral the warrens of humanity into 
organizable and utilitarian territorial conceptions (such as maquiladoras 
and export-processing zones), global climate change as a result of the 
negative externalities of the production chain gone global long understood 
as socialized costs to not be considered in the profit-maximizing 
production equations of neoclassical economics, and the proliferation of 
resistance forces promising either freedom and liberation or some variant 
of nostalgic longings for imagined pasts projected onto an uncertain 
futures with a markedly fascist flavor.835
Pepe Escobar has written in a recent article, ‘Post-History Strip Tease,836’ 
that there is now a concentration camp for Muslims - Guantanamo, - there 
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is a simulacrum concentration camp in Palestine and especially in Gaza, 
and that with the response by the American state’s northeastern regional 
security forces from multiple agencies, and the accompaniment of their 
actions by cheering drunken crowds in the streets of Boston, to the recent 
bombing there, we also have an instantiated state of exception evident in 
American domestic law enforcement procedures.837 Escobar writes that 
with failed states, panopticon-surveilled global cities like London - and 
more ominously places with massive wealth gaps like Rio De Janeiro and 
Bombay - with police forces comparable to standing armies and layers of 
private security atop, successful states resorting to regimes of brutality and 
austerity to control their citizenry, and a political class ruling over these 
wastelands of the social with a “negative art” of imagining the “least worst 
society possible,838” human social life and civilization are taking a turn to 
the dystopian.
The increasingly escapist politics of disembedding that has come to define 
the “human,” or as Aime Cesaire points out, has come to define that 
“European invention,” “man,839” has, at the same time as its being highly 
destructive because of its indifference to what is in the name of servicing 
the illusion of a permanent artifice that the caveman bows before (read: 
the obelisk in 2001 Space Odyssey, or the same concept featured in 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit), the dialectical propensity to allow us 
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to shift our gaze towards that which truly is. This is because there is no 
inherent reason that the caveman cannot look away from the obelisk, from 
the artifice, and see what truly is in his or her surroundings. Every political 
philosophy we surveyed has been some variant of a constructed edifice 
which has been presented as the ‘true’ answer to the human condition, 
including Mill’s, whose theory of rational progress and the 
institutionalization of skepticism and the search for the truth has been 
lauded by liberals as a free-minded alternative to metaphysics. But by 
measuring humanity in the image of its cooperative projects, and not by 
simply valuing human beings as they are, Mill created a standard of 
evaluation that mimics the split between public and private realms that 
mapped onto other divisions in existence that prioritize one over the other. 
Against this valuation of what Aristotle called bios over zoe840 Agamben 
has called for us to think about identity, existence, and human freedom in 
an entirely different way such that the split between self and other that has 
been constitutive of the polis, which today has led to the production of the 
camp to sequester elements to be removed from the polity in a zone of 
indistinction, need no longer be central. Indeed, the polis, the gathering, 
the city, and the space of human civilization - if we simply take that term 
to mean peaceful interaction and coexistence - be it a traditional city or 
state formation, or be it a camp organized on the peripheries of power and 
centralized authority, could, in either case, be a place of either the 
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judgement and relegation of facticity and the historicizing element of 
being to clandestinity, or could be a place where “bare life,” zoe, could be 
supported with love, friendship, and cooperative work. Agamben, 
defending the reading of Heidegger we have put forth in this chapter, 
where we suggest that his philosophy is one of freedom and authenticity, 
and not one which is an existential support for Nazism and authoritarian 
sovereignty - something more accurately put to Schmitt and his defense of 
the state as the protector of human essence - to which it has been 
attributed by liberals in the West seeking to desperately divert attention 
from their own complicity with savagery, is worth quoting at length here. 
In this selection is contained the seeds of the new humanity that Fanon has 
spoken of, and that Sartre, inspired by Fanon, wrote about in his 
introduction to The Wretched of the Earth in order to free the European 
peoples of their illusions of supremacy.841 If we follow the dialectics of 
artifice, which Hegel, the liberals in the European canon of political 
thought, the modern American and neoliberal partisans of globalization, 
and even now the American left with its embrace of identity politics as a 
means of repressive desublimation through allowing the consumption of 
the self’s reinforcement as identity and cultural belonging, what we see is 
that factical human beings are disparaged in favor of adherence to the 
codes of what counts as “man,” and that, in the end, to properly police the 
boundaries of inclusion the “bare life” of each bios must be administered 
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on the biological-political level, since there is no logical reason to not do 
this once the state of exception is invoked. Like Arendt and Polanyi, who 
both saw the origins of fascism in the great expectations of liberalism to 
produce “improvement” of society at the cost of “habitation,842” Agamben 
sees the origins of Nazism in the desire to produce negative liberty for the 
group within a polis, thus radically questioning political science and the 
practice of politics, as well as our very understanding of the human, in the 
West. “For both Heidegger and National Socialism,” Agamben analyzes
“life has no need to assume “values” external to it in order to become politics: life is 
immediately political in its very facticity. Man is not a living being who must abolish or 
transcend himself in order to become human - man is not a duality of spirit and body, 
nature and politics, life and logos, but is instead resolutely situated at the point of their 
indistinction. Man is no longer the “anthropomorphous” animal who must transcend 
himself to give way to that, if grasped, constitutes him as Dasein and, therefore, as a 
political being. This means, however, that the experience of facticity is equivalent to a 
radicalization without precedent of the state of exception (with its indistinction of nature 
and politics, outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion) in a dimension in which the 
state of exception tends to become the rule. It is as if the bare life of homo sacer, whose 
exclusion founded sovereign power, now became - in assuming itself as a task - explicitly 
and immediately political. And yet this is precisely what characterizes the biopolitical 
turn of modernity, that is, the condition in which we find ourselves. And this is the point 
at which Nazism and Heidegger’s thought radically diverge. Nazism determines the bare 
life of homo sacer in a biological and eugenic key, making it into the site of an incessant 
decision on value and nonvalue in which biopolitics continually turns into thanatopolitics 
and in which the camp, consequently, becomes the absolute political space. In Heidegger, 
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on the other hand, homo sacer - whose very own life is always at issue in its every act - 
instead becomes Dasein, the inseparable unity of Being and ways of Being, of subject 
and qualities, life and world, “whose own Being is at issue in its very Being.” If life, in 
modern biopolitics, is immediately politics, here this unity, which itself has the form of 
an irrevocable decision, withdraws from every external decision and appears as an 
indissoluble cohesion in which it is impossible to isolate something like a bare life. In the 
state of exception become the rule, the life of homo sacer, which was the correlate of 
sovereign power, turns into an existence over which power no longer seems to have any 
hold.843”
Heidegger’s choice to become a Nazi represents not what his liberal 
detractors have suggested - his philosophy’s complicity with the Holocaust 
and the aggressive warfare of the Nazi government in the second world 
war - but rather can be seen as a cowardly - but human, all-too-human - 
capitulation to his own fears and trepidation owing both to the 
inescapability of these states of mind in the human condition and the 
failure of his imagination, and his ignorance, at the time, about the “Being 
of Being.” By emphasizing what has been labeled the “decisionist” 
element of his thought, and by not carefully reading his own rejection of 
Nazism before even the outbreak of the second world war, he becomes a 
convenient scapegoat and foil for aberrations in the otherwise progressive 
march toward modernity and civilization that has been the narrative 
superstructure of self-identification for the West.844 But what is more 
specifically revealed in Heidegger’s choice on our reading is that his 
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desire to defend Germany and Germanness from what he perceived to be 
the existential threat of the Soviet Union, Communism, and what many 
Germans for centuries had considered their Slavic inferiors, is that the 
Western idea of the nation-state, whereby one people’s existence is seen as 
contiguous with a piece of territory, and with the state as an organic 
appendage fastened to both as an agent of rationalization of ownership and 
control - a.k.a. sovereignty - has built into it precisely this limitation, this 
weakness, this propensity to warp perceptions of its residents by 
producing a sense of naturalness about its existence.845 This, as we have 
been saying all along, transforms that which is essentially artifice into a 
illusorily naturalized totem of devotion - a being constructed by beings 
seeking to escape from finitude - which, since requiring the harnessing of 
resources and beings as resources for its survival and support both 
incentivizes authorities to condition the people to become one people in 
thoughts, behavior, and existence, to the detriment of variety and diversity, 
and encourages the people to go along with this, lest they risk exclusion, 
persecution, social ostracism, and death at the hands of the enforcers of 
order. In democratic nations - what some have termed herrenvolk 
democracies846 - this enforcement capacity is flexibly distributed 
throughout the body politic to all citizens - and perhaps even aspiring 
citizens - to perform in order to receive recognition as one who is included 
in the political order.847 From such fear-induced coordinates of belonging 
                    408
is born the politics of divide and conquer, where authorities can distribute 
recognition to some groups at the expense of others, and where these 
groups are disposes to compete with one another for this recognition; all in 
the name of the People.
Agamben writes that this distinction between “People” and “people,848” 
between bios and zoe, is more elementary than Schmitt’s “friend-enemy” 
distinction and even that between classes in Marx’s concept of “class 
struggle.” This is because in the absence of guaranteed recognition nobody 
is willing to trust one another, and the various mechanisms in history for 
bringing about this trust - rationality, nationalism, co-religiousness, 
imperial decree, and even the idea of the fraternity of humanity (language 
which excludes women) - have all been dependent on both the conferral of 
recognition according to evaluable criteria whose origins are in the 
essentialization of the self and of identity achieved through material 
performance of physical tasks, and the ideological fervor deemed 
necessary in the reproduction of the state as society. Trust can also emerge 
from, as Agamben said in the previous quotation, the recognition of the 
unity of Being that is always already factical - in Heideggerian terms - by 
accepting the limitations in existence, chiefly death, and building our 
freedom on the basis of this facticity. This is precisely how Polanyi 
concluded his discussion of socialism and freedom in a complex society, 
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specifically that this would require the identification of the socialist with 
society and the freedom of each individual, and would necessitate a clash 
with fascists who would base their idea of freedom on the desire to turn 
away from social complexity in the name of identification with power 
which facilitated their desire to sublimate their being over and above the 
unity of which Agamben speaks through the philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger.
And this mentality has come to infect all major ideologies. From liberal 
apologetics over drone attacks on civilians in American war zones - and 
the adjoining phenomena of the drastic diminishment of the vigor of the 
anti-war movement during the Presidency of Barack Obama, to the 
subversion of feminism and queer radicalism through liberal feminist 
exultations for women to compete with men in careers such as finance and 
military jobs (rather than engaging in a feminist, or eco-feminist critique 
of these fields) and the enormous emphasis on repealing “don’t ask don’t 
tell” and securing marriage rights for gay people, to the creeping anti-
immigrant sentiment - both newfound and suppressed in the name of 
politeness for so long - in both Europe and America, and to the general 
transformation of identity politics into a “politics of self-respect,849” in 
non-white countries building new, precarious nations in the wake of the 
ravages of colonialism, what we see is Nietzsche’s prophecy of the “war 
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of spirits” come true. The sublimated, spiritualized, essentialized version 
of the self - what some may call an “ego-ideal” - which forces those who 
are not accepted and included to posit the freedom of warriors to compete 
and survive with their dignity, gives way to a war of the People versus the 
people.
“…if the people necessarily contains the fundamental biopolitical fracture within itself, 
then it will be possible to read certain decisive pages of the history of our century in a 
new way. For if the struggle between the two “peoples” was certainly always under way, 
in our time it has experienced a final, paroxysmal acceleration….when it becomes the 
sole depositary of sovereignty, the people is transformed into an embarrassing presence, 
and misery and exclusion appear for the first time as an altogether intolerable scandal. In 
the modern era, misery and exclusion are not only economic or social concepts but 
eminently political categories (all economism and “socialism” that seem to dominate 
modern politics actually have a political - and even a biopolitical - significance)…
…our age is nothing but the implacable and methodical attempt to overthrow the division 
dividing people, to eliminate radically the people that is excluded. This attempt brings 
together, according to different modalities and horizons, Right and Left, capitalist 
countries and socialist countries, which are united in the project - which is in the last 
analysis futile but which has been partially realized in all industrialized countries - of 
producing a single and undivided people. The obsession with development is as effective 
as it is in our time because it coincides with the biopolitical project to produce an 
undivided people.850”
The significance of this point is difficult to overstate. First, rather than 
politics being a conflict of ideologies about different ways of life, the 
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question, quite radically, of being, of what way of life should prevail, is 
apparently settled to a degree that Fukuyama would surely relish. Except 
in this case the negative side of the ‘end of history’ is revealed: namely, 
that global civilization fabricated in the pursuit of certainty, freedom, and 
what has been casually referred to as democracy - but is really just the 
democratization and decentralization of sovereign violence to the 
“People’s” representatives - has produced a commonality of recognition 
across nations and ideological systems on the basis of existential fear of 
the Other, understood simply as recalcitrants to order. The simple truth 
about this insight is that Heidegger’s great error, for which he has been 
endlessly excoriated and his philosophies marked with a taboo to ward off 
exploration by those seeking to learn from this great thinker’s ideas and 
failings, is an entirely human error that is committed repeatedly the world 
over in the name of what J.S. Mill called civilization: the coordinated 
activity of disciplined individuals under the direction of their social and 
intellectual betters aimed at producing that which is good for the 
continued progress of “the People.” Disagreement with these projects, 
refusal to go along with them, or half-hearted participation are deemed to 
be cause for suspicion on the part of those who police the boundaries of 
identity and its reproduction. 
In the United States today, the language used to described Muslims, the 
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lower-middle classes and below, those receiving various forms of social 
welfare or social security - including the old, who are seen as drains on 
society, - women who insist on reproductive choice access or on sexual 
freedom, homosexuals who refuse to toe the line of the newfangled 
heteronormativity for gays being dangled before their eyes as enticements 
to conformity (reinforced by opportunity for membership in the military), 
black Americans who refuse to give up black pride and cultural 
uniqueness, various latino populations who are perceived as ‘illegals’ - a 
disgusting way of describing people whose own nations have been 
economically ravaged by American foreign economic policies, prompting 
their desperate migrations - constitute an amalgam of exclusionary 
gestures whose poisoned fruits may become ripened in the near future.851 
Bauman has said as much when he compares the use of boundary-drawing 
practices in Nazi Germany with those used to address anxieties over status 
and social change in the Western democracies.852 Glenn Greenwald has 
documented similar practices with regard to an ongoing battle in the gay 
community over the veneration or revulsion of Chelsea Manning, a soldier 
currently imprisoned for passing information about global power politics 
to Wikileaks, an independent journalism and anti-corruption resource 
whose publication of Manning’s information has also placed its staff in 
legal and perhaps physical jeopardy at the hands of the United States’ 
government.853 The battle over who counts as “the People” is precisely 
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what rages in these instances - and in the modern world, because the 
technologies of distancing available, from weaponry to organizational 
systems, from ideological apparatuses like the mass media to the subtle 
influences of self-alienation within each individual, this battle, as 
Agamben says, can take any form. “The extermination” Agamben writes
“of the Jews in Nazi Germany acquires a radically new significance in this light. As the 
people that refuses to be integrated into the national political body (it is assumed that 
every assimilation is actually only simulated), the Jews are the representatives par 
excellence and almost the living symbol of the people and of bare life that modernity 
necessarily creates within itself, but whose presence it can no longer tolerate in any way. 
And we must see the extreme phase of the internal struggle that divides People and 
people in the lucid fury which with the German Volk - representative par excellence of the 
People as a whole political body - sought to eliminate the Jews forever…
… The fracture that was believed to have been been overcome by eliminating the people 
(the Jews who are its symbol) thus reproduces itself anew, transforming the entire 
German people into a sacred life consecrated to death, and a biological body that must be 
infinitely purified (through elimination of the mentally ill and the bearers of hereditary 
diseases). And in a different yet analogous way, today’s democratico-capitalist project of 
eliminating poor classes through development not only reproduces within itself the 
people that is excluded but also transforms the entire population of the Third World into 
bare life. Only a politics that will have learned to take the fundamental biopolitical 
fracture of the West into account will be able to stop the oscillation and to put an end to 
the civil war that divides the peoples and the cities of the earth.854”
Second, Heidegger’s failure was born of his desire to retain purity, and this 
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desire cannot simply be ascribed to merely Nazis or certainly to a 
relatively marginal political figure such as Heidegger. The tokenization of 
identity, its transformation into an essentialized understanding of the self, 
as something permanent, is a fully-globalized problem today. Liberals and 
conservatives alike, now only differentiating themselves on the basis of 
party/group (i.e. - ‘race,’ nation, even gender or sexual orientation) 
membership and not on temperament or disposition - most ‘liberals’ are in 
fact conservatives when faced with danger -  both plot and scheme away at 
garnering for their group the resources needed to carry out projects that 
secure the group and/or aggrandize the self-conception of its members. 
This was the purpose of our discussion of Arundhati Roy’s political 
thought concerning the middle classes of present-day India, where the 
“Union” and “Progress” projects are two sides of the same coin, both 
relying on a negative sanction against otherness, and both complicit in 
genocidal violence against the Other.
Heidegger’s failure politically, to either realize the success of his project, 
or to live up to the profound statements he makes on behalf of freedom, 
caretaking of being, authenticity, and, in the end, individuality engaged in 
an immanently dialectical relationship with the question of being doesn’t 
impugn his philosophy any more than supporters of Barack Obama being 
believers in free speech and unquestioning of the Obama administration’s 
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foreign policy program of targeted assassination impugns the value of free 
speech as an ideal.
The problem is not that Heidegger was a temporarily active Nazi, it is that 
the notion of being that he felt he was defined by at the time and place that 
he exhorted Germans to “follow the fuhrer” and when he participated in 
purifying purges on behalf of the party in his academic place of 
employment - his most odious act being the purging of his mentor, the 
great philosopher Edmund Husserl, a German-Jew to whom he dedicated 
Being and Time - he was following a concept of order and being that 
preceded the arrival of his philosophy and that has survived quite in tact 
following his death. Indeed, this is the danger about being - if it is not 
sufficiently examined, questioned, wondered about, ruminated upon, and 
experimented with authentically (as opposed to for the mere sake of 
experimenting itself), being can be ignorantly reduced downward to 
idealized notions of existence and the self, as well as the community, in 
precisely the kind of resignation that characterized Isaiah Berlin’s 
statement about freedom being a specific property of the West, Richard 
Rorty’s claim that ethnocentrism was all we could expect of people, 
including intellectuals, and all the other liberals’ view, in some form or 
another, that the irrational and undomesticated had to be made to submit to 
the terms of order before they could be trusted with freedom and the rights 
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for which liberalism purports to the safeguard of. For Heidegger, 
Germanness meant anti-communism, the preservation of an idealized 
notion of a volk that defined the nation, and that all beings and resources 
necessary, gathered in a manner that needless to say involved brutal 
coercion from the family structure and throughout society at large, had to 
be harnessed for this outcome.
Liberals have claimed that they could avoid this outcome with the 
traditional liberal approaches to social order that emphasize rights, 
individuality understood as the liberation of one’s true self and 
concomitant identity, checks and balances in the governmental apparatus 
to strangle and frustrate the growth of despotism, and the creation and 
security, especially importantly in Arendt’s philosophy, of a private sphere 
or otherwise named realm in which one could retreat from the demands of 
society and simply live. If we broaden our conception of politics to 
include the polis understood simply as “the gathering,” and we disabuse 
ourselves of conceiving of the political as merely the state - which of 
course we want refuge from - but rather as the entire terrain of existence 
of which the state is merely one part, if we make our being an issue for our 
being, then the rationalizations, justifications, differentiations, and 
distancings that we produce through the drive towards mastery over the 
planet, then we can immediately understand why Arendt was wrong about 
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her claim of racial integration being a private matter,855 and that that issue, 
and all such issues addressing the question of how we shall live together 
are not only political - since they bear on our relations with one another in 
the polis - but are related, in how we choose to deal with them, 
fundamentally to our freedom, our own ability to be free in the context of 
our thrownness - our factical, contingent circumstances beyond our 
control - and our ability to consciously consider the idea of freedom for 
safeguarding. Against this liberal conceit that divides the world into 
spheres of being and non-being - deficient, unfree, educable being to be 
disciplined for the sake of cooperative action - Agamben, following 
Foucault’s deconstruction of the sciences and of knowledge, closes Homo 
Sacer by arguing for collapsing the distinction between bios and zoe so 
that the confusions that have perplexed seekers of freedom, because 
failing this, the cycle of violence between peoples in the name of being 
recognized as “the People” has no end in sight. The “biopolitical body”
“that is bare life must itself instead be transformed into the site for the constitution and 
installation of a form of life that is wholly exhausted in bare life and a bios that is only its 
own zoe. Here attention will also have to be given to the analogies between politics and 
the epochal situation of metaphysics. Today bios lies in zoe exactly as essence, in the 
Heideggerian definition of Dasein, lies in existence. Yet how can bios be only its own 
zoe, how can a form of life seize hold of the very haplos that constitutes both the task and 
the enigma of Western metaphysics? If we give the name form-of-life to this being that is 
only its own bare existence and to this life that, being its own form, remains inseparable 
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from it, we will witness the emergence of a field of research beyond the terrain defined 
by the intersection of politics and philosophy, medico-biological sciences and 
jurisprudence. First, however, it will be necessary to examine how it was possible for 
something like bare life to be conceived within these disciplines, and how the historical 
development of these very disciplines has brought them to a limit beyond which they 
cannot venture without risking an unprecedented biopolitical catastrophe.856”
Taking these last two points together, what follows is that the idea of 
negative liberty is unsustainable, and in order to sustain it a division 
between who enjoys it and who doesn’t have the right to enjoy it must be 
introduced into the polis. This has the effect of transforming, at first, at 
least part of the place of the gathering of beings into a space governed by a 
different nomos than that which governs the ‘free’ section. Vividly 
capturing this in his film The Battle of Algiers, the filmmaker Gillo 
Pontocorvo depicts in that masterful work the ‘European city’ as entirely 
distinct from the ‘the Casbah,’ - or Arab quarter, with one governed by the 
ability to access leisure and the other forced into a brutal competition for 
survival that becomes a breeding ground for self-hatred, criminality, 
internecine conflict, and, with the right sort of elements present, the 
incipient feelings that can be manipulated by fundamentalist parties if 
there is no revolutionary movement present. But the connection to this 
violence, to these feelings, and to not feel ashamed of them, is the avenue 
to an authentic retrieval of possibilities latent in the physis. This is what 
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Agamben means by the founding of a new form-of-life that is at once bios 
and zoe, and that bios would be based on zoe, and zoe, or bare life, alone. 
In order to have it the other way, whereby recognition could be secured 
through the use of metaphysical categories that are defined as the logos, or 
political rationality in this case, of the polis, human societies have taken 
an immensely unproductive detour on the way to being, indeed, they have 
lost the ability to be, since existence, disciplined by the category of 
essence, always already requires forms of mastery, over the self, over 
others, and over the world. Anywhere we witness this drive to mastery at 
work, we are witness to profound unfreedom, on the part of the masters as 
well as the slaves, leaving us only with the freedom of the warrior, cutting 
through metaphysical totems in the name of the freedom of the chained 
self; but this same warrior is unable to free his and her fellows, and in the 
end, in isolation, cannot free his or herself in a manner that comports with 
specifically human freedom: that kind of openness, experience, love, joy, 
artistry, knowledge, poetry, and, yes, even technological forms of 
enjoyment, that are only possible in society and when humanity has a 
home in language and literature.
The drive to mastery has created an era that Heidegger calls “the Age of 
the World Picture,” which is the result of the “enframement” of beings and 
things in the matrix of technology, and most importantly, the reduction, as 
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we have discussed previously, of beings and things to the position of “the 
standing reserve,” - that compilation of elements and resources needed to 
make the trains run on time.857 In every respect this philosophical insight 
anticipates what today we call ‘globalization,’ which during the so-called 
‘Cold War’ was in its initial stages and is now secured by the panoptic net 
that has come to encapsulate much of the globe in the name of freedom 
and democracy - and liberalism and the drive to progress and civilization, 
too - under the name ‘the war on terrorism.’ Freedom is a governmentality 
- a mode of government - that produces its own systems of order, and that 
the freedom of the individual understood as an objectively present bearer 
of rights and accountable for its responsibilities on the basis of its will 
requires the securitization of freedom through techniques of government.
Samuel Huntington, writing for the Trilateral Commission in the 1970’s 
referred to this conundrum as the effect of having too much democracy 
because the desire of formerly excluded sectors to be involved in the 
governing of society - this being the promise of what the overwhelming 
majority of people around the world understand to be democracy - and so 
he recommended that a new vision of democracy be launched in order to 
sate the masses’ desires for liberation from authority, but at the same time 
to secure that authority’s legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Bill 
Robinson has indicated that Huntington’s chief contribution in this time 
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was to revise his previous thesis of capitalist modernization being 
sufficient on its own to produce world order. It was not effective enough 
on its own because the centralization of power it produced no longer gave 
the lie to capitalism’s authoritarian ideology. Rather, through the use of 
interventions in the emerging field of political culture theories in the 
political sciences, institutions in civil society, a new, autonomous and 
independent bourgeoisie could be created to effectively indigenize the 
interests of the richer nations in the Third World.858 
This model of development, indeed, of humanity, human desires, human 
actions aimed at satisfying those desires, effectively tried to provide an 
answer to the question of being, and therefore preclude local variations 
and contingent, authentic, knowledge available to partisans of freedom in 
various sectors of the globe. It also had the effect of providing a similar 
model for freedom, or at least reinforcing the existing model, in the richer 
nations, so that as the neoliberal economic agenda began having its effect 
on those societies, the middle, upper-middle, and otherwise aspirant social 
classes therein would clamor after recognition by their social and 
economic superiors - whose absolute, nearly feudal power, in the 
workplace goes unchallenged to this day (unionization rates are falling 
precipitously!)859 - which, as with any metaphysicalization of being, 
creates a hierarchy of interpreters who, generally, are not qualified, per se, 
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but who learn the codes of signification, and audaciously grab their 
position in a competitive, self-aggrandizing move that cannot brook not 
being a winner in all instances. So all ideals become relative, all choices 
become driven by despair and resentment, and thus strategic, with the 
illusory goal in mind of one day reaching Valhalla. The residents of that 
gentle clime, from their perch, tinker, manipulate, and transform the 
system of signification with foresight that they acquire out of necessity 
(which of course leaves them open to being manipulated by a new class of 
the ambitious, too, but the mechanics of ego-individualism and the 
absence of positive ideals remains all the while irregardless of who rules). 
And in the world’s institutions of higher learning and knowledge, in 
conjunction with private research institutes, the elite create a framework to 
colonize knowledge itself, and retain authority on this basis.
Fanon has called for a new man, as has Agamben, as has Polanyi, and, in a 
tacit reversal of his previous position concerning the “destiny of the volk,” 
which Heidegger has been rightly criticized for - if not for intent at least 
for the kind of aesthetic politics it opens up and the inherent 
uncontrollability of the outcomes of such political programs (criticism 
similar to that leveled on Nietzsche, Freud, and also Charles Darwin) - by 
Jurgen Habermas,860 near the end of the essay ‘the Age of the World 
Picture,’ he makes the case that nations, race, and empires are the 
                    423
outgrowth of the idea of objectified humanity as “subjectum,861” 
effectively clarifying what he meant by volk in the first place. I say this 
knowing full well the controversy it arouses, but with this in mind, 
consider the following: the volk, or “the people,” in Agamben’s 
construction, simply means the community understood as a “singularity” 
which is the object not of fear or discipline, or even order, but of love.862 
And there is no inherent reason for this object of love, the ‘volk,’ the 
identity, the community, or even the lover, to be understood as an essence 
that always is something such and such, but, rather, as Agamben says, as 
“whatever.863” Poetry, in its ongoing commitment to witness the unfolding 
of existence, is the existential mode of being that enables this sort of 
awareness of possibility, of freedom, and is in this sense, the enemy of 
technology in service of the artifice. “Whatever singularity,” Agamben 
writes, “which wants to appropriate belonging itself, its own being-in-
language, and thus rejects all identity and every condition of belonging, is 
the principal enemy of the State. Wherever these singularities peacefully 
demonstrate their being in common there will be a Tiananmen, and, sooner 
or later, the tanks will appear.”864 And appear they will, because, as 
Heidegger writes “Man founds and confirms himself” 
“as the authoritative measure for all standards of measure with which whatever can be 
accounted as certain - i.e., as true, i.e., as in being - is measured off and measured out 
(reckoned up). Freedom is new as the freedom of the subjectum. In the Meditationes de 
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prima philosophia the freeing of man to the new freedom is brought onto its foundation, 
the subjectum. The freeing of modern man does not first being with the ego cogito ergo 
sum, nor is the metaphysics of Descartes merely a metaphysics subsequently supplied and 
therefore externally built onto this freedom, in the sense of an ideology. In the co-
agitatio, representing gathers all that is objective into the “all together” of 
representedness. The ego of the cogitare now finds in the self-securing of “together” of 
representedness, in con-scientia, its essence. Conscientia is the representing together of 
whatever has the character of object, along with representing man, within the sphere of 
representedness safeguarded by man. Everything that presences receives from out of this 
representedness the meaning and manner of its presence… The con-scientia of the ego as 
subjectum of the coagitatio determines, as the subjectivity of the subjectum that is 
distinctive in this way, the Being of whatever is…
…Man has become subjectum. Therefore he can determine and realize the essence of 
subjectivity, always in keeping with the way in which he himself conceives and wills 
himself. Man as a rational being of the age of the Enlightenment is no less subject than is 
man who grasps himself as a nation, wills himself as a people, fosters himself as a race, 
and, finally, empowers himself as lord of the earth… In the planetary imperialism of 
technologically organized man, the subjectivism of man attains its acme, from which 
point it will descend to the level of organized uniformity and there firmly establish itself. 
This uniformity becomes the surest instrument of total, i.e., technological, rule over the 
earth. The modern freedom of subjectivity vanishes totally in the objectivity 
commensurate with it. Man cannot, of himself, abandon this destining of his modern 
essence or abolish it by fiat. But man can, as he think ahead, ponder this: Being subject as 
humanity has not always been the sole possibility belonging to the essence of historical 
man, which is always beginning in a primal way, nor will it always be.865”
Thiele writes that alternative ways of being and relating between self and 
other are everywhere to be found around us, and that “wonder and 
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astonishment” is what mindful thinking about the plurality of beings can 
be for those who are interested in freedom.866 Precluding these types of 
thoughts from emerging, indeed, preventing thought itself from 
functioning in a spontaneous and uncoerced manner is the aim of 
sovereignty, be it found in states or in individuals, since they see 
themselves as defending a proper way of being to which they must aspire 
lest they truly and totally resign themselves to being nothing. Agamben 
notes that the significant conflicts over forms of life in the coming years, 
especially in an age of globalization, will be between “the State and the 
non-State,” because the state is “not founded on a social bond…but rather 
on the dissolution, the unbinding it prohibits”867 meaning that identities 
articulated based on the negation of the Other who is not a member of that 
identity can be integrated into the state on its terms, but that singularities 
that refuse identities - a metaphysical nature - are impossible to discipline. 
In response to the “planetary petty bourgeoisie,” - residents of the camp 
who have become its administrators - Agamben writes that 
“instead of continuing to search for a proper identity in the already improper and 
senseless form of individuality,* humans were to succeed in belonging to this impropriety 
as such, in making of the proper being-thus not an identity and an individual property but 
a singularity without identity, a common and absolutely exposed singularity - if humans 
could, that is, not be-thus in this or that particular biography, but be only the thus, their 
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singular exteriority and their face, then they would for the first time enter into a 
community without presuppositions and without subjects, into a communication without 
the incommunicable.868”
This requires a new understanding of facticity, of the origins of the private 
sphere of life, and of the possibilities of positive liberty whose fruition can 
only come about in a relatively more “socialist” and “anarchist” 
understanding of human existence, where the only function of authority is 
to teach its expertise and then disappear altogether, and where the idea of 
sovereignty understood as the absolute capacity to render decisions on the 
distinction between friends and enemies is transformed into merely the 
capacity, not the right or duty, to engage in defensive uses of force when 
deemed necessary, and not in accordance with just war doctrines that can 
in the end only be mechanisms for the justification of aggression. Hobbes 
would agree, ironically, with that claim, since, in the end, the individual 
even in his theory - the singularity burdened with identity, rationality, and 
the conformities of bios - has every right according to nature to defend 
themselves from the aggressions of anyone up to and including the 
state.869
The state, in history both prior to and reaching its pinnacle in the political 
philosophy of liberalism and in that of its detractors who are merely 
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reactive to it in the philosophies of fascism but who still take it as a 
touchstone, has been a mechanism of those who benefit, simply, from 
freezing the status quo, and in arresting, more accurately attempting, to 
arrest change, can only prevail for an interval. Over time, the 
contradictions quashed temporarily by the agency of sovereign authorities 
are pushed and pulled by material and ideological currents beyond the 
boundaries of the state and into the global realm. Bill Robinson has 
extensively documented the rise of the “transnational capitalist class” and 
its increasingly congealing “transnational state apparatus,” created in a 
contingent moment by privileged classes in many nations whose 
attachment to a way of life has become globalized.870 The Nazis were 
defeated in the second world war, but today Germany rules the European 
continent through its hegemonic position in the European supra-state, the 
European Union, and the elites around Europe collaborate with the 
Germans in the name of preserving their privileges against their own 
people. Identities have become containers that people can be boxed into 
and controlled. And in controlling people, these identities, ranging from 
various specific national and ethnic identities, to religion-based identities, 
and to the identity simply as ‘the free,’ or even as ‘the happy,’ people who 
succumb to this circumstance are denuded of the possibility of responding 
authentically to their surroundings, their fellow travelers, and all those 
beings and things that make up their world.
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Against this identity politics of essentialized subjects, we have posited an 
immanent concept of being-in-the-world, invoking the philosophy of the 
controversial philosopher Martin Heidegger. Thiele sums up this 
ideological maneuver as follows:
“The political sensibility we may derive from Heidegger’s philosophy, then, might be 
formulated as follows: Let not a resentment at our thrown Being-in-the-world-with-others 
become the impetus for the pursuit of possessive mastery. Strive for a home in difference 
and bear witness to its freedom.871”
——————————————————————————
XXVII. Being-Here, Being-There: Authentic Liberalism
We will close our inquiry by discussing the merits of the Heideggerian 
idea of authenticity and its relevance to the reframing of liberalism that 
has driven this effort. This requires our interrogation of certain 
terminology that has been used to carelessly refer to liberalism in recent 
years, which, as we have been suggesting, is erroneous. First, as 
previously emphasized, liberalism has been understood as identity politics 
and not as a practiced way of life. For this reason it has been employed by 
both conservatives and liberals - self-proclaimed - to indicate certain 
things, but not liberalness, or liberality. Conservatives have used 
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liberalism as a tool to indicate their tolerance of difference - a tolerance 
which as we have seen in Brown’s work, can be switched on and off as 
need be - and their magnanimity with resources and wealth they may have 
a periodic excess of through the mechanism of charity, of which there are 
many new formulations being experimented with. Some of these notions 
of charity even utilize the concept of indebtedness innovatively to retain 
control over the recipient of the loan given - portrayed as generosity pure 
and simple, although with caveats - thus allowing the donating party to 
conserve as best as they can their excess but gain the benefits of labeling 
themselves as liberals. This point should give us pause, because its 
implication is that many who call themselves liberals in today’s world are 
in fact conservative as a matter of their temperament, because their 
generosity, ability to tolerate, and overall sense of security are based on 
the conservation of their position and the political dynamics of the status 
quo on which these rest.
Second, conservatives and liberals alike use liberalism’s identity-politics 
to shield themselves from dialectical engagement with other people who 
share the world with them, retreating into an ironically postmodern (in the 
case of conservatives) or selfishly disengaged (in the case of liberals) 
standpoint in relation to the unfolding of reality. While conservatives 
whose belief in traditional values are challenged by changing elements of 
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existence which reveal those beliefs to be contingent and rooted in the 
conjunctures of contingencies of a bygone time, and therefore use the 
liberal individualist framework to claim that everyone is entitled to one’s 
own point of view - ‘this is a free country,’ they can be overheard saying 
in resignation - a liberal, when challenged on the socioeconomic basis of 
their ability to express their individuality, namely, that it lies upon a basic 
exploitation of the world’s resources and other people around the world 
whose ‘right’ to free and enjoyable lives - on the terms of liberalism’s 
universal theory - must be repressed for the liberal’s individuality to be 
possible, must also resort to some form of justification or rationalization. 
Most of the excuses, if simple ignorance isn’t pled, take the form of 
distancing, which of course is the cause of ignorance in the first instance, 
but through complex ideological maneuvers, can also come to encompass 
updated tropes of ‘ancientness’ of differences between cultures and 
therefore the justification of the lot of those who toil in globalization’s 
factories of gloom. Matt Yglesias, writing for the website Slate.com, has 
recently, in the wake of an horrific building collapse that has claimed the 
lives of over 500 workers whose toils bring brand-name clothing to the 
West, written that the people of Bangladesh, where this collapse occurred, 
have a different cultural valuation of human life than Americans do, and 
therefore the collapse of this factory, which workers were forced to enter 
against their wishes by hired goons in league with politicians and the 
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shady sub-contractors used by the global textile industry, was not 
sufficient evidence to make the case for uniform global labor standards, 
which would threaten the progress of business and economic growth.872 
Liberalism, in both the case of the conservative retreating into 
fundamentalism based on tradition, and in that of the self-professed liberal 
vouching absolutely for a fundamentalist understanding of individualism 
and economic ‘laws’ that operate purely in the absence of political - i.e. - 
existential - choice by individuals involved in such a system, is used as a 
means for producing expediency in favor of the continuation of the 
depredations found in the status quo. The consequences be damned.
So liberalism has been used as identity politics, and, also, as a mechanism 
to achieve a retreat from reality. Little effort is made to differentiate 
between politics done in the name of one worldview or another, or 
between authentic individuals who truly engage in a care-taking politics in 
their physis, and those who are rightly distrusted. Arundhati Roy has 
argued that this mentality has led to a kind of resignation to making 
money and becoming caught up in everyday social lives for bourgeois 
middle-class Indians, who, while surrendering their political agency to 
politicians whom they collectively loathe, and to lower-classes who 
sometimes are the source of social movements for change but are just as 
often if not more frequently subverted by identity politics (the politics of 
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self-respect) and vote-bank politics in which they exercise little autonomy 
over their final vote choices. Heidegger called this self-absorption in the 
“they-self,” characterized by “idle talk” and a kind of trivial “curiosity,” 
which would preclude a recognition of one’s thrownness in the world, and 
even the phenomena of worldhood itself understood as an ontological 
totality.873 
The importance of Heidegger’s emphasis on facticity, and that this means 
that existence precedes essence should be clear now. The world is always 
decaying, changing, reemerging, and the word ‘being’ simply is 
humankind’s appropriation of this phenomena; it is our way of marking its 
taking place, its temporal unfolding. This means that underneath the word 
is in fact an unstoppable ‘becoming’ including a being (becoming)-
towards-death that marks all existences, including that of the ‘universe’ 
itself. Human beings who remain engaged in the world - not overcome and 
falling prey to it - who care for their contingency and their thrown 
relations and connections with beings and things, posit some notion of 
‘world’ as a unity of references, beings, temporality, and space, in order to 
orient themselves to the unfolding of the everydayness of existence. 
Failing to do this, or to come to terms with others having already done 
this, and the significant extent to which others have constituted the 
individual’s self through the interplay of these references that make up the 
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world, individuals may reject the worldhood of the world, and create what 
the psychiatrist and philosopher R.D. Laing has called a “false-self 
system,” which can enable the individual’s retreat from the world as it is 
into a world of fantasy.874
So our third point here is that liberalism, even more than enabling an 
expedient escapism, because of its transformation from a moral and 
political practice into an mechanism of identity politics, also has the 
effect, if understood this way, of producing what Laing has termed 
“ontological insecurity.”875 This outcome is most significant since it (1) 
leaves the individual stuck in a search for security by trying to “recreate 
primary bonds”876 that are no longer available to individuals subsequent to 
their childhood experiences with familial and parental guarantees, 
theoretically (theoretically since this leaves aside the fact that many 
children also experience the phenomena of these guarantees being 
conditional, being mixed with confusing messages relating to arbitrary and 
corporal punishment, and in some cases only seeing these guaranteed in 
the lives of others and thus internalizing the expectation indirectly); (2) 
liberalism therefore produces a retreat from one’s own perceptions of the 
world, forcing reliance on authorities who, today, speaking in the name of 
science, objectify, and rearrange beings as “the standing reserve.” This 
only heightens alienation and therefore one’s reliance on authority for the 
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sake of designating activity in the service of larger projects than oneself. 
If their capacity to reject their position remains lively enough, they 
become a potential enemy simply for their thoughts. Banning rebels from 
social order, authorities are able to turn back to the rest of the people, and 
indicate that their only deliverance from such rebels is to accept the 
hegemonic intervention of the state, because, in the absence of authority, 
individuals will find themselves in an irreconcilable ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ 
which will drive them to despairing their fellow human beings as sources 
of violence, chaos, and instability, who must be made accountable to 
authority to protect society both from itself, and from outsiders whose 
potential admissibility to the pact cannot be considered for various 
expedient reasons for those in command, rationalized to those ruled over 
by reference to essential difference. But individuals realize on some level 
that there is something amiss in this state of affairs, which requires both 
their denuding of spontaneity, and the discipline of their feelings, 
emotions, and potential for love, all found in their bodily, material, 
everyday realities, through the agency of the mind as a bulwark of 
stabilized representation.
But this is not a reason to abandon liberalism, because, even though 
communitarian philosophers suggest that liberals cannot form social 
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solidarity, against this view we can propose to rethink the individual along 
the lines of a Heideggerian critique of the liberal subject, thereby texturing 
that subject with attachments, connections, relationships, and 
encumbrances, that, rather than becoming a scandalous intrusion into the 
autonomy of individuals, can instead be seen as the source of their ability 
to be authentically in the world, to make their own meaningful choices, 
and to rise to their destinies. Opposed to this is the idea that individuals 
either make free decisions on the basis of free-will, or that freedom itself 
is entirely an illusion in the sense we have been driving at here, and that 
collective life understood in a way that negates the self in the name of the 
collective, is the only road forward. Against this resignation, where 
individual freedom at the expense of the non-conformist, or achieved 
through collective aggrandizement, perhaps in the form of nationalism, are 
the only authentic options available for people, Jonathan Salem-Wisemann 
writes, invoking the conception of individual freedom we have been 
employing here, that
“in Heidegger’s early thought it is the individual who enjoys an ontological, and, by 
extension, normative priority over community, yet this priority does not come at the 
expense of deracinating individuals from their cultural contexts.877”
Liberalism, requires leaving the question of being unanswered. Answering 
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this question has been the route to political and social order in most 
traditional liberal and European political philosophy, from the 
anthropologies of Hobbes which labeled freedom as a property of the 
rational being but whose inclination is always towards self-preservation 
against all others, to the universalization of this idea, which Foucault 
called the “empirico-transcendental doublet,”878 formally at least as early 
as the works of Kant which sought to posit a universal moral order 
(transcendental) that through dispassion and discipline human beings 
could gain access to and therefore be recognized by their fellow beings as 
free, rational, and worthy of that freedom (empirical proof of conformity). 
In seeking an answer to the question of being freedom has been made into 
something metaphysical, into a property, to be gained, to be secured, to be 
lost. As Wendy Brown argued, the transformation of tolerance into a 
mechanism for identity politics of the ruling class, to distinguish 
themselves from those whom they proclaim the authority, duty, and even 
right, to tolerate (and not tolerate), like we are saying about freedom itself 
as an idea transformed into governmentality, restricts the manner in which 
people can meet each other, conditions their awareness of the world, and, 
in so doing, strongly influences the directionality of interaction and the 
products of interaction. The precondition for interaction, and the 
postcondition of the interpretation of the outcomes of interactions is lain in 
advance, so individual facticity, which is based on thrown circumstances 
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rather than pure will understood as expressible in rational decision 
making, cannot be admitted to influence the interaction. Individuals must 
be deracinated (as the Vietnamese culture had to be as well, in the name of 
progress); or factical existence as transformed into an exaggerated fear of 
collectivism that fails to see collectivism in negative liberty-based 
societies whose social order is enforced through culture, as well, but 
whose culture is recognized non-contingently as rational human behavior 
simply by the fiat of sovereign definition.
This deployment of rationality, indeed of thinking, transforms the critical 
capacity into calculative reasoning, which, if taking as its reference point 
the prevailing mode(s) of being and the orchestration of beings as such, 
reduces beings to essentialized existences not changing and not becoming 
always already “whatever,” makes it impossible to be authentically. In the 
absence of authenticity as a possibility, there is no for freedom, and 
eventually people too come to understand what is prevalent as destiny 
simply, conditioning their interactions in a way that connects them to the 
producers of social order - the state and corporations managing legions of 
persons through bureaucratic hierarchies that sub-divide tasks - greatly 
limiting their awareness of choices and their potential for being-together-
with others. This is the purpose of technology deployed for the sake of 
gaining greater and greater levels of mastery over beings and things - over 
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the world: it makes all art, sensation, enjoyment, leisure, culture, and 
human activity part of its technologizing ambit. The more manifest the 
technological enframement of being-in-the-world, the less likely that a 
free meeting between beings, in all their radical difference, can take place. 
This last possibility is where we find the significance of the idea of 
authenticity, which the individual can come to understand by responding 
to the “call of conscience,” that which becomes manifest in the “call of 
care.” Salem-Wisemann argues that the existential instinct to care, which 
emerges from an individual’s awareness of their surroundings and not 
through a metaphysical renunciation of enjoyment or privilege in the name 
of justice and being a selfless or good person, is specific to individuals in 
their space and time, and that this limits freedom to merely those choices 
available in a person’s unique life situations.879 This is not an argument for 
abandoning social justice, but merely to engage in these pursuits 
authentically, and to obviate the need for judgment on the question of the 
moral standing of a person through their memberships and apparent 
concern for global charity. Communitarians, according to Salem-
Wisemann, have leveled a similar critique against individualism and 
liberal politics because they say that this call of conscience that vaunts 
“decisionism,”880 over collective decision-making endows “isolated 
individuals with the abstract freedom to pursue arbitrary ends.”881 But for 
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Heidegger, the point about authenticity is not that it appear consistent in 
relation to some overall moral framework, but that his idea of being - 
“fundamental ontology”882 - simply reveals to us the fact that thrownness 
determines what choices there are, and in abandoning metaphysics of 
either liberalism understood as the preservation of the self, or seen as the 
defense of historically true values inherent to political bodies like city-
states and nation-states, we can begin to see how we are residing in a 
factical world of our own making, allowing us the possibility of being 
responsible for it, to care for it, and therefore, to care for ourselves in the 
most robust sense. 
Without such a conception of the uniqueness of the self, as a non-
teleological self, there would appear to be no particular meaning to 
freedom, since all persons would simply be receptacles for the same 
education and who would be presumed to then, as a Kantian may have it, 
make rational choices that are universalizable. Unlike a Kantian 
individualist, or a Hobbesian anthropologically-defined security-
maximizer fearing an imminent - exaggerated deliberately - fear of death, 
which both prescribe a metaphysics of being, 
“Heidegger does not endorse any particular tradition; he merely recognizes Dasein’s 
inevitable immersion and self-understanding within a particular horizon of intelligibility; 
a particular social and historical context. Dasein’s primordial “historicizing” thus “lies in 
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authentic resoluteness…in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, a 
possibility which it has inherited and yet has chosen.” Clearly, it is false to think of 
Dasein as utterly deracinated from all forms of social life, for Dasein’s selfhood is a 
project that can only be realized in the shared, historical unfolding of its community.883”
In the Hobbesian world in which individuals are strongly discouraged 
from using their private languages to create with the peers a public 
language of desire, fear, freedom, expression, love, emotion and 
everything else beyond the merely practical considerations of exchange, 
obedience to the law, and stable signification in the name of security, and 
in the Kantian world, where positive liberty is theoretically sought after 
but is restricted to a ‘true form’ whose trueness is adjudicated upon by the 
intellectual elite and those who successfully take the position of judge, the 
community, and historicization that happens in a dialectical manner 
between individual and community is cast aside in favor of a rigorous 
institutionalization of judgment  that permits for the recognition of 
rationality through the use of practical reason, and the human being is cut 
off from other human beings who are viewed as either potentially 
dangerous (Hobbes), or as a source of possible irrationality (Kant), and, as 
a result, an intervening authority comes to be of the essence in assisting 
the metaphysical education of the individual contra their surroundings.
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Hobbes, making this quite clear, has written:
“He whose error proceeds from the authority of a teacher or an interpreter of the law 
publicly authorized is not so faulty as he whose error proceedeth from a peremptory 
pursuit of his own principles and reasoning; for what is taught by one that teacheth by 
public authority, the commonwealth teacheth, and in all crimes that contain not in them a 
denial of the sovereign power, nor are against an evident law of authorized doctrine, 
excuseth totally; whereas he that groundeth his actions on his private judgment ought, 
according to the rectitude of the error thereof, to stand or fall.884”
And while Hobbes tries to maintain the distinction between publicly 
acceptable reasons and decisions and the ability of people to still hold 
private opinions as a matter of the natural limits of the state’s ability to 
coerce thoughts, he nonetheless adds that in “such a diversity of as there is 
of private consciences, which are but private opinions, the commonwealth 
must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the sovereign power 
farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes.885” So thus in diversity is 
weakness and distraction to social order, and that permitting such a 
possibility, the rulers of the state, whose power is required as an article of 
faith for the provision of freedom from, tempt chaos and disorder that will 
destroy a free society of individuals free to pursue their own ends in the 
framework of the law. This is recipe for the proliferation of interests and 
expectations that Fromm warns us will produce the desire for a 
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dictatorship.
But acknowledgement of limits produces an ironic kind of freedom. The 
idea of perfect liberty in Hobbes’ thought is simply an inducement, and 
not an authentic possibility. Authentic reflection and judgment of one’s 
thrownness does not preclude freedom, but rather informs us of “the 
strong sense in which Dasein’s choices are culturally and historically 
bound” and that this is “not inconsistent with Dasein’s freedom to stand 
back from, neglect, renounce - in other words revise - these thoroughly 
circumscribed possibilities in a way that [communitarian philosophers] 
have difficulty attempting to explain.886” “Revisability,” Salem-Wisemann 
argues, is an essential freedom, one that is in practice undeniable in the 
absence of the harshest coercion, and that this trumps both tolerance as a 
mechanism for accommodating difference, as well as universalization as a 
mechanism for incorporating difference, since this would prevent 
individuals from making their own decisions on what their own goals in 
life would be, and would also result in an institutionalization of the 
majority’s desire to never be challenged on their views, which would 
produce an illiberal outcome.887 And the mere tolerance of difference, 
Salem-Wisemann adds shortly thereafter, is inadequate because “Dasein is 
only conditionally attached to its ends and is always open to revise its ends 
as the situation changes,888” because in a system based on mere tolerance 
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individuals are not free to radically-individualize their consciousnesses 
and thinking in concern of their own being because there would be a 
strong incentive to remain a member of a recognized, and tolerated, group 
in society, and there would be a major incentive for group administrators 
to police the boundaries of group identity through custom, law, and 
coercive political and economic relationships through hierarchical 
administrative procedures that secure the reproduction of relationships 
fomented under its sign.889 “Consequently,” Salem-Wisemann concludes
“by showing how revisability is consistent with a “thick theory” of the self, Heidegger’s 
existential analytic provides ontological support for the most robust argument for 
individual freedoms. His view of the self helps us, at a deeper level of analysis, to settle 
an ongoing argument within liberal theory.890” 
But despite our emphasis on individual freedom, there is nothing 
part icularly anti-community in Heidegger ’s thought. This 
oversimplification usually involves an exaggeration of both Heidegger’s 
stature in the Nazi movement, and also a jump to conclusions regarding 
what is a fairly nuanced, but at least from our perspective, extremely 
obvious argument that attends to the facticity of the human experience. 
Salem-Wisemann indicates at the end of the article that even though 
“Heidegger privately harbors an illiberal view of politics,” and that he is 
likely “guilty of philosophical inconsistency” and “tragic theoretical 
                    444
blindness” - indeed we cannot say much more about Heidegger from a 
standpoint of moral judgment as citizens of Western nations given our 
genocide-denying attitude towards the Vietnam war, to say nothing of 
similar atrocities conducted in many countries in the world by our political 
institutions - but that “this is no reason for contemporary readers who 
rightly reject Heidegger’s personal politics to likewise stop thinking about 
the possibilities Heidegger’s philosophy […] offers to a liberal politics in 
our pluralistic age.”891
——————————————————————————
XXVIII. A Point of Departure
The creation of game theory in the ‘Cold War’ to rationalize capitalist 
democracy and stake the claim that it was the only route to a free and 
liberal society, then, comes to appear not so much a claim about the 
individualist nature of the self in the Western polis - this being the core of 
the theory - but rather a projection of self-conceptions of conformity onto 
the Other about whom collectivist generalizations are proffered, because 
the inability to square a doctrinal individualism with an actual conformity 
because of the absence of liberal culture. To bind the collective together, at 
once incapable of authentic individuality and therefore of authentic 
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connections between individuals, the idea of the prisoner’s dilemma, “the 
trap,” to borrow the title of Adam Curtis’ documentary, comes to define 
reality for nations organized in the midst of the metaphysics of 
modernity.892 This precludes the formation of connections in the absence 
of coercion, because any such loyalty would be termed irrational - which 
means that nation-states have to be based on a negative identity that 
excludes certain groups as the key to signification of togetherness for the 
rest. Accepting this coercion as the rational basis for society, on a purely 
cost-benefit scale, destroys spontaneous being-together-with. “If 
inauthenticity is characterized by coercion,” Salem-Wisemann concludes
“even in subtle forms like unspoken peer pressure, then authenticity is characterized by a 
freedom from such coercion. If this is so, if authenticity demands freedom […] then 
surely authenticity and authentic social relations would most likely flourish in a world 
that permits, rather than prevents, freedom of association, freedom of speech, conscience, 
work, movement, and so forth, since rights to such freedoms are designed to prevent at 
least some of the sorts of paternalistic relationships characterized by inauthenticity…the 
analyses of Dasein and Mitsein in [Being and Time] move within recognizably liberal 
horizons and thus provide a detailed road map for liberals attempting to defend their 
normative commitments without reverting back to atomistic or unduly abstract 
conceptions of the self.893”
As Karl Polanyi was noted as saying above, the idea of a self-interested 
rational actor had to be disembedded from a social context in which 
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people found themselves in order to seem real. But at the beginning of the 
‘Cold War,’ the imperative to defend wealth already secured by America 
and by the other Western powers through imperial conquest led to persons 
whose lives had been supported and instrumentalized by industrialization 
to become frightened of (world) society itself, with prominent organic 
intellectuals representing global powers from George Kennan to Samuel 
Huntington recognizing pointing out that the imperative of US foreign 
policy was to retain its preponderance of wealth and power (Kennan) and 
to transform other societies in our image so that their development would 
be managed by our vision of social order and would benefit our 
corporations (Huntington). What we got was torture and dirty wars, on the 
one hand, and giveaways of surplus agricultural products deemed unlikely 
to be consumed by Americans, on the other. Through these twin agencies 
of violence and social transformation, which in the institutions of slavery, 
jim crow, the genocide and concentration of American Indian nations in 
reservations, the immigration labor regimes that strategically manipulate 
labor supplies, etc., which were also applied to America and actual 
Americans, too (a point often forgotten if we tell history from a strictly 
state-centric perspective and utilize a metaphysical - meaning legal - 
definition for Americans, as opposed to an immanent and existential one 
that counts all people living in America as Americans), the removal of all 
the relations and social contexts needed for an authentic and free 
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individual was achieved to enough of a degree that a culture of 
conservative individualism and consumerism has arisen. This disconnects 
people from each other in the name of freedom, and we can see its effects 
around the world. By doing so, individuals are articulated not to 
communities or families or neighborhoods, but to large, impersonal, 
bureaucratic institutions of the state and the corporate economy, against 
which they simply cannot stand alone, and because of the prescriptive 
effects of game theory, will have difficulty finding allies to stand with. So 
we have a scared collective of atomized individuals, rather than a robust 
community of strongly shaped persons who can authentically relate to 
their being-in-the-world in multiple ways who create the kind of social 
resilience needed to defend freedom, practice open-mindedness, and avoid 
becoming a mindless drone who could be swindled by economic and 
political confidence men. 
From the ‘end of history’ to the liberal identity politics of Richard Rorty, 
to the systematic attempt by John Rawls to create a science of liberal 
morality; back in history to the frankly fascist admission by Hobbes his 
need to fasten all concepts and notions of good and evil to produce a 
disciplined subject, to Tocqueville’s desire to prove liberalism to be a 
muscular ideology more worthy of imperial victories than other doctrines, 
and J.S. Mill’s desire for more or less the same thing, our so-called liberal 
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tradition has not been particularly interested in open-mindedness, and has, 
in each case, sought to arrest somehow the unfolding, the becoming, that 
is, of being. Each of these philosophers, including Mill - whose idea of 
individual freedom seems at first glance more open-ended than the others 
because of his defense of eccentricity, is in the final analysis much more 
akin to these co-travelers of his in relation to a second point, namely, what 
is the significance of one’s identity - hold dear a concept of being that 
prioritizes a proof for the existence of being. It is fair to say that they have 
inherited this need to prove themselves and justify their existence through 
the sweeping influence of Descartes; each of these thinkers variously 
thinks…. and therefore they are. For Mill, this is even more pronounced, 
since his superior and always improving thinking in the name of utility 
and individual freedom understood as an expedient for the benefit of 
civilization, smuggles back in an ontology which he seems to momentarily 
dismiss.
Each of these philosophies, therefore, can be compared accurately to 
rational choice theory’s core assumptions about human nature: human 
beings are driven by self-interest loosely defined, they are rational agents 
who can reflect on their surroundings and choose wisely, and they can 
stabilize cooperation with each other on public matters. On the first point, 
this is patently false empirically; regarding the second one, as we have 
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already said the alienated individual cannot reflect authentically on their 
surroundings, and each of these theories is responsible for producing 
social alienation; and regarding the third point, in recent years only fear - a 
negative ideal for group identity - has motivated individuals in the absence 
of state coercion on a truly significant level, and individuals remain locked 
in their own milieux, unable to authentically bond with the Other, to share 
the world with the Other, in the absence of guarantees.
“In mapping out the social landscape in contour lines of rational self-interest, rational 
choice theorists have at times been hegemonic in insisting that the rational choice 
approach is not only a valuable methodological tool for social science, but that it is the 
only cogent method for making progress. Its many contributions to social theory, 
especially in situations where questions of self-interest dominate (such as in negotiation 
and coalition formation) should not make us deaf to the way the language of rational 
choice theory can sound like INGSOC* in Oceania: the state-condoned language of Big 
Brother that continually strikes words, and hence concepts, meanings, and practices, out 
of existence. To insist that human behavior be understood, even predicted, in terms of a 
well-ordered set of transitive preferences combined with strategic calculations of how to 
maximize expected utility is to nullify modes of existence not structured around payoffs; 
love, sympathy, respect, duty, and valor fall by the wayside. Transitivity, completeness, 
and the axioms of expected utility theory become the defining characteristics of 
rationality whereas the dictum of treating individuals as ends in themselves has no basis 
in reason.894”
Individuals, thus reduced to being elements in an orchestrated reality, are 
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reduced to seeking as their dignity the permanence of their position in the 
overall ensemble of existence, which they are encouraged to identify with 
as their lot. Rational choice theory, which assumes that reality is 
rationally-constructed and as inevitable for all persons, becomes a 
powerful vehicle to rationalize the status quo and also to naturalize it. 
Dividing nations from one another, and individuals within and across 
nations from each other, too, and then conditioning people to accept this 
reality, diverting individuals’ attentions through a shallow understanding 
of freedom as a final hegemonic mobilization for consent to rule, leaders 
in nation-states that stabilize this system also produce the expectation in 
people that all will conform. When this theory fails to explain reality, as it 
always has because while it presents itself as a non-normative theory, it in 
fact makes negative normative claims on how human society should be 
arranged as an atomized mass or rational individuals acting on their 
strategic interests and instrumentalizing life and other people, too, it 
specifically fails to prepare people in the world for the emergence of 
difference that is always already manifest in the uniqueness of each 
passing moment. Be these agents of disorders individuals or enemy 
nations, those primed to the terms of order will feel the psychological 
experience of terror - the absence of order - which Fromm has indicated 
will drive them to redouble their reliance on leadership to extricate them 
from their situation, either by assigning them a role in the social system (if 
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they are so lucky in an age of downsizing and expendable populations 
rendered superfluous), or by giving them a relatively stable existence in 
comparison with the fear-driven tropes of the state of nature.
But on the contrary, what we have strived to show in this chapter is that 
individuals are always in a position to make a choice, even if these choices 
are not particularly good, and that social structures have an effect not only 
on the choices available, but also the manner of choosing available. What 
is called ‘rational choice’ comes to be understood not as individuals 
authentically pursuing their existence in relation to their physis - 
something which is fortunately irreducible to normalization - but as a 
projection of what certain persons might choose writ large as an 
explanation for all human behavior, which either lives up to the standard 
of rationality projected - be this disposed towards the maximal use of 
resources for a nihilist pursuit of pleasure at the expense of others and the 
world in a fashion which eventually threatens even the sustainability of the 
self; or be it the rationalization through discipline of an identity associated 
with a communal ritual and the unsustainable orchestration of resources in 
the name of reproducing that identity against the unfolding of being - or if 
they fail to do so, can be judged as being less-than-human, with the 
attendant consequences to be commenced by the use of force.
——————————————————————————
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XXIX. Self and Other: A Model Interaction
“Back the fuck up, we are here for your fucking freedom.” - U.S. Soldier 
in Iraq, Second American-Iraqi War
“Fuck you buddy.” - name of iterative game created by the RAND 
corporation to show that rational human behavior was to not cooperate 
with other people, save for in the presence of a guarantor providing order.
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experience would be more and more intense, destructive, and harmful to the survival of humanity, at the least, 
and even possibly all life on the planet. The point of Nietzsche’s pronouncement, here, is not to suggest that this 
is an inexorable end, but rather than part of the trajectory of modernity - the will to power - was both his 
hallmark idea as well as his intellectual style, allowing him to offer his own self-criticism while demonstrating 
the pitfalls of faith in the will to power. It is even all the more appropriate that he did all of this quite 
unwillingly, being driven mad in the process. In pursuit of mad ends, the use of rational means will undoubtedly 
drive one to madness. In this case, the idea that one provides a final answer to the question of being, and then, in 
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261 See Rorty’s discussion here of the need to domesticate what he calls ‘strong poets’ whose private fantasies of 
idealistic strivings he claims will harm social stability if left free to be fully vented irregardless the normative 
legal standard in most western societies that fully protects freedom of expression. Rorty’s words on this point 
betray a significant contradiction between liberalism in theory and the cultural inability to translate theory into 
practice. Despite strong support in western countries’ legal systems and, as has been reinforced in official 
historical narratives that equate liberalism, the West, and freedom all with one another, nonetheless, this 
supposed existential western liberal calls for a rationalized view of the need to potentially curtail expression - 
even expression by those very similar to himself (he names philosophers of the past whose romantic and 
passionate views of freedom he deems to be destabilizing because of their idealism - Fichte, Schelling, 
Nietzsche, and Heidegger, to be specific), to say nothing of the likely implications of his ‘ethnocentric’ attitude 
in relation to the question of giving any quarter to the strong poetry of cultures more difficult for the Rortarian 
to comprehend that those of there merely European exotic. See Rorty (1989) 120-121. Because of this view, 
Rorty comes to conclude that philosophy has run its course and that private ideologies informed by people 
being open with their feelings will come to replace philosophy in a way that can be radically decentralized and 
perhaps much more useful for the daily lives of people, who, in being their own poets, can develop their own 
contingent vocabularies. This is all well and good, save for the issue of social coordination, on the one hand, 
and the generalized drive towards eliminating welfare states around the world, that neoliberalism has come to 
understand as an inefficient allocation of resources, in order to best free up resources to be utilized by the ‘free.’ 
In this instance, the ‘free’ come to resemble a sort of neo-calvinist elect, seeking to confirm their predestinated 
excellence and superiority, rather than to in fact be free. See Rose (1999). 195-196
262 Our inclusion of Fukuyama here is important. Neoconservatism is an outgrowth of the despairing and 
resigned liberalism that predominates today, and that takes as its initial assumption the precise assumption that 
we find in conservative, metaphysical, and theological doctrines: that the individual is not to be trusted, that 
people become fearful in the face of difference in all cases as a natural instinct, and that people prefer 
metaphysical lies to existential truths. The irony, here, is that on this last point, Rorty is entirely in agreement. 
When he posits the replacement of political ideologies that form public discourse with the elevation of 
subjective suffering above all structural considerations, he, too, is relegating strong poetry, the kind that can 
become truly political, to the private sphere. Much like Fukuyama. Fukuyama (2006). Rorty (1989)
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uncontrollable - effect of poetry on society, seeks the privatization of the discourse on the most important 
poetry. As such, he achieves little more than the formalization of the trite illiberal rule of socializing that 
proscribes the discussion of politics and religion in polite company. See Rorty (1989). 28
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constitute a contradiction in the overall inter-nationalized inter-state world system. As the boundaries that 
sought to secure the realm of a nation defined by a way of life become more permeable over time in the current 
era - Campbell called this the ‘irruption of contingencies’ - the idea that imperialism is carried out only abroad 
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effect of imperial, necessarily totalitarian technologies, as these return in search for the terms of order back 
home to the nation. What results in effect is the denigration of the individual as phenomena - as an inferior 
being - in comparison to a new national ideal, practiced against one’s own country as a form of internal 
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273 the intention in leveling this argument is to openly challenge the idea that the prevailing american state 
culture and self-proclaimed majorities do not value freedom, and, to this end, demand the conformity of non-
conformists who do. fearing exclusion from socialization, anti-war liberals, people with humanitarian spirit, and 
other potential politically-active persons, have largely failed to challenge the intensification of imperial activity 
following 9.11. in some cases, too, certain prominent liberals have lent their active support to the imperial 
providing, if shoddy, nonetheless public arguments in favor of the current wars. in the official media where 
appearances are evidently quite clearly stage-managed to provide the establishment with the greatest amount of 
coverage for policies and events that favor their prevailing attitudes. See Miller and Mills (2009, 2010). See also 
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democratization favored by Descartes, based on the mutual evidence of the presence of a thinking being where 
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relation to the prevailing norms of society, to which were imputed ipso facto a veneer of rationality, when 
democratized, would be applied by normal people for the first time in a manner that became the official 
discourse, too. See Foucault (2003). See also Heidegger (1977)
277 Hobbes (1994). Robin (2004). See also Heidegger (1977).
278 Bauman (1989). 58-59
279 Rose (1999) provides a thematic understanding of the role of surveillance in the creation of freedom as a 
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a technology of government - vastly enhances our comprehension of the US’ National Security Agency’s 
strategic surveillance program, made public by leaks in 2013. The remaining support that the security complex 
still retains - despite this hemorrhaging in wake of the Snowden revelations - shows us the extent to which 
something called ‘freedom’ had been made to be compatible with the technologies of domination. For example, 
now, as Glenn Greenwald has revealed in his reporting on the issue, the NSA has developed as a goal the 
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propose to study as a real phenomena articulated specifically opposition to the Americanness of Americans, as 
opposed to the view held in much of the world that Americans are no better or worse than other nations and 
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freedom of average people around the world.
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302 Drury (1997) argues that this lack of a coherent and unifying purpose leaves liberal theory and liberals 
generally at a loss when asked to forward positive values. Brown (2006) makes the same point in her 
Regulating Aversion, where it is put forth that tolerance elevates to a value in itself, made metaphysical and 
stripped from its socio-political context for development as a social practice, has a kind of probationary effect 
on the lives of people under its sway and the sway of liberal legalism more generally. As such, when the time 
comes to become intolerant of political ideologies and realignments that could upend the practice of liberalism 
as a real cultural practice, the capacity and resignation to self-defense this implies has already been spent 
mistakenly in another theater of operations. Hedges (2006, 2010), as he is renown for, makes this manifest in 
his criticism of the American right wing, whom he argues liberals must become defensively intolerant of, as 
well as his later critique of the liberal class itself, which, in pursuing the twinned aggrandizement of their 
material lives and psychological self-esteem, have opted to settle for an ideology that enforces happinesses as a 
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303 As indeed, there are various conceptions of space and time that are relevant, and that conflict with one 
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305 The reference is to Truman and then Eisenhower’s decision to support authoritarian regimes throughout the 
world, and symbolically to support the principle of eventually liberating Eastern Europe from the Soviet 
Union’s control, however cynical or slow and deliberate this latter policy may have been notwithstanding (the 
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time major military maneuvers never commenced). Eventually, late in the Eisenhower years and in the early 
Kennedy administration, before the onset of matters of considerable controversy regarding Kennedy’s views on 
Vietnam, these aforementioned policies melded into a doctrine of ‘rollback’ aimed at stemming the tide of ‘wars 
of national liberation’ since it was presumed that these would be harmful for a US-centric ‘stability’ due the 
reality of impoverishment - and therefore the appeal of land reform and legal equality which were always on 
offer from communist rivals - which would drive nascent nationalist movements for basic change into the 
socialist camp. This was compounded by the US’ legacy of racial slavery and apartheid, which any minutely 
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attitude towards the freedom fighters of the conquered world of the global south, wherein his dismissal of their 
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class. In this move, he mimics Mill, but, also like Mill, we cannot forget, Berlin conceals the subjectivity of his 
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the Kennedy and Johnson administrations who put forward that a theory modernization could serve as an 
capitalist manifesto of sorts, and that progress through the stages of modernization would, if properly 
supervised, bring nations into modernity. Indeed, the communists developed, based on Marxian terminologies, 
their own variety of the same thing, which served their imperial arrangements similarly. See Berlin (1998). See 
also Mill (1998). See also Fitzgerald (2002). See also Spanos (1990, 2008).
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308 Indeed, the mainstream liberal thinkers of the canon all indicate that on some level the nature of threat is so 
overwhelming, that in opting to erect an all-powerful state to ameliorate these fears, liberals set up the state to 
                    504
meet impossible expectations that come about from an anthropocentric faith in technology and a corresponding 
inability to surrender that which shall always remain beyond human control. Thus, suffering, which is simply a 
matter of existentiality, comes to be a rectifiable condition due to its origins in the actions of those deemed ‘evil’ 
in relation to the constituted social order. See Nietzsche (1967). 68
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310 The point here is not to make a fetish out of optimism as a cure to pessimism and mistrust, but simply to 
point out that the idea of a free society requires optimism and creativity to bring about in conjunction with 
ontological critique.
311 In Pakistan, for example, the war over the identity of the state has recently reached civil-war proportions, 
with thousands being killed. It is well-established that the Pakistani state and the elite have pursued policies at 
the behest of the United States, economic and military, which have been broadly unpopular with the vast 
majority of Pakistanis and have thus required resort to martial law. This has led to the ironic situation where the 
state is allied with the US but the image of the US in society has become very negative for both understandable 
and also out of control, theoretical reasons that see the US’ hand behind each and every activity of the state and 
every bad incident in society. In the midst of the fog of war that has in this context descended over Pakistan in 
the last two or so decades, which dates back to the era of the Pakistani-US alliance in the Soviet-Afghan war,  
the environment in that country has become more and more conducive to the activities of militant groups, to the 
extent that a “kalashnikov culture” prevails; armed gangs, religious outfits, military-connected quasi-
governmental/quasi-charitable organizations, cutthroat private businessmen with ties to armed groups for self-
protection and to dabble in black markets and lucrative profits to be had therein have come to dominate society 
to such an extent that major politicians must sing their tune in their strongholds. Having carved out this space 
for their continued existence, the militant groups, even the most loyal to the state - often their either current or 
former patron - have come to inhabit a space of symbiotic dependency with the state, since in most instances the 
groups can rely on the expectations for visibility of faith in the context of the metaphysics of presence, and thus 
can contest the state’s legitimacy on matters of faith. Out of this scenario emerge two potential enemies to the 
western world so long as that western world sees its being metaphysically: first, the groups themselves, with the 
assistance of the peculiarities and vulnerabilities of modern technology in its incredible ubiquity, can strike at 
the West; and second, in association with governments who in the future may be increasingly compromised by 
their being influenced by militant groups may come to understand their overall geopolitical interests differently 
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316 Fukuyama (2006) argues that the search for recognition and knowledge aimed at practical technical control 
of natural forces has been the underlying impetus behind the dialectical progression of ideological development 
towards the endpoint of liberal democratic capitalism. This significance of this point here is that Fukuyama, like 
other liberals, in making the point that liberalism is somehow the ideal form of government, naturalizes a whole 
series of political and economic relations associated with enforcement of the zone of negative liberty. This 
oversight is also found in Berlin’s work in the sections of his writing we analyze below. 201-206
317 Read this carefully. I am paying a compliment, not registering an insult.
318 This critique includes Rorty as well, whose concealed metaphysics - that considers the alleviation of 
suffering to be coeval with a notion of the good - and not so concealed metaphysics - where we are witness to 
his elevation of western culture as the least complicit with the aggravation of suffering and that is at the same 
time the source of values that demand the reduction of suffering. This metaphysics is concealed in Rorty’s work 
because of his general avoidance of imperialism, racism, and their ongoing, real-world, actual, physical 
legacies. See Baruchello (2000)
319 Berlin (1998). 229-230
320 Taylor, C. 1992. "Multiculturalism and “The Politics of Recognition”: Multiculturalism - An Essay by 
Charles Taylor." Princeton University Press. Taylor points out that the desire for recognition has produced a 
world political milieu in which the identity of individuals cannot be secured in the absence of recognition as a 
means of escape from anomie and uncertainty. Taylor has argued that the sources of the Western self can be 
found in a Christian culture that became increasingly secularized in the last few centuries, and that the unique 
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form of individualism that has developed is reflective of this. Taylor, unlike Berlin and other liberals, is of the 
view that these elements of the Self result in the formation of a dense self with many, many contingent 
elements, without which the Selfhood of that particular self would be impossible. This means something quite 
simple: Berlin, Mill, Hobbes, Locke, Fukuyama, and even Rorty despite his focus on the feelings of individuals 
which he in fact reduces in an non-nuanced manner to suffering and its absence, all are of the view that the Self 
has been freed of these constraints in the West, and thus the West has something of a bit of knowledge to offer 
the world. And although Berlin’s language describing an existential freedom is poetic and capacious, his 
narrow-mindedness regarding what freedom could be suggests his own metaphysicalizing move, which aside 
from being in contrast to our own philosophical preferences as regarding matters of freedom, violates Berlin’s 
own worldview as regards giving up metaphysics as a sign of maturity. At issue here is his clinging to a “self” 
as constituted and unchangeable, which can thus relativize everything other than its own self as as means by 
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challenge the near-hegemony of the instinctual drive towards socialism then found among the world’s poor. 
Berlin’s characterization of positive liberty as a road to tyranny because of its emphasis on the combined 
discipline required for development and social improvement would serve as the basis for much of the thought of 
the RAND corporation’s subsequent development of Modernization theory, which, proffered as an alternative to 
Marxian stages of development, sought to convince nations, and most importantly their critical postcolonial 
elite decision-makers, that the endpoint of RAND’s program would mark the development of a modern society 
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emplacement of explicitly positive doctrines. This worldview was to be systematized after Berlin’s essay at the 
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